Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
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U.S. Tax Progressivity and Redistribution

AI Summary. The U.S. tax code has become more progressive, with average federal tax rates for the bottom fifth of households falling from 9.3% to 1.7% while the top fifth fell from 27.1% to 26.5%, largely due to expanded tax credits for low-income individuals.

David Splinter National Tax Law Journal
Date Posted:
December 17, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The US tax code has become more progressive since 1979, largely driven by tax credits for low-income individuals. Progressivity has more than doubled since 1986, according to @DavidSplinter in the National Tax Law Journal.

Has the U.S. tax code become more progressive over time?

Core argument: Average federal tax rates for the bottom quintile fell 7.6 percentage points between 1979 and 2016, from 9.3% to 1.7%, while the top quintile's rate fell 0.6 percentage points, from 27.1% to 26.5%.

Since 1979, the U.S. tax code has become significantly more progressive, with progressivity more than doubling since 1986, primarily due to increased tax credits for low-income individuals. Between 1979 and 2016, average federal tax rates decreased by 7.6 percentage points for the bottom quintile, from 9.3% to 1.7%, while the top quintile saw a modest decrease of 0.6 percentage points, from 27.1% to 26.5%. The gap between tax rates of the top and bottom quintiles increased by 39% over this period and by 110% since 1986. The RS index of tax-and-transfer redistribution rose by 59%, indicating enhanced redistribution efforts. Despite lower marginal rates, the effective tax rate for the top 1% remained largely unchanged due to reduced use of tax shelters. These changes have offset a significant portion of market income inequality and reduced the number of individuals below real poverty thresholds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average federal tax rates for the bottom quintile fell 7.6 percentage points between 1979 and 2016, from 9.3% to 1.7%, while the top quintile's rate fell 0.6 percentage points, from 27.1% to 26.5%.
  2. U.S. tax progressivity has more than doubled since 1986, primarily due to increased tax credits for low-income individuals, with the gap between top and bottom quintile tax rates rising 110% since 1986 and 39% since 1979.
  3. The RS index of tax-and-transfer redistribution rose 59%, and the effective tax rate for the top 1% remained largely unchanged despite lower marginal rates, attributed to reduced use of tax shelters.

New Splinter using CBO data looks finds (as he has previously) that the progressivity of our tax code has increased significantly since 1979 and has more than doubled since 1986. This has been primarily driven by large tax credits for persons at the bottom, at the same time the average tax burdens of top earners have been relatively unchanged because lower marginal rates were offset by decreased use of tax shelters

The tax code has become more progressive“…Figure 2 presents average federal tax rates for the top, middle, and bottom quintiles. Between 1979 and 2016, tax rates decreased across the income distribution: for the top quintile by 0.6 percentage points (27.1 to 26.5 percent), for the middle quintile by 5.2 percentage points (19.1 to 13.9 percent), and for the bottom quintile by 7.6 percentage points (9.3 to 1.7 percent). The larger decline for those with lower incomes implies an increase in tax progressivity. Although a crude measure of progressivity, the gap between tax rates of the top and bottom quintiles increased by 39 percent over this period and since 1986 increased by 110 percent, suggesting a substantial increase in tax progressivity. Decreases in individual income taxes drove the overall decline in bottom- and middle quintile tax rates. The bottom-quintile decrease of 7.6 percentage points resulted from average income tax rates decreasing from zero to -11 percent and corporate tax rates decreasing about half a percentage point, with offsetting payroll and excise tax rate increases (Figure A1). The middle-quintile decrease of 5.2 percentage points resulted from average income tax rates decreasing 4 percentage points and corporate tax rates decreasing about 1 percentage point. The temporary middle-quintile decrease between 2008 and 2012 resulted from policies in response to the Great Recession: recovery rebates in 2008, making work pay credits in 2009 and 2010, and a payroll tax holiday in 2011 and 2012…. Figure 8 shows that between 1979 and 2016, the RS index of tax-and-transfer redistribution increased 59 percent (from 0.13 to 0.21). Since 1986, it increased 66 percent…

David Splinter, "U.S. Tax Progressivity and Redistribution,"National Tax Law Journal, December 2020, http://www.davidsplinter.com/Splinter-TaxProgressivity-NTJ.pdf

U.S. Tax Progressivity and Redistribution: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Core findings, “…This paper presents new estimates of both tax progressivity and redistribution between 1979 and 2016. Compared to other studies, these estimates are more recent, account for all federal taxes and the entire income distribution, and rely on mainstream tax incidence and income allocation assumptions. Federal tax progressivity increased 46 percent with the Kakwani index and 110 percent with the tax elasticity. Considering the effects of federal taxes and all transfers, the RS index of redistribution increased 59 percent.Tax progressivity fell sharply in the early 1980s, meaning it increased more dramatically since 1986, with the Kakwani index doubling and the tax elasticity tripling. More generous refundable tax credits in this period were a primary cause of increasing tax progressivity. Over the longer run, studies showing earlier progressivity decreases suggest a U-shaped tax progressivity curve since WWII, with the minimum occurring in 1986. For recent decades, these findings are consistent with other estimates showing that taxes and transfers have offset a significant portion of the increase in market income inequality, as shown by OECD (2011), Auten and Splinter (2019a), Elwell, Corinth, and Burkhauser (2020), and the Congressional Budget Office. In addition, changes in taxes and transfers dramatically reduced the number of individuals below real poverty thresholds (Burkhauser et al., 2019) and subject to individual income taxes (Heim, Lurie, and Pearce, 2017; Splinter, 2019a). These long-term patterns of redistribution moved independently from the decrease in top individual income tax rates because a small share of tax returns has been subject to top rates. Moreover, high top rates in earlier decades accompanied significant income sheltering — but this sheltering declined as the gap between corporate and individual tax rates narrowed, such that corrected average top tax rates have been relatively flat since 1960….”

U.S. Tax Progressivity and Redistribution: Extended Excerpt Image 2


The Top 1%’ effective tax rate has been largely unchanged despite lower marginal tax rates, “…But Figure 5 shows that top 1 percent average income tax rates did not fall with the top rate — instead, they increased or at least remained flat. This disconnect between top statutory rates and average rates follows from two effects: a small share of taxpayers being subject to the top rate and reduced use of corporate tax shelters.Both the number of taxpayers and the share of income subject to the top rate was insubstantial in the early 1960s, meaning it had an irrelevant impact on overall progressivity. In the early 1960s, the top rate was paid by only 0.001 percent of tax units, or fewer than 500 tax returns. Except for a few years with two rate brackets, the share paying the top rate remained small: 0.06 percent in 1979 (top rate of 70 percent), 0.31 percent in 1985 (top rate of 50 percent), and 0.60 percent in 2016 (top rate of 39.6 percent)….”

  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
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Showing 158 database articles primarily about Inequality

Heritability and Social Interaction in Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Population of Twins in the United States

AI Summary. The authors estimate the heritability of labor market outcomes by comparing the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins with the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings. They caution that social interaction between twins, assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or indirect parental effects can bias such estimates upward or make them reflect non-genetic influences.

David Card, Jesse Rothstein and Moises Yi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
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Important

Analysis of 44,500 twin pairs suggests ~one-third of the variation in log earnings is due to genetic differences – likely an upper bound, because same-sex twins may influence one another and share more similar environments than ordinary same-sex siblings.

How reliable are twin-based estimates of heritability in earnings?

Core argument: The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.

Our model identifies heritability from the difference-in-differences of same-sex vs. opposite-sex twins vs. siblings. [Specifically], the model attributes to genetic differences the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins over and above the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical. The ordinary-sibling comparison is intended to remove family influences that differ between sons and daughters. Social interactions may lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings. The estimated heritability of outcomes may be biased in the presence of assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or violations of the assumption that the home environment is shared to the same degree for MZ as for DZ twins. Even when estimated without bias, heritability need not indicate direct genetic effects – it also may reflect indirect or cultural effects (e.g., effects of the parents’ genes on a child’s outcomes, not operating through the child’s own genes. Twins may [also] influence each other directly – for example in their choice of jobs -- inflating the correlation in their outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.
  2. Social interactions between twins, such as influencing each other’s job choices, may inflate the correlation in their outcomes and lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings.
  3. Estimated heritability may be biased by assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or unequal sharing of the home environment between identical and fraternal twins, and even unbiased estimates may reflect indirect or cultural effects such as parents’ genes.

Related Articles:

  • IQ Differences of Identical Twins Reared Apart Are Significantly Influenced by Educational Differences — An analysis of 87 identical-twin pairs raised apart with individual IQ and biographical data finds that pairs with similar schooling had an average IQ gap of 5.8 points and a correlation of 0.87, while educationally dissimilar pairs averaged a 12.8-point gap and a 0.75 correlation.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • A Chip Off the Old Block? Genetics and the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status — Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

AI Summary. In New York City, income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than nationally, with nearly two-thirds of real income growth accruing to the top 1% versus under 40% nationally, a divergence driven predominantly by non-wage income. Real median income fell, and real average income for the bottom 90% was essentially flat.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is rising income concentration in a major city driven by non-wage income?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.
  2. Real median income in New York City fell between 2019 and 2024 and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat, with local-price-adjusted purchasing power for the lower 90% of New Yorkers close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally.
  3. The divergence at the top of New York City's distribution is predominantly a story of non-wage income, with wage and salary income widening much more mildly and occupational wage data excluding bonuses showing base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than higher-wage ones.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of World War II, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Employees' share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace in recent years.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are corporate profits taking a record share of national income from workers?

Core argument: US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
  2. Employees' share of national income from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace over the past five years and especially the past 12 months.
  3. Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan, said that regardless of the measure used, workers have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. An analysis of about 7,000 billionaires over the past 25 years classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it derives from inheritance or from sectors such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials that often depend on political access. The authors find half of global billionaire wealth now comes from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, an all-time high.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Is a growing share of billionaire wealth self-made in competitive industries?

Core argument: For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.
  2. A list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years, assembled from Forbes, Hurun and Gapminder data, classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence and raw materials, which often depend on political access.
  3. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth, which counts inheritors, rose slightly from 2001 to 2014, and the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined since 2021.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. The authors estimate that about $200bn of “missing” labor compensation would account for roughly a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, which workers owning a bit above 10% of corporate profits through stock compensation would cover. Spread across the 4.2m top-decile public company employees, that implies about $40,000 in additional pay each.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database
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Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does stock compensation explain part of the falling labor share?

Core argument: The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.
  2. The authors estimate that roughly $200 billion of "missing" labor compensation would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, a sum covered if workers owned somewhat above 10% of corporate profits via stock compensation.
  3. Spread across the 4.2 million employees in the top 10% of public company workforces, that amount would imply about $40,000 in additional pay each, which the authors consider plausible as pay shifted into corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity-based pay has grown to nearly 45% of total compensation for high-skilled workers, and counting it reduces the measured decline in labor share since the 1980s by over 60% while turning the high-skilled labor share decline into an increase of almost 1%. Such workers own 7% of public companies, earning over $85bn annually in equity compensation.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Do initial wealth disadvantages among immigrant groups persist across generations?

Core argument: Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
  2. Roughly 30 million Europeans arrived during the Age of Mass Migration, spanning about 1850 to 1924, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet all are included in average white wealth.
  3. The United States Immigration Commission Reports, known as the Dillingham Commission Reports, indicate that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth, so a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage.

Related Articles:

  • The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rla — Correcting for measurement error by using relative rather than absolute correlations among relatives, the authors estimate that educational intergenerational mobility in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than conventionally measured, with parent-child and sibling correlations much higher. They argue Nordic education spending and income compression have at best modestly reduced families' role in children's educational outcomes.
  • 00 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Across the 1978 to 1992 birth cohorts, adult household incomes fell for white children raised in low-income families and rose for those raised in high-income families, increasing the intergenerational persistence of income ranks among white children by 28%. Over the same cohorts, adult incomes rose for Black children at all parental income levels.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Mobility/Assortative Mating
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