Edward Conard

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To Understand Rising Inequality, Consider the Janitors at Two Top Companies, Then and Now

Neil Irwin New York Times
Date Posted:
September 3, 2017
Is Database:
Database

The shift of lower-skilled work to contractors has contributed to declining mobility & rising inequality. Pay for janitors fell by 4-7% & for security guards by 8-24% in companies that outsourced.

The shift of lower-skilled work to contractors has contributed to declining mobility & rising inequality. Pay for...
The shift of lower-skilled work to contractors has contributed to declining mobility and rising inequality. In the 1980s, Kodak employed 60,000 people in Rochester with average pay and benefits worth $79,000 in today's dollars, fostering middle-class wealth. In contrast, Apple's current model employs fewer direct workers, with many roles outsourced, leading to lower compensation. Pay for janitors fell by 4-7% and for security guards by 8-24% in companies that outsourced. This shift accounts for 20% of the wage inequality increase from 1989 to 2014. The contracting economy pressures wages downward, reducing opportunities for advancement and stability for lower-skilled workers.

Neil Irwin, "To Understand Rising Inequality, Consider the Janitors at Two Top Companies, Then and Now,"New York Times, September 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/upshot/to-understand-rising-inequality-consider-the-janitors-at-two-top-companies-then-and-now.html

To Understand Rising Inequality, Consider the Janitors at Two Top Companies, Then and Now

ROCHESTER — Gail Evans and Marta Ramos have one thing in common: They have each cleaned offices for one of the most innovative, profitable and all-around successful companies in the United States.

For Ms. Evans, that meant being a janitor in Building 326 at Eastman Kodak’s campus in Rochester in the early 1980s. For Ms. Ramos, that means cleaning at Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, Calif., in the present day.

In the 35 years between their jobs as janitors, corporations across America have flocked to a new management theory: Focus on core competence and outsource the rest. The approach has made companies more nimble and more productive, and delivered huge profits for shareholders. It has also fueled inequality and helps explain why many working-class Americans are struggling even in an ostensibly healthy economy.

The $16.60 per hour Ms. Ramos earns as a janitor at Apple works out to about the same in inflation-adjusted terms as what Ms. Evans earned 35 years ago. But that’s where the similarities end.

Ms. Evans was a full-time employee of Kodak. She received more than four weeks of paid vacation per year, reimbursement of some tuition costs to go to college part time, and a bonus payment every March. When the facility she cleaned was shut down, the company found another job for her: cutting film.

Ms. Ramos is an employee of a contractor that Apple uses to keep its facilities clean. She hasn’t taken a vacation in years, because she can’t afford the lost wages. Going back to school is similarly out of reach. There are certainly no bonuses, nor even a remote possibility of being transferred to some other role at Apple.

Yet the biggest difference between their two experiences is in the opportunities they created. A manager learned that Ms. Evans was taking computer classes while she was working as a janitor and asked her to teach some other employees how to use spreadsheet software to track inventory. When she eventually finished her college degree in 1987, she was promoted to a professional-track job in information technology.

Less than a decade later, Ms. Evans was chief technology officer of the whole company, and she has had a long career since as a senior executive at other top companies. Ms. Ramos sees the only advancement possibility as becoming a team leader keeping tabs on a few other janitors, which pays an extra 50 cents an hour.

They both spent a lot of time cleaning floors. The difference is, for Ms. Ramos, that work is also a ceiling.

Eastman Kodak was one of the technological giants of the 20th century, a dominant seller of film, cameras and other products. It made its founders unfathomably wealthy and created thousands of high-income jobs for executives, engineers and other white-collar professionals. The same is true of Apple today.

But Kodak also created enough working-class jobs to help create two generations of middle-class wealth in Rochester. The Harvard economist Larry Summers has often pointed at this difference, arguing that it helps explain rising inequality and declining social mobility.

“Think about the contrast between George Eastman, who pioneered fundamental innovations in photography, and Steve Jobs,” Mr. Summers wrote in 2014. “While Eastman’s innovations and their dissemination through the Eastman Kodak Co. provided a foundation for a prosperous middle class in Rochester for generations, no comparable impact has been created by Jobs’s innovations” at Apple.

Ms. Evans’s pathway was unusual: Few low-level workers, even in the heyday of postwar American industry, ever made it to the executive ranks of big companies. But when Kodak and similar companies were in their prime, tens of thousands of machine operators, warehouse workers, clerical assistants and the like could count on steady work and good benefits that are much rarer today.

When Apple was seeking permission to build its new headquarters, its consultants projected the company would have 23,400 employees, with an average salary comfortably in the six figures. Thirty years ago, Kodak employed about 60,000 people in Rochester, with average pay and benefits companywide worth $79,000 in today’s dollars.

Part of the wild success of the Silicon Valley giants of today — and what makes their stocks so appealing to investors — has come from their ability to attain huge revenue and profits with relatively few workers.

Apple, Alphabet (parent of Google) and Facebook generated $333 billion of revenue combined last year with 205,000 employees worldwide. In 1993, three of the most successful, technologically oriented companies based in the Northeast — Kodak, IBM and AT&T — needed more than three times as many employees, 675,000, to generate 27 percent less in inflation-adjusted revenue.

The 10 most valuable tech companies have 1.5 million employees, according to calculations by Michael Mandel of the Progressive Policy Institute, compared with 2.2 million employed by the 10 biggest industrial companies in 1979. Mr. Mandel, however, notes that today’s tech industry is adding jobs much faster than the industrial companies, which took many decades to reach that scale.

Many of the professional jobs from those companies in the 1980s and ’90s have close parallels today. The high-paying positions setting corporate strategy, developing experimental technologies and shaping marketing campaigns would look similar in either era.

But a generation ago, big companies also more often directly employed people who installed products, moved goods around warehouses, worked as security guards and performed many of the other jobs needed to get products into the hands of consumers.

In part, fewer of these kinds of workers are needed in an era when software plays such a big role. The lines of code that make an iPhone’s camera work can be created once, then instantly transmitted across the globe, whereas each roll of film had to be manufactured and physically shipped. And companies face brutal global competition; if they don’t keep their work force lean, they risk losing to a competitor that does.

But major companies have also chosen to bifurcate their work force, contracting out much of the labor that goes into their products to other companies, which compete by lowering costs. It’s not just janitors and security guards. In Silicon Valley, the people who test operating systems for bugs, review social media posts that may violate guidelines, and screen thousands of job applications are unlikely to receive a paycheck directly from the company they are ultimately working for.

And the phenomenon stretches far beyond Silicon Valley, where companies like Apple are just a particularly extreme example of achieving huge business success with a relatively small employee count. The Federal Express delivery person who brings you a package may well be an independent contractor; many of the people who help banks like Citigroup and JPMorgan service mortgage loans and collect delinquent payments work for contractors; and if you call your employer’s computer help desk, there’s a good chance it will be picked up by someone in another state, or country.

Apple emphasizes that its products generate many jobs beyond those who receive a paycheck from the company directly. The company estimates 1.5 million people work in the “app economy,” building and maintaining the mobile applications used on Apple products. Apple stores in 44 states tend to offer more generous pay and benefits than is standard in the retail industry. And it is growing quickly, including far from its California headquarters, such as with 6,000 jobs in Austin, Tex., at an average salary of $77,000 a year, and many more indirectly through what it says is $50 billion in annual spending to suppliers in the United States.

“We’re responsible for creating over two million jobs in the U.S., across all 50 states,” said an Apple spokesman, “ranging from construction, customer care, retail and engineering to app development, manufacturing, operations and trucking. All Apple employees, whether full time or part time, are eligible for benefits and stock grants. We’re also fortunate to have skilled contractors that contribute to our products and services daily, along with over 9,000 suppliers in every state.”

Perhaps the biggest indictment of the more paternalistic approach taken by an earlier generation of corporate behemoths is that, Kodak, despite having been an early innovator in digital photography, is a shell of its former self. After a bankruptcy and many years of layoffs, the company now has only 2,700 employees in the United States and 6,100 worldwide.

But it is also clear that, across a range of job functions, industries and countries, the shift to a contracting economy has put downward pressure on compensation. Pay for janitors fell by 4 to 7 percent, and for security guards by 8 to 24 percent, in American companies that outsourced, Arindrajit Dube of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and Ethan Kaplan of Stockholm University found in a 2010 paper.

These pay cuts appear to be fueling overall inequality. J. Adam Cobb of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and Ken-Hou Lin at the University of Texas found that the drop in big companies’ practice of paying relatively high wages to their low- and mid-level workers could have accounted for 20 percent of the wage inequality increase from 1989 to 2014.

The same forces that explain the difference between 1980s Kodak and today’s Apple have big implications not just for every blue-collar employee who punches a timecard, but also for white-collar professionals who swipe a badge.

Phil Harnden was coming out of the Navy in 1970 when he applied for a job at Kodak, and soon was operating a forklift in a warehouse. He made $3 an hour, equivalent to $20 an hour today adjusted for inflation. That is roughly what an entry-level contracting job testing software pays.

The difference between the two gigs, aside from the absence of heavy machinery in Apple’s sleek offices, is the sense of permanence. Mr. Harnden put in 16 years operating forklifts before he left in 1986 to move to Florida. When he returned 10 years later, he was quickly rehired and even kept his seniority benefits.

In interviews, tech industry contractors in Silicon Valley describe a culture of transience. They can end up commuting to a different office park that houses a new company every few months; in many cases 18 months is the maximum a contractor is allowed to spend at one company.

“I would rather have stability,” said Christopher Kohl, 29, who has worked as a contractor at several Silicon Valley companies, including a stint doing quality assurance on Apple Maps. “It’s stressful to find a new job every 12 to 18 months.”

For Silicon Valley’s contracting class, there are reminders large and small of their second-class status. Contractors generally do not receive the stock options that have made some midlevel Silicon Valley workers wealthy over the years, nor the generous paid time off for vacation, illness or the birth of a child. The health insurance plans tend to be stingier than those that the tech giants they serve provide for their direct employees.

The smaller reminders can be just as telling. One former Apple contractor recalled spending months testing a new version of Apple’s operating system. To celebrate the release, the Apple employees they’d worked closely with on the project were invited to a splashy party in San Francisco, while the contractors had beers among themselves in a neighborhood pub.

The compensation these white-collar contractors receive puts them squarely in the middle rungs of workers in the United States, and the most skilled can make six figures (though that doesn’t go far in the hyper-expensive Bay Area housing market). Apple, based on its consultants’ report, expected to be indirectly responsible for nearly 18,000 jobs in Santa Clara County by now at an average pay of about $56,000 a year.

There are some advantages. If they work for one of the companies like Apple or Google that feature a subsidized, high-quality cafeteria, contractors can enjoy the food. They can tell their friends that they work at one of the world’s most admired companies, and enjoy predictable, regular hours. Once in a while, a contractor will be hired into a staff position.

“It’s not evil,” said Pradeep Chauhan, managing partner of OnContracting, a site to help people find tech contracting positions. “They have a job and they’re getting paid. But it’s not ideal. The problem with contracting is, you could walk in one day and they could say, ‘You don’t need to come in tomorrow.’ There is no obligation from the companies.”

And that is the ultimate contrast with the middle-skill, middle-wage jobs of earlier generations of titans — a sense of permanence, of sharing in the long-term success of the company.

“There were times I wasn’t happy with the place,” Mr. Harnden said of his Kodak years. “But it was a great company to work for and gave me a good living for a long time.”

When an automaker needs a supplier of transmissions for its cars, it doesn’t just hold an auction and buy from the lowest bidder. It enters a long-term relationship with the supplier it believes will provide the best quality and price over time. The company’s very future is at stake — nobody wants to buy a car that can’t reliably shift into first gear.

But when that same automaker needs some staplers for the office supply cabinet, it is more likely to seek out the lowest price it can get, pretty much indifferent to the identity of the seller.

Labor exists on a similar continuum.

The right product engineer or marketing executive can mean the difference between success or failure, and companies tend to hire such people as full-time employees and as part of a long-term relationship — something like the transmission supplier. What has changed in the last generation is that companies today view more and more of the labor it takes to produce their goods and services as akin to staplers: something to be procured at the time and place needed for the lowest price possible.

There is plenty of logic behind the idea that companies should focus on their core competence and outsource the rest. By this logic, Apple executives should focus on building great phones and computers, not hiring and overseeing janitors. And companies should outsource work when the need for staff is lumpy, such as for software companies that may need dozens of quality-assurance testers ahead of a major release but not once the product is out.

There’s no inherent reason that work done through a contractor should involve lower compensation than the same work done under direct employment. Sometimes it goes in the other direction; when a company hires a law firm, it is basically contracting out legal work, yet lawyers at a firm tend to be paid better than in-house counsel.

But as more companies have outsourced more functions over more time, a strong body of evidence is emerging that it’s not just about efficiency. It seems to be a way for big companies to reduce compensation costs.

Firms in the United States are legally required to offer the same health insurance options and 401(k) match to all employees — meaning if those programs are made extra generous to attract top engineers, a company that doesn’t outsource will have to pay them for everyone.

More broadly, there are a whole set of social pressures and worries about morale that encourage companies to be more generous with pay and benefits for employees who are on the same payroll.

“There was an overriding concern about equity,” said Mr. Cobb, the Wharton professor. “Firms would try to set pay so that the gap between the security guard or administrative assistant and senior V.P. wasn’t as great as you might expect, essentially by paying lower- and middle-skill workers more than they were probably worth on the market.”

Linda DiStefano applied for a secretarial job at Kodak during Easter week of her senior year in high school in 1968, and was hired to start immediately after her graduation for $87.50 a week, today’s equivalent of $32,000 a year. She put in four decades at the company, first as a secretary, then helped administer corporate travel and other projects.

“I helped put on the dinners for the board of directors, which in retrospect someone of my grade shouldn’t have been doing,” she said. “But I had a series of managers who trusted me.”

It bought her a house off Lake Avenue, a new car every few years and occasional long-distance trips to Motown reunion concerts. When her department was abolished in 2008, the travel bookings contracted out, she was making $20 an hour. The best job she could find was as a pharmacy technician at a grocery store for $8.50 an hour.

As you drive around Rochester, the role of Eastman Kodak in the city is evident everywhere, in the Kodak Tower that looms over the center of town, in the Eastman Theater on Main Street, and in the hulking buildings and empty parking lots of the manufacturing center known as Kodak Park.

In reading the company’s old annual reports, you get a sense that its executives thought of the jobs created and the wages paid as a source of pride and achievement. On the first page of most years’ annual reports was an accounting of how many employees the company had in the United States and worldwide, and the total pay and benefits they received.

Apple, with a spaceship-like campus about to open, looms large over Cupertino in its own way, accounting for something like 40 percent of the jobs in the city, and investing $70 million in local environmental and infrastructure upgrades. It is no middle-class enclave; the median home price is $1.9 million.

“We definitely feel a sense of pride to be the home of Apple,” said Savita Vaidhyanathan, the mayor of Cupertino. “But they consider themselves a global company, not necessarily a Cupertino company.” She said she has never met Tim Cook, Apple’s chief executive. “We would have a hard time getting an audience with anybody beyond upper-middle management,” she said.

Ms. Ramos, the Apple janitor, lives down the road in San Jose. She pays $2,300 monthly for a two-bedroom apartment where she and her four children live. Before overtime and taxes, her $16.60 an hour works out to $34,520 a year. Her rent alone is $27,600 a year, leaving less than $600 a month once the rent is paid. Overtime, in addition to the wages from one of her teenage children who works part time at a grocery store, helps make the math work, though always tenuously.

She works from 6 p.m. until 2 a.m. On days when one of the other cleaners doesn’t show up, she may get a few extra hours, which is great for the overtime pay, but it means even less sleep before it is time to take her children to school.

A 60-cent-an-hour raise this year negotiated by her union, the SEIU United Service Workers West, helped. Kodak in its prime was not unionized, though in that era when organized labor was more powerful over all, managers deliberately kept wages high to try to prevent the company’s workers from forming one.

There is little chance for building connections at Apple. “Everyone is doing their own thing and has their own assignment, and we don’t see each other outside of work,” said Ms. Ramos in Spanish.

Ms. Evans, who was a Kodak janitor in the early 1980s before her rise to executive there and at other leading firms like Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, recalls a different experience.

“One thing about Eastman Kodak is they believed in their people,” said Ms. Evans, now chief information officer at Mercer, the human resources consulting giant. “It was like a family. You always had someone willing to help open a door if you demonstrated that you were willing to commit to growing your skills and become an asset that was valuable for the company.”

The shift is profound. “I look at the big tech companies, and they practice a 21st-century form of welfare capitalism, with foosball tables and free sushi and all that,” Rick Wartzman, senior adviser at the Drucker Institute and author of “The End of Loyalty,” said. “But it’s for a relatively few folks. It’s great if you’re a software engineer. If you’re educated, you’re in command.”

But in the 21st-century economy, many millions of workers find themselves excluded from that select group. Rather than being treated as assets that companies seek to invest in, they have become costs to be minimized.

Correction: Sept. 10, 2017

An Upshot article last Sunday about how an increase in outsourcing at large companies has fueled economic inequality misstated a measure of Apple’s job creation compared with Kodak’s decades ago. Apple has created tens of thousands of working-class jobs; it has not fallen short of matching Kodak in that regard. The article also misstated the amount of a wage increase that Marta Ramos, a janitor at Apple, received this year. Her raise was 60 cents an hour, to $16.60 hourly. It was not a dollar-an-hour raise.

  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • High vs Low Skill
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
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Showing 484 database articles primarily about either Productivity, Cronyism, Incentives/Risk-Taking, Innovation/Research, Institutional Capabilities, Intangibles, Investment, Startups, or Workforce Reorganization

The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era

AI Summary. S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.

José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-Espín Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.

Is the college degree losing its economic value to artificial intelligence?

Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.

After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.
  2. Moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 0.086 log points by 2026.
  3. the college–non-college AI-exposure gap accounts for roughly 28% of the total premium compression over that period.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI — Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year…
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Since the summer of 2023, the employment rate for Americans 22–25 has declined for both college grads and non-college workers, a phenomenon beyond both…
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
    • Unemployment/Participation

Gross and Net US Investment

AI Summary. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.

Timothy Taylor Conversable Economist
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

U.S. real net private domestic investment—which adds to the American capital stock—is now only ~25% as large as gross investment, down from ~40% in the 1970s. Taylor suggests the widening gap between gross and net investment reflects the relatively rapid depreciation of IT-related capital.

Does faster asset depreciation explain slowing productivity growth?

Core argument: Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.

The figure divides net investment by gross investment. Back in the 1970s, net investment was often around 40% of gross investment, but the share has been slumping over time. For the last decade or so, net investment has been about 25% of the gross–that is, about three-quarters of gross investment is just making up for depreciation of the pre-existing capital stock. The likely reason for the growing gap between gross and net investment is that modern investment is more likely to be related to information technology [which] depreciates more rapidly and thus needs to be replaced and updated more often. If we want the average US worker to be using a greater amount of capital on the job–which was one of the key drivers of rising labor productivity in the past–it now takes a bigger rise in gross investment to lead to a given rise in net investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.
  2. The shift toward information technology — which depreciates faster than physical machinery — is the primary driver of the widening gap between gross and net investment.
  3. Raising capital per worker, a historic engine of labor productivity growth, now requires a substantially larger increase in gross investment than it did several decades ago.

Related Articles:

  • US Stock Market To Stop Shrinking For First Time In 23 Years — US equity supply is turning positive for the first time in over two decades, as a surge in IPOs and large share sales by major technology companies outweighs the buybacks and privatizations that have shrunk the stock market since 2003.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • The Transition to a Higher Cost of Capital — Bridgewater Associates co-CIO Karen Karniol-Tambour expects 10-year Treasury yields to rise from the current ~4.5% to compensate for structurally higher fiscal…
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t

AI Summary. 615). Claims of re-acceleration result from cherry-picking frontier observations, selecting a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky argues AI capabilities continue to improve, but “the full composite data shows flattening relative gains, not acceleration…rolling relative model gains have fallen from their 2024 peak, while model dispersion has narrowed sharply.”

Are AI performance gains accelerating or just appearing to through selective measurement?

Core argument: Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.

Using all Epoch’s Capabilities Index observations, and controlling for developer and model family, there is no statistically significant breakpoint. A piecewise model—which splits the series into intervals and applies a sub-function to each segment—does not improve on a purely linear trend: p = 0.615, The estimated change in slope has a confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 points per year. In short, the maths shows there is no model acceleration, contrary to claims, and as expected. The result comes from selecting frontier observations only, choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.
  2. Claims of AI re-acceleration rest on a methodological artifact: selecting only frontier model observations, pre-choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on each side of that breakpoint.

Related Articles:

  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — As AI model performance converges toward a ceiling, relative gains per improvement cycle shrink, transforming frontier capability from a pricing moat into a commodity where price becomes the primary differentiator and margin pressure intensifies across leading providers.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
  • Anthropic’s Best AI Model Struggles To Attract Users As Cheaper Tools Thrive — Spending on the most expensive AI model from a leading provider has plateaued at 11% of total outlay, as cheaper, older models prove capable of handling most business tasks.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity
    • Investment

Understanding AI and Productivity

AI Summary. U.S. productivity growth has accelerated to ~2.2% annually since mid-2022, above the 2010s baseline, though pandemic-era labor market and business formation dynamics likely contributed alongside AI. Historical general-purpose technology booms sustained labor productivity growth above 2.5% for a decade or more, making the current acceleration substantial but not unprecedented.

Chad Syverson Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Syverson is skeptical that AI initiated the rise in productivity growth that began in 2023. The acceleration began while AI investment was small, and pandemic-era labor market churn and business dynamism match the acceleration’s start.

Is AI-driven productivity growth sustainable at historical technology boom levels?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.

Productivity from mid-2022 on has maintained a faster-than-2010s trajectory involving annual growth of about 2.2%. Could this acceleration be due to AI? Perhaps. The timing leans against AI being the sole initial cause. Additionally, there were well-documented increases in economic dynamism (labor market churn and business formation) during the pandemic emergence whose timing matches the acceleration’s start. Regardless of AI’s current effect, the longer the aggregate productivity acceleration continues, the more plausible it is that AI is an important driver. As for the magnitude, a sustained increase from 1.5 to 2.2% annual productivity growth would be substantial (after a decade, GDP per capita would be 7% higher than otherwise), but hardly unprecedented. The 1995–2004 productivity boom saw annual productivity growth of nearly 3% per year, and other past general-purpose-technology-related productivity boosts saw labor productivity growth in excess of 2.5% for a decade or longer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.
  2. The 1995–2004 productivity boom averaged nearly 3.0% annual growth, establishing that a durable AI-driven acceleration to 2.2% would be meaningful but well within historical precedent for general-purpose-technology cycles.
  3. Pandemic-era surges in labor market churn and business formation align more precisely with the productivity acceleration’s start date than AI adoption does, complicating AI-as-sole-cause narratives.

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US Widens AI-Driven Investment Gap With Europe

AI Summary. US corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to grow 40% in real terms by the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area, widening a productivity gap where output per hour worked rose $14 in the US compared with $2 in Europe since 2018.

Sam Fleming, Amy Borrett and Olaf Storbeck Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Oxford Economics projects US real business investment will rise 40% over 2021–2027, ~3x the euro area’s 12%. US investment growth since 2024 has been largely information processing and software, but high US growth in GDP/hour is not “merely digital.”

Is artificial intelligence investment widening the transatlantic productivity divide?

Core argument: U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.

Corporate spending on new equipment and facilities in the US is projected to increase 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, according to forecasts from Oxford Economics. The US surge compared with a real-terms increase of just 12% in the euro area, while German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated over the same period. Europe also faces a large and growing productivity gap with the US. “The United States has recently pulled further ahead of Europe,” Bart van Ark, a professor at the University of Manchester, told policymakers at the ECB Forum in Sintra. GDP per hour worked increased $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025, compared with just $2 in Europe. “The gap is not only a digital sector story,” added van Ark, stressing that the US outperformance extended to other sectors, including wholesale and retail as well as professional services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.
  2. U.S. labor productivity rose $14 per hour worked between 2018 and 2025, versus $2 in Europe, with outperformance spanning wholesale, retail, and professional services—not solely the digital sector.

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Why Big Tech’s AI Spending Is $3 Trillion Higher Than It Seems

AI Summary. Nine major technology companies carry ~$3tn in off-balance-sheet AI commitments — 5x their ~$600bn in reported capital spending — obligations that are growing faster than traditional investment and triple their combined lease and debt liabilities.

Peter Rudegeair and Peter Santilli Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
August 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A WSJ analysis finds 9 firms involved in the data center buildout have ~$3T in off-balance-sheet commitments largely tied to AI infrastructure. The growth in such obligations has outpaced the firms’ capex growth over the last year.

Are technology companies hiding the true cost of artificial intelligence?

Nine top tech companies had some $3 trillion of off-balance-sheet commitments mostly related to AI, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of footnotes in their most recent securities filings. Those obligations are growing faster than traditional “capex,” which totaled about $600 billion over the past year they reported, and were about triple what the companies owe under their outstanding leases and long-term borrowings.

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