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Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
October 19, 2021
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The top 0.1% share of wealth in the US increased from 12.9% to 15% btw 2001-2016, according to @MatthewSmith @nberpubs.

From 2001 to 2016, the top 0.1% share of wealth in the US increased from 12.9% to 15%, highlighting a significant concentration of wealth. This increase, while lower than some previous estimates, underscores the disparity where the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90% or the P90-99 group. The primary sources of wealth for the top are pass-through business and public equity, whereas pension and housing wealth dominate for the bottom 90%. The top 0.01% sees C-corporation equity as the largest component, accounting for 40% of their wealth. These findings suggest that wealth concentration is less dramatic than earlier estimates but remains substantial, with implications for policy discussions on taxing the rich.

Research from Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick uses administrative tax to estimate wealth concentration/composition for the US. Their bottom line, “…the top 0.1% share of wealth has increased from 12.9% to 15% from 2001 to 2016. While this increase is lower than some prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated – the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as either the bottom 90% or the P90-99″ class. We find that pass-through business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth for the bottom 90%….”

Core of paper, “…This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that links people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. We combine this Data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates. Our approach which builds on SZ and Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2018) (PSZ) as well as Bricker, Henriques and Hansen (2018) (BHH)|reduces bias because wealth and rates of return are correlated. We provide new wealth estimates, new evidence on the rates of return, and a systematic analysis of the issues most consequential for capitalization. We find less wealth concentration relative to the equal-returns, individual-level approach in PSZ, especially at the very top. Figure 1A shows that the top 0.1% wealth share in 2016 is 15% under our approach, and around 20% in PSZ. Top 1% and 0.01% shares fall by 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively, leaving the recent wealth estimates above the estate tax series and closer to the SCF. The growth in top wealth shares is also less dramatic, especially in the tail. For example, our approach reduces the growth in top 0.01% shares since 1989 by 45%. Nevertheless, wealth is very concentrated:the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as either the bottom 90% or the P90-99″ class. In terms of top portfolios, we find a larger role for pass-through business wealth and a much smaller role for fixed income wealth than PSZ, consistent with the composition of top wealth in the SCF, estate tax data, and surveys of family offices of the ultrarich. Passthrough business and C-corporation equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top. At the very top, C-corporation equity is the largest component, accounting for 40% of top 0.01% wealth, but pass-through business looms large at 29%. In contrast, pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90%…”

The Level of Top Wealth, “… Table 2 shows the number of individuals in each wealth group and the wealth thresholds defining each group. We then report average wealth and the share of total wealth for these groups when applying the equal-returns approach and ranking of PSZ. Panel A focuses on top wealth groups. The full population includes 239 million individuals whose average wealth is $364K in 2016. The top 1% includes 2.4 million individuals with wealth of at least $3.7M and average wealth equal to 32 times average wealth in the full population. In terms of shares, this group’s share of total wealth is 31.5% under our preferred approach, compared to 36.6% under PSZ equal returns. Similarly, for the top 0.1%, who have wealth exceeding $17.8M, our estimates reduce their share from 18.6% under equal returns to 15.0% in our preferred specification. Thus, the combined effect of accounting for estimated heterogeneity, updating Financial Accounts aggregates, estimating private business values, adding Forbes 400 data, and including unfunded pension wealth materially affects the estimated concentration of top wealth. These adjustments are increasingly important within the very top group, as the top 1% share falls by 14% (5:1=36:6), the top 0.1% share falls by 19% (3:6=18:6), and the top 0.01% share falls by 26% (2:5=9:5). Panel B focuses on intermediate wealth groups. A key result is that the bottom 90%, who collectively hold 34.3% of wealth, are allocated 5.6 p.p. more wealth than in PSZ. The P90-99″ class, a group with more than $717K but less than $3.73M in preferred wealth, hold 34.2% of total wealth, on par with the bottom 90% and more than the top 1%. Figure 11 compares Forbes 400 wealth to aggregate wealth according to our preferred specification for telescoping subgroups of the top 1%: P99-99.9, P99.9-99.99, and the top 0.01%. We report totals and counts of individuals in each group as well as results using tax units. The wealth threshold to be in the top 0.01% in 2016 is $84M for individuals and $124M for tax units. The figure provides perspective on the relative importance of accounting for Forbes wealth if capitalization alone misses their unrealized stock wealth in non-dividend-paying companies. The Forbes 400 have considerable wealth ($2.4T in 2016), but the total wealth of the P99-99.9 and P99.9-99.99 tax unit groups exceeds this amount by factors of 6.2 and 3.0, respectively. Of course, Forbes members are much wealthier on average: these groups respectively contain 1.5 million and 150 thousand tax units, whereas Forbes represents only 400. Our top 0.01% group contains $6.6T of wealth, which includes the impact of blending Forbes into our data…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, “Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, October 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29374

Individual-Level Rates of Return, “… Figure 4B presents fixed income rates of return for 2016.We calculate rates of return as the group-level ratio of total interest income divided by total interest-generating fixed income assets. We plot these returns ranking individuals by our estimate of total wealth. Rates of return increase from 0.80% for P0-90 to 0.77% for P90-99 to 0.89% for P99-99.9 to 1.65% for P99.9-99.99 to 3.43% for P99.99-100. Rates of return that rank by AGI or by non-interest wealth display moderately greater heterogeneity in absolute terms though the differences are similar in relative terms. Overall, these data reveal a striking amount of return heterogeneity with the P99.99-100 wealth groups receiving returns that are 3.3 times average returns. At the same time, top rates of return are considerably below the top boutique rates, which reflects the mix of high- and low-yielding fixed income assets held by
those at the top of the wealth distribution…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 2

“… Figure 4C shows the time series of top 0.01%, top 0.1%, top 1%, and bottom 99% rates of return ranked by our preferred wealth estimates. We compare these rates to the equal returns rate and to various capital market rates: the deposit rate from Savov, the 10-year US Treasury rate, and the Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bond rates. All interest rates reached a peak in the 1980s during the Volcker tightening and have been falling since then. In the years since 2000, the bottom-99% rate tracks the deposit rate closely, exceeding it by approximately 0.8% in the low-interest-rate period. The equal-returns yield, which fell from 9.5% in 1982 to 1.1% in 2016, exceeds the bottom-99% but is below the top-1% and top 0.1% rates. The top-1% rate tracks the 10-year US Treasury rate although is slightly lower since the Great Recession. The top-0.1% rate hovers between the 10-year US Treasury and the Aaa rate, moving toward the 10-year rate in the last few years of the sample. In our series, top-0.01% rate is below the riskier Baa corporate bond rate in almost all years and is slightly below the Aaa rate in 2016….”
Note they ~ mirror Sarin’s findings on the impact of social security“…For pension wealth, we capitalize an age-group specific combination of wages and pension distributions. This approach allows us to incorporate the life-cycle patterns in pension wealth and associated income flows. While less important for top wealth,pension wealth accounts for 63% of wealth for the bottom 90% and 36% for the P90-99 group. Although we do not account for the value of Social Security in our main specification, we show that doing so would further increase the role of this category of wealth and flatten the trend in measured wealth concentration….The life-cycle of pension wealth accumulation further complicates the capitalization approach. Figure 9A uses the SCF to plot average wages, pension income, and pension wealth in 2016 dollars, averaging across cohorts from 1989 to 2016. Wage income grows over the life cycle and then declines starting around age 55 to near zero by age 75. In contrast, pension income is nearly zero until age 60. Pension wealth has an inverse-U shape that reflects the accumulation and decumulation of savings. These life cycle dynamics result in flow-to-stock ratios that vary by age. Figure 9B summarizes this heterogeneity by plotting the ratio of wage and pension income to total pension wealth, respectively. The blue bars depict the population average and the red bars show the ratios for four age groups: below 45, 45 to 59, 60 to 74, and above 75. Wage income of adults younger than 45 amounts to 108% of their pension wealth on average, whereas average wages for those above age 75 are only 3% of their pension wealth. The patterns for pension income are reversed. The ratios for those between 45 and 74 are closer to the population averages in blue, with the 45 to 59 aged group having a wage to pension wealth ratio that is similar to the overall average, while those aged 60 to 74 have smaller wage to pension wealth ratios, reflecting larger retirement rates. Overall, the heterogeneity in pension wealth and ow-to-stock ratios across age groups means that an age-group-invariant approach will induce large errors…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Level and composition of aggregate Wealth. “… Figure 2A decomposes aggregate wealth and plots the evolution of key components relative to national income.Other than pass-through business, each component is from the Financial Accounts. In 2016, national wealth amounts to 540% of national income. The largest component is pensions, which equals 203% of national income (of which 40 p.p. are unfunded defined benefit pensions).8 Housing net of mortgages is the next largest (117%), followed by fixed income assets (94%), pass-through business which includes proprietorship, partnership, and S-corporation equity (71%)|and C-corporation equity (67%). Combined C-corporation and pass-through business wealth gives 138%, fifty percent more than the amount of fixed income wealth and commensurate with funded pension wealth. Non-mortgage debt, which includes credit-card balances, debt secured by durable goods, student loans, and other loans, amounts to -16% of national wealth. Aggregate wealth is 77 percentage points of national income higher than in PSZ, of which 40 p.p., 15 p.p., 10 p.p., and 12 p.p. are from unfunded defined benefit pensions, our bottom-up pass-through estimates, adjustments to non-mortgage debt, and residual updates. At the aggregate level, wealth has increased from 346% in 1966 to 540% of national income. Of that increase, 124 percentage points are from pensions, 38 are from net housing, 22 from pass-through business, 18 are from fixed income, and -7 from C-corporation equity.

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Level and composition of observed capital income.. “…. Figure 2B plots six types of capital income relative to national income from 1966 to 2016. Aggregate interest income of U.S. individuals increased in the late 1970s and boomed in the early 1980s. It then fell in the 1990s back to its initial share of national income. Since 2000, aggregate interest income has been falling and amounted to 0.6% of national income or $102 billion in 2016. Pension and pass-through income are now the largest sources of capital income. Pension income has risen tenfold from 0.7% to 6% of national income from 1966 to 2016.Pass-through income was 6.8% in 1966, fell to 4% in the early 1980s, and then recovered following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to 7.3% in 2016. Aggregate dividend income of U.S. individuals amounts to 1.6% and has fluctuated mildly around that level over this period. In contrast, aggregate capital gains of U.S. individuals is much more volatile and ranges from 2% to over 8%. Aggregate property tax payments, which are capitalized to estimate housing assets, amount to approximately 1.2% and grew modestly during the 2000s housing cycle….”
Good factoid, “…Therefore, a dollar of interest income for a wealthy person corresponds to a different level of assets than for a poorer person. Figure 3A uses the 2016 SCF to decompose fixed income holdings into two broad categories: liquid assets, including currency, deposits, and money market funds; and less liquid assets, including bonds, non-money-market fixed income mutual funds, and other fixed income assets. Among fixed income assets, high net worth households have more of their fixed income assets in bonds and other securities. The top 0.1% hold less than 20% of their fixed income portfolio in liquid assets. Bonds and xed income mutual funds account for over 80%. In contrast, the bottom 90% hold more than 80% of their fixed income assets in liquid assets…”

Top wealth overtime, “…. Figure 1 plots our preferred estimates from 1966 to 2016 for the top 0.01%, top 0.1%, and the top 1%. For the top 0.1%, top wealth falls from 10% in the late 1960s to a low of 5.7% in 1978, then steadily rises to around 15% in recent years. Relative to the PSZ series, our preferred series not only shows a lower level in recent years but less growth since 1980. The PSZ top 0.1% series grew from 6.3% in 1978 to 18.6% in 2016; our preferred series grew from 5.7% to 15.0%. Focusing on the 1989-2016 period during which the SCF is available, the top 0.1% share grew 5.1% in our series, 4.3% in the SCF, and 8.1% in PSZ. The gap between the PSZ and preferred series is even larger in recent years for the top 0.01%. Our series and the PSZ series track each other closely before 2000, but they diverge in 2000, especially since 2007. In our series, the top-0.01% shares increase from 5.8% in 2001 to 6.2% in 2006 to 7.0% in 2016; in the PSZ series, the increase from 2001 to 2006 is similar but the increase from 2006 to 2016 is three times larger. For both of these top groups, our series closely tracks the harmonized SCF with Forbes in recent years. For the top 1%, we find a similar trend to the harmonized SCF with Forbes but a lower level. Since 2000, the SCF top 1% share is between the equal-returns series and our preferred series, though shows a sharper increase between 2013 and 2016 that appears to have partly reversed in the 2019 survey. Figure 13 plots time series versions of Figure 12 for the major asset classes for the top 0.01%, top 0.1%, and top 1% in our series, the PSZ equal-returns series, and the harmonized SCF. The figure helps provide a more systematic presentation of the composition of top wealth over time relative to the equal-returns approach. The figure also displays when different updates occur (1980s for pension and housing, 2001 for pass-through and fixed income with information-returns) and the corresponding effects, and how policy and macroeconomic conditions affect the concentration and composition of wealth. For the top 1%, we include estimates from the DFA for comparison…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Composition of top wealth, “…Tables 3A and 3B show the wealth composition in 2016 for each wealth group in our preferred approach. Pass-through business, C-corporation equity, and fixed income account for 26%, 32%, and 23% of top 0.1% wealth, respectively, with the rest in housing and pensions. At the very top, C-corporation equity is the largest component, accounting for 40% of top 0.01% wealth, but pass-through business looms large at 29%. In contrast, the wealth composition for the bottom 90% is 63% pensions and 23% in housing. The portfolios of the P90-99 are more balanced, with almost equal shares from fixed income (18%), C-corporation plus pass-through equity (21%), housing (25%), and a larger role for pensions (36%). Figure 12 plots the level and allocation of wealth across asset classes among the top 10%. We group individuals into percentile bins and further divide the top 1% into P99- 99.9, P99.9-99.99, and the top 0.01%. Each plot shows the share of total household wealth accruing to that group in a particular asset class. We compare our preferred estimates to the PSZ equal-returns approach and the harmonized SCF with Forbes. The figure displays where in the distribution and across assets differences in approach lead to differences in top wealth shares. Overall, the top 0.01% has 7.0% of total household wealth in our series, of which 1.3 p.p., 2.0 p.p., 2.8 p.p., and 0.9 p.p. are due to fixed income, pass-through business, public equity, and other categories, respectively. The largest difference between our series and the PSZ series is fixed income, for which the PSZ approach estimates fixed income assets of the top 0.01% account for 4.1% of total US household wealth. This difference is partially o set by our pass-through business estimate, which exceeds PSZ’s estimate of 1.1% of total household wealth by 0.9 percentage points. The estimates for the other asset classes are similar for the top 0.01%. In our series, those in the P99-99.9 hold a substantial amount of wealth that exceeds that held by the top 0.1% in terms of fixed income and have considerably more wealth in pensions and housing. For pass-through wealth, the P99-99.9 hold 2.9% of total household wealth, whereas the top 0.1% holds 3.9%. C-corporation equity is more concentrated, as the top 0.01% holds more wealth than the P99-99.9 and P99.9-99.99 groups despite representing 1/100th and 1/10th the number of individuals, respectively…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 6


“… Figure 14A plots top 1%, P90-99, and P0-90 wealth shares over this time period under both our preferred and the equal-return approaches. The difference in growth between the PSZ and preferred approaches is less pronounced for the top 1% than for the top 0.1% and top 0.01%, with the growth of the top 1% share from 2001 to 2016 falling from 5.4 to 4.2. percentage points. Overall, wealth is still concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as either the bottom 90% or the P90-99″ class. The evolution of the P0-90 versus P90-99 shares from 1965 to 2000 reflects the evolution of pensions, housing, and public equity and relative exposures for different groups. Aggregate pension wealth rises secularly over this time, which is most important for the bottom group. Housing wealth rises and falls in the 1980s, affecting the bottom group and the P90-99 groups significantly. Public equity wealth falls in the 1970s, remains low, and then resurges in the mid-1990s, which drives the time series for the top 1%. In more recent years, the bottom 90 group loses ground relative to both the top 1% and the P90-99. These results are consistent with findings from other data sets (e.g., Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins (2020)). Saez and Zucman (2016) also highlight the decline of P0-90 wealth driven by housing and an increase in debt. Our series shows a less dramatic decline due to the increased role for pensions, including unfunded defined benefit plans, smaller aggregate non-mortgage debt, as well as the more concentrated nature of housing wealth in our unequal-property-tax-rate series. Average wealth of the bottom 90 increased modestly by 17% from 2001 to 2016 (from $120K to $140K in 2016 dollars), whereas average wealth for P90-99 and the top 1% rose by 40% and 49% (from $1.0M to $1.4M and from $7.7M to $11.5M), respectively…”

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich: Extended Excerpt Image 7


The rich are able to get better returns, “…We introduce two innovations to estimate fixed income wealth. First, we construct a novel data set on the universe of taxable interest sources linked to owners using de-identified ed data from income tax records spanning 2001-2016. These 3.2 billion source-owner observations allow us to disaggregate taxable interest income into subcomponents. This disaggregation reveals that rich individuals earn a much larger share of their interest income in the tax data in higher-yielding forms (such as boutique investment partnerships of distressed debt or mezzanine funds). Disaggregation also allows us to estimate interest rates more accurately than prior work. These data reveal a striking amount of return heterogeneity across wealth groups, with the top 0.01% group receiving returns that are 3.3 times average returns. In 2016, our estimates increase from nearly 1% within the bottom 99.9 to 1.6% for P99.9-99.99 to 3.4% for the top 0.01%…“

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Showing 156 database articles primarily about Inequality

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
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Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
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The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
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An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Anti-AI rhetoric is emerging in Democratic fundraising messaging at the same adoption rate that anti-billionaire language showed in 2019, driven by the party's progressive wing and framed not as a jobs or safety concern but as an extension of billionaire power.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Inequality is mostly the result of an increasing premium on returns from risk and high-skilled labor ushered in by technological disruption and the feedback…
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Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. A shift of ~$200bn in worker pay into corporate profits as stock-based compensation could explain roughly one-third of the long-run decline in labor's share of income, as stock ownership allows high earners to receive tax-preferred pay recorded as profits rather than wages.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
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Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does tax-preferred stock compensation explain the labor share decline?

Core argument: $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.
  2. Top 10% of public company employees ($40k additional implicit pay via equity ownership) concentrate gains that would equal $200bn aggregate.
  3. $12.2tn corporate value added vs. $7.2tn employee compensation reveals labor’s shrinking claim on output, as tax-preferred equity arrangements redirect worker.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity Based Compensation ~45% Of Total Comp Of High-Skilled Labor, Including It In Labor Share Cuts Decline of Labor Share Since The 1980’s By 60%.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
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    • Wages/Income

Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

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The Great $110 Trillion Wealth Transfer Won’t Happen Any Time Soon

AI Summary. Bequeathable wealth in the U.S. rose from 256% to 424% of GDP between 1997 and 2021, with 97% of that increase concentrated in households headed by someone 55 or older. The wealthiest 10% of that age group drove 75% of the total gain, meaning inherited wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated

Rachel Louise Ensign and James Benedict Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The age at which Americans are inheriting money has risen. According to Federal Reserve surveys, btw 1998 and 2010, Americans in their late 50s were most likely to report receiving an inheritance; by 2013–2022, that age had ticked up to the mid 60’s.

Will the concentration of inherited wealth impact economic equality?

Core argument: Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.

Fed data [indicates] that what is known as the bequeathable wealth rose from 256% of gross domestic product in 1997 to 424% in 2021, the last year of available data. A staggering 97% of that increase was due to wealth gains in households where the head of household was 55 or older. Older Americans may keep accumulating wealth, especially if the stock market keeps rising. But some will spend it on living costs and expensive long-term care, leaving less for heirs. When they die, many will leave their money to their spouses, who are often in their same generation. This year, around $1.3 trillion is expected to be passed onto spouses, compared with about $2 trillion to heirs in Gen X and younger generations, according to projections from research firm Cerulli Associates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.
  2. The wealthiest 10% of households age 55+ captured 75% of total bequeathable wealth gains since 1997, resulting in widening inequality.
  3. Boomers accumulated $1tn+ in wealth during Q4 alone, outpacing all other generational groups, as stock and business valuations drive outsized.

Related Articles:

  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an…
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Has Generational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans

AI Summary. Generational income growth in the United States has slowed across five successive generations, with each cohort earning less relative to the previous one by their late 30s.

Kevin Corinth and Jeff Larrimore Demography
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As measured by the 36–40 cohort across generations, Americans’ real market income has continued to rise but at a slower pace. Accounting for taxes and transfers partially offsets the slowdown in the growth of market income.

Core argument: Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).

We zoom in on a focal age range in peo­ple’s late 30s—an age at which we observe the five gen­er­a­tions from the Greatest Generation (born 1901–1927) through the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996)—and assess both whether gen­er­a­tional prog­ress is positive and the extent to which the rate of growth is speeding up or slowing down. Focusing first on median market income, there are two notable takeaways that apply for both the individual/couple and the household sharing units.The first is that generational progress has clearly slowed since the Baby Boom Generation, although it remains positive. Second, despite the perception that slowing generational progress is a recent phenomenon, the substantial slowdown did not start with Millennials but began a generation earlier with Generation X. Looking at the patterns formed in household market income by generation, the income of Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that for similarly aged adults in the Silent Generation. Progress slowed substantially for Generation X—their incomes increased by 10% relative to Baby Boomers—and then ticked up for Millennials, whose incomes rose by 15% relative to Generation X. Although market income is an important indicator of progress, it does not reflect the full set of resources that individuals have available for consumption. The slowdown in generational progress is softened when accounting for taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).
  2. Wage growth deceleration across five generations results in widening inequality, with top earners capturing disproportionate income gains while median earners.
  3. Workforce participation shifts and wage stagnation for Millennials vs. prior generations lead to delayed wealth accumulation and reduced intergenerational economic.

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