Edward Conard

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The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts RD, Artistic Creation

Peter Coy Bloomberg
Date Posted:
May 17, 2015
Is Database:
Database

The US Bureau of Economic Analysis has reclassified R&D & artistic creation as investments, boosting measured GDP by 2.7% & reflecting the growing importance of intangible assets in the economy. @PeterCoy

The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis has reclassified R&D and artistic creation as investments, significantly impacting GDP calculations. This change, effective July 31, will boost measured GDP by about 2.7%, reflecting the growing importance of intangible assets in the economy. Historically, business R&D was treated as an expense, but now it is recognized as a long-lived asset, akin to physical investments like factories. This shift aligns with the economic reality where companies like Apple derive only 4% of their market value from tangible assets. If all intangible investments were recorded, they would surpass tangible investments as a % of GDP. This reclassification underscores the increasing role of intellectual property and innovation in driving economic growth, although challenges remain in accurately measuring the value and depreciation of intangible assets. The revision aims to provide a clearer view of economic activity, aligning national accounts with modern business practices.

The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts RD, Artistic Creation: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Peter Coy, "The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts R&D, Artistic Creation," Bloomberg, July 18, 2013, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-18/the-rise-of-the-intangible-economy-u-dot-s-dot-gdp-counts-r-and-d-artistic-creation

The U.S. is set to count investment in movies, books, and ideas as part of the gross domestic product. It’s about time

On July 31, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis will rewrite history on a grand scale by restating the size and composition of the gross domestic product, all the way back to the first year it was recorded, 1929. The biggest change will be the reclassification—nay, the elevation—of research and development. R&D will no longer be treated as a mere expense, like the electricity bill or food for the company cafeteria. It will be categorized on the government’s books as an investment, akin to constructing a factory or digging a mine. In another victory for intellectual property, original works of art such as films, music, and books will be treated for the first time as long-lived assets.

It’s a great idea, if late. The BEA has the 20th century economy down cold. It can tell you about personal income trends in Anchorage, Alaska, or America’s annual output of rubber products and plastics. Now the agency is putting more attention on R&D—the lifeblood of the 21st century economy—by moving it from an experimental “satellite” account into the heart of measured GDP.

GDP is the main yardstick of macroeconomics—the sum total of all goods and services produced in the country. Business R&D was never counted in that total. It was considered an expense, an “intermediate input,” that ate into profit. Intangible investments such as R&D and the creation of artistic originals have been like physicists’ dark matter: influential but invisible. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said in a 2011 speech, “We will be more likely to promote innovative activity if we are able to measure it more effectively and document its role in economic growth.”

The effect of the revision will be immediate. Measured GDP will get a one-time boost of about 2.7 percent when the government starts counting R&D and artistic creation as investments. (New Mexico and Maryland will get the biggest lifts.) The future growth rate will probably be fractionally higher, too. With R&D treated as an investment, measured economic growth from 1959 to 2007 would have been 3.39 percent annually instead of 3.32 percent, the BEA estimates.

Of course, it’s hard to work up much excitement over an upward revision in historical GDP figures. It’s like being told that you’re happier than you thought you were: unconvincing. The “comprehensive revision” won’t raise wages or put anyone back to work. Then again, that’s not the BEA’s job.

Intangible investment is far from a faddish new idea. In 1908 the sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen used the phrase to encompass everything from advertising to design. A century before the iPad’s launch, he wrote of companies that give their goods “a more elegant finish for the sake of a readier sale, beyond what would conduce to their brute serviceability.” In the 1930s and 1940s, economist Joseph Schumpeter made intangibles the centerpiece of his theory that economies grow through innovation. Businesses, he observed, innovated to differentiate their products so they could charge higher prices.

Economic theory was ahead of accounting practice. Stage 1 for recognition of intangibles was the reclassification in 1999 of software development as an investment. That was appropriate, since a big software installation can last longer than the sturdiest piece of factory equipment. The second stage is part of a change agreed to through a United Nations working group in 2008. Australia and Canada have already made the switch, and Europe will do so in 2014.

The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts RD, Artistic Creation: Extended Excerpt Image 2


The U.S. generates a disproportionate share of its wealth from the likes of patents, copyrights, trademarks, designs, cultural creations, and business processes. To see the intangible economy in numbers, look at Apple’s balance sheet: Property, plant, and equipment, those traditional forms of wealth from the industrial and preindustrial eras, account for $15 billion of its $400 billion market value—just 4 percent of the total. They’re only 7 percent of market value at moviemaker Time Warner and drugmaker Pfizer.

Thanks in part to the power of ideas, the nine or 10 most valuable companies in the world are headquartered in the U.S. (It’s nine on days when PetroChina edges ahead of Wells Fargo.) Only three—General Electric, ExxonMobil, and Chevron—are in the world’s top 10 for tangible fixed capital, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

If all forms of intangible investment were officially recorded, they would exceed investment in bricks, mortar, and machines, according to estimates by economists Carol Corrado of the Conference Board and Charles Hulten of the University of Maryland. Intangibles include brand-building, worker training, and the development of advanced organizational practices like total quality management, which meet the definition of an investment because they create assets that will produce revenue a year or more in the future, says Hulten. Those, however, will continue to be treated by the government as expenses. Brent Moulton, the BEA’s associate director for national economic accounts, says their investment nature can’t yet be measured accurately enough to use as official data.

That underscores the limits of trying to come up with a single statistical measure of the nation’s economic activity. Government statisticians have to make some heroic assumptions and generalizations to incorporate intangibles like R&D and works of art. Not knowing their true worth, the BEA assigns value to them by estimating the cost to create them. It thus undervalues Hollywood blockbusters and overvalues big-budget flops, assuming that the errors will cancel out in the long run.

Then there’s the challenge of calculating depreciation. Ideas don’t rust like machines, but they do lose value to their creators as they are copied or superseded. The BEA assigns an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent to pharmaceutical R&D assets, vs. 36 percent for computer systems design; 9 percent for movies, but 27 percent for music. In a priceless footnote, it writes: “Long-lived television programs include situation comedies and drama programs. Other types of television programs, including news programs, sporting events, game shows, soap operas, and reality programming, have much shorter service lives and will not be capitalized.”

So Under the Dome is an investment but America’s Got Talent isn’t. You can see how quickly a good economic theory slides into guesstimation and value judgments. And measuring intangible investment is only a first step toward figuring out how much that investment contributes to economic growth. Robert Atkinson, president of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation think tank, criticizes “intangible-capital fundamentalists” who, he says, unreasonably dismiss the contribution to growth of investment in tangible high-tech equipment.

No one said this would be easy. Steering a $16 trillion economy with the aid of historical GDP data is like driving a car while looking in the rearview mirror. But if that’s what policymakers must do—and it is—they need to make sure that the view to the rear is as clear as possible. That’s the purpose of recognizing R&D and artistic originals as investments, and bringing the national accounts more closely in line with the way the economy works and businesspeople think. Is it perfect? No. But better to be imprecisely correct than precisely incorrect.

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Previous articleMay 4, 201540 Years Later—The Relevance of Okun’s “Equality and Efficiency: The Big TradeoffThe U.S. has seen income inequality rise significantly, with the top 1% capturing over 20% of total income, up from 10% in the 1970s.Next articleMay 21, 2015Quality, Not Just Quantity, of Infrastructure Needs AttentionThe total public capital stock as a share of GDP has been declining in most G7 countries, particularly in the U.S., indicating insufficient infrastructure investment.
Showing 484 database articles primarily about either Productivity, Cronyism, Incentives/Risk-Taking, Innovation/Research, Institutional Capabilities, Intangibles, Investment, Startups, or Workforce Reorganization

The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era

AI Summary. S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.

José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-Espín Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.

Is the college degree losing its economic value to artificial intelligence?

Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.

After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.
  2. Moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 0.086 log points by 2026.
  3. the college–non-college AI-exposure gap accounts for roughly 28% of the total premium compression over that period.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI — Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year…
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Since the summer of 2023, the employment rate for Americans 22–25 has declined for both college grads and non-college workers, a phenomenon beyond both…
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Gross and Net US Investment

AI Summary. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.

Timothy Taylor Conversable Economist
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

U.S. real net private domestic investment—which adds to the American capital stock—is now only ~25% as large as gross investment, down from ~40% in the 1970s. Taylor suggests the widening gap between gross and net investment reflects the relatively rapid depreciation of IT-related capital.

Does faster asset depreciation explain slowing productivity growth?

Core argument: Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.

The figure divides net investment by gross investment. Back in the 1970s, net investment was often around 40% of gross investment, but the share has been slumping over time. For the last decade or so, net investment has been about 25% of the gross–that is, about three-quarters of gross investment is just making up for depreciation of the pre-existing capital stock. The likely reason for the growing gap between gross and net investment is that modern investment is more likely to be related to information technology [which] depreciates more rapidly and thus needs to be replaced and updated more often. If we want the average US worker to be using a greater amount of capital on the job–which was one of the key drivers of rising labor productivity in the past–it now takes a bigger rise in gross investment to lead to a given rise in net investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.
  2. The shift toward information technology — which depreciates faster than physical machinery — is the primary driver of the widening gap between gross and net investment.
  3. Raising capital per worker, a historic engine of labor productivity growth, now requires a substantially larger increase in gross investment than it did several decades ago.

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  • US Stock Market To Stop Shrinking For First Time In 23 Years — US equity supply is turning positive for the first time in over two decades, as a surge in IPOs and large share sales by major technology companies outweighs the buybacks and privatizations that have shrunk the stock market since 2003.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • The Transition to a Higher Cost of Capital — Bridgewater Associates co-CIO Karen Karniol-Tambour expects 10-year Treasury yields to rise from the current ~4.5% to compensate for structurally higher fiscal…
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The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t

AI Summary. 615). Claims of re-acceleration result from cherry-picking frontier observations, selecting a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky argues AI capabilities continue to improve, but “the full composite data shows flattening relative gains, not acceleration…rolling relative model gains have fallen from their 2024 peak, while model dispersion has narrowed sharply.”

Are AI performance gains accelerating or just appearing to through selective measurement?

Core argument: Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.

Using all Epoch’s Capabilities Index observations, and controlling for developer and model family, there is no statistically significant breakpoint. A piecewise model—which splits the series into intervals and applies a sub-function to each segment—does not improve on a purely linear trend: p = 0.615, The estimated change in slope has a confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 points per year. In short, the maths shows there is no model acceleration, contrary to claims, and as expected. The result comes from selecting frontier observations only, choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.
  2. Claims of AI re-acceleration rest on a methodological artifact: selecting only frontier model observations, pre-choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on each side of that breakpoint.

Related Articles:

  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — As AI model performance converges toward a ceiling, relative gains per improvement cycle shrink, transforming frontier capability from a pricing moat into a commodity where price becomes the primary differentiator and margin pressure intensifies across leading providers.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
  • Anthropic’s Best AI Model Struggles To Attract Users As Cheaper Tools Thrive — Spending on the most expensive AI model from a leading provider has plateaued at 11% of total outlay, as cheaper, older models prove capable of handling most business tasks.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Understanding AI and Productivity

AI Summary. U.S. productivity growth has accelerated to ~2.2% annually since mid-2022, above the 2010s baseline, though pandemic-era labor market and business formation dynamics likely contributed alongside AI. Historical general-purpose technology booms sustained labor productivity growth above 2.5% for a decade or more, making the current acceleration substantial but not unprecedented.

Chad Syverson Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Syverson is skeptical that AI initiated the rise in productivity growth that began in 2023. The acceleration began while AI investment was small, and pandemic-era labor market churn and business dynamism match the acceleration’s start.

Is AI-driven productivity growth sustainable at historical technology boom levels?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.

Productivity from mid-2022 on has maintained a faster-than-2010s trajectory involving annual growth of about 2.2%. Could this acceleration be due to AI? Perhaps. The timing leans against AI being the sole initial cause. Additionally, there were well-documented increases in economic dynamism (labor market churn and business formation) during the pandemic emergence whose timing matches the acceleration’s start. Regardless of AI’s current effect, the longer the aggregate productivity acceleration continues, the more plausible it is that AI is an important driver. As for the magnitude, a sustained increase from 1.5 to 2.2% annual productivity growth would be substantial (after a decade, GDP per capita would be 7% higher than otherwise), but hardly unprecedented. The 1995–2004 productivity boom saw annual productivity growth of nearly 3% per year, and other past general-purpose-technology-related productivity boosts saw labor productivity growth in excess of 2.5% for a decade or longer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.
  2. The 1995–2004 productivity boom averaged nearly 3.0% annual growth, establishing that a durable AI-driven acceleration to 2.2% would be meaningful but well within historical precedent for general-purpose-technology cycles.
  3. Pandemic-era surges in labor market churn and business formation align more precisely with the productivity acceleration’s start date than AI adoption does, complicating AI-as-sole-cause narratives.

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  • AI and Productivity — Rising US labor productivity is driven by higher capital utilization—factories, servers, and hotel rooms running harder—rather than new investment or efficiency gains at the individual task level.
  • Google’s AI & Economy ATLAS v1.0: Mapping Gemini Usage in the Economy — Google’s new AI & Economy ATLAS maps 15M AI interactions to occupations, tasks, and activities, showing AI use is pervasive but not intensive…
  • Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools — Event studies indicate that adoption of AI coding tools raised “commits” (saved code updates) ~180%, but releases by only ~30%. Large upstream…
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

US Widens AI-Driven Investment Gap With Europe

AI Summary. US corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to grow 40% in real terms by the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area, widening a productivity gap where output per hour worked rose $14 in the US compared with $2 in Europe since 2018.

Sam Fleming, Amy Borrett and Olaf Storbeck Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Oxford Economics projects US real business investment will rise 40% over 2021–2027, ~3x the euro area’s 12%. US investment growth since 2024 has been largely information processing and software, but high US growth in GDP/hour is not “merely digital.”

Is artificial intelligence investment widening the transatlantic productivity divide?

Core argument: U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.

Corporate spending on new equipment and facilities in the US is projected to increase 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, according to forecasts from Oxford Economics. The US surge compared with a real-terms increase of just 12% in the euro area, while German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated over the same period. Europe also faces a large and growing productivity gap with the US. “The United States has recently pulled further ahead of Europe,” Bart van Ark, a professor at the University of Manchester, told policymakers at the ECB Forum in Sintra. GDP per hour worked increased $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025, compared with just $2 in Europe. “The gap is not only a digital sector story,” added van Ark, stressing that the US outperformance extended to other sectors, including wholesale and retail as well as professional services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.
  2. U.S. labor productivity rose $14 per hour worked between 2018 and 2025, versus $2 in Europe, with outperformance spanning wholesale, retail, and professional services—not solely the digital sector.

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  • Investment
  • Comparisons
    • Europe USA Relative Performance
  • GDP
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    • Innovation/Research

Why Big Tech’s AI Spending Is $3 Trillion Higher Than It Seems

AI Summary. Nine major technology companies carry ~$3tn in off-balance-sheet AI commitments — 5x their ~$600bn in reported capital spending — obligations that are growing faster than traditional investment and triple their combined lease and debt liabilities.

Peter Rudegeair and Peter Santilli Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
August 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A WSJ analysis finds 9 firms involved in the data center buildout have ~$3T in off-balance-sheet commitments largely tied to AI infrastructure. The growth in such obligations has outpaced the firms’ capex growth over the last year.

Are technology companies hiding the true cost of artificial intelligence?

Nine top tech companies had some $3 trillion of off-balance-sheet commitments mostly related to AI, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of footnotes in their most recent securities filings. Those obligations are growing faster than traditional “capex,” which totaled about $600 billion over the past year they reported, and were about triple what the companies owe under their outstanding leases and long-term borrowings.

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  • The Market Is Asking Questions — AI infrastructure debt spreads are widening as markets question whether returns on massive, front-loaded capital spending will outpace financing costs before assets depreciate. If compute demand plateaus from efficiency gains or slow adoption, the industry faces a glut of expensive, rapidly depreciating capacity.
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