Edward Conard

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  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Trump As The Wizard Of Oz Can't Win Re-Election, But Democrats Could Still Lose The Presidency

Bruce N. Gyory Empire Report
Date Posted:
April 9, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Trump’s base remains loyal, but he’s failed to expand support. Democrats must hit critical targets: 42% white vote, high African American & Hispanic turnout, & win independents by double digits.

Despite Trump's weakened position among key swing voting blocs since 2016, Democrats face significant challenges in securing the White House in 2020. Trump's base remains loyal, but his failure to expand support beyond it has damaged his re-election prospects. Economic indicators, such as the Federal Reserve's 1.9% GDP growth projection for 2020, suggest a lack of economic momentum that could further hinder Trump. However, Democrats must hit critical electoral targets: securing over 42% of the white vote, achieving high African American and Hispanic turnout, and winning independents by double digits. Failure to meet these benchmarks could result in a Trump victory, despite his vulnerabilities. The Democrats' ability to project a compelling narrative and avoid internal missteps will be crucial in overcoming these hurdles and capitalizing on Trump's declining approval ratings, which have consistently remained below 50%.

Bruce N. Gyory, "Trump As The Wizard Of Oz Can't Win Re-Election, But Democrats Could Still Lose The Presidency," Empire Report, April 7, 2019, https://empirereportnewyork.com/bruce-gyory-donald-trump-wizard-of-oz-2020-part-1/

Trump As The Wizard Of Oz Can't Win Re-Election, But Democrats Could Still Lose The Presidency

Rick Wilson is correct: Donald Trump can’t win re-election, but the Democrats could still lose the 2020 presidential election. That was the conclusion of Never-Trump Republican strategist Rick Wilson, in his excellent op-ed in last Sunday’s Daily News.

I had reached the same contradictory conclusions in doing the research for this column. A subsequent column will examine how the Democrats can reduce their risk of losing to Trump in 2020.

Why can’t Donald Trump win re-election? That assertion rests upon the plain fact that no one has actually explained to Donald Trump why he was elected President in 2016. Trump’s base was the bright tip of his Electoral College iceberg, but that it is not what elected Trump President. By playing only to his base, rather than trying to expand his support as President, Trump has done grievous damage to his re-election prospects.

Trump was elected because of a small but significant slippage in the Democrat’s share of white vote (Clinton got 37% of white vote according to exit polls vs. Obama’s 39% in 2012 and 43% in 2008) combined with a lower black turnout (African Americans turned out at 56% of all eligible voters in 2016 vs. turnout percentages among African Americans at 65% in 2008 and 66% in 2012; the white turnout percentage was 65% in 2016 vs 64% of all eligible white voters in 2012) and Clinton getting a lower share of the Hispanic vote(65% of Hispanics voted for Clinton in 2106 vs 71% for Obama in 2012).

Nevertheless, Trump still would not have carried a majority in the Electoral College had third party voting not been the balance of power in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Florida (e.g., Jill Stein’s vote was greater than Trump’s margin of victory in Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin).

When you delve deeper into the exit poll numbers from 2016, it becomes clear that there were four swing voting blocs underlying Trump’s victory. First, the late swing against Clinton among married white women in the suburbs. Second, the near third of the electorate that had some college but not a four year degree—the so-called kids who stayed home (Trump according to the exit polls carried these voters by 9% whereas Obama carried this bloc by 4% in 2012). Third, middle aged Hispanic men gave Trump 35% of their vote (as opposed to Latino voters over 65 and under 45 in age who both gave Clinton 71% of their vote). The overall slippage among Hispanics (which included 6% of Hispanics who voted for third party candidates) cut off any chance Clinton had of holding Florida and carrying Arizona, North Carolina or Georgia (Clinton’s top raid targets in the Electoral College). Fourth, was independents (31% of the electorate according to exit polls) who Trump carried by 6%: 48-42% with a full 10% of Independents voting for third party candidates (Obama had carried Independents in 2008 and only narrowly lost Independents to Romney in 2012).

When you crunch these numbers, it becomes clear that these four voting blocs on top of the minority slippage in the urban cores had a decisive impact on 83% of the vote (49% of the nation’s vote according to the 2016 exit polls came from the Suburbs and 34% from urban areas), while only 17% of the electorate came from small town and rural communities. So the blue collar male vote from rural and small town America did surge for Trump and it had a clear impact, but those votes would have been mere shards of ice in the ocean, rather than the tip of the iceberg that elected Trump, had those four swing voting blocs (a much larger number of voters in the aggregate), not shifted against Clinton at the close of the campaign in 2016.

Two factors are worth noting in regard to these four swing voting blocs: one, polling data shows us that as President Trump is noticeably weaker today among each of these swing voting blocs than he was in November of 2016. Two, it is likely that these four swing voting blocs from 2016, will remain the swing voting blocs determining the outcome in the 2020 presidential race.

Yet, because Trump and derivatively most pundits, have been obsessed with Trump’s base, rather than the vast number of voters who actually enabled him to squeeze out a victory in the Electoral College, there has been precious little notice attending Trump’s slippage. Don’t take my word for Trump’s declining standing with these swing blocs, study the returns in the 2018 midterm elections both in terms of Democratic gains (Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Virginia, Colorado and Arizona) and the far narrower Republican margins of victory (Georgia, Florida and Texas).

Moreover, while the Mueller report’s finding of no criminal collusion by Trump or his campaign with the Russians, will be a shot of political adrenaline for Trump’s base, events are still threatening Trump’s public standing. The storm clouds threatening the economy (the inversion of the yield curve which has foreshadowed most recent recessions) and disorder in the world (from our relationship with NATO, to the potential for Brexit chaos, to the collapse of the North Korean nuclear arms talks, China’s advances in the Pacific and Europe, not to mention the prospect of turbulence in the Middle East) remain real threats to President Trump’s political standing, heading into next year’s election.

Nor can we be certain, as Judge Napolitano recently pointed out in his Fox News commentary, that there will not be a dragon’s tail from the Mueller report lashing Trump, once it comes out, particularly if Attorney General Barr’s March 24th letter is perceived as having whitewashed Mueller’s report. The traditional bread and butter issues of the economy and health care leavened by foreign policy threats, will of course dominate the electorate’s concerns, but the continuing investigations of Trump remain a dormant threat to his re-election prospects.

Thus, Trump is not a favorite to win re-election, unless economic growth were to jump next year towards the 4% growth level for GDP (i.e., the current Federal Reserve Board projections for 2020 are at the 1.9% growth level for GDP). The polling data bears this out. Trump as President has never hit, much less passed the 50% mark in his job approval rating, according to the Real Clear Averages data.

In Gallup’s data, Trump’s job approval ratings have stayed mostly in between the 38-42% levels (levels too low to sustain a President’s re-election). Four times President Trump has gone below the 35% level in Gallup’s polls, but only for an instant and only once did he hit 46% in job approval, back in his first week in office. That is significant because no President, has won the next presidential election, when their job approval in Gallup’s data has gotten below 35%. (I am using the Gallup polling data here as an illustrative example of the overall trend line, not as a dispositive source tracking public opinion).

Trump seems almost allergic to the concept of expanding his base, which renders his loss of support from the four key swing blocs from 2016 all the more significant. Consequently, if Trump is polling at or under 42% in the Fall of 2020, he will lose re-election, unless Howard Schultz’ candidacy (or a Schultz plus a Stein type candidacy from the left, frays the Democratic coalition from both ideological ends of the spectrum) proves to be the spoiler.

There is a decisive tactical play the Democrats can make in the 2020 presidential campaign: projecting a narrative that defines Trump as the veritable Wizard of Oz (i.e., establishing that there is really nothing behind the curtain). Democrats often abjure the power of narrative campaigning, preferring list campaigns (campaigns which focus upon a check list of issue based platform planks). That would be a mistake.

Narrative campaigning works, precisely because voters are busy and a clear and compelling narrative provides a clean hook for voters to hang their concerns upon. Inevitably, the 2020 campaign will become a referendum upon Donald Trump’s presidency. Democrats would be wise to find and project a narrative which resonates with voters.

The Wizard of Oz is a good narrative choice for three reasons. One, Trump is not on top of the details of either the policies his administration advances or the implementation of those policies. Two, the Wizard of Oz is something very understandable to older Americans, who will be the toughest swing voting bloc for Democrats to carry. Three, if this narrative catches hold with the public, being called the Wizard of Oz, will drive Trump nuts, because it vitiates his self-image as the all-powerful CEO. If Trump senses that people are laughing at him, he could explode, hastening his political demise with swing voters.

So why am I not advising the Democrats to crack open the champagne? Because I am not at all confident that the Democrats can pass their own 2020 math test. Can the Democrats get through the presidential primaries and produce a ticket for President and Vice-President, which simultaneously hits the following six electoral marks critical to winning both the popular vote and a majority in the Electoral College? One, crack 42% of the white vote. Many pundits subliminally convey that the Democratic problems with the white vote are connected to electing President Obama. In fact, Barack Obama got a higher percentage of white voters in his two races than Dukakis, Kerry and Hillary Clinton. The Democrats’ problems with white voters actually goes back to the McGovern era.

Two, next year can Democrats’ nurture a turnout percentage where African American voters turnout at the same levels as white voters (a la 2008 and 2012)? Three, the Democratic ticket needs to once again break the 70 % threshold among Hispanic voters (with an uptick in the Hispanic share of the total vote crossing the 12% threshold, from a 9% share in 2008 and 10% of the total vote in 2012). Four, Democrats need to carry the votes of those with some college but not a four year degree (roughly a third of the electorate, that is crucial in the Midwest and Southern Atlantic Coastal states). Five, juice the turnout of under 30 in age voters, so that their share of the total electorate crosses the 22% share level (given Trump’s chronic weakness with millennial voters). Six, carry independent voters by double digits (i.e., as in 2018, but not 2010, 2012 and 2014 when the GOP carried Independents). Given that the overwhelming majority of Independent voters are white, carrying Independents is an essential ingredient in the Democrats’ ability to shave the GOP’s traditional edge among white voters.

If Democrats hit all six of those targets they can’t lose next year’s presidential election and will win back control of the US Senate, as well as holding the House. If they hit four of those six targets, they will not lose the White House and will certainly hold the House of Representatives, with a chance to narrowly take control of the Senate. But if they hit only two of those six targets Trump could win re-election with accompanying Republican gains in the congressional races.

My fears that the Democrats could blow the chance to defeat Trump were reawakened by the political events emerging in the wake of the federal government shutdown. When following the unified leadership of Pelosi and Schumer, the Democrats drove Trump’s job approval ratings sharply down in the wake of the shutdown standoff (e.g., Gallup had Trump’s job approval down to 37% in its January 2-10th polling with a job approval rating of only 31% among Independents) to levels that could not sustain Trump’s re-election. Then Trump delivered a fumble free State of the Union, followed by the Democrats suffering a stilted roll out attending the Green New Deal and the debacle of Representative Omar’s anti-Semitic spasm of statements.

The political impact of this triad was predictable, for it sent troubling signals to a mix of suburban, faith based and independent voters who are predisposed to believe in institutions. No surprise then when voters eyes were averted from Trump’s repeated assaults on institutions, that Trump’s job approval rating in Gallup bounced back to 44% and his disapproval dropped from 59% to 52% (February 1-10 data). If Trump is at 45% job approval in November of 2020, he could still win re-election.

Once things stabilized, Trump’s job approval in Gallup’s March 1-10 data stood at 39% to a disapproval rating of 57%. It will be interesting to see what the impact is on Trump’s poll ratings from the Mueller report, followed so closely by the Trump administration’s attack on the ACA in the courts and the public’s reaction to all that, as it settles into the body politic.

Actually, Trump’s political standing, as reflected in the polling data, reminds me of a basketball team that is behind the whole game, but only trails by about five points heading into the last few minutes of the game. Experienced basketball fans know if the other team is not careful, that lead could vanish down stretch (e.g., the close of the 2016 campaign).

Democrats therefore have a choice heading into in 2020 presidential campaign. Would Democrats rather be right (in the eyes of their base) or would they rather elect a President by reforming the Blue Wall in the rust belt and by winning at least two of the four tough states starting to tilt away from the Republicans demographically (e.g., Florida, North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona)?

I am uncertain as to the choice Democratic candidates and their campaigns will ultimately make. That is why I feel confident concluding that Trump has no business winning re-election, but the Democrats could still lose next year’s presidential election.

  • Politics
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Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

Related Articles:

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  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
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The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

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  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

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  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

Core argument: Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
  2. Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
  3. Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. American patriotism, measured by those "extremely proud" to be American, tracks closely with which party controls the presidency, with partisan gaps widening sharply over time. Republican pride swings ~14 points between administrations, while Democratic pride has collapsed from 58% to 14% across the same period.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

Core argument: Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
  2. Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
  3. Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government — A Pew study finds that only 15% of Americans trust the Federal government to do what is right “most of the time,” down from ~75% in 1960. A secular drop…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Politics

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all U.S. states in business investment and population growth, creating roughly 20% of net new jobs nationally from 2020 to 2025, and is on track to surpass California as the largest U.S. economy.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas replacing California as America's economic powerhouse?

Core argument: Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.
  2. ExxonMobil’s reincorporation in Texas signals a broader corporate migration that leads to revenue losses for high-tax states like California and.
  3. Texas’s economic dominance positions it to surpass California’s GDP, prompting competitive tax and regulatory reforms across North Carolina, Tennessee, and.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
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