Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 273
  • Primary focus 104
Showing 104 database articles primarily about Fiscal Deficits
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove Fiscal Deficits
  • Remove "primary topics only" restriction
  • Remove 'Database'
Show all 7,289 articles
For whatever topics you select (currently: Fiscal Deficits):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

Why Is Europe More Equal Than The United States

AI Summary. The US redistributes a larger share of national income to the bottom 50% than any European country, with net transfers of 6% of national income versus about 4% in Western and Northern Europe. Europe taxes and redistributes more overall, 47% of national income versus 35%, relying more on indirect taxes.

Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel and Amory Gethin Paris School Of Economics
Date Posted:
June 7, 2022
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The US redistributes a larger fraction of its national income to the poorest 50% than any European country, with the bottom 50% receiving a net transfer of 6% of national income in 2017.

Does the US redistribute more income to the bottom half than Europe?

Core argument: The bottom 50% in the US received a net transfer of 6% of national income in 2017, versus about 4% in Western and Northern Europe and under 3% in Eastern Europe.

Despite the common perception that Europe is more redistributive, the US redistributes a larger fraction of its national income to the poorest 50% than any European country. In 2017, the bottom 50% in the US received a net transfer of 6% of national income, compared to about 4% in Western and Northern Europe and less than 3% in Eastern Europe. This is partly due to the US tax-and-transfer system being more progressive, with the top 10% seeing their income decrease by 8% after taxes and transfers, compared to about 4% in Western and Northern Europe. However, Europe taxes and redistributes a larger share of its national income overall (47% vs. 35% in the US), with higher indirect taxes that disproportionately affect low-income earners. Additionally, Europe's more developed public pension systems contribute to higher redistribution estimates when pensions are included in analyses.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The bottom 50% in the US received a net transfer of 6% of national income in 2017, versus about 4% in Western and Northern Europe and under 3% in Eastern Europe.
  2. The US tax-and-transfer system is more progressive at the top, with the top 10% seeing income fall 8% after taxes and transfers, compared with about 4% in Western and Northern Europe.
  3. Europe taxes and redistributes 47% of national income versus 35% in the US, with higher indirect taxes that disproportionately affect low-income earners and more developed public pension systems.

Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel and Amory Gethin, "Why Is Europe More Equal Than The United States,"Paris School Of Economics, November 9, 2021, https://wid.world/document/why-is-europe-more-equal-than-the-united-states-world-inequality-lab-wp-2020-19/

“…Why do our conclusions contradict the standard view on redistribution in Europe and the US? We find that this is the case for three main reasons. First, OECD estimates rely exclusively on surveys, while we systematically distribute the entire national income by combining surveys with tax data and national accounts. Second, standard estimates of redistribution only allocate direct taxes and transfers to individuals, thereby ignoring corporate taxes, indirect taxes, and in-kind transfers. Distributing these components of government revenue and expenditure reverts the rankings of Europe and the US in terms of redistribution. This is because indirect taxes are much higher in Europe than in the US and fall disproportionately on low-income earners. Third, our benchmark measure of redistribution compares pretax incomes to Post tax incomes, while the standard view tends to compare factor incomes (sometimes referred to as market incomes) to posttax incomes. Because many European countries have a greater share of pensioners than the United States, and because public pension systems are much more developed in Europe than in the US, including pensions in the analysis leads to increasing estimates of redistribution more in the former than in the latter. However, as we now show, our conclusions are strongly robust to using one or the other of these two income concepts….”

Predistribution vs. Redistribution: Revisiting the Europe-US inequality gap

“…Figure VIIa directly answers this question by representing the share of national income transferred by the tax-and-transfer system between pretax income groups in Eastern Europe, Western and Northern Europe, and the United States in 2017. The bottom 50% and the middle 40% are net beneficiaries of redistribution in all three regions, but the US tax-and-transfer system appears to be unequivocally more progressive. The bottom 50% in the US received a positive net transfer of 6% of national income in 2017, compared to about 4% inWestern and Northern Europe and less than 3% in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the top 10% saw their average income decrease by 8% of national income in the US after taxes and transfers, compared to about 4% in Western and Northern Europe and 3% in Eastern Europe. The middle 40% benefits slightly more from redistribution in the US (2%) than in Europe (less than 1%)….”

The Net Impact of Taxes and Transfers on Inequality

“…FigureVIbprovides a complementary picture of the magnitude and progressivity of government expenditure by plotting total transfers received by the bottom 50% in European countries and the United States, expressed as a share of national income. The US ranks third in terms of the smallest share of national income transferred to the bottom 50% (about 13%), due mainly to lower expenditure on pensions. In Europe, transfers received by the poorest half of the population are smallest in Serbia (11%), followed by Romania (12%), Estonia (14%), and Poland (14%). Meanwhile, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland stand out as the European countries allocating the greatest share of national income to the poorest half of the population (22-23%, corresponding to slightly less than half of all government revenue in these countries)….”

“…As for taxes, total government expenditure is significantly lower in the US (35% of national income) than in Europe (47%).36 The difference between the two regions is due to cash transfers, which represent 9% of national income in the US compared to 23% in Europe. Within cash transfers, pensions are the aggregate that differs the most between the two regions (16% of national income in Europe versus 5% in the US), followed by family and social assistance transfers (5% vs. 3%) and unemployment and disability benefits (1.6% vs. 1.4%). Meanwhile, in-kind transfers in health, education, and other collective government expenditure are very similar in Europe and the US (25-26%, of which about 7% goes to health). Total government expenditure is higher in Northern Europe (51% of national income) and Western Europe (48%) than in Eastern Europe (42%), due mainly to the larger size of social assistance transfers (5% inWestern and Northern Europe vs. 3.5% in Eastern Europe) and in-kind transfers (29% vs. 25% vs. 23%, respectively) in Western and Northern Europe. Figure VIa presents the distribution of transfers across posttax income groups in Europe and the US, expressed as a share of posttax national income. Unsurprisingly, transfers are progressive in both the US and Europe: they represent over 60% of the posttax incomes of bottom deciles, compared to less than 30% of those of the top 1%. Pensions represent a smaller share of posttax income in the US than in Europe for all posttax income groups, while the distribution of other cash transfers is relatively similar between the two regions. Health payments are the most progressive type of transfers. In Europe, this is directly due to the fact that we distribute health expenditure on a lump-sum basis, assuming as a first approximation that all individuals benefit from the same in-kind transfer (see methodology). Health expenditure is also highly progressive in the United States, where public health spending is significant and targeted towards the very poor (via Medicaid). Other in-kind transfers are neither progressive nor regressive, because we assume that they are distributed proportionally to posttax disposable income (we come back to this assumption in the next section)…”

The Structure and Distribution of Transfers

“…By doing so and by narrowing down the analysis to the employed and working-age (20-64) population, the analysis remains consistent and cross-country comparisons meaningful. The main conclusions are unchanged. Because social contributions fall on labor income and are generally set at fixed rates, they tend to be flat for most groups within the bottom 90% and regressive at the top. This turns the tax systems of Western and Northern European countries into approximately flat tax systems, while those of most Eastern European countries become strongly regressive at the top end of the distribution. Because social contributions are smaller in the United States than in Europe, the US tax system remains more progressive than that of all European countries (with the exception of the UK)….”

“…Figure Vb ranks European countries and the United States according to a simple measure of tax progressivity: the ratio of the total tax rate faced by the top 10% to that of the bottom 50%. The composition of bars correspond to the composition of taxes paid by the top 10%. The US stands out as the country with the highest level of tax progressivity: the top decile faces a tax rate that is more than 70% higher than that of the poorest half of the population. By this measure, the European country with the most progressive tax system is the United Kingdom, followed by Norway, the Czech Republic, and France. Many European countries have values close to 1 on this indicator, corresponding to relatively flat tax systems, in which top income groups face a tax rate approximately equal to that of the bottom 50%....”

“..Figure Va represents the level and composition of non-contributory taxes paid by pretax income group in Eastern Europe, Western and Northern Europe, and the United States in the past decade.34 Two results clearly stand out. First, while taxes paid are lower in the US than in Europe for most pretax income groups, the taxation profile is unambiguously more progressive in the United States. The top 1% face a tax rate higher than 30% in the US, which is relatively comparable to what we observe in Western and Northern Europe. Meanwhile, bottom income groups are taxed an average rate that is nearly twice as small in the US as in Europe. Second, the difference in tax progressivity between the two regions is mainly driven by indirect taxes, which represent a significantly larger share of national income in Europe than in the US. These taxes tend to be regressive, because they are paid proportionally to consumption…”

“…Before investigating the distributional impact of taxes, it is useful to briefly compare the size and composition of government revenue in Europe and the United States.33 In 2007-2017, taxes and social contributions amounted to 47% of national income in Europe, compared to 28% in the United States. The United States collected less tax revenue than any European country, from Romania (32%), the country with lowest tax revenue, to Denmark (57%), which displayed the highest tax to national income ratio. The gap between the two regions was driven by two components of revenue: social contributions, which represented 19% of national income in Europe versus 8% in the US, and indirect taxes (14% versus 7%). Meanwhile, both regions collected comparable amounts of revenue from income and wealth taxes (10-11%) and from corporate income taxes (3%). The macroeconomic tax rate was larger in Northern Europe (52%) than in Western Europe (48%) and Eastern Europe (41%), due mostly to the larger share of national income collected in income and corporate taxes. If one excludes contributory social contributions from the analysis (that is, contributions financing the pension and unemployment systems), then the gap between Europe and the US decreases but remains significant: 23% of national income was collected in non-contributory taxes in the US in 2007-2017, compared to 30% in Europe….”

The Structure and Distribution of Taxes

“…TableIVprovides a more detailed picture of the rise of pretax income inequality by showing the real average annual income growth of selected income groups in our four regions of interest over the 1980-2017 and 2007-2017 periods.30 National incomes grew at a modest yearly rate in the past four decades in Europe and the US: 1% in Western Europe, 1.2% in Eastern Europe, 1.4% in the US, and 1.8% in Northern Europe. In all regions, however, growth rates have been markedly higher the further one moves towards the top end of the distribution. The average pretax income of the top 1% thus rose at a rate of 1.9% in Western Europe, 3.2% in Northern Europe, 3.3% in the US, and 3.8% in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, middle-income groups saw their average pretax incomes grow at a rate closer to the average of the full population in all regions. The bottom 20% benefited the least from real national income growth: their average income increased at a rate of 1.2% in Northern Europe and 0.7% in Western Europe, while it decreased at a rate of 1.3% in Eastern Europe and fell on average by 1.1% every year in the United States….”

“..The US ranks third of all the countries considered here, with an increase in the top 10% share of almost 14 percentage points. In Western Europe, Germany is the country where the top 10% share grew the most (+ 9 percentage points)…”

“…We now turn to documenting the evolution of pretax income inequality in Europe and the US. FigureIIashows the evolution of the top 10% pretax income share in the US, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Northern Europe from 1980 to 2017. The United States remained more unequal than most European countries throughout the entire period, but the gap between Europe and the US has widened significantly over time.27Indeed, the top 10% rose most rapidly and steadily in the US (from 34% to 48%), followed by Eastern Europe (from 24% to 36%), Western Europe (from 30% to 35%), and Northern Europe (from 26% to 31%). From 1980 to 2017, Eastern Europe shifted from being the least unequal to the most unequal European region. A significant part of this change occurred between 1989 and 1995, following thedisintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition of Eastern European countrie to market economies…”

The Distribution of Pretax Income Growth

“…How do pretax incomes vary in Europe and the United States today? Table III provides a first answer to this question by displaying the average incomes and income shares of key income groups in Western Europe, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, and the US in 2017. The average national income per adult stood at e52,700 in the US at purchasing power parity, compared to e44,900 in Northern Europe, e35,300 in Western Europe, and e21,700 in Eastern Europe. In Europe, only Norway (e55,000) and Luxembourg (e102,000) have higher average national incomes than the US.23Things look very different at the bottom of the pretax income distribution. Thebottom 50% earned only about e12,300 in the US in 2017, compared to e21,600 inNorthern Europe and e14,600 in Western Europe. Of the twenty-seven countriesconsidered in this paper, the US thus ranks third in terms of average national incomeper adult but nineteenth when it comes to the average income of the poorest 50%.24On average, pretax income inequality at the bottom is lowest in Northern Europe(with a bottom 50% share of 24%), followed by Western Europe (21%) and EasternEurope (20%). With a bottom 50% pretax income share of only 11.7%, the US is byfar the most unequal of all countries, followed by a distant Serbia (16%) and veryfar from the values observed in the Czech Republic, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden(all above 25%).25These differences appeared even more pronounced at the verybottom of the distribution: the average income of the poorest 20% was e11,600 inNorthern Europe in 2017, more than three times larger than its counterpart in theUnited States (e3,800).The same differences are visible at the top end of the distribution: the top 1% captured 21% of total pretax income in the US in 2017, compared to 12% in Eastern Europe, 11% in Western Europe, and less than 9% in Northern Europe. In 2017, the top 0.001% average pretax income exceeded e92 million in the US, nearly ten times the value observed in Northern Europe. The European countries with lowest top 1% income shares are the Netherlands, Slovenia, Iceland, Belgium, and Finland (less than 9%), while those with highest top income concentration are Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Poland (13-15%).26 In summary, while the US stands out as being richer than most European countries today, differences in average national incomes mask substantial heterogeneity. With inequality levels surpassing by far those observed in any European country, theUS displays bottom pretax average incomes that barely exceed those observed inpoorer Eastern European countries. In contrast, the lower inequality levels and higheraverage incomes observed in Northern Europe imply significantly better standardsof living for the majority of the population than in the United States….”

“..The efforts made by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to harmonize existing surveys, for instance, have been extremely helpful to improve the comparability of pre-2000 inequality statistics in Europe. Yet, because of sampling issues and misreporting at the top of the income distribution, surveys can picture evolutions that are inconsistent with those suggested by tax data. In this paper, we combine for the first time all these sources in a meaningful way, using new techniques and a consistent methodology. We show that correcting for the weaknesses of existing estimates does lead to substantively different conclusions on the level and evolution of inequality in Europe, the distributive impact of taxes and transfers, and how inequality and redistribution compare across European countries….”

Core Evidence

“..the main reason for Europe’s relative resistance to the rise of inequality has little to do with the direct impact of taxes and transfers. While Western and Northern European countries redistribute a larger fraction of output than the US (about 47% of national income is taxed and redistributed in Europe versus 35% in the US), the distribution of taxes and transfers does not explain the large gap between Europe and US posttax inequality levels. Quite the contrary: after accounting for all taxes and transfers, the US appears to redistribute a greater fraction of its national income to the poorest 50% than any European country. This finding stands in sharp contrast with the widespread view that “redistribution”, not “predistribution”, explains why Europe is less unequal than the US (e.g.,OECD, 2008;2011). In other words, Europe has been much more successful than the US at ensuring that its low-income groups benefit from relatively good-paying jobs. We show that the differences between our conclusions and those of the OECD are driven by several factors, including the greater underrepresentation of top incomes in US surveys, the fact that we account for indirect taxes and in-kind transfers, which are moreprogressive in the US than in Europe overall, and the inclusion of pensions in the definition of pretax income….”

“…Between 1980 and 2017, the share of pretax income that accrued to the richest 1% Europeans rose from 8% to 11% before taxes and transfers and from 7% to 9% after taxes and transfers. In the US, the top 1% pretax income share rose from 11% to 21% over the same period, and the top 1% post tax income share from 9% to 16%....”

Steve Notes

The bottom 20% in the US earn effectively zero, suggesting they don’t have jobs vs Northern Europe,which earns 21.6 euros suggesting they have significant jobs. That seems like apples to oranges. The amount transferred to the bottom 20% in the US seems very small compared to the amount calculated in the table we made of the many experts estimating the amounts. 6k euros vs tens of thousands of dollars. Lastly, they mix retirees with the poor so straightforward comparisons are very complicated/impossible. Perhaps they break them out in the online data table.

And also

3.2 delta/36.6 (average national income per capita) = 8.7% vs the chart above, which says 4.4%. I did this for the other (three) countries and found the same result: the allocation in the table seemed to be twice the number in the chart. I only have the chart for the US and not the table. So I believe I have to double the number in the chart to produce an equivalent table. But that’s too bold a leap for me to use publicly. Perhaps I don’t understand the chart or my math is wrong. I interpret the chart to be: what percent of national income is being distributed to the bottom 50% on net (i.e. less taxes plus services). On net, the US distributes more to the poor than other countries and national income per capita is larger so dollar-wise (or euro-wise in this case) more gets distributed both percentage-wise and even more so dollar-wise. Several other things made my ears perks up: Not presenting a comparable US page is a red flag. They use Piketty and Saez data for the US. But those estimates were criticized by Auten and Splinter. Pages 67 and 68 in the appendix show the (supposedly real) growth in average income (both are inflated to 2017ppp adjusted euros). But what inflation index did they use for the US and Europe, and are those indexes similarly accurate? When you inflate/deflate over that long a time period, the indexes matter. I’m always leery of data that changes significantly in a couple years. The significant down tick in the US and uptick in Europe makes my ears perk up. Things seldom change quickly. And, as far as I know, the incomes of American lesser-skilled workers grew faster than the economy on average (so their share would be growing).

Taking France as an example. It says the difference between pre and post tax income for the bottom 50% is 4.4% of national income. 21.0 (post tax per capita income for the bottom 50%, measured in 2017 purchasing poser adjusted euros) - 17.8 (pretax income for the bottom 50%) = 3.2 delta between pre and post

They have a chart like this for each country which show the net effect (i.e., minus taxes plus services)

And also

Blanchet Comment, “The figure for net redistribution shows the aggregate amount of income that is redistributed (on net) to each group, while you are calculating the change in each group’s average income. That is where the factor 2 comes from. The bottom 50% receives 4.4% on national income on net, but since that is distributed across half of the population, the change in that group’s average is twice as large. We don't show the US in our appendix because for them we are not making our own estimates, but use the data from:https://gabriel-zucman.eu/usdina/We always use the GDP implicit price deflators as price indexes, which in principle are harmonized across countries to the same extent that GDP numbers are.”

Ed Comment: Here’s the summary:

Post tax

2017 euro

ppp

Next 30

Bottom 20

Avg income bottom 50% 2017 euros

Middle 40

avg

US

26.1

8.3

19.0

56.0 (1.0)

52.7 (1.0)

Germany

23.3

10.4

18.1

42.5 (1.32)

39.2 (1.34)

France

25.7

14.1

21.0

40.4 (1.38)

36.6 (1.44)

UK

22.4

11.4

18.0

37.2 (1.50)

34.3 (1.53)

Italy

19.0

6.3

13.9

35.1 (1.59)

29.6 (1.78)

Sweden

31.1

16.6

25.3

49.1 (1.14)

43.0 (1.23)

Finland

24.0

14.5

20.2

40.1 (1.40)

36.7 (1.44)

Denmark

30.4

16.1

24.7

50.4 (1.11)

45.7 (1.15)

I don’t fully understand the numbers and need you to look at the online database and call them. On pages 261, 276, 345 and 485 (France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) they have charts that look like this:

Ed Comment:Nowhere could I find an equivalent chart for the US except for pretax (i.e. before all their calculations)—Table III in the main report. I tried to calculate post tax US amounts myself but the I couldn’t reconcile the numbers. Perhaps they have a chart I couldn’t find. or we can find it in the online database. I fear they didn’t presenting one because the numbers aren’t as comparable as they want the reader to believe. (Post tax BTW is after subtracting taxes and adding back government services. The study says the poor in Europe are heavily taxed but receive more government services.) They do make post tax comparison in charts in the appendix see below

  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleJune 7, 2022America's Redistributive Welfare StateThe U.S. redistributes a larger fraction of national income to the bottom 50% than European countries, despite government spending accounting for a smaller share of national income (35% vs. 47% in Europe).Next articleJune 8, 2022Comparing Past and Present InflationAdjusting for changes in how housing inflation is measured reveals that achieving target inflation today requires disinflation similar to the Volcker era.
Showing 103 database articles primarily about Fiscal Deficits

Projections of Deficits and Debt Under Alternative Scenarios for Interest Rates and the Budget

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates rose to 1 percentage point above its baseline, federal debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP by 2056, 47 percentage points above baseline, with primary deficits averaging 2.3% of GDP and annual growth 0.1 percentage point slower.

CBO Staff Congressional Budget OffIce
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

If interest rates rise 1pp above CBO’s current extended baseline (a mean rate of 4% over 2026–2056), CBO projects federal debt held by the public will be 222% of GDP in 2056, versus 175% under the current baseline.

How much would higher interest rates raise projected federal debt?

Core argument: CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.

Under a scenario in which interest rates increased until they were 1 percentage point higher than in CBO’s extended baseline, primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—would average 2.3% of GDP over the 2026–2056 period, 0.2 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Debt held by the public would grow to 222 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Average annual GDP growth over the 2026–2056 period would be 0.1 percentage point slower than in CBO’s extended baseline, and the average interest rate on federal debt would be 0.7 percentage points higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
  2. Primary deficits, which exclude net outlays for interest, would average 2.3% of GDP over 2026–2056 in CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, 0.2 percentage points larger than in its extended baseline.
  3. Under CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, average annual GDP growth over 2026–2056 would be 0.1 percentage point slower and the average interest rate on federal debt 0.7 percentage points higher than in its extended baseline.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Estimated Fiscal Reaction Functions and the Calculation of Sustainable Government Net Debt Limits for the US and 24 Other OECD Countries

AI Summary. Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.

Mark Warshawsky American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.

How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?

Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.

Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
  2. If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
  3. A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?

AI Summary. An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Refinancing the entire US debt stock at the current five-year borrowing rate, on current growth forecasts, would require a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to hold the debt ratio stable, a fiscal consolidation of 4.7pp. In October 2025, it would have required 2.3pp.

How much belt tightening would rich countries need to stabilize debt?

Core argument: The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.

The Economist calculated what would happen if rich countries had to replace their entire debt stocks at today’s five-year bond yields, using IMF forecasts for nominal growth. Out of 22 countries, Britain would need to run the largest primary surplus, of about 1.5% of GDP, merely to keep its debt-to-GDP ratio stable. Italy and France are next, needing surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%, respectively. America is not far behind, requiring one of 1%. Japan can run a deficit of 0.8% since its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt. America is running a primary deficit of nearly 4% of GDP, meaning significant belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP is needed to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs. The situation is deteriorating fast as a result of persistent deficits and surging yields. Just a year ago America required an adjustment of more than two percentage points less than it does today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.
  2. America requires a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs while running a primary deficit of nearly 4%, implying belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP, by The Economist’s calculation.
  3. Japan can run a primary deficit of 0.8% of GDP and still keep its debt burden stable because its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt, while Italy and France need surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

Michael MacKenzie and Alice Gledhill Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields — The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform

AI Summary. A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.

Mark Warshawsky American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
July 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Warshawsky projects US debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, well above CBO’s 120% projection, as higher real rates and a dynamic Baumol cost-disease effect will increase healthcare spending relative to GDP in an aging economy.

Does modeling health spending and interest rates jointly raise debt projections?

Core argument: The model projects U.S. federal debt-to-GDP at 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, above CBO's 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056.

The Congressional Budget Office makes certain simplifying assumptions on health care spending, and is based on current law. By contrast, in the model presented in this paper, these variables are simultaneously determined by supply and demand, based on logical functional forms and parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis, and the model is based on current policy. This approach better reflects real economic relationships—between health care spending, the federal budget, and investment in capital—and changing underlying conditions, especially demographics. Within the next twenty or so years, the model predicts that federal government debt will grow significantly beyond historical experience, to be judged unsustainable because the real interest rate exceeds real economic growth. Debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, compared to CBO’s 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056. Real interest rates rise for several decades, ratcheting interest payments, deficits, and debt in a vicious cycle.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The model projects U.S. federal debt-to-GDP at 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, above CBO's 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056.
  2. The model judges the projected debt path unsustainable because the real interest rate exceeds real economic growth, with real rates rising for several decades and ratcheting up interest payments, deficits, and debt.
  3. Unlike CBO's current-law projections with simplifying assumptions on health care spending, the model determines these variables simultaneously through supply and demand under current policy, using functional forms and parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis.

Related Articles:

  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Intergovernmental Grants to School Districts and Educational Outcomes During the COVID-19 Pandemic

AI Summary. The authors find no statistically significant evidence that $190bn in federal emergency K-12 school aid mitigated pandemic learning loss or raised district spending. Districts qualifying for additional funds saw local revenues fall by $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of pre-pandemic average, roughly 80% from property taxes.

Jeffrey Clemens, Philip Hoxie and Stan Veuger National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Exploiting a discontinuity in K-12 public school districts’ qualification for Covid emergency funding (ESSR), Clemens et al find that the funds did not mitigate learning loss. To a large extent, local districts used them to lower property taxes.

Do federal emergency education grants reduce student learning loss?

Core argument: Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.

Emergency funding for K-12 public schools was an important component of recession spending packages during COVID, involving $190 billion in additional expenditure. We see no evidence that ESSER funds helped to mitigate learning loss, at least in the short run. We find no statistically significant evidence that districts increased expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022. We do find evidence that districts that qualified for additional ESSER funds had statistically significant reductions in local revenues that were in excess of their ESSER funds. This pass-through of federal funds may partially explain why ESSER had minimal impacts on learning loss for districts around the 5% poverty threshold. Our estimates suggest that over the three years, crossing the qualification cutoff for additional ESSER funds is associated with a $907 per pupil decrease in local revenues, or about 8% of the pre-COVID average. We show the decline in local revenues as an event study in Figure 3, which includes a flat pre-COVID trend in local revenues per pupil across the qualification threshold. In Table 5,Column 5 [], we can see that about 80% of the revenue decline came from decreases in revenues from property taxes, [which fell] by $718 per pupil across the 3 years. The findings apply specifically to districts in the neighborhood of the 5% poverty threshold for qualifying for additional ESSER funds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.
  2. About 80% of that local revenue decline came from property taxes, which fell by $718 per pupil across the three years.
  3. The authors find no evidence that ESSER emergency K-12 funding, totaling $190 billion, mitigated learning loss in the short run, and no statistically significant increase in district expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022.

Related Articles:

  • Aid for Incumbents: The Electoral Consequences of COVID-19 Relief — Using congressional representation as an instrument — an extra senator or representative per million residents predicts roughly $1,000 more aid per capita — the authors estimate that federal pandemic relief strongly predicts incumbent performance in state-wide elections.
  • What Do States Do with Fiscal Windfalls? Evidence from the Pandemic — The authors estimate that for every $1,000 per capita of federal pandemic aid committed to state and local governments, state revenues and expenditures each rose by roughly the same amount, with $379 going to general government spending and $72 to pension contributions. They find no statistically significant increases in healthcare, education, or infrastructure spending.
  • Spatial Spillovers and the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from Pandemic-Era Federal Aid for State and Local Governments — The authors estimate that each $878,000 in federal assistance to state and local governments created or preserved one state or local job-year, with about a third of the effect driven by spillovers from other states. Their confidence intervals rule out a cost below $428,000 per job-year, implying weaker employment support than during the global financial crisis.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12
      • Test Scores
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms