Are Financial Crises Predictable?
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The Shleifer model suggests financial crises are more predictable than traditionally believed, particularly when examining periods of rapid credit & asset price growth. The probability of a financial crisis within one year of entering the Red Zone is over 13%, compared to a 4% baseline.
Greg Obenshain and Eldar Safarov report on a Andrei Shleifer paper (attached) we previously highlighted that argues financial crisis are relatively predictable, "...The authors define periods when three-year debt growth has been in the top 20% of historical increases and three-year asset price growth has been in the top third of historical increases as the “Red Zone,” shown in the upper right-hand corner of the figure below... The probability of experiencing a financial crisis within one year of entering the Red Zone is over 13%, compared to a 4% probability in the entire dataset. Remarkably, the probability of entering a financial crisis within three years of entering the Business Red Zone is 45% and an astounding 69% in the rare instances when both the household and business Red Zones are breached. The authors note that crises do not immediately follow high debt and asset price growth, suggesting they take time to develop.... And most interestingly, we have just entered a Red Zone as of the end of 2020.This is driven by the rise of debt-to-GDP and the equity market rally. Even if debt-to-GDP is calculated using the pre-COVID GDP level, this result holds. So, if crises are by-products of credit and asset price growth cycles, as the authors’ evidence strongly suggests, then the US may have just entered the danger zone. This does not mean that we need to worry about the sky falling just yet. The authors show clearly that crises take time to develop, and only materialize 36% of the time after a Red Zone has been entered...."

Greg Obenshain and Eldar Safarov, "Are Financial Crises Predictable?" Verdad, August 9, 2021, https://mailchi.mp/verdadcap/are-financial-crises-predictable
Are Financial Crises Predictable?
The consensus wisdom among academics and practitioners alike is that crises are inherently unpredictable. But Harvard’s famed behavioral economics group has recently produced a new paper suggesting the consensus wisdom on predicting crises might be wrong—at least on a time horizon of three years or longer. Instead, they argue that rapid expansions of credit can drive asset price booms, which are followed by credit busts.
Building off earlier academic research, the authors combine data from 42 countries between 1950 and 2016 to study financial crises in the context of business and household credit growth as well as equity and home price growth. They define crises as declines in bank equities by greater than 30% or banking panics, which capture events such as the Great Recession (2007) and the Savings and Loan Crisis (1990), but not the bust of the dot-com bubble. In line with the theories of Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger, the authors find that financial crises tend to follow periods that feature both elevated debt and asset price growth. The authors define periods when three-year debt growth has been in the top 20% of historical increases and three-year asset price growth has been in the top third of historical increases as the “Red Zone,” shown in the upper right-hand corner of the figure below.

Businesses and households are analyzed separately, meaning a country can enter the Red Zone either because household debt and equity prices have jointly risen or because business debt and equity prices have jointly risen. It turns out that businesses and households rarely overheat together. The few crises preceded by both high business and household debt growth tend to be notable, including Japan in 1988-89, Spain in 2005-07, and Iceland in 2005-07.
The table below shows the probability of entering a financial crisis once the Red Zone has been breached, broken down by the type of Red Zone event: business, household or both.

The probability of experiencing a financial crisis within one year of entering the Red Zone is over 13%, compared to a 4% probability in the entire dataset. Remarkably, the probability of entering a financial crisis within three years of entering the Business Red Zone is 45% and an astounding 69% in the rare instances when both the household and business Red Zones are breached. The authors note that crises do not immediately follow high debt and asset price growth, suggesting they take time to develop.
As a leading indicator, the Red Zone would appear to be effective. 64% of crises were preceded by either the business or household Red Zone warning within the prior three years. When the authors expand their three-year debt growth to include the top 40% of historical increases and the three-year price growth to be in the top two-thirds of historical increases, the Yellow Zone precedes 82% of crises within the prior three years. But like most leading indicators, their presence does not necessarily result in the event. Red Zones and Yellow Zones were followed by crises only 36% and 20% of the time. To give a sense of what this data looks like, we show the Red and Yellow Zone indicators for the US housing sector along with the real housing price index.

The data fit well. The Yellow and Red Zones precede subsequent falls in home prices, most notably in the late 1980s and ahead of the 2008 financial crisis.
Ideally, we’d show the same chart for US businesses debt and asset price growth. However, there were no business Red Zones in the United States in the authors’ dataset. But while the authors needed to study 42 countries across 60 years so that they could get statistically significant results, we are not similarly constrained. We can use their insights to see what happens if we use US data alone. Specifically, rather than global cut-off values for Red and Yellow Zones, we can use only the US data to define the Yellow and Red Zones. The results are shown below.

The Yellow and Red Zones capture the late 1980’s leveraged buyout boom and the dot-com bust. And most interestingly, we have just entered a Red Zone as of the end of 2020. This is driven by the rise of debt-to-GDP and the equity market rally. Even if debt-to-GDP is calculated using the pre-COVID GDP level, this result holds. So, if crises are by-products of credit and asset price growth cycles, as the authors’ evidence strongly suggests, then the US may have just entered the danger zone. This does not mean that we need to worry about the sky falling just yet. The authors show clearly that crises take time to develop, and only materialize 36% of the time after a Red Zone has been entered.
Credit and asset booms are what predict busts. In part, the authors argue, because investors tend to extrapolate these booms into the future, taking more risks than they should. Investors feel an inevitable desire to “reach for yield” in low-yielding environments, spurring credit growth that drives asset growth until the inevitable reckoning when some portion of the assets and some portion of the debt go bad.





























Ed Comment: I LOVE to see Main finally admitting my chief criticism of their work -- criticism I published that surely they read: "The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis." As you (Steve) recall, those were imbalances their proposed solution stupidly advocated perpetrating after the crisis as a solution to the crisis. Failing to see that allocations prior to the crisis were onetime and could not continue growing forever was a preposterously stupid oversight on their part. Ironically, I was also the one who recognized it might not be a misallocation, just a one time expansion of an allocation that could not continue to expand at the same rate forever, much less expanded in the face of the crisis as they initially proposed. It showed an utter lack of understanding of what caused the crisis--an expansion of risk-averse (offshore ) savings that destabilized an inherently unstable banking system (that costs more than it was worth to stabilized privately rather than publicly--hence the slowest recovery since ww2).
Amir Sufi and Alan Taylor argue that financial crises are predictable and foreshadowed by credit and elevated asset prices. The negative consequences are a function of both to the crisis itself but also preceding imbalances, “…Financial crises have large deleterious effects on economic activity, and as such have been the focus of a large body of research. This study surveys the existing literature on financial crises, exploring how crises are measured, whether they are predictable, and why they are associated with economic contractions. Historical narrative techniques continue to form the backbone for measuring crises, but there have been exciting developments in using quantitative data as well. Crises are predictable with growth in credit and elevated asset prices playing an especially important role; recent research points convincingly to the importance of behavioral biases in explaining such predictability. The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis. Crises do not occur randomly, and, as a result, an understanding of financial crises requires an investigation into the booms that precede them…”
“…For financial crises to be seen as a distinct, important, and disastrous type of event, we might first ask: how damaging are they? and how frequent?The associated downturns are much more adverse than a typical normal recession. We present a headline summary in Table 1. Using local projections (LPs, see Jorda`, 2005), the deviation of real GDP per capita y is estimated h years after a crisis event. In the first two panels, the event is a crisis year and the baseline is trend; in the last two panels the event is the peak of a financial recession (a crisis within ±2 years) and the baseline is a normal recession. To start, using the simpler crisis year definition, Table 1a shows that at a 6 year horizon, real GDP per capita is lower by about 5%-6% following crises, relative to trend. Table 1b shows the result is not driven by the great global crises, the synchronized distress in many countries seen in the interwar depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Next, aligning events using business cycle peaks as in Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor ` (2013), Table 1c shows that over 6 years, real GDP per capita is lower by about 4% after financial peaks, relative to normal peaks. Table 1d shows this is also not driven global crises, with a deviation of about 3% still seen…”

“…The raw event frequency summary for the onset of financial crises is given in Table 2, and it is also noteworthy that, despite the unusually calm period from 1946 to 1970, when no financial crisis events were seen in advanced economies and very few in emerging economies, the incidence of financial crisis recessions has been large in recent decades, and comparable to outcomes in the turbulent 1870 to 1939 period….”
“…The empirical evidence we survey supports the view that financial crises are indeed predictable, especially by credit and asset price growth. Support has also built up for the view that deviations from rational expectations are an important component in explaining this predictability. In general, the findings in the literature fit a broader trend in macroeconomics towards the study of the booms that precede economic downturns; or, as (Beaudry, Galizia, and Portier, 2020) put it, “putting the cycle back into business cycle analysis.”…”
“…We highlight two interesting findings in Baron, Verner, and Xiong (2021), notably: first, declines in real bank equity returns R B are the best coincident classifier of conventional narrative financial crisis binary events, compared to many macroeconomic and financial variables; second, bank equity returns are a strong predictor of subsequent growth slow downs and credit crunches, based on an LP analysis, even controlling for real nonfinancial equity returns R N, a result we discuss in more detail below. A third result also bears mentioning: banking panics (runs by depositors/creditors) on their own have small macro-financial consequences—it is the bank failures that matter most. Obviously, panics can happen without failures, and failures without panics, in theory and in the data. This finding is important since much debate centered on whether the key locus of the crisis problem is runnable funding outbreaks (roughly, liquidity), or systemic failures (roughly, solvency). The empirical record points to the latter as the more serious issue in terms of macroeconomic consequences, and justifies the central use of solvency and failure criteria in the traditional narrative definition of a financial crisis…”
“..In sum, both measures—bank equity crashes and the traditional narrative indicator— reflect emergent problems on bank balance sheets. They are not perfectly correlated, and the failure-based narrative indicator still provides the most discriminating information: BVX count 197 narrative failure events, and out of these 193 are called as crises (98%); but out of a count of 269 bank equity crashes, only 138 are called as crises (51%). This shows that the inclusion of data on bank equity declines complements the narrative approach with useful auxiliary information….”
“…To confront the issue of whether asset price booms also contribute meaningfully to elevated financial crisis risk, Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2015b) collate further data series on equity and housing prices for the long-panel of advanced economies. They develop a “bubble indicator” based on whether the asset price in a given year is more than one s.d. above its de-trended value (using a lowpass filter) and whether there is also a subsequent large correction. An illustration of this approach is in Figure 6c, where the sample is again restricted to recession peaks, and the logit estimation is augmented to include a bubble indicator for either asset price. When there is no bubble in either asset price, crisis risk is generally low. In contrast, when there is either kind of bubble, crisis risk is significantly elevated, by a factor of roughly 1.5 in the mid-range of credit growth
“…Some illustrative evidence is shown in Figure 7a using local projections. The outcome variable is private credit to GDP, denoted CREDGDPct, from the Jord`a, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) bank loan measure, and the sample is the long-panel of advanced economies. The shock is a change in the degree of financial liberalization, treated as exogenous, according to a set of indices constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) for the period 1973-2005, a range of dates which closely encompasses the great era of financial liberalization in both advanced and emerging economies. The index used here is the standardized sum of three measures of the domestic financial sector, the stock market, and the capital account. The figure clearly shows that in the 5 years after a financial liberalization event, changes in credit to GDP, which were on a positive long-run postwar trend anyway, had a tendency to accelerate even more rapidly….”
“…Illustrative evidence on trends around financial crises are shown in Figure 8 for the JST long panel. Using an event-study approach, the average evolution of each variable is plotted relative to the peak year of the cycle. Averages are displayed separately for normal recessions (solid blue line) and financial crisis recessions (dashed red line). The first row of four charts shows the familiar timing of events and macro aggregates. Crisis probability is of course high in the ±2 year window around a financial crisis recession, by construction, given the JST peak classification; it is negligible in normal recessions, although it is not exactly zero except in year zero, since nearby financial crisis events may be associated with a different nearby cyclical peak in JST. Real GDP per capita growth decelerates after a recession peak, but much more so in a financial crisis recession as expected. Likewise, a recession is associated with the onset of a disinflationary period of several years, but the trend is much more pronounced in a financial crisis recession. Finally, the fourth chart shows that financial crisis recession peaks are preceded by credit booms and followed by credit crunches much more so than normal recessions. The second row of charts in Figure 8 shows some interesting financial market covariates using selected asset prices. The first chart shows the Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) normalized credit spread, which is the percent difference of the credit spread from its country mean (so 0% means the spread is equal to this average), and clearly spreads are tighter than average (50% lower) before a financial crisis recession peak, and much wider immediately after (50%-100% higher), compared to the minimal variation seen in normal recession events. The next chart shows the Baron and Xiong (2017) real total return on bank equities, which is a little high before a normal recession peak and indistinguishable from zero after; but near a financial crisis recession peak, bank equities experience a very large run up before, and a large crash afterwards, with significant negative real returns (note that these are log×100 units). Finally, we can see that distress clearly spills over into broader aggregate asset prices, where the onset of a financial crisis recession event similarly implies much larger and predictable reversals for investors exposed to the stock market or housing market, as shown in the last two charts….”