Edward Conard

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Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying Motherhood

AI Summary. US birthrates are declining, with the birthrate for women in their 20s down 28% and the steepest drops among unmarried women and in urban counties with strong wage growth and robust job markets. Child care, housing and student debt costs, greater access to birth control, and a cultural shift toward intensive parenting are cited as contributing to delayed motherhood.

Claire Cain Miller New York Times
Date Posted:
June 18, 2021
Is Database:
Database

US birthrates are declining, particularly in counties with strong wage growth, as women prioritize education and careers over early motherhood. Since 2007, birthrates for women in their 20s have dropped 28%, with the most significant declines seen among unmarried women.

Why are American women delaying motherhood?

Core argument: The US birthrate for women in their 20s has fallen 28% since 2007, with the steepest declines among unmarried women, as women prioritize education and careers over early motherhood.

Birthrates in the US are declining, particularly in counties with strong wage growth, as women increasingly prioritize education and career over early motherhood. Since 2007, the birthrate for women in their 20s has dropped by 28%, with the most significant declines among unmarried women. In contrast, birthrates for women in their 30s and 40s initially rose but have also started to decline. The trend is most pronounced in urban areas with robust job markets, such as Denver County (38% decline) and Maricopa County (33% decline). Economic factors like child care costs, housing, and student debt contribute to this delay, as women seek financial stability and career advancement before starting families. Improved access to birth control and a cultural shift towards intensive parenting further influence this decision, reflecting a broader societal change in the perception of motherhood and career.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US birthrate for women in their 20s has fallen 28% since 2007, with the steepest declines among unmarried women, as women prioritize education and careers over early motherhood.
  2. Birthrate declines are most pronounced in urban counties with strong job markets and wage growth, including Denver County, down 38%, and Maricopa County, down 33%.
  3. Child care costs, housing, and student debt contribute to delayed motherhood, alongside improved access to birth control and a cultural shift toward intensive parenting, while birthrates for women in their 30s and 40s initially rose before beginning to decline.

NYT reports birthrates are declining for women in all age groups, most sharply in areas with strong job markets, “…For decades, delaying parenthood was the domain of upper-middle-class Americans, especially in big, coastal cities. Highly educated women put off having a baby until their careers were on track, often until their early 30s. But over the past decade, as more women of all social classes have prioritized education and career, delaying childbearing has become a broad pattern among American women almost everywhere. The result has been the slowest growth of the American population since the 1930s, and a profound change in American motherhood. Women under 30 have become much less likely to have children. Since 2007, the birthrate for women in their 20s has fallen by 28 percent, and the biggest recent declines have been among unmarried women. The only age groups in which birthrates rose over that period were women in their 30s and 40s — but even those began to decline over the past three years. “The story here is about young women, whose births are plummeting,” said Caitlin Myers, an economist at Middlebury College who analyzed county-level birth records for The New York Times. “All of a sudden, in the last 10 years, there’s this tremendous transformation.”A geographic analysis of Professor Myers’s data offers a clue: The birthrate is falling fastest in places with the greatest job growth— where women have more incentive to wait….”

Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying Motherhood: Extended Excerpt Image 1


In more than two dozen interviews with young women in Phoenix and Denver, some said they felt they could not afford a baby. They cited the costs of child care and housing, and sometimes student debt. Many also said they wanted to get their careers set first and expressed satisfaction that they were exerting control over their fertility — and their lives — in a way their mothers had not.

“I can not have a kid and not have to feel bad about it,” said Eboni McFadden, 28, who grew up in rural Missouri and is now two weeks from graduating as a medical technician in Phoenix. “I feel powerful that I can make that decision with my own body. I don’t have to have a kid to be successful or to be a woman.”

Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying Motherhood: Extended Excerpt Image 2


The annual fertility rate may be dropping — births have fallen for six straight years and declined precipitously during the pandemic — but the share of women who have children by the end of their reproductive years has been climbing. Still, in the past decade, births to women over 30 have not offset the decline for women in their 20s, driving down overall births and leaving an open question: Are young women delaying childbirth or forgoing it altogether?

Child care costs, and opportunity costs

The declines in childbearing over the past decade have varied by region, according to the data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Census Bureau. They were greater on the West Coast and in the Mountain West than in the South or Northeast. The large urban counties that have gained the most jobs and population since the recession have seen birthrates fall twice as fast as smaller, rural counties that have not recovered as strongly. The birthrate fell 38 percent in Denver County and 33 percent in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix.

In economically stagnant places, fertility tends to be higher, and having a child is seen as a primary route to fulfillment.

Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying Motherhood: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Kara Schoenherr moved to Maricopa County, Ariz., from a small town south of Seattle a few years ago. She was tired of paying $1,500 a month for a house in a town with no stoplight and a drug epidemic. Her friend lived in Phoenix, and she had heard it had lots of good colleges and jobs.

She married last year, but she and her husband, a sous-chef at a casino, have been holding off on having children. She will graduate this summer as an aesthetician, doing things like facials and waxing. But she wants to have a base of clients before having a baby.

“I still don’t think I have everything I want to set myself up for success,” said Ms. Schoenherr, who is 27. “I want to have a house and a career first.”

The cost of living is adding to her hesitation. Houses in areas that she likes sell overnight with dozens of offers. Day-care rates gave her sticker shock.

In interviews with women from immigrant families, almost all of them Hispanic, the delay was less about the cost of children than about a desire to set their lives on track.

Ms. Portillo, who is 22, said her immigrant parents had raised her and her three siblings frugally and done fine.

“If they did it, I certainly should be able to,” she said.

Hispanic women, who once had by far the highest fertility of any major racial or ethnic group, have had the single largest drop in fertility of any group, more than a third since 2007. In Arizona, Hispanic women made up approximately 60 percent of the total decline in births in the state since 2007, according to a University of Arizona analysis.

Miguel Brusuelas, an instructor at GateWay Community College, where Ms. Portillo is a student, said that 20 years ago, most of his students in their 20s were single mothers, struggling to make ends meet. Today, far fewer have children, he said. Many have specific career goals for their education. About half of GateWay’s students are Hispanic, and nearly half are the first in their families to go to college.

“What I see now is students looking beyond, ‘OK, I have to pay this bill next week,’” Mr. Brusuelas said. “I see them looking into the future.”

Some women said they wanted to build a career as a way to avoid repeating difficult childhoods. Jakeisha Ezuma grew up on the South Side of Chicago, one of 10 children. Her older sisters, she said, had several children, and for a while in her teens, she wanted nothing more than to become pregnant, too. But she did not. Now 26 and living in Denver, she wants to wait. She is earning her dental hygienist degree, which comes with more money and a more flexible schedule than her current job as a dental assistant.

“I’m trying to go higher,” she said. “I grew up around dysfunctional things. I feel like if I succeed, my children won’t have to. I’ll be breaking the generational cycle.”

Fewer unintended pregnancies

The largest declines in births have been in unintended pregnancies and those to single mothers, Professor Myers found. The birthrate for unmarried women dropped 18 percent, compared with 11 percent for married women.

A major reason women are able to be more intentional about when to have children is better access to birth control. Long-acting reversible contraception, such as arm implants and IUDs, have given women new options, and the Affordable Care Act made many of them free.

The lower rate of unplanned pregnancy is a signal that the decline in births — despite the hand-wringing about what it portends for the nation’s work force and social safety net — could be good news for individual women.

“One of the big shifts has been fewer people having kids before they wanted to,” said Amanda Jean Stevenson, a demographer at the University of Colorado. “Maybe there are fewer babies right now, but people are able to live the lives they want to, and that’s a profound thing.”

Demanding jobs, and demanding children

Researchers cannot say for sure if education is a cause of the fertility decline, but there appears to be some connection. What is clear is that women are far more educated than they were in past generations, even since the Great Recession in 2008.

Women’s graduation rates are now rising faster than men’s. One-third of women in their 20s had a college degree in 2019, up from one-quarter in 2007.

Their place in the labor force has changed, too. Forty-four percent of female workers are in professional or management occupations, compared with 38 percent before 2008. The number of women doing jobs that do not require as much education, like office assistant, has dropped.

The emphasis on career has spread beyond women with bachelor’s degrees — as has a recognition of how children can derail it.

“The perceived price of having children has really increased since I first talked to women in the mid-1990s,” said Kathryn Edin, a sociologist at Princeton University who has spent years writing about low-income families. “Even among the poorest women, there’s a recognition that a career is part of a life course.”

At the same time, there was more of a glorification of work in American culture, and workplaces began expecting employees to be available around the clock. Yet there is little in the way of policies to help parents combine work and family.

Parenting, too, became more stressful. American parents spend more money and time on their children than any previous generation, and many feel immense pressure to be constantly teaching their children, enrolling them in enrichment classes and giving them their undivided attention. This is known as intensive parenting, and while it used to be an upper-middle-class phenomenon, it is now rising fast across all social classes.

Ms. Schoenherr is acutely aware of how much the demands of parenting have changed. She was born on a bean and corn farm in Illinois. Her parents divorced when she was 2, and her grandmother babysat while her mother was at work. She remembers long days of riding her bike and coming home when the streetlights came on.

“Back then you could let your kids do whatever and you wouldn’t be judged,” she said. “Now there’s so much mom shaming. You are looked down on if you are not fully focused on your kid.”

A number of women said they wanted to avoid the schedules of their working-class parents because they were inflexible and allowed little time for play or family activities.

Alejandra De Santiago, of Surprise, Ariz., remembers yearning for her mother to stop by school during lunch the way other mothers did, but she was always working. Her parents, a house cleaner and a truck driver, both immigrants from Mexico, divorced when she was 7, and she was raised mostly by her grandmother, while her mother worked.

“I want to know who I am first before having kids,” she said.

Ms. De Santiago, 23, said she wanted to start a spa business, which would allow her to control her schedule more than hourly work.

“I don’t want them to feel closer to their babysitter than to me,” she said.

It is uncertain whether young women will end up having the children that — at least so far — they are putting off. In surveys, they say they still want them, though the number of children they intend to have has fallen. It is possible that the drop over the past decade is a new normal for fertility in America, one that looks more like what has happened in Europe and some Asian nations.

Kristal Wynn, 36, grew up in rural Florida. Her best friend from high school had three children by the time she was 19, and Ms. Wynn knew she did not want that. She eventually became a nurse. Now living in Denver, she is going back to school to earn her bachelor’s degree, a longtime dream and something no one in her family has done.

“It was something no one ever expected me to do, I never expected myself to do,” she said.

As for children, she said she still wants them but that “it won’t be the end of the world if it doesn’t happen.” She loves learning, traveling and living in Denver. “I’m at the point in my life where I could be fulfilled by other things.”

Sabrina Tavernise, Claire Cain Miller, Quoctrung Bui and Robert Gebeloff, "Why American Women Everywhere Are Delaying Motherhood,"New York Times, June 16, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/16/us/declining-birthrate-motherhood.html

PHOENIX — Luz Portillo, the oldest daughter of Mexican immigrants, has many plans. She is studying to be a skin care expert. She has also applied to nursing school. She works full time, too — as a nurse’s aide and doing eyelash extensions, a business she would like to grow.

But one thing she has no plans for anytime soon is a baby.

Ms. Portillo’s mother had her when she was 16. Her father has worked as a landscaper for as long as she can remember. She wants a career and more control over her life.

“I can’t get pregnant, I can’t get pregnant,” she said she tells herself. “I have to have a career and a job. If I don’t, it’s like everything my parents did goes in vain.”

For decades, delaying parenthood was the domain of upper-middle-class Americans, especially in big, coastal cities. Highly educated women put off having a baby until their careers were on track, often until their early 30s. But over the past decade, as more women of all social classes have prioritized education and career, delaying childbearing has become a broad pattern among American women almost everywhere.

The result has been the slowest growth of the American population since the 1930s, and a profound change in American motherhood. Women under 30 have become much less likely to have children. Since 2007, the birthrate for women in their 20s has fallen by 28 percent, and the biggest recent declines have been among unmarried women. The only age groups in which birthrates rose over that period were women in their 30s and 40s — but even those began to decline over the past three years.

“The story here is about young women, whose births are plummeting,” said Caitlin Myers, an economist at Middlebury College who analyzed county-level birth records for The New York Times. “All of a sudden, in the last 10 years, there’s this tremendous transformation.”

A geographic analysis of Professor Myers’s data offers a clue: The birthrate is falling fastest in places with the greatest job growth — where women have more incentive to wait.

  • Demographics
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
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Showing 102 database articles primarily about Demographics

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

AI Summary. Across surveyed countries, intended fertility and the ideal number of children both declined, while children came to be seen more as a constraint on parental freedom and less as a source of status. Gender roles grew less traditional and housework more equally shared, yet the belief that a fulfilled life requires children weakened most of all attitudes measured.

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Are shifting attitudes about children behind falling fertility intentions?

Core argument: Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
  2. Children became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status, and the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any other attitude measured.
  3. Gender roles became less traditional and household work was divided more equally, yet work–family conflict rose sharply.

Related Articles:

  • The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch — Across 22 countries, the gap between women's and men's daily hours of housework and caregiving is strongly correlated with lower total fertility rates. Countries that modernized rapidly show larger gender gaps in home work and lower fertility than those with more continuous economic growth since 1920.
  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — Fertility rates have fallen in nearly every country, but timing differed: some developed nations fell below the 2.1 replacement level as early as the 1970s, while others dropped to "lowest low" levels below 1.3. The author argues nations with rapid, discontinuous growth saw sharper declines as women's expectations outpaced tradition-bound men's willingness to share family time.
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

AI Summary. Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:
August 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?

Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
  2. World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
  3. Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

AI Summary. Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
July 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?

Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
  2. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
  3. A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States — Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
  • Demographics
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

AI Summary. The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Date Posted:
July 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?

Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
  2. Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
  3. An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.

Related Articles:

  • Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy — A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

AI Summary. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Do lower birth rates raise output per worker decades later?

Core argument: A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.
  2. Estimated coefficients for GDP per worker are near zero and statistically insignificant before affected cohorts enter the working-age population at t = 0.
  3. Lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents, a growing high-tech industry share across countries and US commuting zones, higher TFP growth, and more ICT and automation patenting, with WWII-era death variation offering suggestive evidence that scarcity of younger workers, rather than smaller population, drives the growth effects.

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  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
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  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

AI Summary. Running standard demographic models—including the Cohort-Component, United Nations World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter, and Lotka-Volterra approaches—across all plausible analytical choices yields a wide range of possible global population outcomes for 2050 and 2075. The authors argue that presenting a single population trajectory hides the compounding uncertainty inherent in such projections.

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
May 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much uncertainty do single-trajectory population projections hide?

Core argument: Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.
  2. Standard demographic practice uses these projection models in isolation, as in the FAO's How to Feed the World in 2050, which rests on a single UN World Population Prospects trajectory and shields readers from the compounding effect of their uncertainty.
  3. Abandoning Song Jian's historic model and navigating the "garden of forking paths"—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators examined the same problem—allows uncertainty in demographic projections to manifest itself.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
  • World Depopulation: Prospects and Implications — The US is projected to account for a growing share of the rich world's labor force, youth, and highly educated talent, with continuing population and labor force growth and only moderate aging through 2050. Its fertility, though below replacement, exceeds that of East Asian and nearly all European countries, and sustained legal immigration is essential to this demographic advantage.
  • Take the Under — Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make climate change appear more tractable, the author argues, since the scenarios used to model emissions rely on socio-economic assumptions that are more extreme than real-world observations. With slower population and economic growth, even partial policy successes could bring emissions consistent with a 2C target within reach.
  • Demographics
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
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