Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Why The US Pandemic Response Risks Widening The Economic Divide

James Politi and James Fontanella-Khan Financial Times
Date Posted:
June 18, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The US pandemic response may exacerbate economic inequality, mirroring post-financial crisis trends where wealth recovery favored the affluent.

The US pandemic response may exacerbate economic inequality, mirroring post-financial crisis trends where wealth recovery favored the affluent. While the wealthy saw rapid income and wealth restoration, many Americans experienced prolonged stagnation or permanent loss. Economist Michael Strain emphasizes that addressing low productivity growth is crucial, as it underpins broader economic challenges. With wages growing more slowly than GDP, businesses lack incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing technology, potentially stalling economic progress and widening the divide. This dynamic risks entrenching disparities, as those with capital benefit disproportionately from economic rebounds, leaving others behind.

“..“We are very much at risk of having this exacerbate inequality just like the financial crisis did,” says Heather Boushey, executive director of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, a left-leaning think-tank. “In the US after the financial crisis, it was the wealthy who saw their incomes and wealth come back fairly quickly, in the first couple of years, while the rest of America had to wait, and for many, in fact, wealth never recovered.”…Michael Strain, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank, says that focusing on limiting inequality should not be the immediate priority, arguing that other problems such as low productivity growth are more important to tackle….”

James Politi and James Fontanella-Khan, "Why The US Pandemic Response Risks Widening The Economic Divide,"Financial Times, June 18, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/d211f044-ecf9-4531-91aa-b6f7815a98e3

Ed Comment:Oy! High-skill productivity is growing faster than GDP because the investment opportunities (e.g., IT) exceed the supply of properly trained talent. Algebraically, if something grows faster than average, then something else must grow slower than average, namely low-skilled productivity. An unconstrained supply of low-skilled labor from low-skilled immigration, trade with low-wage economies, and automation exacerbates the problem. Growth will increase wages if the supply of labor is constrained, or employment if it’s not. US employment has grown twice as fast as Europe (and still America’s middle-class incomes are 30 to 70% higher). Were the supply of low-skilled workers constrained, high-skilled productivity growth would get transmitted to low-skilled productivity growth in the following way: Increasing demand for a limited supply of low-skilled labor would raise wages, which would prune off the least valuable work (e.g., landscaping), which would increase the marginal product of labor, which would raise wages. An unconstrained supply of low-skilled labor causes its productivity to grow slowly. Strain doesn’t see the above linkage to supply. (more below on that.) he thinks of productivity growth as an independent variable. Probably, in large part, because he sees it only linked to capital investment, like Pettis. Pettis uses a two factor model, instead of 3 factors—labor and capital, without talent. And weirdly he doesn’t start with causality. So business doesn’t invest if low-skill productivity is growing slower than GDP. And productivity doesn’t grow faster without investment. Unlike me, he never explains why productivity is growing slower than GDP. It just is. It’s empirically true. But he provides nothing more than a circular reason.I’m always surprised how much difficulty economists have following all the macro links around. In part, I think most economists lack the training, knowledge, brain power, and determination to think through all the linkages carefully. The also have a certain determination not to admit to themselves that certain truths are true—in this case, that low-skilled immigration increase the supply of labor, which reduces the marginal product of labor and wages. (in Glenn’s case, that the multiplier probably does justify his proposed investments and therefore they must be justified for humanitarian reasons.) The purpose of thinking is to stop thinking. In the case of low-skilled immigration, they are too quick to justify their wishful thinking (to support low-skilled immigration because it’s virtuously humanitarian) with “supply creates it’s own demand.” Yes, it does; but what at what marginal product of labor? Aside from the supply of labor (and capital per worker), the primary thing driving up the marginal product of low-skilled labor from “waiters waiting on waiters”, is the supply of high-skilled relative to the supply of low-skilled. Only I see that.

Michael Pettis Comment:According to this important article, “an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank, says that focusing on limiting inequality should not be the immediate priority, arguing that other problems are more important to tackle, such as the ‘slow rate of productivity growth’”. But what if the two problems are related? As long as wages grow more slowly than GDP, why would businesses invest in productivity-enhancing technology?With wages so low there is little pressure to do so (unlike in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when US wages were the highest in the world and rising rapidly). In fact it is more profitable for companies individually to force down wages, and with wages continuing to grow slowly, businesses collectively don’t face the demand for their products that justifies large increases in productivity-enhancing investment. This is a self-reinforcing process, and it is probably not a coincidence at all that the slowdown in American productivity growth overlaps with the rise in American income inequality. This by the way is also what happened in Germany after the 2003-04 labor reforms.

  • Business Cycle
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
Previous articleJune 17, 2020Race Problem or Crime Problem?Black Americans face homicide-related disparities that are disproportionately higher than other racial disparities, with a 500% higher likelihood of being murdered and a 600% higher likelihood of becoming a murderer compared to white Americans.Next articleJune 18, 2020Savings Gluts And Investment DroughtsGlobal savings glut has not led to a corresponding investment boom, raising questions about why surplus economies’ exported capital is consumed rather than invested by deficit economies.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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    • Innovation/Research
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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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