Do trade balances actually drive countries' international investment positions?
Core argument: Unraveling the Cobweb of Global Imbalances: Drivers, Vulnerabilities, and Adjustment Scenarios*.
Figure 8 shows accumulated trade flows over 2010-24 (as a share of 2024 GDP) for each of the 28 countries in our sample (plus the euro area as one entity) in blue bars, with the corresponding changes in NIIPs (from Figure 5) in black squares. For a few countries (such as Germany and France), changes in NIIPs largely correspond to accumulated trade surpluses or deficits. However, in most cases, trade flows are only weakly correlated with these changes in imbalances. In the United States, trade deficits contributed to only about one-third of the deterioration in its NIIP, and in Canada, the striking improvement of 73pp in its NIIP (relative to 2024 GDP) entirely reflected financial effects, as accumulated trade balances alone would have generated an NIIP deficit. In other countries, accumulated trade flows would have generated much larger changes in imbalances than actually occurred if they were not offset by financial channels working in the opposite direction. For example, in China, accumulated trade surpluses would have improved the NIIP by 24% of 2024 GDP, rather than the reported 10% (with the difference primarily explained by financial losses and unexplained errors and omissions).

