Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 8, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The top 1% in the US holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%, with the top 10% controlling 68.7% of total wealth.

The latest estimates on wealth distribution in the U.S. reveal that the top 1% holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%, highlighting significant economic inequality. The top 10% of households control 68.7% of total wealth, with the top 1% alone holding 31.2%. This concentration of wealth has implications for tax policy, as it suggests that taxing the rich could address fiscal imbalances and fund public services. The disparity is further underscored by racial wealth gaps, where white households have a median wealth of $171,000, ten times that of Black households at $17,100. These figures emphasize the need for policies that address both wealth concentration and racial disparities to promote economic equity.

Here are CBS’s claims (I used your language describing them as opposed to theirs)

I’ve added in descending order research that refutes or provides context for their claims. Please let me know if this is directionally what you were looking for.

Steve

“….40% can’t cover a $400 expense (fed) disputed…”

We read the Fed report when it was released and pointed out it’s being misrepresented. However Michael Strain refuted it effectively in the Bloomberg op-ed, “…It turns out the claim that nearly half of Americans are a flat tire away from financial crisis is largely based on an inaccurate reading of one survey question. The question comes from theannual“Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households” by the Federal Reserve. Thereportfinds, in 2018, that 61% of adults would cover a $400 unexpected expense using cash (or its equivalent). Politicians and many in the media seem to be subtracting 61 from 100, and concluding that 39% of people, to use Warren’s phrase, “can’t come up with” the money they’d need to handle this situation….”

CBS News, “Income Inequality, and coronavirus’ economic fallout,” CBS News, September 6, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/income-inequality-and-coronavirus-economic-fallout/

CBS claims live here:

Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn and Jay Shambaugh, “Examing The Black-White Wealth Gap,” Brookings, February 27, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/

Brookings provides some context for driver of the wealth gap btw black and white families with the same income, “…Why are high- and middle-income white families so much wealthier than Black families with the same incomes? We note a few reasons. White families receive much larger inheritances on average than Black families. Economists Darrick Hamilton and Sandy Darity conclude that inheritances and other intergenerational transfers “account for more of the racial wealth gap than any other demographic and socioeconomic indicators.”In addition, the income groups in figure 2 are based on a snapshot of family income, which does not fully capture lifetime income. Black families who make it to the top of the income distribution in a particular year are more likely than white families to drop out of the top in subsequent years, and their respective wealth levels reflect this difference. Likely less important, but still notable, high- and middle-income Black families are more likely than their white counterparts to be called upon to assist family members and neighbors…”

Rakesh Kochhar and Anthony Cilluffo, “How Wealth Inequlaity Has Changed In The U.S. Since The Great Recession, By Race, Ethnicity And Income,” Pew Research Center, November 1, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/

They are attributing this to Pew’s analysis of SCF data, “… In 2016, the median wealth of white households was $171,000. That’s 10 times the wealth of black households ($17,100)– a larger gap than in 2007 – and eight times that of Hispanic households ($20,600), about the same gap as in 2007. (Asians and other racial groups are not separately identified in the SCF data.)…”

“…Black network 10% of white federal reserve…Hispanic 12% (same source)…”

Amazon’s pre-Covid peak for 2020 2,170.22 on February 19, it’s trough was March 12 1,676.61. Currently it’s 3,182.78 From February to today it’s up 46.65% from trough to today it’s up 89.83%. From the 18thto today it’s up just over 40%.

You are correct the work is benchmarked to March 18th.

“….Net worth of 600 billionaires increased (20%), I suspect they start at the market bottom and not the day before the drop… Bezo net worth up $43.8 B (again probably at the trough)…

https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf

Thomas Stengle, “Covid-19 Impact,” U.S. Department Of Labor, September 3, 2020,

According to Labor Department this checks out, as of mid august 29mm persons were getting UI insurance

“…..29mm collecting unemployment…”

USDA “How Many People Lived In Food-Insecure Households?” USDA Economic Research Service, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx

9.5mm adults and 540,000 (.7% of children)lived in households which one of more children experienced very low food security defined as“…In these food-insecure households, normal eating patterns of one or more household members were disrupted and food intake was reduced at times during the year because they had insufficient money or other resources for food…”

If you look at the USDA statistics themselves37.2mm individual were in the broader food insecure households(this is defined as “These food-insecure households obtained enough food to avoid substantially disrupting their eating patterns or reducing food intake by using a variety of coping strategies, such as eating less varied diets, participating in Federal food assistance programs, or getting emergency food from community food pantries”

Paul Roderick Gregory, “If Children Are Hungry In America, It Is The Parents’ Fault,” The Mercury News, July 1, 2013, https://www.mercurynews.com/2013/07/01/hoover-fellow-if-children-are-hungry-in-america-it-is-the-parents-fault/

“…The 20 percent of families that are classified as “food insecure” worry food will run out, substitute cheaper foods, serve unbalanced meals or cut meal sizes at least once in the past 12 months. Such measures are far from the concept of regular hunger that celebrity media ads, sponsored by Feeding America, imply. Meanwhile, the USDA’s specific questions about child hunger are dutifully ignored. They are inconveniently low. The USDA’s most direct measures of child hunger show that around 1 percent of families with children have a child who experienced hunger (skipping meals or not eating for a whole day) at least one day in the last 12 months. This is a far cry from “1 in 5” children going to bed hungry we hear regularly in the media. The USDA’s figures for an incidence of child hunger on an average day show that one tenth of 1 percent of children were hungry on an average day. This adds up to two hungry children per ZIP code.Adult hunger should be higher than child hunger because USDA studies show children are given preference when food is low. The USDA finds, however, that on an average daily basis, one quarter of one percent of all adults do not eat for a whole day due to lack of money. That is 21/2 per thousand….”

Paul Roderick Gregory from Hoover has debunked this myth

“…54mm food insecure (feeding America)…”

His FPMis “..matches President Johnson’s initial standard. Second,these initial 1963 thresholds must be held constant in real terms over time by updating them each year using an unbiased measure of inflation. Third, the metric for evaluating success should include the full array of anti-poverty programs utilized by the government, including in-kind transfers and transfers administered through the tax code. No existing poverty measure meets all three of these conditions. We create a poverty measure, which we refer to as the Full-Income Poverty Measure (FPM), which meets all three of these conditions…”

Obviously Burkhauser finding that poverty rate based on President Johnson’s standards fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 to 2.3 percent in 2017 are also useful. What did Will Rogers say during the depression“We are the first nation in the history of the world to go to the poorhouse in an automobile”

Jeff Larrimore, Jacob Mortenson and David Splinter, “Presence and Persistence of Poverty in U.S. Tax Data,” Federal Reserve Board and Joint Committee on Taxation, February 2020, http://www.davidsplinter.com/LMS_PersistencePoverty_2020.pdf

“….There is substantial mobility in and out of poverty. For example, 41 percent of those in poverty in 2007 were out of poverty in the following year. However, many of those who are poor spend multiple years in poverty or escape poverty only to fall back into it. Of those who were in poverty in 2007, one-third are in poverty for at least half of the years through 2018….”

FRED actually has 41mm, however I think David Splinter’s research that shows the transitory nature of poverty for younger people is a better way to contextualize that number (granted he finds older people who are poor stay poor)

“…38mm in poverty (census)….”

Sarin’s SS paper may also be also useful here, she is showing that the Top 10% (so not top 5%) have around ~ 60% of total wealth with the top 1% accounting about half that with Social Security

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, “Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July 19, 2019, http://ericzwick.com/wealth/wealth.pdf

Smith/Zidar/Zwick agree“…Overall, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the “P90-99” class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Relative to a top 0.1% wealth share of more than 20% under equal returns, we estimate a top 0.1% wealth share of and find that the rise since 1980 in top wealth shares falls by ….”

“Distribution Of Household Wealth In The U.S. Since 1989,” Distributional Financial Accounts Federal Reserve, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/

This is directionally correct according to the Fed’s Z1 data the top 10% 68.7% of US wealth with the top 1% holding 31.2%, so presumably 96-99 get you there

“….5% own 2/3s of the wealth (sourced to oddly the NBER)….”

Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan, “Consumption And Income Inequality In The US Since The 1960s,” Center For Economics And Policy Research, January 15, 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/consumption-and-income-inequality-us-1960s

Meyer’s work on consumption inequality is also an effective rebuttal

Sylvain Catherine, Max Miller and Natasha Sarin, “Social Security and Trends in Inequality,” University of Pennsylvania, February 29, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

Perhaps a better rebuttal is Sarin SS paper that found that wealth inequality has not increased in the past three decades after accounting for social security given she is Summer’s protégé

Gerald Auten and David Splinter, “Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-term Trends,” December 20, 2019, http://davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-Tax_Data_and_Inequality.pdf

Three recent paper’s come to mind that provide context, first the initial Auten/Splinter that found the top.1% income share had gone up, but not nearly as much as Saez suggests it has net taxes.

U.S. Census Bureau, “Income Gini Ratio For Households By Race Of Householder, All Races,” Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, Accessed September 8, 2020, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GINIALLRH

CBS is also citing Census which claims“The Gini index was significantly higher in 2018 than 2017 for the United States”but they are usingMedian Household Income showing.482 for 2017 and.485 for 2018.So that checks, even if we can point to the Household Gini to pushback.

According to FRED the Income Gini Ratio ForHouseholds By Race of Householders, All Racesticked down btw 2017 and 2018 (last year with available data from ) (from Census) from. 489 to.486

“…income inequality at highest level in 50 years Census 2109….”

Michael Strain, “Americans May Be Strapped, But the Go-To Statistic Is False,” Bloomberg, June 4, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-04/the-400-emergency-expense-story-is-wrong

  • Poverty/Crime
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Showing 70 database articles primarily about Poverty/Crime

An Extra Point for Attendance: The Impact of High School Varsity Athletics on Absenteeism

AI Summary. High school varsity sports participation reduces student absenteeism by ~20%, with absence rates falling further during active seasons, indicating the relationship is at least partly causal rather than purely a result of selection.

Nat Malkus and Sam Hollon American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The absentee rate of Indiana high school students, ~23% of whom played a varsity sport, was ~20% lower for those who participated in varsity athletics than for non-athletes. The effect was stronger when an athlete’s particular sport was in season.

Does participation in high school sports significantly reduce student absenteeism?

Core argument: Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.

We find that varsity sports participation is strongly associated with better student attendance, and we argue it is plausible that varsity sports participation causes better attendance. When we control for a number of factors that we know matter for both sports participation and attendance, we continue to find that varsity athletes are absent less often than their peers across the entire year. Across the school year, athletes’ absence rate was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes’. That’s a reduction of almost 20%. The broad pattern shown in Table 1 is that students from more advantaged groups were more likely to participate in varsity sports and less likely to be absent from school. It’s thus no surprise that, in the raw data, there is an association between playing varsity sports and having good attendance (Figure 3). But is that because students who attend school more reliably are more likely to play sports or because playing sports leads to better attendance? One way to tease out the answer is to compare varsity athletes' attendance during their sports seasons with their attendance the rest of the year. Not only do varsity athletes have lower annual absence rates—especially unexcused absences—than non-athletes, but [Figure 3 and Figure 4] show that their absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, [which suggests at least some causal effect].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.
  2. In-season absence rates fall further for varsity athletes, suggesting sports participation directly leads to more reliable attendance patterns.
  3. Athletes from advantaged backgrounds show stronger attendance gains, indicating varsity sports participation compounds existing socioeconomic advantages in school engagement.

Related Articles:

  • The Benefits of Scholastic Athletics — Heckman et al, using two longitudinal data sets with a rich set of controls, find that participation in varsity athletics raises rates of high school and…
  • Long COVID for Public Schools: Chronic Absenteeism Before and After the Pandemic — 28% of American public school students missed at least 10% of the school year in 2022 up from 15% before the pandemic. The change was most pronounced in…
  • The Latest Chronic Absenteeism Numbers — The number of students missing 10% or more of the school year doubled from 15% in 2019 to 28% in 2022 and 26% in 2023. Early reports for 2024 show signs of…
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      • K-12

Sports Betting Across Borders: Spatial Spillovers, Credit Distress, and Fiscal Externalities

Jacob Goss and Daniel Mangrum Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
March 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

After the legalization of sports betting in 2018, delinquency rates on a wide range of consumer debts rose, increasing .31pp as of 2025. The delinquency rate for the ~3% of the population that were new gamblers increased by ~10pp driven by those under 40.

Exploiting the staggered roll-out of state-level legalization following the 2018 Murphy v. NCAA decision, we use an extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) framework that separately estimates direct treatment effects and cross-border spillover effects. Our first-stage estimates establish that legalization dramatically increases betting activity: average quarterly spending per person rises by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50, and the share of the population with any sportsbook spending in a quarter increases by 3.1 percentage points. The effects on average spending grow continually over time with no clear evidence of saturation, suggesting the market for mobile sports betting continues to mature years after legalization. At the same time, substantial betting activity occurs in counties where sports betting is not legal but which lie near a legal state, with spillover effects on total spending roughly 14% of the direct effect for counties within 15 miles of a legal state, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles. These spillovers have real consequences for consumer financial health. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates increase by 0.31 percentage points following legalization. [Under-40 auto loan delinquency increases by half a percentage point and credit card delinquency by one percentage point, driving the overall increase in delinquency.] Since only about 3.1% of the population takes up betting after legalization, these intent-to-treat estimates would imply that those who are induced to bet due to legalization experience delinquency increases of 10 percentage points.

Related Articles:

  • The Case for Prohibiting Vice — Lehman makes the case for restricting sports gambling, marijuana, and pornography. The costs of vice and its regulation are not limited to individual harm…
  • Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports — 43% of American adults say widespread betting on sports is “a bad thing for society,” up from 34% in 2022. 47% of men under 30 say legal sports…
  • From Sports to AI, America Is Awash in Speculative Fever. Washington Is Egging It On — Citing the AI-related equity boom, crypto and the rise of sports betting, Greg Ip argues that “speculation has become woven into today’s political…
  • Poverty/Crime
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New York City Government Services: Services for the Unsheltered

Thomas DiNapoli New York State Comptroller
Date Posted:
March 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2025 New York City spent $81,705 per “street” homeless person, up 262% from 2019 whose numbers increased 26% during that period. This does not include spending on “sheltered” homeless, who are ~97% of the homeless population.

New York City’s unsheltered population increased from 3,588 in FY 2019 to 4,504 in FY 2025 — a 26% increase from pre-pandemic levels. In that time, spending on services for this population has more than tripled, growing from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025 (a 262% increase). Its share of spending has also increased, from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services (DHS) spending.

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  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
  • The Clock Now Ticks on Zohran Mamdani — Reihan Salam argues that NYC’s incoming mayor will take office with “the clock on his program already five minutes to midnight,” citing the erosion of the tax…
  • Supply and The Mam — At ~15%, NYC has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US, and the top marginal corporate income tax rate at 17.4%. The city also has the…
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce

Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023

Richard Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

Related Articles:

  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The US won the War on Poverty on LBJ’s terms, cutting the absolute full-income poverty rate from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019. During these years the share of…
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Transfer payments made up 18% of all US personal income in 2022, up from 8% in 1970. Social Security/Medicare made up 56% of the increase from 1970 to 2022…
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — A 2-adult, 3-child US family with $20,000 of market income receives at least $61,000 in annual benefits and has $79,000 of disposable income. That same family…
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce

The Biggest Fraud in Welfare

Phil Gramm and John Early Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual Federal poverty spending, including non-cash benefits, were distributed in cash to those households, each would receive $70,000.

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual...
The government’s failure to count its largess as recipients’ income allows welfare households to blow past the income level above which a working family no longer qualifies for government help. Take a single parent with two school-age children who earns $11,000 annually from part-time work. The government considers this household in poverty because its income is below $25,273. But this family would qualify for benefits worth $53,128. It would receive Treasury checks of $3,400 in refundable child tax credits and $4,400 in refundable earned-income tax credits. The family would also receive Food Stamp debit cards worth $9,216 a year, $9,476 in housing subsidies, $877 of government payments for utility bills, $16,033 to fund Medicaid, $3,102 in free meals at school and $6,624 in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. All this puts the family’s income at $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level. A hardworking family earning anything like $64,128 in salary wouldn’t be eligible for any of these welfare benefits in four-fifths of the states. Meanwhile, the welfare family would be eligible for another 90 small federal benefits and sundry state and local welfare programs.

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  • Mitigating Benefits Cliffs for Low-Income Families: District of Columbia Career Mobility Action Plan as a Case Study — A single parent with one child in Washington DC, earning $11K, receives $68K of government benefits net of taxes for a total after-tax income of $79K. A…
  • Welfare Is What’s Eating the Budget — Phil Gramm notes that after transfers and taxes “the average household in the bottom, second, and middle quintiles all have roughly the same incomes—despite…
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Explaining the Widening Divides in US Midlife Mortality: Is There a Smoking Gun?

Christopher Foote, Ellen Meara, Jonathan Skinner, and Luke Stewart National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
December 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The college/non-college life expectancy gap widened from 2.6–6.3 years btw 1992 and 2019, while county mortality inequality jumped 30% to the detriment of rural areas. Smoking by state predicts ~300 extra deaths per 100k for non-college grads, 0 for grads.

The education-mortality gradient has increased sharply in the last three decades, with the life expectancy gap btw people with and without a college degree widening from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019. During the same period, mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty. Using county- and state-level data from the 1992–2019 period, we demonstrate that these three trends arose due to a fundamental shift in the geographic patterns of mortality among college and non-college populations. First, we find a sharp decline in both mortality rates and geographic inequality for college graduates. Second, the reverse was true for people without a college degree; spatial inequality became amplified. Third, we find that rates of smoking play a key role in explaining all three empirical puzzles, with secondary roles attributed to income, other health behaviors, and state policies. [An objection is that] the non-college smoking rate declined by somewhat more than the college rate from 1992 to 2019. [The resolution is that] college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did. [The key] college/non-college comparison [is] among 55–64 year-olds, the age group for which the smoking mortality penalty is greatest.

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  • Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life? — Bor, @Cutler_econ, Glaeser, and @lj_ristovska find a strong negative correlation between the % of college graduates in an area and all-cause mortality, even…
  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by…
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — As of 2021, US adults with a college degree have a life expectancy at age 25 on par with Japan, but US adults without a BA have a life expectancy that’s 8.5…
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