Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
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The United States and Its Creditors: Assessing Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets

AI Summary. Foreign ownership of US Treasury securities has shifted from official investors, who held the predominant share in 2008, toward private investors, whose holdings of $6.7tn now exceed official holdings of $3.9tn. Net issuance of Treasury securities boomed during and after the COVID pandemic, even accounting for Federal Reserve purchases that reduce net market supply.

Anusha Chari and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti Brookings Institution
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The composition of foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury debt has shifted sharply from official to private investors over the past two decades. Foreign private investors now hold $6.7T in Treasuries, vastly exceeding the $3.9T held by foreign official institutions.

Have private foreign investors overtaken official ones in holding Treasuries?

Core argument: Foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities reached $6.7 trillion in mid-2025, including the Cayman Islands correction, exceeding official foreign holdings of $3.9 trillion.

Figure 5 shows a large shift in foreign holdings of US Treasurys: a diminishing role for official investors, who accounted for the predominant share in 2008, offset by a rising role for private investors. Figure 6 shows net issuance and purchases of U.S. Treasury securities during the past 25 years. The boom in net issuance during and after the COVID pandemic is particularly striking, even after controlling for the net purchases by the Fed which reduce net market supply. Foreign net purchases show a notable shift toward private purchases relative to the 2000s. As a result, foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities in mid-2025 ($6.7 trillion, including the Cayman Islands correction) vastly exceed official holdings of $3.9 trillion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities reached $6.7 trillion in mid-2025, including the Cayman Islands correction, exceeding official foreign holdings of $3.9 trillion.
  2. Foreign official investors accounted for the predominant share of foreign Treasury holdings in 2008, and their diminishing role has been offset by a rising role for private investors.
  3. Net issuance of U.S. Treasury securities boomed during and after the COVID pandemic, even after controlling for Federal Reserve net purchases that reduce net market supply, alongside a shift in foreign net purchases toward private buyers relative to the 2000s.

Related Articles:

  • Mid-Year Outlook: At the Crossroads of Stagflation—What’s Next? — Foreign investors hold roughly $18.5tn in US equities (about 20% of the market), $7tn in Treasuries and $5tn in credit (about 30% of each), and foreign participation in 30-year Treasury auctions has trended down in recent months. Combined with US fiscal challenges, the authors argue this reliance on foreign demand is a vulnerability.
  • Tariffs and “International Payments Problems” — Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are on foreigners across direct investment, stocks, bonds, currency, deposits, and loans, and the U.S. net international investment position has moved from -20% of GDP in 2010 to -89%. Almost all of that swing reflects valuation gains on U.S. stocks rather than added borrowing.
  • Global Trade Imbalances: Actual Problems, Unlikely Solutions — Foreign capital flowing into the US is shifting from government purchases of US Treasury bonds toward private foreign investment in US stocks and other riskier assets. This means a share of future gains from US productivity-enhancing investment will flow to these foreign investors, who are likely more willing to sell and exit if returns worsen.
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Monetary Policy
Previous articleAugust 25, 2026Let the Bond Market SpeakStan Druckenmiller cautions that there is no question that the Treasury’s efforts to cap long-term yields will fail: “Governments defending prices against fundamentals always lose. The only variable is how much they spend before conceding.”Next articleAugust 25, 2026The Battle Against the Bond VigilantesGold has risen 7% since Treasury’s buyback announcement, and the dollar has continued to fall relative to G10 and EM currencies as investors seek safe havens from “debt monetization.”
Showing 892 database articles primarily about either GDP, Business Cycle, Financial Markets, Growth, Housing, Inflation, Savings Glut/Trade Deficit, or Trade (not deficits)

Earnings Will Be Spectacular. It May Not Be Enough

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins, long regarded as one of the economy's most reliably mean-reverting series, have risen continuously so far this century. Measured through the national income accounts used in calculating GDP, profits now take a larger share of the economy than on the eve of the 1929 crash.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

Core argument: Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
  2. Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
  3. The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

Related Articles:

  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices

AI Summary. Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.

Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David Weinstein Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.

How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?

Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.

Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
  2. The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
  3. Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.

Related Articles:

  • The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026 — The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

The Bond Market Reckoning Has Only Begun

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields has widened at a pace matched only during the euro zone sovereign debt crisis. France and the UK have less room than the US to close deficits with tax increases, as tax revenues equal 43.9% of GDP in France and 35.3% in the UK versus 25.2% in the US.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds has widened at a pace seen only during the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. John Authers warns that France “satisfies all the classic conditions for a major debt crisis.”

Do high tax burdens limit France and the UK's deficit options?

Core argument: The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.

Only in the worst days of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis, in 2011 and 2012, has the [spread of 10-Year French OATS over German Bunds] risen so fast. Talk of a second euro-zone crisis, this time with an epicenter in Paris, is growing, and it’s easy to see why. Why is this more of a problem for France and the UK? Beyond their deficits, they also shoulder much higher tax burdens than the US. Tax revenues are 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest of the major developed economies - but 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France. It’s hard to imagine after decades of tax-cutting, but a US politician could deal with the deficit fairly easily with a tax hike. It’s not clear that option is open to French lawmakers, even if they could somehow persuade voters to go along with them. The populist politicians of left and right, who currently look well placed in next year’s presidential elections, are in any case unlikely to try.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.
  2. Tax revenues equal 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest among major developed economies, versus 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France, leaving American politicians more room to close the deficit with a tax hike.
  3. Populist politicians of left and right, currently well placed for France’s presidential election, are unlikely to attempt tax increases to address the deficit.

Related Articles:

  • French PM to Freeze Emmanuel Macron’s Pension Reform Until 2027 — France's prime minister said he would suspend the plan to raise the retirement age to 64 until the next presidential election, while asking parties to agree on other savings. He outlined a €30bn package of spending cuts and tax rises to cut the deficit to 4.7% of national output from 5.4%.
  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • GDP
  • Politics

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades

AI Summary. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.

Michael Taffe and George Steer Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Foreign investors bought a record net $426B of US equities and fund shares in Q2, up 62% y/y, part of a record $942B in the 12 months through July. Overseas investors bought a net $188B of US debt securities in Q2, down from $314B in Q1.

Are foreign investors shifting from US debt into US stocks?

Core argument: Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.

Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, accelerating a shift in overseas investment towards American stocks and away from debt. The flows represented the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares by foreign investors jumped to $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025, and surpassing the previous quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign demand for US debt moved in the opposite direction. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.
  2. Net foreign purchases of US equities and investment fund shares reached $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025 and above the prior quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  3. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Related Articles:

  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
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