Does China's trade surplus mask a deeper problem with domestic spending power?
Core argument: China’s $1.1tn trade surplus in 2025 reflects systematic spending transfers from households to businesses and governments, depressing domestic consumption relative.
In 2025, the last full year for which we have data, Chinese residents sold about $4.5T in goods and services to people in the rest of the world, but spent just $3.4T on goods and services produced outside of China. Improved “competitiveness” simply cannot explain the rise in China’s economy-wide trade surplus with the rest of the world. Instead, the source of China’s post-pandemic surplus is systematic transfers of spending power from ordinary Chinese to businesses, local governments, and foreign consumers. These transfers depress consumer spending and imports relative to production, investment, and exports. The best way to address (many of) the concerns of China’s trade partners is to raise the living standards of most Chinese people. It is better to start from the beginning and remember that the trade balance is the same thing as domestic production minus domestic demand. The initial downturn was caused by the (planned) withdrawal of consumer subsidies, which were completely ended in 2020. That coincided with falling spending on new vehicles, and therefore falling production by Chinese producers. Production gradually recovered, but domestic demand did not. Instead, the additional output all went towards exports.

