Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. New-car dealerships, alcohol distributors, and construction contractors represent distinct tiers of revenue concentration, with dealerships showing the highest share of locations clearing $5m+ (~60%), followed by alcohol distributors (~26%), and contractors (~4%).

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
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Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick estimate that as of 2021, 4,075 American auto dealers, 479 beverage distributors, and 6,418 contractors generated at least $25mm in annual revenue

Core argument: Of 21,622 new-car dealerships, 13,826 locations clear $5M annually and 4,114 exceed $25M, making auto retail one of the highest-density industries for mid-market revenue concentration.

There are 21,622 new-car dealerships with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns. We estimate that more than half of them take in at least $5 million a year; in the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 13,826 dealer locations clear $5 million and 4,114 clear $25 million. There are 4,742 beer, wine, and spirits wholesalers with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns. We estimate that about a quarter of them take in at least $5 million a year; in the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 1,232 distributor locations clear $5 million and 491 clear $25 million. There are 780,257 construction businesses with employees, according to the Census’s County Business Patterns—building, heavy civil, and specialty trade contractors. Anyone with a truck and a license can enter. We estimate that only about 4% of them take in at least $5 million a year. In the Dun & Bradstreet business records, 33,752 contractor locations clear $5 million and 6,525 clear $25 million.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Of 21,622 new-car dealerships, 13,826 locations clear $5M annually and 4,114 exceed $25M, making auto retail one of the highest-density industries for mid-market revenue concentration.
  2. Beer, wine, and spirits wholesaling delivers outsized revenue per location: 491 of 4,742 distributor sites clear $25M, a ~10% hit rate reflecting the sector’s structural consolidation and volume economics.
  3. Construction’s low barriers to entry suppress revenue scale: only ~4% of 780,257 contractor businesses clear $5M annually, versus more than half of new-car dealerships at the same threshold.

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AI Summary. Over 53mn Chinese workers are employed in food delivery and ridesharing, with flexible and gig work projected to reach 320mn workers, reflecting weak aggregate demand that reduces worker bargaining power and forces acceptance of underemployment.

Thomas Hale and William Langley Financial Times
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There are ~320mm “flexible workers” in China including ~53mm food delivery or rideshare drivers whose ranks have grown by ~10mm in the last two years. Flexible work is serving as a “shock absorber” in the face of broad-based labor market weakness.

Does weak demand push workers into lower-paying gig jobs?

Core argument: Flexible employment in China is on track to reach 320mn workers in 2025, up from 280mn the prior year—a 14% rise that reflects broad labour market weakness rather than platform-driven opportunity.

Flexible employment, an official term that is vaguely defined, implies a broader scope than gig work. It stood at 200mm in 2021 [including] part-time work and self-employment as well as “new forms of employment.” More than 53mm people as of 2025 work as food delivery or ridesharing drivers in China, up 10mm in two years, estimates the China New Employment Forms Research Center. [They] estimate that flexible employment will hit 320mm this year, up from 280mm last year. Andrew Batson, China research director at Gavekal, suggests flexible employment and gig work are “more of a symptom of broad-based labour market weakness in China than a totally independent development…Because aggregate demand is low, the bargaining power of workers is weaker, and they have to accept more underemployment and less favourable working conditions."

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Flexible employment in China is on track to reach 320mn workers in 2025, up from 280mn the prior year—a 14% rise that reflects broad labour market weakness rather than platform-driven opportunity.
  2. Over 53mn Chinese workers are employed as food delivery or ridesharing drivers as of 2025, a figure that has grown by 10mn in two years, driven by weak aggregate demand forcing workers into underemployment.

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  • China’s Youth Unemployment Rate Edges Down In May As Economic Strains Persist — China's youth unemployment rate (ages 16–24, excluding students) fell to 15.6% in May but remains above the 14.9% recorded a year earlier. A record 12.7m graduates entering the labor market this summer is expected to tighten conditions further.
  • Chinese Student High-Flyers Set Sights On Police and Military Academies — Top-scoring Chinese students are increasingly choosing police and military academies over elite universities, with admission scores for some programmes reaching 650+/750 — placing them within 3 points of the country's most prestigious university. Public-sector job security is driving high achievers toward state institutions, with military academy entrants ranking on average
  • China Says Hostile Foreign Forces Are Driving Its Youth to Slack Off — Youth unemployment and disillusionment in China have driven millions of young people to reject work and ambition entirely. The Chinese government attributes this trend to foreign ideological influence rather than domestic economic conditions such as scarce well-paying jobs.

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
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Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

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  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
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In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.
  2. Guaranteed income transfers reduced partner labor supply, with statistically significant declines in promotions and job transitions, though effect sizes were small.
  3. partner hours and employment showed larger but statistically insignificant declines.

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John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
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Using OECD skills data and the Luxembourg Income Study, Burn-Murdoch finds US workers at the lowest levels of literacy and numeracy earn ~ on par with British workers scoring a 2, ~ a mean score.

30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old. The same proportion of US workers who score stunningly low on literacy earn an average of almost $30 per hour, and two-thirds of them are in work. Their British counterparts make the equivalent of $20 and fewer than half are employed. This all looks more like the fruits of years of stronger growth than vocational education policy. We should view education as creating potential that a strong economy unleashes (and a weak one disappoints).

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Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
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A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

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Joel Suss Financial Times
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In advanced economies, increases in labor productivity growth have decoupled from real wage growth, especially post-1980.

In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead. US Labour productivity — measured as real GDP per hour worked — is now more than five times greater than in 1947, whereas real hourly compensation is only about three times greater. Median wage growth has lagged even further behind productivity growth, with inequality pushing the average wage higher than the median. (The figures above show average rather than median wages; plotting median wages would show an even greater divergence.)

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AI Summary. Japan's Engel coefficient — the share of household income spent on food — reached a 25-year high of 30.75%, one of the highest in the developed world, as import-driven inflation eroded real wages and intensified household cost pressures despite headline inflation of only 1.5%.

Leo Lewis Financial Times
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Reflation in Japan has left real wages below their 2020 level, though headline inflation is only running at a modest 1.5%.

Is Japan's cost-of-living crisis worse than headline inflation suggests?

Core argument: Japan's Engel coefficient reached a 25-year peak of 30.75% in December — among the highest in the developed world — as import-driven food costs consumed a rising share of household income against a backdrop of 1.5% headline inflation.

[Japan’s] return to what is, in global and historical terms, modest headline inflation of 1.5% feels, for many households, like a severe cost of living crisis, as real wage increases have failed, until recently, to match the costs of more expensive imports. Japan’s Engel coefficient, a “pain index” that measures the proportion of household income spent on food, stood at a 25-year peak of 30.75% in December — one of the highest in the developed world.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan's Engel coefficient reached a 25-year peak of 30.75% in December — among the highest in the developed world — as import-driven food costs consumed a rising share of household income against a backdrop of 1.5% headline inflation.
  2. Stagnant real wage growth relative to import-cost inflation converted Japan's historically modest 1.5% price cycle into a household purchasing-power crisis felt acutely across consumer spending.

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