Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
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  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows

Alan Feuer New York Times
Date Posted:
August 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Urban violence: Top 50 cities see homicides +24%. NYC case study: Gun arrests plunge -81% (113→22) as shootings spike +174% (23→63). Data reveals pandemic/protest impact on enforcement.

In the 15 largest US cities, a notable percentage change in total homicides Y/Y has been observed, with a significant decline in gun arrests correlating with an increase in shootings. In New York City, gun arrests dropped from 113 in the week of May 24 to just 22 by June 28, while shootings rose from 23 to 63 over the same period. This trend is not isolated to NYC; a Wall Street Journal analysis found homicides up 24% across the 50 largest US cities, with shootings and gun violence also increasing. The pandemic's impact on the criminal justice system, including court slowdowns and reduced police presence due to protests, has been cited as contributing factors. Despite other major crimes declining, the rise in gun violence poses a risk to urban safety and economic stability, potentially reversing decades of progress in crime reduction.

Alan Feuer, "The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows,"New York Times, August 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/nyregion/nyc-shootings-coronavirus.html

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows

In the past few weeks, Mayor Bill de Blasio and his police commissioner, Dermot F. Shea, have tied the steep rise in shootings in New York City to a breakdown in the criminal justice system that they contend has allowed criminals back out on the streets.

The mayor and commissioner have cited a range of causes that they have portrayed as outside their control: the pandemic and the George Floyd protests, as well as measures approved by the State Legislature, including one that eliminated cash bail for many defendants.

But a confidential analysis of police data, conducted by city officials but not released to the public, offers little if any evidence to back up their claims. In fact, the analysis, obtained by The New York Times, suggests the state’s new bail law and the mass release of inmates from city jails in recent months because of the coronavirus outbreak played almost no role in the spike in shootings.

Of the 1,500 inmates let out of Rikers from March 16 to April 30, only seven had been rearrested on a weapons charge by mid-July, according to the confidential analysis.

Nearly 2,000 people who in July had open gun cases were allowed to go home to await trial, but only about 40 of those defendants were arrested on another weapons charge while they were out, the analysis said.

Instead, the analysis points to a different possible reason for the wave of shootings: The number of arrests for gun crimes has plummeted.

While murders and shootings have surged, reports of other major crimes have actually fallen in recent months. Still, the spike in gun violence has stirred deep fears that the city might be sliding back to an era of random violence on the streets. Recent shooting victims have included a two teenagers going to play basketball and a baby boy.

New York City is not alone. Shootings have skyrocketed in major cities across the country, and that surge has led to intense political fights over whether efforts to rein in the police, including the Defund the Police movement touched off by the killing of George Floyd, are playing a role.

On Sunday, another 19 people were shot in New York City, one fatally. Through the first seven months of this year, shootings were up 72 percent over the same period last year and murders rose 30 percent, even as reports of other violent crimes like rape, assault and robbery fell.

The police say feuds between street gangs are behind most of the incidents, and so far detectives have been unable to make enough arrests to stop reprisals. The pandemic and the need to divert investigators to cover widespread protests have set back investigations, police officials said.

In recent days, Mr. de Blasio has been particularly critical of the courts, saying that the lack of trials because of the pandemic and the inability of prosecutors to push cases forward with indictments were “a huge piece” of the spike in violent crime.

“The bottom line is our criminal justice system needs to get back to full strength,” Mr. de Blasio said. “Our courts not only need to reopen, they need to reopen as fully and as quickly as possible.”

But prosecutors, court officials and defense lawyers have pushed back against that theory.

Lawrence Marks, the state’s chief administrative judge, told the NY1 cable news station that the mayor’s attacks on the courts were “false, misleading and irresponsible.”

Judge Marks countered that the rise in violent crime was more likely a result of the sharp drop in gun arrests in recent months, a position that the department’s own data seems to buttress.

In mid-May, gun arrests citywide began to drop precipitously, the city analysis of police data shows. During the week of May 24, there were 113 gun arrests. During the week of June 7, there were 71 such arrests. By the week of June 28, there were only 22.

Over the same period, the data shows, shootings started rising. During the week of May 24, there were 23 shootings; in the week of June 7, there were 40. In the week of June 28, the number of shootings spiked to 63.

At a new conference on Tuesday, Mr. de Blasio said the city had deployed more officers to troubled precincts, and gun arrests were beginning to rise again. During the week ending on July 27, arrests for firearms climbed up back up to 54, the police said.

The confidential analysis that was obtained by The Times was prepared by city officials with Police Department data and shared with the city’s district attorneys’ offices. It was provided to The Times by an official who wanted to counter the mayor’s narrative, but wished to remain anonymous because the report was not intended to be released.

On Tuesday, Mr. de Blasio denied that he had ever blamed the rise in violent crime solely on the changes the pandemic had wrought on the courts. He said he had always cited a “perfect storm” of causes, including the virus’s devastating effect on the city’s economy.

Still, he said that the slowdown in the courts and the lack of trials had affected the behavior of some people, sending a signal that there would not be consequences for their acts. “And it affects the ability to ensure that someone who should not be on the street, isn’t,” he added.

“You cannot take away all the underpinnings of normal life and expect the same outcome, and then when you don’t have all of the pieces of the criminal justice system working, that does affect the reality,” he said.

But the city’s own analysis suggests the bail law, which allows many defendants accused of nonviolent crimes to be released before trial without posting bail, had little to do with the rise in violence. It notes that shooting incidents stayed relatively stable for more than four months after the legislation was passed.

The analysis also indicates that the courts are processing gun crimes at close to the same rate as before the pandemic. According to the Police Department’s data, there were 2,181 unresolved gun cases in July — slightly fewer than the 2,285 gun cases that were open in December 2019.

Similarly, the courts handled 642 gun and murder arraignments from October 2019 to December 2019. Between April and June of this year, they handled 819 gun and murder arraignments — and all of them were conducted remotely by video.

“The way we are processing arrests has not changed at all,” said Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., the Manhattan district attorney. “In May, the volume and severity of the arrests we were handling was the same as it was in January. We’re open.”

Darcel D. Clark, the Bronx district attorney, said that her office’s complaint room, where new crimes are charged, was “running at full strength” — albeit virtually.

“It is wrong to say that the district attorneys are not prosecuting or that the court system is not functioning,” Ms. Clark said.

Court records in Brooklyn, which has seen some of the worst gun violence in recent weeks, suggest there is little sign that the release of people from jail was driving most of the shootings there.

From June 15 to July 15, according to court records, the Brooklyn district attorney’s office opened a total of five prosecutions of defendants for shootings or for homicides with guns.

None of the defendants, an analysis of the records showed, had been released from Rikers Island because of the pandemic or had been sent back home on a separate case under the new, more lenient bail law. Nor were they free because of the slowdown in court proceedings, the records showed.

Still, Michael LiPetri, the Police Department’s chief of crime control strategies, said that the virus’s effects on the criminal justice system were being felt on the streets.

Early in the pandemic, Chief LiPetri said, many suspects arrested on gun charges who in the past would have been asked to post bail were instead released without bail to stem the spread of disease in jail.

So far this year, he said, 40 percent of all gun suspects were released on their own recognizance, compared to only 25 percent last year, and about 35 percent had bail set, compared to 55 percent last year.

The large number of people being sent home to await trial, even with a serious gun charge, he said, had created a permissive atmosphere, especially among gang members who the police believe are driving the wave of shootings.

“When people get arrested and then get out, their crew members start feeling comfortable carrying firearms,” he said.

Chief LiPetri acknowledged the number of gun arrests had dropped off, saying that the force was stretched thin because of the pandemic and the need to redeploy people to cover protests.

In the past month, he said, the department has started moving robbery detectives to work on violent crime and has shifted more than 300 officers in administrative positions to precincts with high numbers of shootings.

“We were stretched — even an agency as big as the N.Y.P.D.,” he said.

Jon Hilsenrath, "Homicide Spike Hits Most Large U.S. Cities,"Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/homicide-spike-cities-chicago-newyork-detroit-us-crime-police-lockdown-coronavirus-protests-11596395181

Homicide Spike Hits Most Large U.S. Cities

A sharp rise in homicides this year is hitting large U.S. cities across the country, signaling a new public-safety risk unleashed during the coronavirus pandemic, and amid recession and a national backlash against police tactics.

The murder rate is still low compared with previous decades, and other types of serious crime have dropped in the past few months. But researchers, police and some residents fear the homicide spike, if not tamed, could threaten an urban renaissance spurred in part by more than two decades of declining crime.

A Wall Street Journal analysis of crime statistics among the nation’s 50 largest cities found that reported homicides were up 24% so far this year, to 3,612. Shootings and gun violence also rose, even though many other violent crimes such as robbery fell.

Police, researchers, mayors and community leaders see a confluence of forces at work in the homicide spike. Institutions that keep city communities safe have been destabilized by lockdown and protests against police. Lockdowns and recession also mean tensions are running high and streets have been emptied of eyes and ears on their communities. Some attribute the rise to an increase in gang violence.

Some cities with long-running crime problems saw their numbers rise, including Philadelphia, Detroit and Memphis, Tenn. Chicago, the worst-hit, has tallied more than one of every eight homicides.

Less-violent places have been struck as well, such as Omaha, Neb., and Phoenix. In all, 36 of the 50 cities studied saw homicide rise at double-digit rates, representing all regions of the country.

“I was surprised at the consistency of the increase across all of the different cities,” said Jens Ludwig, a University of Chicago professor and director of its Crime Lab, which researches crime, after examining the Journal data.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Police and academics who study crime have long debated why homicide rates rise or fall, citing variables including demographics, incarceration rates, drug epidemics, the economy and policing. That debate has been thrown a new curve: fallout from the pandemic. Moreover it is complicated by the fact that other kinds of crime are falling. Reported robberies were down 11% among the 41 largest cities that made robbery data available.

One explanation for the divergence between homicide and other crime might reside in what is known as “routine activity theory,” which holds that crime is a function of three factors: The supply of offenders, the supply of victims and the intervention between the two by society’s guardians—including police, schools and churches.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Police in many departments said robberies, burglaries and rapes are down so far this year because more people stayed home during Covid-19 lockdowns, leaving fewer prospective victims on the streets, in bars or other public places. Burglars weren’t likely to break into homes filled with people under lockdown, they say.

Homicides, on the other hand, are up because violent criminals have been emboldened by the sidelining of police, courts, schools, churches and an array of other social institutions by the reckoning with police and the pandemic, say analysts and law-enforcement officials in several cities.

Anecdotally, many police departments point to a rising tide of gang violence, in which rival groups of mainly young offenders battle over control of neighborhoods, catching rivals and innocents in the process.

Schools let out young adults in March because of the pandemic and after-school activities largely stopped. Churches and other social institutions were restrained for the sake of social distancing. Police first were hit by coronavirus and then blowback in the neighborhoods they patrol after the killing in Minneapolis of George Floyd, a Black man, while in police custody.

“Gangs are built around structure and lack thereof,” said Jeff La Blue, a spokesman for the Fresno police department. “With schools being closed and a lot of different businesses being closed, the people that normally would have been involved in positive structures in their lives aren’t there.” He noted shootings and stabbings have soared in his community. “Nerves are high. People are short on money.”

Some researchers say the upward trend in murder might be evidence of a fraying of the social order. “Everything that society does that might shape public safety was turned upside-down during the pandemic,” Mr. Ludwig said.

Police say homicide increases are hitting low-income, mostly Black and Latino communities especially hard. The crime maps published by many cities show homicides aren’t up in city centers where antipolice protests are happening, but instead in low-income neighborhoods outside of those city centers.

In Portland, for instance, the police department didn’t see any homicides around protests in July, a department spokeswoman said. Through June, its latest crime maps show, all of its homicides happened east and south of the city center.

Mr. Ludwig studied maps of homicides in Chicago and found killings were concentrated in the south and west, “the most disadvantaged neighborhoods that were already suffering the most from longstanding economic challenges and the coronavirus,” he said. The pace is accelerating: Of 433 homicides in Chicago as of July 26, 106 were in the previous 28 days.

Mr. Trump has blamed increased violence in U.S. cities on Democratic Party leadership in hard-hit municipalities. His decision to send federal agents into U.S. cities, he said, was to help fight violent crime.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 3


In addition to sending federal agents to Portland to protect government property from protesters, the White House said it is sending agents to other cities including Detroit, Albuquerque, Chicago, Milwaukee, Kansas City and Cleveland as part of a program aimed at curbing violent crime. The program, known as Operation LeGend, is named after LeGend Taliferro, a boy who was killed in Kansas City this year.

Though many of America’s biggest cities are run by Democrats, the rise in killings is a bipartisan problem. Homicides are rising at a double-digit rate in most of the big cities run by Republicans, including Miami, San Diego, Omaha, Tulsa, Okla., and Jacksonville, Fla., as well as in cities run by Democrats and in the two major cities run by Independents: San Antonio and Las Vegas.

The Journal’s statistical analysis was based on individual police department reports about crime in their cities. Some public-information departments made data available. The University of Chicago’s Crime Lab helped fill in some blanks and reviewed the Journal data.

Chicago police say conflict springs from tit-for-tat gang violence, including drive-by shootings. In one recent attack on the city’s South Side, shooters in a Chevrolet Malibu fired 60 times from a car, injuring 15 people attending the funeral of a man who himself had been killed in a drive-by shooting days before, apparently in retaliation for an earlier shooting, according to local reports. People at the latest funeral returned gunfire.

The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Heres What Crime Data Shows: Extended Excerpt Image 4


The recession and coronavirus lockdowns are hurting programs aimed at curbing the violence in Chicago, said Eduardo Bocanegra, senior director of READI Chicago, a mostly privately funded program that provides employment and counseling services to men at risk of becoming, at turns, victims of violence or attackers.

“Men in my program are being killed right now,” he said, noting that five people in the program, which currently has about 220 people enrolled, were killed in the five weeks from Memorial Day to July 4, including one who was walking away from a confrontation.

State and city grants that he expected to come through were put on hold. Mr. Bocanegra has cut staff from 120 to 100 and trimmed enrollment in the program from 18 months to 12. It has gotten harder to place men in the program into jobs, he said, and he worries it is only going to get tougher to tap funds as organizations fight for scarce public and philanthropic dollars.

Michael LiPetri, chief of crime control strategies at the New York Police Department, said the city’s rise in homicide is worst in Brooklyn, where shootings have broken out at large gatherings such as barbecues in public parks and outdoor dice games.

The department is moving officers to Brooklyn from larceny units, where the work has slowed. City policy has made it harder to keep the peace, Mr. LiPetri said. He cited a city council decision in June that exposes New York officers to criminal charges if they kneel on the chest or back of suspects. Public anger at police is also an impediment, he said: “It is impossible for a New York City police officer to break up those large gatherings.”

New York, Detroit and Fresno officers all said the easing of bail requirements in their states likely returned some dangerous criminals to the streets.

Mayor Bill de Blasio has acknowledged police concerns about the new restrictions on police tactics but in July said, “I believe we can make it work.” In a statement to the Journal, the New York mayor’s office added, “It’s a perfect storm out there. Not only are the courts not fully open, but don’t fail to notice that there is a historic pandemic and economic crisis right now.”

Homicide this year is still far lower than it was in the past. In 1990, for example, New York City alone had 2,262 murders, about equal to the total number of killings in the nation’s largest 25 cities so far this year.

Between 1993 and 2018, violent crime in U.S. cities dropped 54%. After 2000, the pace of that decline in cities was faster than in suburbs and rural communities, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics crime victimization surveys.

It is hard to tell if the long-run trends that transformed many U.S. cities for the better are now reversing, or if instead this will be a spike. A great deal hangs on that question, experts say.

“If the city descends into the level of danger that we saw in the 1970s, that will be a challenge for all of America,” said Edward Glaeser, an urban economist at Harvard University.

Alan Feuer, "The Mayor Blames the Virus for Shootings. Here’s What Crime Data Shows,"New York Times, August 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/nyregion/nyc-shootings-coronavirus.html

"... In mid-May, gun arrests citywide began to drop precipitously, the city analysis of police data shows. During the week of May 24, there were 113 gun arrests. During the week of June 7, there were 71 such arrests. By the week of June 28, there were only 22. Over the same period, the data shows, shootings started rising. During the week of May 24, there were 23 shootings; in the week of June 7, there were 40. In the week of June 28, the number of shootings spiked to 63...."

Ed Comment:“…Steve's party making America great again. I find it interesting that they don't show murder rate changes before and after George Floyd instead of since the start of the year or even better, since the start of covid. Then we could see the effect of covid vs Floyd. There has clearly been a spike in killings since Floyd and, based on their data, significantly higher in cities with democratic mayors. And sadly, those cities probably had more murders per capita so they are growing more off a larger base. Ironically, I'm starting to wonder the policing protection required to get boys not to join gangs for protection is worth it. Are there many innocent victims? Do gangs scare off innocent homeowners? Perhaps they do…”

Ed Comment:“…It’s seems clear that homicides are correlated to policing efforts by the police. Presumably, gun collection is indicative of that. With all the guns in America, surely a person who wants to kill someone can find a gun to do it. Maybe there is shortage of guns available to criminals! But that seems hard to believe. With crime down and murders up, it looks like murders are driven by the negative feedback loop of “kill or be killed,” which would drive people to gangs for protection, which might only increase the cycle of violence. I’m surprised the police seem to be able to provide enough protection, whether directly through active policing or indirectly by increasing the risk of carrying a gun enough to have a significant impact on homicides, to significantly impact gun violence. The police, when working, seems to have an impact and be deeply engaged with criminals. That’s not what we see when we see police on the streets of NYC.The reduction in gun collection is probably more symbolic of reduced policing than anything. But the symbol wouldn’t be powerful if police weren’t effective when they are policing. I’m surprised the symbolic impact is so big and works so fast. Maybe policing and gun collections are irrelevant. Perhaps Criminals just grew more determined to kill each other in the wake of Floyd regardless of any change in police behavior. I don’t think low apparent recidivism is enough to conclude the bail laws aren’t somewhat responsible. How many murders are unsolved? Lots of those murders could be committed by “kill or be killed” parolees seeking revenge. Maybe it’s a one time blip that will go away regardless of what the police do….”

  • Poverty/Crime
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Showing 70 database articles primarily about Poverty/Crime

An Extra Point for Attendance: The Impact of High School Varsity Athletics on Absenteeism

AI Summary. High school varsity sports participation reduces student absenteeism by ~20%, with absence rates falling further during active seasons, indicating the relationship is at least partly causal rather than purely a result of selection.

Nat Malkus and Sam Hollon American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The absentee rate of Indiana high school students, ~23% of whom played a varsity sport, was ~20% lower for those who participated in varsity athletics than for non-athletes. The effect was stronger when an athlete’s particular sport was in season.

Does participation in high school sports significantly reduce student absenteeism?

Core argument: Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.

We find that varsity sports participation is strongly associated with better student attendance, and we argue it is plausible that varsity sports participation causes better attendance. When we control for a number of factors that we know matter for both sports participation and attendance, we continue to find that varsity athletes are absent less often than their peers across the entire year. Across the school year, athletes’ absence rate was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes’. That’s a reduction of almost 20%. The broad pattern shown in Table 1 is that students from more advantaged groups were more likely to participate in varsity sports and less likely to be absent from school. It’s thus no surprise that, in the raw data, there is an association between playing varsity sports and having good attendance (Figure 3). But is that because students who attend school more reliably are more likely to play sports or because playing sports leads to better attendance? One way to tease out the answer is to compare varsity athletes' attendance during their sports seasons with their attendance the rest of the year. Not only do varsity athletes have lower annual absence rates—especially unexcused absences—than non-athletes, but [Figure 3 and Figure 4] show that their absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, [which suggests at least some causal effect].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.
  2. In-season absence rates fall further for varsity athletes, suggesting sports participation directly leads to more reliable attendance patterns.
  3. Athletes from advantaged backgrounds show stronger attendance gains, indicating varsity sports participation compounds existing socioeconomic advantages in school engagement.

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Sports Betting Across Borders: Spatial Spillovers, Credit Distress, and Fiscal Externalities

Jacob Goss and Daniel Mangrum Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
March 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

After the legalization of sports betting in 2018, delinquency rates on a wide range of consumer debts rose, increasing .31pp as of 2025. The delinquency rate for the ~3% of the population that were new gamblers increased by ~10pp driven by those under 40.

Exploiting the staggered roll-out of state-level legalization following the 2018 Murphy v. NCAA decision, we use an extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) framework that separately estimates direct treatment effects and cross-border spillover effects. Our first-stage estimates establish that legalization dramatically increases betting activity: average quarterly spending per person rises by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50, and the share of the population with any sportsbook spending in a quarter increases by 3.1 percentage points. The effects on average spending grow continually over time with no clear evidence of saturation, suggesting the market for mobile sports betting continues to mature years after legalization. At the same time, substantial betting activity occurs in counties where sports betting is not legal but which lie near a legal state, with spillover effects on total spending roughly 14% of the direct effect for counties within 15 miles of a legal state, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles. These spillovers have real consequences for consumer financial health. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates increase by 0.31 percentage points following legalization. [Under-40 auto loan delinquency increases by half a percentage point and credit card delinquency by one percentage point, driving the overall increase in delinquency.] Since only about 3.1% of the population takes up betting after legalization, these intent-to-treat estimates would imply that those who are induced to bet due to legalization experience delinquency increases of 10 percentage points.

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New York City Government Services: Services for the Unsheltered

Thomas DiNapoli New York State Comptroller
Date Posted:
March 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2025 New York City spent $81,705 per “street” homeless person, up 262% from 2019 whose numbers increased 26% during that period. This does not include spending on “sheltered” homeless, who are ~97% of the homeless population.

New York City’s unsheltered population increased from 3,588 in FY 2019 to 4,504 in FY 2025 — a 26% increase from pre-pandemic levels. In that time, spending on services for this population has more than tripled, growing from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025 (a 262% increase). Its share of spending has also increased, from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services (DHS) spending.

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Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023

Richard Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

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  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The US won the War on Poverty on LBJ’s terms, cutting the absolute full-income poverty rate from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019. During these years the share of…
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  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — A 2-adult, 3-child US family with $20,000 of market income receives at least $61,000 in annual benefits and has $79,000 of disposable income. That same family…
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The Biggest Fraud in Welfare

Phil Gramm and John Early Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual Federal poverty spending, including non-cash benefits, were distributed in cash to those households, each would receive $70,000.

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual...
The government’s failure to count its largess as recipients’ income allows welfare households to blow past the income level above which a working family no longer qualifies for government help. Take a single parent with two school-age children who earns $11,000 annually from part-time work. The government considers this household in poverty because its income is below $25,273. But this family would qualify for benefits worth $53,128. It would receive Treasury checks of $3,400 in refundable child tax credits and $4,400 in refundable earned-income tax credits. The family would also receive Food Stamp debit cards worth $9,216 a year, $9,476 in housing subsidies, $877 of government payments for utility bills, $16,033 to fund Medicaid, $3,102 in free meals at school and $6,624 in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. All this puts the family’s income at $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level. A hardworking family earning anything like $64,128 in salary wouldn’t be eligible for any of these welfare benefits in four-fifths of the states. Meanwhile, the welfare family would be eligible for another 90 small federal benefits and sundry state and local welfare programs.

Related Articles:

  • Stranded by the Safety Net: How to Fix the Benefit Cliff Problem — A non-working, non-disabled mother of two in North Carolina can collect $50k in benefits. Due to benefit phase-outs, she would have to earn $70k in market…
  • Mitigating Benefits Cliffs for Low-Income Families: District of Columbia Career Mobility Action Plan as a Case Study — A single parent with one child in Washington DC, earning $11K, receives $68K of government benefits net of taxes for a total after-tax income of $79K. A…
  • Welfare Is What’s Eating the Budget — Phil Gramm notes that after transfers and taxes “the average household in the bottom, second, and middle quintiles all have roughly the same incomes—despite…
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Explaining the Widening Divides in US Midlife Mortality: Is There a Smoking Gun?

Christopher Foote, Ellen Meara, Jonathan Skinner, and Luke Stewart National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
December 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The college/non-college life expectancy gap widened from 2.6–6.3 years btw 1992 and 2019, while county mortality inequality jumped 30% to the detriment of rural areas. Smoking by state predicts ~300 extra deaths per 100k for non-college grads, 0 for grads.

The education-mortality gradient has increased sharply in the last three decades, with the life expectancy gap btw people with and without a college degree widening from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019. During the same period, mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty. Using county- and state-level data from the 1992–2019 period, we demonstrate that these three trends arose due to a fundamental shift in the geographic patterns of mortality among college and non-college populations. First, we find a sharp decline in both mortality rates and geographic inequality for college graduates. Second, the reverse was true for people without a college degree; spatial inequality became amplified. Third, we find that rates of smoking play a key role in explaining all three empirical puzzles, with secondary roles attributed to income, other health behaviors, and state policies. [An objection is that] the non-college smoking rate declined by somewhat more than the college rate from 1992 to 2019. [The resolution is that] college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did. [The key] college/non-college comparison [is] among 55–64 year-olds, the age group for which the smoking mortality penalty is greatest.

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  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by…
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — As of 2021, US adults with a college degree have a life expectancy at age 25 on par with Japan, but US adults without a BA have a life expectancy that’s 8.5…
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