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Labor Shortages and the Immigration Shortfall

Giovanni Peri and Reem Zaiour Econofact
Date Posted:
January 27, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The U.S. is down 2mm working-aged immigrants relative to 2020 trend, with half being college-educated, impacting labor markets & economic growth @ReemZaiour

The U.S. is experiencing a shortfall of 2m working-age immigrants relative to the 2020 trend, with half being college-educated, impacting labor markets and economic growth. From 2010-2019, the foreign-born working-age population grew by ~660,000 annually, but this halted in 2020 due to stricter immigration policies and the pandemic. The absence of these immigrants, particularly in sectors reliant on foreign labor, has contributed to significant job shortages despite rising wages. Industries with a 10% higher dependence on foreign workers in 2019 saw a 3% higher rate of unfilled jobs in 2021. The loss of skilled immigrants, especially in STEM fields, could reduce productivity and innovation, with an estimated 2.5m fewer jobs created due to the multiplier effect. Additionally, the decline in foreign students affects U.S. educational institutions and their research capabilities. Addressing visa processing delays could mitigate these economic challenges.

Giovanni Peri and Reem Zaiour estimate that relative to the 2020 trend the United States is down 2 million working aged immigrants, half of whom would have been college educated, "...During the years 2020 and 2021, the number of immigrants arriving in the United States decreased substantially...This decline in immigrant and nonimmigrant visa arrivals resulted in zero growth in working-age foreign-born people in the United States. Prior to 2019, the foreign born population of working age (18 to 65) grew by about 660,000 people per year, as reported in data from the monthly Current Population survey…. This trend came to a stop already in 2019 before the pandemic, due to a combination of stricter immigration enforcement and a drop in the inflow of Mexican immigrants. The halt to international travel in 2020 added a significant drop in the working-age immigrant population. As of the end of 2021, the number of working-age foreign-born people in the United States is still somewhat smaller than it was in early 2019. and,relative to the level it would have achieved if the 2010-2019 trend had continued, there is a shortfall of about 2 million people. A similar calculation done using Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly data on foreign-born individuals with a college degree indicates that of the missing two million foreign workers, about 950,000 would have been college educated, had the pre-2020 trend continued. This is a very substantial loss of skilled workers, equal to 1.8 percent of all college-educated individuals working in the US in 2019.... As the U.S economy recovered from the Covid-19 crisis in 2021 and job-creation increased, employers found it more difficult to fill jobs. Across sectors, these shortages are significantly associated with the loss of foreign workers. The recent economic recovery has seen more numerous job openings and jobs going unfilled for longer periods of time. In spite of upward pressure on wages in several sectors, such as hospitality and food-related services, the number of unfilled job openings relative to employment has remained very high. The absence of foreign-born workers plays an important role in this. Those sectors that had a higher percentage of foreign workers in 2019 had significantly higher rates of unfilled jobs in 2021 (see second chart). Our estimates suggest that an industry that had a 10% higher dependence on foreign workers than another industry in 2019 saw a 3% higher rate of unfilled jobs in 2021….The loss of two million potential immigrants, of which a million are college educated, could impact productivity and employment in the long run..."

Giovanni Peri and Reem Zaiour, "Labor Shortages and the Immigration Shortfall,"Econofact, January 11, 2022, https://econofact.org/labor-shortages-and-the-immigration-shortfall

Labor Shortages and the Immigration Shortfall

The Issue:

Labor Shortages and the Immigration Shortfall: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Due to increased restrictions on immigration and travel, which began with the COVID-19 pandemic in the early months of 2020, the net inflow of immigrants into the United States has essentially halted for almost 2 years. By the end of 2021 there were about 2 million fewer working-age immigrants living in the United States than there would have been if the pre-2020 immigration trend had continued unchanged. Of these lost immigrants, about one million would have been college educated. The data on labor shortages across industries suggest that this dramatic drop in foreign labor supply growth is likely a contributor to the current job shortages and could slow down employment recovery and growth as the economy picks up speed.

The Facts:

During the years 2020 and 2021, the number of immigrants arriving in the United States decreased substantially. In the early months of 2020 and in response to the Covid-19 health crisis, the Trump administration closed the borders with Mexico and Canada and placed restrictions on international arrivals. Visa processing at U.S. embassies and consulates around the world was also severely disrupted, leading to a dramatic decline in the inflow of foreign nationals on all types of temporary visas. According to the Department of State, the slowdown in visa processing generated much fewer visa entries and a large backlog of more than 460,000 people with unprocessed visas as of late 2021. Similarly, the number of permanent residents arriving in the U.S. also fell substantially. Statistical estimates relative to the Fiscal year 2020 (from October 1st 2019 to September 30th 2020) indicate a decrease of immigrant visas by 45% and a decrease of nonimmigrant visas by 54% relative to the previous year.

This decline in immigrant and nonimmigrant visa arrivals resulted in zero growth in working-age foreign-born people in the United States. Prior to 2019, the foreign born population of working age (18 to 65) grew by about 660,000 people per year, as reported in data from the monthly Current Population survey (see the first chart). This trend came to a stop already in 2019 before the pandemic, due to a combination of stricter immigration enforcement and a drop in the inflow of Mexican immigrants. The halt to international travel in 2020 added a significant drop in the working-age immigrant population. As of the end of 2021, the number of working-age foreign-born people in the United States is still somewhat smaller than it was in early 2019. and, relative to the level it would have achieved if the 2010-2019 trend had continued, there is a shortfall of about 2 million people. A similar calculation done using Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly data on foreign-born individuals with a college degree indicates that of the missing two million foreign workers, about 950,000 would have been college educated, had the pre-2020 trend continued. This is a very substantial loss of skilled workers, equal to 1.8 percent of all college-educated individuals working in the US in 2019.

Labor Shortages and the Immigration Shortfall: Extended Excerpt Image 2


As the U.S economy recovered from the Covid-19 crisis in 2021 and job-creation increased, employers found it more difficult to fill jobs. Across sectors, these shortages are significantly associated with the loss of foreign workers. The recent economic recovery has seen more numerous job openings and jobs going unfilled for longer periods of time. In spite of upward pressure on wages in several sectors, such as hospitality and food-related services, the number of unfilled job openings relative to employment has remained very high. The absence of foreign-born workers plays an important role in this. Those sectors that had a higher percentage of foreign workers in 2019 had significantly higher rates of unfilled jobs in 2021 (see second chart). Our estimates suggest that an industry that had a 10% higher dependence on foreign workers than another industry in 2019 saw a 3% higher rate of unfilled jobs in 2021.

The loss of foreign workers is not the only reason for the high rate of unfilled jobs. Increased retirement and increased bargaining power of workers are likely playing an important role. While more generous unemployment and welfare benefits introduced during the crisis may have discouraged workers from taking low-paying jobs in 2020 and early 2021, they do not seem to be the cause of current shortages, since most of those benefits expired by mid-2021. Recent anecdotal and preliminary evidence finds a push by workers for more job-flexibility, safety and, generally, better conditions causing resignations and contributing to unfilled job openings. Moreover, increased retirement rates have contributed to the decline in available workers. A recent study finds that just excess retirement and reduced re-entry of retirees to the labor force has increased the share of retirees relative to the US labor force by 1.3 percentage points in the last 2 years (compared to an annual rate of increase or about 0.3 percentage points prior to the pandemic). These factors have affected labor availability, especially in low-paying manual-intensive jobs in sectors as food services and hospitality. The second chart shows that the rates of unfilled jobs in those two sectors are well above what is predicted by the statistical association across all industries between the rate of unfilled jobs and industries' dependence on foreign workers, suggesting that other factors are at work in those sectors.

The loss of two million potential immigrants, of which a million are college educated, could impact productivity and employment in the long run. A recent study by one of the authors shows that college educated immigrants are likely to work in the Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) sectors; these jobs are drivers of innovation and productivity growth. Additionally, research focused on the high-skilled STEM jobs shows that they are responsible for creating a job-multiplier effect at the local level, producing opportunities of up to 2.5 additional jobs for each additional employed high-skilled worker through local demand for goods and services and by companies expanding and hiring other workers. In light of these effects, the loss of one million college-educated immigrants may leave the U.S. economy with lower productivity which translates to lower growth. Applying the estimated job multiplier from the research referenced above to the observed loss of college-educated immigrants implies 2.5 million fewer jobs in those local economies where the immigrants would have worked.

The loss of immigrants could imply a large loss of entrepreneurship. Immigrants have a three times higher probability of starting firms than natives in the U.S., according to estimates from an article published in 2020. Immigrants are more likely to start small firms (with 0-10 employees) but also medium size and large firms (with 1000 employees or more) relative to natives. Using the estimated entrepreneurship rate of immigrants from this study, two million fewer immigrants would imply a decline in firm creation, solely due to lack of entrepreneurs, corresponding to a loss of more than 200,000 jobs.

The loss of foreign college students will affect American educational institutions. Foreign college students are the part of the foreign-born population with the largest decline in the last 2 years. After decades of continued growth in foreign enrollment in American colleges and universities, peaking in 2018-19, their number dropped by 20% in 2020. This has had an adverse effect on higher education, one of the largest U.S. service exports. Furthermore, foreign students, especially graduate students, have been very important contributors to US research and innovation and patenting. Their absence could weaken the innovation and patenting potential of those universities, research institutions, and businesses that depend on cutting-edge research and innovation.

What this Means:

The shortfall of immigrants over the past two years has had immediate adverse consequences for filling jobs and also harms the long-run prospects for the U.S. economy. The drop in the number of foreign students and high-skilled immigrants is particularly concerning for the long-run effects on productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship. The drop in the number of less-skilled immigrants can be contributing to the current shortages in several industries in which they had been highly represented. In light of this, the government should make an effort this year to facilitate the processing of non-immigrant and immigrant visas to avoid further reducing the number of immigrants and the resulting negative economic consequences.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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  • Workforce
    • Immigration
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Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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