Job Prospects for Black Workers Have Never Been Better—In Ways That Might Last
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Showing 96 database articles primarily about Unemployment/Participation
On Europe’s Economy, Let’s Ditch The Lazy Stereotypes
AI Summary. Prime-age (25–54) and older (55–64) employment rates in Europe exceed those in the U.S., disproving the claim that European welfare systems suppress work. Higher-welfare northern European countries tend to have higher employment rates than lower-welfare southern ones.
Chris Giles Financial Times- Date Posted:
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Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.
Does European welfare actually discourage work?
Core argument: Prime-age adults (25–54) and older workers (55–64) both achieve higher employment rates in Europe than in the U.S., refuting the premise that generous welfare systems suppress labor force participation.
It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Prime-age adults (25–54) and older workers (55–64) both achieve higher employment rates in Europe than in the U.S., refuting the premise that generous welfare systems suppress labor force participation.
- The U.S. records a higher share of young people (15–24) not in education, employment, or training than Europe, indicating that lower U.S. youth employment reflects weaker human capital investment, not stronger labor markets.
- Within Europe, higher-welfare northern economies consistently outperform lower-welfare southern ones on employment rates, though intra-Eurozone convergence is underway, led by rapid gains in Spain.
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- The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — An EC study of European competitiveness finds that EU gross value-added per hour worked increased by 0.7%/year from 2000-19, vs. 1.2%/year in the US. “Europe…
- Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here
AI Summary. AI-driven data-center expansion and related professional hiring have added roughly 1.05m jobs above trend since 2022–2023, spanning electrical contracting, equipment manufacturing, software development, and data science. The job gains exceed what broader construction, manufacturing, and professional employment trends would predict.
Economist Staff The Economist- Date Posted:
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The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.
Is artificial intelligence creating a genuine employment boom or temporary hiring surge?
Core argument: AI-linked demand has generated roughly 730,000 above-trend jobs in engineering, software development, and data science since 2022, substantially outpacing near-term displacement effects.
[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- AI-linked demand has generated roughly 730,000 above-trend jobs in engineering, software development, and data science since 2022, substantially outpacing near-term displacement effects.
- Data-centre construction has added approximately 320,000 above-trend jobs across electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing since 2023, with grid upgrades and broader factory-building contributing alongside AI demand.
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- The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.
- Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Young workers in the most AI-exposed occupations face an employment shortfall ~19% below less-exposed peers, driven by reduced hiring rather than job losses, and concentrated in roles where AI replaces rather than complements human tasks.
- Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
Americans Without College Degrees Are Having One of the Best Job Markets in Years
AI Summary. Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing historically low unemployment relative to their own two-decade range, outperforming college-educated peers on that relative measure. College graduates still hold an absolute advantage, with a 2.7% unemployment rate versus 4.7% for high-school-only workers.
Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal- Date Posted:
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In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.
Is the job market finally tightening for workers without degrees?
Core argument: Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing one of their strongest job markets in two decades, with unemployment rates near historic lows relative to their own 2003–present range, outperforming their college-educated peers on that relative measure.
The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing one of their strongest job markets in two decades, with unemployment rates near historic lows relative to their own 2003–present range, outperforming their college-educated peers on that relative measure.
- On an absolute basis, a college degree still confers a significant labor-market advantage: prime-age degree-holders averaged 2.7% unemployment versus 3.6% for some-college workers and 4.7% for high-school-only workers over the 12 months ending July.
Related Articles:
- College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up — The narrowing unemployment gap between young college graduates and non-graduates reflects rising labor force dropout among non-graduates, not equal job market outcomes; the share of young non-graduates who are employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels and falling, while graduates are near recovery.
- To Fix Education, Fix The Economy First — Using OECD skills data and the Luxembourg Income Study, Burn-Murdoch finds US workers at the lowest levels of literacy and numeracy earn ~ on par with British…
- The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.
What’s Behind the Declining Trend Unemployment Rate?
AI Summary. The structural unemployment rate fell from 7.8% to 4.8% between 1976 and 2024, with over half of the 3.3 percentage point decline driven by workforce composition shifts, particularly rising educational attainment, which alone accounts for 1 percentage point of the reduction.
Andreas Hornstein, Marianna Kudlyak, Greeshma Avaradi and Taerin Kim Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco- Date Posted:
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Hornstein et al find that about half of the ~3pp drop in the trend unemployment rate since 1976 is due to compositional change in the work force towards lower unemployment “types ” – in particular, older and more educated workers.
Is rising education driving down structural unemployment?
Core argument: The U.S. trend unemployment rate fell 3.3 percentage points—from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024—with rising educational attainment alone accounting for 1.0 percentage point of that structural decline.
We find that the trend unemployment rate declined from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024 [Figure 1]. Roughly half of that decline reflects compositional change. Figure 2 separates the estimated cumulative change in the annual unemployment trend since 1976 into its components. The total decline was about 3.3 percentage points by 2024. Changes in workforce composition account for a little more than half of that decline. Rising educational attainment is the single largest compositional force, lowering the trend about 1pp. Figure 4 plots estimated education shares for entering cohorts of women, and these patterns are similar for male cohorts (not shown). The figure shows a steady long-run fall in the share of new female cohorts with less than high school education and a steady rise in the share with some college or a college degree. [Returning to Figure 2], changes in group-specific LFP rate trends contribute only ~0.3 pp. The remaining decline, a bit under 1pp, comes from lower group-specific trend unemployment.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- The U.S. trend unemployment rate fell 3.3 percentage points—from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024—with rising educational attainment alone accounting for 1.0 percentage point of that structural decline.
- Workforce compositional shifts explain slightly more than half of the 3.3-percentage-point decline in trend unemployment since 1976, making demographic change the dominant driver over the period.
- Group-specific labor force participation trends contributed only 0.3 percentage points to the trend unemployment decline, while lower group-specific unemployment rates drove the remaining approximately 1.0 percentage point reduction.
Related Articles:
- Global Views: They’re Not Hiking — The decline in unemployment has been driven by lower labor force participation, not an increase in employment. Hatzius stresses continued weakness in wage…
- Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The overall labor force participation rate is a misleading measure of labor market health because it does not account for age-related variation in work patterns, making it especially distorted when large population groups shift into retirement-age brackets.
College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up
AI Summary. The narrowing unemployment gap between young college graduates and non-graduates reflects rising labor force dropout among non-graduates, not equal job market outcomes; the share of young non-graduates who are employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels and falling, while graduates are near recovery.
Justin Fox Bloomberg- Date Posted:
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Labor force participation is rising for American college graduates aged 25–29, and is now at 89.4% – above its pre-pandemic level. Participation among non-college members of that age cohort is falling; at 78.7%, it is now below its pre-pandemic level.
Are non-graduates disappearing from the job market?
Core argument: The narrowing education-unemployment gap among young adults reflects labor force withdrawal by non-degree holders—not diminished diploma value—as workers who stop seeking jobs are excluded from unemployment calculations.
The narrowing of [the unemployment gap btw college and non-college workers] in recent years has lent support to narratives that college diplomas are losing their value amid the rise of large language models, the purported return of blue-collar work, and other job market changes. But while it may well be that diplomas have lost value, the recent shrinking of the young-adult education-unemployment gap seems to be driven mainly by a different phenomenon. Growing numbers of young adults without college degrees simply aren’t trying to find work and thus aren’t counted in unemployment calculations. The employment-population ratio for young college grads is not far off from where it was just before the pandemic and seems as if it might be headed upward again after a sharp drop in 2023 and 2024, for non-grads it is 1.7 percentage points lower than before the pandemic and clearly trending downward.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- The narrowing education-unemployment gap among young adults reflects labor force withdrawal by non-degree holders—not diminished diploma value—as workers who stop seeking jobs are excluded from unemployment calculations.
- Young adults without college degrees carry an employment-population ratio 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels and trending downward, while college graduates have nearly recovered to pre-pandemic parity.
Related Articles:
- Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The overall labor force participation rate is a misleading measure of labor market health because it does not account for age-related variation in work patterns, making it especially distorted when large population groups shift into retirement-age brackets.
- How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders — Male labor force participation has fallen steadily since the 1970s, while female participation rose sharply before plateauing, driven by shifts in education levels and age composition rather than a single cause.
- AI, Immigration, and Collapsing Labor Force Participation — Declining labor force participation concentrates economic output among fewer workers, raising the return on automation and making productivity growth the primary driver of expansion. Any productivity shortfall carries greater consequences because a shrinking worker base cannot compensate through increased participation.
The Big Exceptions To The American Manufacturing Jobs Decline
AI Summary. U.S. aerospace and electrical components manufacturing are the two largest sources of job growth in an otherwise declining manufacturing sector, driven by record airline order backlogs and surging demand for electrical infrastructure from data centers. Dedicated data center consumption of electrical equipment and components more than doubled between 2019 and
Jiaxin (Jason) He Agglomerations- Date Posted:
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The US has lost 300,000 manufacturing jobs since their recent peak in Q2 2023. Two subsectors have seen strong job growth: aerospace manufacturing added 43,000 jobs, and electrical equipment, cable and battery manufacturing added 36,200.
Are aerospace and electrical components bucking the broader manufacturing decline?
Core argument: Aerospace posted a $116.7 billion trade surplus—the largest of any U.S. manufacturing industry—while leading all sectors in job growth since 2023, driven by record commercial airline order backlogs and Boeing's return to profitability and high delivery volumes.
Aerospace leads all manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023. Last year it also posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry, at $116.7 billion. Driving the growth has been strong commercial and passenger airline demand, including a record-high order backlog. Boeing, the world’s leading airplane manufacturer, returned to profitability and high delivery volumes in 2025. The employment surge in the electrical components subsector tells a different story. It owes its strength to two industries: electrical equipment manufacturing and batteries, wires, cables, and miscellaneous electrical components. These are among the industries that bore the brunt of the China Shock and suffered acute decline in the 2000s. Green energy and electric vehicles likely contributed to their initial recovery, raising demand for batteries and electrical infrastructure. But their continued growth even after the cancellation of EV subsidies in 2025 points to a different, potent, and entirely unsurprising driver: Artificial Intelligence. AI’s manufacturing footprint runs the length of the supply chain. Dedicated data centers more than doubled their real consumption of electrical equipment and components from 2019 to 2024.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Aerospace posted a $116.7 billion trade surplus—the largest of any U.S. manufacturing industry—while leading all sectors in job growth since 2023, driven by record commercial airline order backlogs and Boeing's return to profitability and high delivery volumes.
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- Does the Import Invasion Explain the Mysterious Disappearance of Productivity Growth in U.S. Manufacturing? — Rising import penetration in U.S. manufacturing after 2000 is strongly linked to slower productivity growth, as foreign competition reduced domestic sales, investment, and innovation capacity, with offshoring of production to Asia severing the link between design and process improvement.
- Midyear Outlook — AI investment is crowding out rival capital projects by absorbing scarce physical inputs—grid capacity, construction labor, metals, and engineering talent—while semiconductor prices surge where supply constraints meet surging demand. With hyperscaler free cash flow exhausted, over 80% of future AI capital spending requires external financing, including fresh equity issuance.
- What Would It Take to Bring Back US Manufacturing? Part 1: America’s Structural Headwinds — Bridgewater estimates that closing the ~$3T gap btw US manufacturing output and goods consumption will be an uphill battle. Largely due to manufacturing wages…