Edward Conard

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A Plan For Economic Patriotism

Elizabeth Warren Medium
Date Posted:
June 6, 2019
Is Database:
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Tucker Carlson of Fox endorses Warren’s “Plan for Economic Patriotism.”

Tucker Carlson of Fox endorses Warren’s “Plan for Economic Patriotism.”
Tucker Carlson's endorsement of Warren's "Plan for Economic Patriotism" highlights a shift towards policies prioritizing American workers over multinational interests. The plan critiques past trade policies that favored capital, leading to job losses and stagnant wages. It proposes aggressive government intervention to support domestic industries, similar to Germany's approach, which has maintained employment despite high automation levels. Key strategies include managing currency value to boost exports, increasing federal R&D investments with domestic production requirements, and restructuring worker training programs. The creation of a Department of Economic Development aims to consolidate job creation efforts, ensuring government actions align with the goal of defending and creating quality American jobs.

apparently Tucker Carlson’s endorsed Warren’s economic plan on his show last night, just an FYI in case it comes up at the conference. it’s sort of autarky

“… Some people blame “globalization” for flat wages and American jobs shipped overseas. But globalization isn’t some mysterious force whose effects are inevitable and beyond our control. No — America chose to pursue a trade policy that prioritized the interests of capital over the interests of American workers. Germany, for example, chose a different path and participated in international trade while at the same time robustly — and successfully — supporting its domestic industries and its workers. Others blame “automation” for American job losses, especially in manufacturing. It’s a good story — robots and other new technologies made American manufacturing workers more productive, so companies needed to hire far fewer actual human beings. A good story, except it’s not really true. Recent research finds this story is based on a widely-held misunderstanding of the data on American manufacturing output, and a statistical quirk about how productivity is measured in our computer industry. There is actually no “evidence that productivity caused manufacturing’s relative and absolute employment decline” in America since the 1980s. Meanwhile, Germany has nearly five times as many robots per worker as we do and has not lost jobs overall as a result.And a lot of people blamed a supposed “skills gap” for job losses — that American workers lacked the skills or credentials they needed to fill the jobs available. Except that wasn’t true either. It was just a symptom of high unemployment rates. Companies felt comfortable demanding more skills from workers as an excuse to be more selective about which workers to hire. The truth is that Washington policies — not unstoppable market forces — are a key driver of the problems American workers face. From our trade agreements to our tax code, we have encouraged companies to invest abroad, ship jobs overseas, and keep wages low. All in the interest of serving multinational companies and international capital with no particular loyalty to the United States….”
Elizabeth Warren, “A Plan For Economic Patriotism,”Medium, June 4, 2019, https://medium.com/@teamwarren/a-plan-for-economic-patriotism-13b879f4cfc7
A Plan For Economic Patriotism

I come from a patriotic family. All three of my brothers joined the military. And I’m deeply grateful for the opportunities America has given me. But the giant “American” corporations who control our economy don’t seem to feel the same way. They certainly don’t act like it.

Sure, these companies wave the flag — but they have no loyalty or allegiance to America. Levi’s is an iconic American brand, but the company operates only 2% of its factories here. Dixon Ticonderoga — maker of the famous №2 pencil — has “moved almost all of its pencil production to Mexico and China.” And General Electric recently shut down an industrial engine factory in Wisconsin and shipped the jobs to Canada. The list goes on and on.

These “American” companies show only one real loyalty: to the short-term interests of their shareholders, a third of whom are foreign investors. If they can close up an American factory and ship jobs overseas to save a nickel, that’s exactly what they will do — abandoning loyal American workers and hollowing out American cities along the way.

Politicians love to say they care about American jobs. But for decades, those same politicians have cited “free market principles” and refused to intervene in markets on behalf of American workers. And of course, they ignore those same supposed principles and intervene regularly to protect the interests of multinational corporations and international capital.

The result? Millions of good jobs lost overseas and a generation of stagnant wages, growing inequality, and sluggish economic growth.

If Washington wants to put a stop to this, it can. If we want faster growth, stronger American industry, and more good American jobs, then our government should do what other leading nations do and act aggressively to achieve those goals instead of catering to the financial interests of companies with no particular allegiance to America.

It’s not a question of more government or less government. It’s about who government works for.

That’s why today I’m announcing that, as President, I would pursue an agenda of economic patriotism, using new and existing tools to defend and create quality American jobs and promote American industry.

My Administration will pursue fundamental, structural changes in our government’s approach to the economy, finally putting American workers and middle-class prosperity ahead of multinational profits and Wall Street bonuses.

In the weeks ahead, I’ll be releasing longer individual plans on how economic patriotism should shape our approach to specific parts of the American economy, from trade policy to Wall Street. All of these proposals will share this common vision for economic policymaking in America. Today I’m also releasing the first specific example — a plan for American manufacturing.

But first, let me explain how economic patriotism works.

An End to the Excuses

It’s time to reject the excuses we’ve heard for decades about why we can’t do more to help American workers.

Some people blame “globalization” for flat wages and American jobs shipped overseas. But globalization isn’t some mysterious force whose effects are inevitable and beyond our control. No — America chose to pursue a trade policy that prioritized the interests of capital over the interests of American workers. Germany, for example, chose a different path and participated in international trade while at the same time robustly — and successfully — supporting its domestic industries and its workers.

Others blame “automation” for American job losses, especially in manufacturing. It’s a good story — robots and other new technologies made American manufacturing workers more productive, so companies needed to hire far fewer actual human beings. A good story, except it’s not really true. Recent research finds this story is based on a widely-held misunderstanding of the data on American manufacturing output, and a statistical quirk about how productivity is measured in our computer industry. There is actually no “evidence that productivity caused manufacturing’s relative and absolute employment decline” in America since the 1980s. Meanwhile, Germany has nearly five times as many robots per worker as we do and has not lost jobsoverall as a result.

And a lot of people blamed a supposed “skills gap” for job losses — that American workers lacked the skills or credentials they needed to fill the jobs available. Except that wasn’t true either. It was just a symptom of high unemployment rates. Companies felt comfortable demanding more skills from workers as an excuse to be more selective about which workers to hire.

The truth is that Washington policies — not unstoppable market forces — are a key driver of the problems American workers face. From our trade agreements to our tax code, we have encouraged companies to invest abroad, ship jobs overseas, and keep wages low. All in the interest of serving multinational companies and international capital with no particular loyalty to the United States.

In my administration, we will stop making excuses. We will pursue aggressive new government policies to support American workers. And we will start with two major changes:

  • Aggressively using all of our tools to defend and create American jobs. The prevailing view in Washington — from both political parties — has been that our government should not aggressively intervene in the markets to boost American workers. (This “rule” goes out the window when it comes to subsidizing Wall Street and multinational corporations.) We have tried that approach, and it has failed spectacularly. From our own experience and the experience of other countries, we know what types of government actions actually work to promote sustainable job growth and industrial development. It’s time to have the courage to pick up the tools we have and use them.
  • Consolidating existing government programs that affect job creation into a new agency with the sole responsibility to create and defend quality, sustainable American jobs. The new Department — the Department of Economic Development — will replace the Commerce Department, subsume other agencies like the Small Business Administration and the Patent and Trademark Office, and include research and development programs, worker training programs, and export and trade authorities like the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The new Department will have a single goal: creating and defending good American jobs.

    Aggressive Intervention on Behalf of American Workers

    If we can aggressively intervene in markets to protect the interests of the wealthy and well-connected — as we have for decades with bailouts and subsidies — then we can damn well use all the tools at our disposal to protect the interests of American workers. That’s why we should use a variety of more aggressive tactics, including:

    • More actively managing our currency value to promote exports and domestic manufacturing. One of the most important factors in our trade deficit and our weak export levels is the value of our currency. Othercountries have actively managed the value of their currency to boost exports and develop their domestic industries. And foreign investors and central banks have driven up the value of our currency for their own benefit. We should consider a number of tools and work with other countries harmed by currency misalignment to produce a currency value that’s better for our workers and our industries.
    • Leveraging federal R&D to create domestic jobs and sustainable investments in the future. We spend only half as much as we did in the 1980s on federal research and development. Meanwhile, when American taxpayers do invest in R&D, we often see American companies take that research and use it to manufacture products overseas, like Apple did with the iPhone. The companies get rich, and American taxpayers have subsidized the creation of low-wage foreign jobs. Other countries have adopted different approaches to public R&D funding that have produced strong outcomes for the economy and for taxpayers. Learning from these approaches, my administration will substantially increase our investments in R&D, but with three critical new conditions:
    • Production stemming from federally funded research should take place in the United States. If taxpayer investments in R&D lead to new ideas and products, those products should be made here. The federal government already includes this requirement in some of its programs, but it should be a standard requirement, absent truly extraordinary circumstances.
    • Taxpayers should be able to capture the upside of their research investments if they result in profitable enterprises. Like any investor, taxpayers should get a return on the risky investments they are making in R&D. That can take various forms. Taxpayers can: get an equity stake in any company that relies on intellectual property these investments create; retain royalties on publicly funded innovation or a golden-share of the patent revenue; or require the companies benefitting from publicly funded R&D to reinvest profits back into domestic production, R&D, and worker training programs, rather than into stock buybacks.
    • R&D investments must be spread across every region of the country, not focused on only a few coastal cities. There are talented Americans in every part of the country, but too often cities and towns experience brain drain and shrink because corporations move jobs and opportunities overseas or to a small handful of American cities. We must allocate R&D funding across the country, to ensure that there are economic opportunities in every region and that funding is targeted at solving regional problems.
    • Increasing export promotion to match the efforts of our competitors.In 2017, our main export promotion agency, the Export-Import Bank, provided $200 million in total medium- and long-term financing to support American exports. China’s equivalent agency provided more than a hundred times as much support, while Germany’s agency provided more than thirty times as much support. We must spend more to boost American exports so we can level the playing field for American workers. And while historically a large chunk of the Export-Import Bank’s support has gone to a handful of big companies, our export promotion should focus more on smaller and medium-sized businesses.
    • Deploying the massive purchasing power of the federal government to create markets for American-made products. The federal government spends hundreds of billions of dollars each year to purchase goods and services. We should require whenever possible for the government to purchase American-made products, and use large federal procurement commitments as a tool to create demand for new American-made goods and to develop particular domestic industries.
    • Restructuring worker training programs to deliver real results for American workers and American companies. Nearly half of the German workforce has graduated from a post-secondary apprenticeship program, which gives people access to good jobs without a four-year college education and provides German companies with a steady stream of capable workers. We should take aggressive steps to overhaul our worker training programs so they produce better results for American workers and companies.
    • Dramatically scale up apprenticeship programs. We currently invest $200 million annually in apprenticeship programs. We should increase that tenfold and make a $20 billion commitment to apprenticeship programs for the next ten years. These efforts should bring together community colleges, technical schools, unions, and companies.
    • Institute new sectoral training programs. We should also create sectoral training programs — a model that has been successful in Wisconsin. These local or regional sector training partnerships would help align training with the local job market, leverage the community college system, and, by designing training based on an entire sector, ensure that workers gain skills that are transferable across employers.

      Economic patriotism is about using all the tools we have to boost American workers and American industries so they have the best opportunity to compete internationally. While those tools can include certain things like tariffs, our principal goal should be investing in American workers rather than diminishing our competitors. If our workers are on a level playing field, I know they can take on any challenger and win.

      The Department of Economic Development

      Our international competitors like China, Germany, and Japan develop concrete plans for promoting domestic industry and then make serious investments to achieve their goals. China’s Made in China 2025 plan aims to dominate advanced manufacturing in the coming decades using various incentives and “hundreds of billions of euros” in subsidies. Germany and Japan have also developed plans that identify long-term goals for domestic production and put real money behind achieving them.

      This is a pretty straightforward idea. But outside of the defense context, the United States has nothing remotely like it.

      Government programs that affect job creation are an afterthought, uncoordinated and scattered across the government, and submerged in larger agencies with different primary missions:

      • There are 58 programs in 11 federal agencies that provide support to American manufacturing — all of them tacked on to the primary missions at those agencies.
      • There are at least nine offices in five different agencies primarily responsible for trade policy and export promotion.
      • And there are 47 different employment and training programs spread across nine different federal agencies.

        Even worse, there are some government agencies that undermine sustainable American jobs. For example, the Office of the United States Trade Representative — whose mission is to negotiate trade deals on behalf of America — is captured by the interests of corporate executives and lobbyists. Its actions across Administrations demonstrate a deep ideological opposition to anything that might put the interests of American workers above the interests of multinational corporations or Wall Street.

        We should put all of these offices and programs in the same place, get rid of the ones that are redundant or don’t work, and bring the rogue ones to heel — to make it clear that the unified mission of the federal government is to promote sustainable, middle-class American jobs.

        That’s why I’m proposing the creation of a new agency — the Department of Economic Development — that will have the single goal of defending good-paying American jobs and creating new ones.

        The Department will be responsible for creating a National Jobs Strategy (NJS) every four years, just as countries like Germany and China produce regular strategic plans. The NJS will be a long-term plan that examines the worldwide economic environment and identifies new risks and opportunities. It will focus not just on the overall American economy, but on regional economies. It will examine trends that have disproportionate effects on rural communities and smaller cities. And it will establish clear goals for American jobs and American industry that will guide how the Department of Economic Development prioritizes its investments and direct its programs.

        Critically, all of our trade-related programs will fall within the new Department. By placing our trade programs within this new Department, we will make clear that trade policy must defend and create American jobs.

        ________________________________

        It’s becoming easier and easier to shift capital and jobs from one country to another. That’s why our government has to care more about defending and creating American jobs than ever before — not less. We can navigate the changes ahead if we embrace economic patriotism and make American workers our highest priority, rather than continuing to cater to the interests of companies and people with no allegiance to America.

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Previous articleJune 6, 2019In science, grit counts as well as talentResearchers who narrowly missed securing grants but persisted in reapplying outperformed those who succeeded initially, achieving 36% more citations & 39% more high-impact papers over a decade.Next articleJune 10, 2019Aggregate Implications of Changing Sectoral TrendsConstruction sector accounts for 30% of decline in TFP growth. Sector-specific disturbances have reduced trend GDP growth by 2-3pp over last 6 decades.
Showing 8 database articles primarily about Regulation

Lax Merger Enforcement Is a Myth

Mark Jamison American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
August 2, 2024
Is Database:
Database

@drj_policy @AEI argues that from 1982–2021 antitrust enforcement standards “have become more pro-enforcement—exactly the opposite of the accepted wisdom.”

@drj_policy @AEI argues that from 1982–2021 antitrust enforcement standards “have become more pro-enforcement—exactly the...
The new study systematically analyzed the evolution of judicial standards for proposed mergers and found that the Chicago School in fact upgraded antitrust enforcement. The study examined 84,985 mergers reported to the agencies from 1982 to 2021 under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976. The agencies challenged 1,477 mergers, meaning that one of the agencies petitioned a court to stop the merger. The study found that the likelihood that agencies would win fully litigated cases rose since the Chicago School’s influence. It also found that the likelihood of challenged mergers proceeding to litigation increased. Both findings indicate a shift towards stricter enforcement standards in the courts. The study’s findings are consistent with those of an earlier study by some of the same authors. This earlier study found that the intensity of merger challenges increased from 1979 to 2017 and that the rising enforcement did not depend on who was in the White House.

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  • Has Market Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing Increased? — A @NewYorkFed note argues that overall market concentration across 169 manufacturing industries has remained flat from 1992 to 2012 as foreign competition has…
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Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs

Gordon Dahl National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
June 27, 2022
Is Database:
Database

UI benefit cuts show employment-wage trade-off: 23-50% UI reduction drives job growth +1.5-2.4% but wages fall -1.8-7.2%. Study across 7 states reveals -1.0 labor demand elasticity.

A study of labor market effects following 23-50% reductions in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits across seven states reveals significant economic impacts. Establishments in reform states experienced 1.5-2.4% faster employment growth compared to counterparts in non-reform states, indicating that reduced UI benefits incentivize quicker job acceptance. However, starting salaries fell by 1.8-7.2%, reflecting decreased worker bargaining power and lower match quality. These changes suggest a labor demand elasticity of -1.0, highlighting the trade-off between stimulating employment and reducing wages. The findings underscore the complexity of UI policy decisions, balancing employment growth against wage reductions.

We study the labor market effects of permanent 23-50% reductions in unemployment insurance benefits available in seven states. Leveraging linked firm-establishment data,we find that establishments based in reform states experience 1.5-2.4% faster employment growth relative to the same firm's establishments in other states. Using a similar multi-state firm design, starting salaries are 1.8-7.2% lower in reform states and posted salaries for the same job fall by 1.4-5.5%. These labor supply shocks yield an average labor demand elasticity of -1.0. Our results reveal a substantial decline in match quality and worker bargaining power as UI benefits become less generous.Specifically, we study the employment and earnings responses to reforms in 7 different states which sharply cut the generosity of their state UI programs in the 2010s. The largest of these state-level reforms occurred in North Carolina in 2013. This reform is well-suited for understanding the consequences of cutting UI benefits for two reasons. First, it was larger than any previous rollback implemented in the U.S. The change simultaneously reduced the maximum weekly benefit from $535 to $350 and the maximum duration from 26 to 20 weeks. The combined reductions permanently reduced the maximum value of UI benefits by 50%. Second, the cuts were implemented based on the insolvency of North Carolina’s state UI fund, rather than local labor market conditions. This allows us to compare workers in North Carolina to other states with similar labor market trends, but which had more prudent funding of their state UI programs. Six other states also enacted sizable reductions in UI generosity, but which were more modest compared to North Carolina. These “moderate reform” states (Florida, Georgia,Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina) cut maximum benefit durations by 6 weeks while holding fixed weekly benefit amounts, resulting in the maximum value of benefits falling permanently by 23%. Our first key finding is that following the reform, North Carolina-based establishmentsexperience 2.4% faster employment growth than do their same-firm counterparts in other states over the two years after the reform. For the six moderate reform states, employment grows 1.5% relative to same-firm counterparts in other states. These results suggest that any contractionary effect on consumer spending and aggregate demand, or increased competition for jobs are not large enough to overturn the incentive effects of finding a new job quickly. Using data from Glassdoor, our second key finding is that the earnings of new hires fall by an economically and statistically significant 7.2% in North Carolina establishments relative to the same firm’s establishments in control states. In the moderate reform states, the corresponding effect is a 1.8% decline in starting salaries. These drops combine not only the effect for new hires transitioning from unemployment and changing jobs, but also those entering the labor force. The drop in earnings is unlikely to be explained by negative worker composition effects, as new hires in the post-reform period are not negatively selected based on demographic characteristics in the CPS. Using the Glassdoor data, we estimate that lower match quality in the form of firm and occupational downgrading can account for approximately 40% of the wage effect. The remaining 60%-a 5.9% and 1.6% drop in starting salaries in North Carolina and the moderate reform states, respectively-is due to a decline in either unobserved match quality or worker bargaining power.One limitation of the Glassdoor data is that we cannot entirely rule out unobserved degradations in match quality or unobserved changes in the composition of new hires. Whether unemployment insurance cuts are desirable from a policy perspective depends on the benefits versus costs. On the positive side, these UI reforms stimulated employment growth and lowered benefit payouts. But counterbalancing this was a reduction in the wages of new hires, due to a combination of lower match quality and reduced bargaining power. This tradeoff adds a layer of complexity to debates on the optimal level of unemployment insurance benefits.

Core of paper, "...Specifically, we study the employment and earnings responses to reforms in 7 different states which sharply cut the generosity of their state UI programs in the 2010s. The largest of these state-level reforms occurred in North Carolina in 2013. This reform is well-suited for understanding the consequences of cutting UI benefits for two reasons. First, it was larger than any previous rollback implemented in the U.S. The change simultaneously reduced the maximum weekly bene t from $535 to $350 and the maximum duration from 26 to 20 weeks. The combined reductions permanently reduced the maximum value of UI benefits by 50%. Second, the cuts were implemented based on the insolvency of North Carolina's state UI fund, rather than local labor market conditions. This allows us to compare workers in North Carolina to other states with similar labor market trends, but which had more prudent funding of their state UI programs. Six other states also enacted sizable reductions in UI generosity, but which were more modest compared to North Carolina. These “moderate reform" states (Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina) cut maximum bene t durations by 6 weeks while holding fixed weekly benefit amounts, resulting in the maximum value of benefits falling permanently by 23%. We analyze North Carolina's reform separately due to its more drastic nature, and combine the six moderate reform states to gain precision. In contrast to most studies, we estimate the effects of reductions in UI generosity, rather than expansions, during a period when the labor market was recovering, rather than languishing...."

Key Findings

"... Our first key finding is that following the reform, North Carolina-based establishments experience 2.4% faster employment growth than do their same firm counterparts in other states over the two years after the reform. For the six moderate reform states, employment grows 1.5% relative to same firm counterparts in other states.These results suggest that any contractionary effect on consumer spending and aggregate demand, or increased competition for jobs are not large enough to overturn the incentive effects of finding a new job quickly. Instead, our results are more consistent with workers' employment and reservation wages depending on their outside options, which decrease when UI benefits become less generous, as suggested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). We focus on the wages of new hires given downward wage stickiness for already employed workers (Kahn 1997; Pissarides 2009; Haefke et al. 2013)...."

"... Using data from Glassdoor, our second key finding is that the earnings of new hires fall by an economically and statistically significant 7.2% in North Carolina establishments relative to the same firm's establishments in control states. In the moderate reform states, the corresponding effect is a 1.8% decline in starting salaries.These drops combine not only the effect for new hires transitioning from unemployment and changing jobs, but also those entering the labor force.6 The drop in earnings is unlikely to be explained by negative worker composition effects, as new hires in the post-reform period are not negatively selected based on demographic characteristics in the CPS. Using the Glassdoor data, we estimate that lower match quality in the form of rm and occupational downgrading can account for approximately 40% of the wage effect. The remaining 60%{a 5.9% and 1.6% drop in starting salaries in North Carolina and the moderate reform states, respectively is due to a decline in either unobserved match quality or worker bargaining power. One limitation of the Glassdoor data is that we cannot entirely rule out unobserved degradations in match quality or unobserved changes in the composition of new hires. We overcome this limitation by estimating the reforms' effects on posted wages for the same job, within the same rm, but across treated versus non-treated establishments. We use the near-universe of posted wages in online job ads from Burning Glass Technologies, which as noted in Hazell and Taska (2020), has the key advantage that they are not contaminated by the compositional or match quality effects which could be present in the wages of new hires. We estimate that the reforms generated a 5.5% and 1.4% reduction in posted wages, effect sizes which are nearly identical to the Glassdoor estimates that account for occupational and firm fixed effects.

"... We find that the reductions in UI generosity result in an average 2.8 week decline (8% drop) in unemployment spell lengths...."

"...The unexpected UI reductions represent exogenous negative shocks to workers' outside options, which shift labor supply curves outwards. Marginal revenue product of labor declines for two reasons: increases in employment due to lower reservation wages and reduced match quality. With two points along rms' labor demand curves, we can calculate the labor demand elasticity. Combining our estimates of the changes in employment and in posted wages from the EEOC and Burning Glass analyses, respectively,we derive an average labor demand elasticity of -1.0 across all of the 7 reform states. These are in line with historical estimates of labor demand elasticities calculated based on data from British plants and coal mines, American women following World War II, and manufacturing labor in Germany. Our elasticity lies at the higher end of estimates based on changes to the minimum wage, which could be explained by UI covering low, middle, and higher wage workers...."

Evidence

"...In Figure 1, we plot the evolution of the short-term recipiency rate over time in North Carolina, starting after the official end of the Great Recession and continuing for 9 years. The blue line in panel (a) plots the rate in North Carolina at the monthly level, while the red line plots the corresponding rate for other Southern and Midwestern states which did not change their UI program over this time period. The dashed vertical line marks the date North Carolina passed their UI reform bill, while the solid vertical line denotes the date the reform became effective for newly led claims. Prior to the implementation of the reform, North Carolina (blue line) and other states (red line) exhibit a similar level and trend for short term UI receipt. Since the economy was recovering from the Great Recession, UI participation is gradually falling in the pre-period, with some seasonal patterns present as well. After the reform, the control states' recipiency rate continues its mild decline. In sharp contrast, North Carolina's rate drops shortly after the reform's implementation.20 Two years after the reform, North Carolina's recipiency rate is 10% compared to a rate of 30% in control states. Panel (b) graphs the difference between the blue and red lines, along with 95% confidence intervals. There is no evidence for differential pre-trends, with the UI recipiency rate difference between North Carolina and the control states bouncing around zero. After the reform, the gap becomes negative and widens to a 20 percentage point difference roughly two years after the reform, with this gap persisting until the end of our sample period. Estimates for the moderate reform states can be found in panel (c). Using a dynamic event study design, there is a 5.5 percentage point reduction in the short-term UI recipiency rate in treated states relative to controls in the post-reform period. This smaller effect for moderate reform states is expected given the more extreme cuts enacted by North Carolina. These analyses confirm that the UI reforms sharply curtailed the use of UI, which was the intent of the law changes. The reduction in use is partly mechanical, as individuals were eligible for 6 fewer weeks of benefits after the reform. But it could also be partly driven by the 35% reduction in weekly bene t levels in North Carolina, which could have caused individuals to exit UI earlier..."

Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs: Extended Excerpt Image 1


“…we conclude that the North Carolina UI reform is responsible for a 1.68% increase in employment growth, which is slightly higher than the 1.54% estimate for moderate reform states. These combined results suggest a limited scope for crowd out of other job-seekers, with firms being willing to expand relative employment in treated states to take advantage of a larger pool of workers. To assess the robustness of these results, we deploy data from the CPS to estimate the effect of the UI reforms on employment probabilities. We note that the identification strategy is less convincing as our controls are other Southern and Midwestern states which did not undergo a permanent UI reform, rather than the same firm's establishments in other states. With this caveat in mind, column (1) of Table 6 demonstrates that employment probabilities increase by approximately 1 percentage point (s.e. = 0.43) of a baseline of 64.8% employment probability in UI reform states. As with the multi-state rm analysis, the event-study coefficients indicate no evidence of pre- trends but rather a gradual increase in employment that begins in the year in which the reforms were implemented. Overall, employment growth increased by just over 1.5%, which is qualitatively consistent with our headline estimates….”

Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Gordon Dahl and Matthew Knepper, "Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs,"National Bureau Of Economic Research, June 2022, https://www.nber.org/papers/w30152

  • Regulation
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    • Unemployment/Participation
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New Emissions Regulations are Coercive Paternalism, not Environmental Science, or even Benevolent Paternalism

Casey Mulligan Supply And Demand (In That Order)
Date Posted:
June 27, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Trump’s CEA highlighted vehicle standards to abate a ton of CO2 cost ~$163 on margin, while Obama valued abatement at only $50, a significant cost-benefit mismatch.

Trump's CEA [Council of Economic Advisers] highlighted that vehicle standards to abate a ton of CO2 cost ~$163 on the margin, while Obama valued the abatement at only $50, indicating a significant cost-benefit mismatch. Biden's administration claims new standards pass a cost-benefit test, but this relies on assumptions outside environmental economics. Consumer fuel savings are largely double-counted due to "behavioral economics," inflating net benefits. Additionally, Biden's approach discounts environmental benefits at 2.5%/yr while other costs are discounted at 3%/yr, skewing results. These methods suggest coercive paternalism rather than sound economic policy.

“…Trump's CEA showed, based on credit transactions among manufacturers, that vehicle standards to abate a ton of CO2 cost about $163 on the margin, while even Obama said the abatement was worth only $50. i.e., tightening emissions regulations fails a cost-benefit test by a wide margin. Now Biden claims that new stricter standards pass a cost benefit test. Although this will be cast as an environmental issue, the changes have nothing to do environmental economics: (1) Consumer fuel savings get (mostly) double counted because "behavioral economics."...(2) Biden says that some tightening comes for free because 5 manufacturers had already signed a pledge with California EPA to so tighten...(3) When the above are enough to tilt the scale, all costs and benefits are discounted 3%/yr. When an extra push is needed, Biden discounts environmental benefits at 2.5% per year while everything else is discounted 3%/yr…”

More on coercive paternalism

Trump's DOT and EPA spoke forcefully against paternalism as a justification for fuel standards. If people lack knowledge, give them the knowledge rather than imposing a decision on them. Here is how they said it

"the idea that regulating fuel economy and CO2 emissions can mitigate the consequences of inadequate access to information by placing decisions that depend on access to complete information in the hands of regulators rather than buyers has superficial appeal. Yet commenters do not establish that such a drastic step is necessary to overcome any inadequacy of information, or that requiring manufacturers to supply higher fuel economy will be more effective than less intrusive approaches such as expanding the range of information available to buyers." (85 FR 24608, italics added)

In contrast, Biden's DOT and EPA say nothing like this, but instead extol the purported virtues of "behavioral economics." They do not mention less intrusive approaches, let alone show why they would have fewer net benefits.

Casey Mulligan, "New Emissions Regulations are Coercive Paternalism, not Environmental Science, or even Benevolent Paternalism,"Supply And Demand (In That Order), April 5, 2022, http://caseymulligan.blogspot.com/2022/04/emissions-regulations-are-divorced-from.html

New Emissions Regulations are Coercive Paternalism, not Environmental Science, or even Benevolent Paternalism

Trump's CEA showed, based on credit transactions among manufacturers, that vehicle standards to abate a ton of CO2 cost about $163 on the margin, while even Obama said the abatement was worth only $50. i.e., tightening emissions regulations fails a cost-benefit test by a wide margin.

Now Biden claims that new stricter standards pass a cost benefit test. Although this will be cast as an environmental issue, the new conclusion is driven by assumptions unrelated to environmental economics or climate science:

(1) Consumer fuel savings get (mostly) double counted because "behavioral economics." Specifically,

"The agency’s analysis assumes that potential car and light truck buyers value only the savings in fuel costs from purchasing a higher-MPG model they expect to realize over the first 30 months they own it. Depending on the discount rate buyers are assumed to apply, this amounts to 25-30 percent of the expected savings in fuel costs over its entire lifetime." (p. 420 of DOT's final rule)

This double counting (100 - 27.5% = 72.5% of $98 billion in fuel savings) is more than quadruple the purported $16 billion net benefit shown in Table VI-11 of the final rule.

By comparison, the gross climate benefit is purportedly $27.5 billion. i.e., they would have to more than double their already inflated "social cost of carbon" to push their thumb on the scale as vigorously as they did with "behavioral economics." See below for more on paternalism.

(2) Biden says that some tightening comes for free because 5 manufacturers had already signed a pledge with California EPA to so tighten

But this ignores that California rules, when followed by just a subset of manufacturers, do not reduce the supply of federal credits, whereas changes in federal rules do even if the federal rules are not as strict as California's. The equilibrium credit price is built into the prices paid by purchasers of new cars.

(3) When the above are enough to tilt the scale, all costs and benefits are discounted 3%/yr. When an extra push is needed, Biden discounts environmental benefits at 2.5% per year while everything else is discounted 3%/yr.

"the use of the social rate of return on capital... inappropriately underestimates the impacts of climate change for the purposes of estimating the SC-GHG.... the consumption rate of interest is the theoretically appropriate discount rate in an intergenerational context." (p. 547 of the Technical Support Document. See also p. 573 of the final rule.)

  • Regulation
  • Science
    • Global Warming

Should US policies transfer our wealth to OPEC?

Benjamin Zycher National Review
Date Posted:
August 16, 2021
Is Database:
Database

@BenjaminZycher Reducing US fossil fuel production benefits OPEC+, offsetting US cuts with increased production. This shift transfers wealth to foreign producers, highlighting the unintended consequences of US policy decisions.

@BenjaminZycher Reducing US fossil fuel production benefits OPEC+, offsetting US cuts with increased production. This shift...
The Biden administration's constraints on U.S. fossil fuel production, aimed at climate goals, inadvertently benefit overseas producers like OPEC+. As U.S. crude oil output fell from 13.1 mmbd in Feb 2020 to 11.2 mmbd by July 2021, OPEC+ increased production by 2 mmbd through 2021, offsetting U.S. reductions. This shift transfers wealth to foreign producers, as global demand for fossil fuels rises with economic recovery. Despite the administration's climate policies, the net effect on global temperatures is negligible, with a projected reduction of only 0.173°C by 2100. The economic implications are significant: reduced U.S. production leads to higher energy costs domestically while enhancing the economic wellbeing of non-U.S. producers. This dynamic underscores the challenge of balancing climate objectives with economic realities, as international producers capitalize on the demand for fossil fuels, highlighting the unintended consequences of U.S. policy decisions.

Benjamin Zycher, "Should US policies transfer our wealth to OPEC+?"National Review, August 13, 2021, https://www.aei.org/articles/should-us-policies-transfer-our-wealth-to-opec/

Should US policies transfer our wealth to OPEC+?

Incoherence is nothing new in the Beltway, but it’s still quite something to see the Biden administration simultaneously pursue new constraints on U.S. production of fossil fuels as a central component of its “climate” policies, while at the same time attempting to avoid the adverse price effects of that production stance. The administration on August 11 issued a plea for another increase in crude-oil production by OPEC+ (the 13 members of OPEC and ten other major international producers):

While OPEC+ recently agreed to production increases, these increases will not fully offset previous production cuts that OPEC+ imposed during the pandemic until well into 2022. At a critical moment in the global recovery, this is simply not enough. President Biden has made clear that he wants Americans to have access to affordable and reliable energy, including at the pump.

This follows the Biden administration effort in July to urge OPEC+ “to quickly come up with a compromise ‘that will allow proposed production increases to move forward.’”

Increases in gasoline prices in particular are highly visible, and thus politically damaging. And so it is both distressing and amusing to observe these efforts by the administration even as it remains busy proclaiming its climate credentials.

The basic laws of economics are difficult to defy: As fossil-energy demand strengthens alongside the global recovery from the COVID-19 downturn, sharp price increases follow, an effect reinforced by previous cutbacks in crude-oil production by OPEC+. The Biden administration may believe that its July pronouncements carried weight, but, in the end, OPEC+ made its own decision in its own interests. Accordingly, OPEC+ in July agreed to increase production as a response to the increase in the international demand for crude oil. OPEC+ production will increase by about 2 million barrels per day (400,000 barrels per day each month) through the end of this year, and the overall OPEC+ production cut of 9.7 mmbd — about 23 percent — implemented in May 2020 will be phased out fully by September of next year.

This decision was going to be forthcoming with or without the statements from the Biden administration. Fossil-fuel resources are one central form of national wealth — at least in countries where it is recognized as such. The increase in demand for crude oil allows producers to realize the wealth value of those resources, a reality ignored by the Biden administration and its allied opponents of fossil fuels. This national-wealth dynamic is not a mere intellectual exercise: Competitive market forces combined with long-standing legal arrangements yield a distribution of that national wealth consistent with the contributions of workers, asset owners, investors, suppliers, and others whose efforts, risk-taking, and ownership rights make the acquisition of the increased national wealth a reality.

In other words, the enhanced production of fossil resources improves the economic wellbeing of actual people. U.S. production of crude oil was 13.1 mmbd at the end of February 2020, fell to 10 mmbd one year later, and since then has increased only to 11.2 mmbd in late July. For federal lands (onshore and offshore) managed by the Bureau of Land Management, total production of crude oil increased by about 3.4 percent from February 2020 to March 2021 (the latest month for which official data are available).

Accordingly, the Biden pause on new leasing on federal lands is perverse. Even if maintained permanently, it would have an impact on future climate phenomena literally equal to zero; the entire Biden net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions policy would reduce global temperatures by 0.173°C by 2100, using the EPA climate model under assumptions that exaggerate the effects of reductions in GHG emissions. Note that this outcome is independent of assumptions and views of the science and evidence on anthropogenic climate change.

As an aside, this dismal benefit/cost reality applies to international climate policy proposals also. The entire Paris agreement: about 0.17°C. Net-zero emissions by the entire Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 0.352°C. A 50 percent reduction in Chinese GHG emissions: 0.184°C. A global 50 percent reduction in GHG emissions implemented immediately and maintained strictly: 0.687°C. Because “climate policy” in its essence means a reduction in the wealth expansion represented by fossil fuels, and a sharp increase in energy costs, it is difficult to see how it can satisfy any rational benefit/cost test.

That international reality applies a fortiori to the U.S: There is no good reason that the U.S. should engage in mindless economic sacrifice. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Biden administration is determined to find ways to impose artificial restrictions on expanded fossil-fuel output, simply as a matter of ideological imperative: a self-defeating increase in the royalty rate on production from federal leases, disapprovals or restrictions on investments in pipelines and other fossil energy infrastructure, a deeply dubious tightening of methane-emissions standards, and a general shift away from fossil fuels in favor of an energy system producing “net-zero” greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

This stance is perverse: Whatever one believes about climate issues, a reduction in U.S. fossil-fuel production will yield an offsetting increase in production by non-U.S. producers. That is the ongoing reality — no other outcome is plausible — and nothing can change it in a world in which individuals, groups, and governments are interested in wealth acquisition greater rather than smaller. When we observe the opponents of fossil fuels arguing for reduced U.S. production but increased output overseas, it is time to recognize that Bizarro World is not merely a comic-book construct.

Ed Comment: The entire Paris agreement: about 0.17°C. Net-zero emissions by the entire Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 0.352°C. A 50 percent reduction in Chinese GHG emissions: 0.184°C. A global 50 percent reduction in GHG emissions implemented immediately and maintained strictly: 0.687°C. BTW Here's why the biden admin can't manage the Afghan withdraw with the least bit of competence:Whatever one believes about climate issues, a reduction in U.S. fossil-fuel production will yield an offsetting increase in production by non-U.S. producers — no other outcome is plausible.When we observe the opponents of fossil fuels arguing for reduced U.S. production but increased output overseas, it is time to recognize that Bizarro World is not merely a comic-book construct.

  • Regulation
  • Science
    • Global Warming

Biden Turns Back the Progressive Clock

Phil Gramm and Mike Solon Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 15, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Transportation deregulation reduced the cost of moving goods as a % of GDP by 50% over 40 years.

Transportation deregulation reduced the cost of moving goods as a % of GDP by 50% over 40 years.
Over the past 40 years, transportation deregulation has significantly reduced the cost of moving goods, cutting it by 50% as a % of GDP. This deregulation, initiated in the late 1970s, led to a wave of innovation and efficiency, exemplified by airline fares being halved on a per mile basis and air cargo increasing from 5.4% to 14.5% of all shipments by 2012. The reforms, supported by figures like Sen. Ted Kennedy and President Jimmy Carter, aimed to protect consumers from high prices and limited choices caused by excessive regulation. The resulting competitive environment fostered economic growth and innovation, with companies like Amazon and FedEx emerging as beneficiaries. However, current policy shifts under President Biden threaten to reintroduce Progressive Era regulations, potentially stifling the competitive gains achieved through deregulation.

Phil Gramm and Mike Solon, "Biden Turns Back the Progressive Clock,"Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-turns-back-the-progressive-clock-11626286594

Biden Turns Back the Progressive Clock

In a sweeping executive order aimed at reimposing Progressive Era regulatory policy across the U.S. economy, President Biden recounted the foundational myths of modern progressivism. The first canon of progressivism holds that breaking up the consolidating industries or trusts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and regulating those industries heavily until the late 1970s, benefited the economy and gave “the little guy” a fighting chance. Consumers, workers and the economy took a hit, according to the progressive myth, when the regulatory structure was overturned 40 years ago.

Progressive interpretation claims that the industrial concentration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was evidence of the rise of monopolies, but if the consolidating industries were exhibiting anticompetitive behavior, output would have fallen and prices would have risen. The opposite happened. As economist Thomas DiLorenzo showed in a classic study, output in industries accused of being monopolistic during the debate on the Sherman Act in 1890 increased by 175% from 1880 to 1890—seven times the growth rate of the economy as a whole. The average price of products sold by these same industries fell three times as fast as the Consumer Price Index.

Hard economic data consistently shows that the industrial concentration at the turn of the 19th century was driven by vigorous competition arising from transformative technology and improved industrial organization. Efficient producers mastered the economies of scale to provide consumers with lower prices and improved product quality. Competition and new technology destroyed the pricing power of emerging trusts, and most failed to survive. Even the oil and sugar trusts, which existed because of protective tariffs, faced relentless price competition.

Many trusts welcomed progressive regulation. A comprehensive study by economist George Hilton and historian Gabriel Kolko showed convincingly that railroads championed regulation. They were more than happy to have the feds set freight rates. Market forces had driven down revenues per ton-mile by some 18% between 1870 and 1890. The first major action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was to ban price competition by outlawing price rebating, which the owners of an overbuilt railway system welcomed. When interstate trucking became an effective competitor of the railroads, the ICC muted that competition by regulating the new industry.

The 1970s brought two recessions, double-digit inflation and an end to America’s postwar economic dominance, setting off an intense policy debate. As economists, regulators, politicians, business leaders and policy advocates debated why the U.S. economy seemed to be losing its exceptionalism, a consensus formed around the belief that regulations based on the Progressive Era principles that Mr. Biden now seeks to revive were hurting consumers, workers and the economy.

Experts charged with protecting consumers, like then-Senate Judiciary Committee staffer (and Harvard antitrust law professor) Stephen Breyer and Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman Alfred Kahn, provided the hard evidence that convinced their bosses, Sen. Ted Kennedy and President Jimmy Carter, that America needed to reform agency regulation and end regulation of vast sectors of the economy. Any doubt that the consensus that Progressive Era regulation had failed ended when Ralph Nader testified before Kennedy’s subcommittee, denouncing regulations that kept prices high and choices low, and protected regulated industries.

When airline deregulation passed the Senate in 1978, Kennedy declared: “The success of this legislation is the result of a clear consensus... that rigid federal economic regulations of the airlines tends to increase prices, foster inefficiency in operations and perpetuate Government control, bureaucracy and red tape.... This consensus has been built brick by brick in recent years by serious and careful nonpartisan examinations of... the nature of government and competition in the 1970s.”

The Senate passed airline deregulation 82-4 on Oct. 14, 1978, and Sen. Joe Biden voted for it. But Democratic deregulation was only beginning. As Kennedy noted: “The restrictive price and entry provisions of the Federal Aviation Act... were copied directly from the Interstate Commerce Act of the 1880s governing railroads.... We need to now look beyond the airlines and the corrective measures we are voting upon today and recognize the fact that... heavy regulation, as illustrated by the airline industry, is not the answer.”

On April 1, 1980, the Senate voted on the Staggers Rail Act to deregulate railroads. Again, Mr. Biden voted for it. In signing the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which Mr. Biden also voted for, President Carter sounded the death knell on Progressive Era regulation: “This historic legislation... will remove 45 years of excessive and inflationary Government restrictions and red tape.... No longer will trucks travel empty because of rules absurdly limiting the kinds of goods a truck may carry. No longer will trucks be forced to travel hundreds of miles out of their way for no reason or prohibited senselessly from stopping to pick up and deliver goods at points along their routes. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 will bring the trucking industry into the free enterprise system, where it belongs.”

Far from hurting consumers, as progressive myth alleges, deregulation of the U.S. transportation system unleashed a wave of invention and innovation that reduced logistical transportation cost—the cost of moving goods as a percentage of gross domestic product—by an astonishing 50% over 40 years. Airline fares were cut in half on a per mile basis, while air cargo surged from 5.4% of all shipments to 14.5% by 2012, making air transit for people and packages a routine part of American life. “Our economy would be much smaller and per capita income significantly lower without these far-sighted changes,” according to FedEx CEO Fred Smith.

In this Carter-Kennedy led reform, the duty of government was to protect the consumer from harm, not to protect the producer from competition. Without the productive energy released by deregulating airlines, trucking, railroads, energy and communications, the U.S. might not have found its competitive legs as its postwar dominance in manufacturing ended in the late 1970s. The benefits of deregulation to this day continue to make possible powerful innovations that remake the world. Amazon, FedEx and Facebook are but a tiny fraction of a long list of progeny produced by lifting the heavy hand of Progressive Era regulation. We reimpose that regulation at our own peril.

Ed Comment, "I like the fact. I think it’s a simplistic argument about regulation. Some regulation limits competition, some increases it some reallocates income, some increases the common good, some is ill conceived, and there’s unintended regulatory capture. It’s complicated."

"...Far from hurting consumers, as progressive myth alleges, deregulation of the U.S. transportation system unleashed a wave of invention and innovation that reduced logistical transportation cost—the cost of moving goods as a percentage of gross domestic product—by an astonishing 50% over 40 years. Airline fares were cut in half on a per mile basis, while air cargo surged from 5.4% of all shipments to 14.5% by 2012, making air transit for people and packages a routine part of American life...."

  • Regulation

United Van Lines top 10 inbound vs. top 10 outbound US states in 2020: How do they compare on a variety of measures?

Mark Perry American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
January 13, 2021
Is Database:
Database

New Jersey, New York, and Illinois saw the most outbound moves in 2020, while Idaho, South Carolina, and Oregon had the most inbound moves. Migration patterns reflect economic and demographic shifts, with residents seeking lower taxes, affordable housing, and better quality of life.

In 2020, United Van Lines' data revealed significant migration trends, with New Jersey, New York, and Illinois experiencing the highest outbound moves, while Idaho, South Carolina, and Oregon saw the most inbound. This migration pattern reflects broader economic and demographic shifts, as residents seek states with lower taxes, affordable housing, and better quality of life. For instance, Idaho's population grew by 2.1%, driven by its attractive cost of living and job opportunities. Conversely, high-tax states like New York and Illinois faced population declines of 0.4% and 0.5%, respectively, as residents relocated to more economically favorable regions. These trends have implications for state economies, affecting labor markets, housing demand, and fiscal policies. Policymakers must consider these dynamics to address challenges such as infrastructure strain in growing states and revenue shortfalls in shrinking ones. Understanding these migration patterns is crucial for developing strategies that enhance economic resilience and competitiveness.

Mark Perry breaks down state migration data for 2020 but state level economic policy, “…Since 1977 United Van Lines “has annually tracked migration patterns on a state-by-state basis. The 2020 study is based on household moves handled by United within the 48 contiguous states and Washington, D.C. and ranks states based on the inbound and outbound percentages of total moves in each state.”The top ten inbound and top ten outbound states in 2020 are displayed in the table above….”

Mark Perry, "United Van Lines’ top 10 inbound vs. top 10 outbound US states in 2020: How do they compare on a variety of measures?," American Enterprise Institute, January 8, 2021, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/united-van-lines-top-10-inbound-vs-top-10-outbound-us-states-in-2020-how-do-they-compare-on-a-variety-of-measures/

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