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The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs

Daron Acemoğlu Center for Economic and Policy Research
Date Posted:
May 23, 2019
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The Restrepo Papers explore the dynamic interplay btw automation & human labor, highlighting its implications for economic growth, factor shares, & employment.

The Restrepo Papers explore the dynamic interplay between automation and human labor, highlighting its implications for economic growth, factor shares, and employment. The research suggests that while automation can displace jobs and reduce labor's share in national income, it also creates opportunities for new complex tasks where human labor has a comparative advantage. From 1980 to 2007, US employment grew by 17.5%, with new job titles accounting for half of this growth. However, the introduction of one more robot per 1,000 workers can reduce the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.37%. The future of labor depends on whether the creation of new tasks can keep pace with automation. If automation outpaces task creation, labor's share in the economy may decline, but if balanced, it could lead to stable growth. The study underscores the need for policies that encourage innovation in new tasks to ensure continued wage growth and employment opportunities.

Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs," Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 5, 2016, https://voxeu.org/article/job-race-machines-versus-humans
Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,"National Bureau of Economic Research, July 16, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/15254Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Robots and jobs: Evidence from the US," Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 10, 2017, https://voxeu.org/article/robots-and-jobs-evidence-usDaron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "The Race Between Machine and Man: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment," National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2017, https://www.nber.org/papers/w22252Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor," National Bureau of Economic Research, March 5, 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25684Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Demographics and Automation," National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018, http://www.nber.org/papers/w24421Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work," National Bureau of Economic Research April 19, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/14641
Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Low Skill and High Skill Automation,"Journal of Human Capital, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/15118Core of Restrepo's argument, evidence based, as long as the rate of automation of jobs by machines and the creation of new complex tasks for workers are balanced, there will be no major labor market decline, parallels your analogy that you won't automate farms if you can't move workers to higher productivity sectors so they will be able to buy the corn

"...The stabilising forces in the model stem from ‘price effects’. Because automation tends to reduce payments to labour, it also increases the profitability of the creation of new complex tasks relative to further automation. This stabilising force implies that rapid automation tends to self-correct itself, provided that it takes place within an environment in which the technology for creating future innovations and R&D of different types remains unchanged.Under these circumstances, the economy will ultimately return back to its state before the arrival of these automation technologies. If so, the current difficulties of workers in the face of new technologies notwithstanding, the future may not be bleak for labour. Nevertheless, this stabilising force does not imply that all sorts of changes will necessarily reverse themselves.If what has changed is the technology for creating future innovations, and in particular, if automation-related innovations have become easier than creating new tasks, then the wave of new automation technologies we are now seeing will be just the first stage before the economy settles into a new long-run equilibrium with worse prospects for labour. Overall, the extent to which the future will validate concerns about rising technological non-employment will depend on whether we are witnessing a period of rapid discovery of new automation technologies or a fundamental shift in how we are able to produce technologies for the future...."
The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs

Concerns that new digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and robotics will create widespread technological non-employment are now widespread. Various recent labour market trends, ranging from declines in US labour force participation to increases in wage inequality and the share of capital in national income, are seen as harbingers of this new normal (e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, Akst 2014, Autor 2015, Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014, Oberfield and Raval 2014). A major shortcoming of the typical arguments about technological non-employment is that there is no clear reason why the effect of new technologies will be different this time than in the past, when they did not create such widespread reductions in employment.

It is not that new technologies weren’t predicted to be equally calamitous. John Maynard Keynes stated in 1930:

“We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come — namely, technological unemployment.” (Keynes 1930).

In 1965, economic historian Robert Heilbroner confidently asserted:

“As machines continue to invade society, duplicating greater and greater numbers of social tasks, it is human labour itself — at least, as we now think of ‘labour’ — that is gradually rendered redundant." (quoted in Akst 2014).

The famous economist, Wassily Leontief, was equally pessimistic about the implications of new machines. By drawing an analogy with the technologies of the early 20th century that made horses redundant, he speculated that:

“Labour will become less and less important… More and more workers will be replaced by machines. I do not see that new industries can employ everybody who wants a job” (Leontief 1952).

So why did these previous dire predictions not come true? And why should it be different this time?

Our recent work attempts to answer these questions (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2016). Our approach is built on two key ideas. First, during most times, there is a continuous process of tasks previously performed by labour being mechanised and automated, while at the same time, new employment opportunities for labour are created. Second, new employment opportunities come mostly from the introduction of new and more complex tasks in which labour has a comparative advantage relative to capital. Herein lies our answer to Leontief's puzzle - the difference between human labour and horses is that humans have a comparative advantage in new and more complex activities. Horses did not.

The importance of these new complex tasks is well illustrated by the technological and organisational changes during the Second Industrial Revolution, which involved not only the replacement of the stagecoach by the railroad, sailboats by steamboats, and of manual dock workers by cranes, but also the creation of new labour-intensive tasks. These new tasks generated jobs for a new class of engineers, machinists, repairers, and conductors, as well as of modern managers and financiers involved with the introduction and operation of new technologies (e.g. Landes 1969, Chandler 1977, Mokyr 1990).

The importance of new complex tasks can also be seen in recent US labour market dynamics. Employment figures document not just the automation of existing labour-intensive jobs, but also the rise of new occupations, ranging from engineering and programming jobs to those performed by audio-visual specialists, executive assistants, data administrators and analysts, meeting planners, or computer support specialists. Indeed, during the last 30 years, new tasks and new job titles account for a large fraction of US employment growth. To document this fact, we use data from Lin (2011) that measures the share of new job titles — in which workers perform newer tasks than those employed in more traditional jobs — within each occupation. In 2000, about 70% of the workers employed as computer software developers (an occupation employing one million people at the time) held new job titles. Similarly, in 1990 a radiology technician and in 1980 a management analyst were new job titles.
Figure 1 shows that for each decade since 1980, employment growth has been greater in occupations with more new job titles. The regression line shows that occupations with 10 percentage points more new job titles at the beginning of each decade grow 5.05% faster over the next ten years (standard error = 1.3%). From 1980 to 2007, total employment in the US grew by 17.5%. About half (8.84%) of this growth is explained by the additional employment growth in occupations with new job titles, relative to a benchmark category with no new job titles.1

These two key building blocks imply that one should consider the dynamics of modern labour markets in advanced economies as being characterised by a race between two technological forces: automation on the side of machines, and the creation of new complex tasks on the side of man. While automation is an ongoing process which, all else equal, takes jobs away from labour, the creation of new complex tasks is also an ongoing process which adds new jobs for labour. If the first force outpaces the second, there will be a declining share of labour in national income and technological non-employment. If the second force outpaces the first, the reverse will happen - there will be a greater share of labour in national income and rising employment. Our task-based framework further shows that automation, though it corresponds to a technological improvement and increases GDP, may also reduce the real wages of workers, not just their share in national income. This last result is relevant for understanding a key pillar of the concerns about the effect of new technology on wages, which is generally hard to reconcile with existing models (in which technological improvements always increase wages).

Viewed from the perspective of our theoretical framework, the reason why illustrious commentators of the past, including Keynes and Leontief, did not turn out to be right is that the second force in the race between machine and man was every bit the first one’s equal. Looking into the future, whether the wave of new technologies will spell doom for labour will similarly depend on whether this second force can keep up with the increased pace of the first.

But in this framework, leaving as exogenous the rates at which automation and the creation of new complex tasks proceed is not fully satisfactory. Though it helps us understand the forces at work, it poses an equally deep question: Why was it that in the past the two forces turned out to be balanced? Is there any reason why we should expect the same from today’s technological developments?

To answer this even more fundamental question, we develop the full version of our framework in which the rates at which automation and the creation of new complex tasks proceed is endogenised, and responds to whichever of these two activities are more profitable. For example, the cheaper capital is, the more profitable automation is, which replaces the relatively expensive labour with cheaper capital. In the endogenous technology version of the model, this greater profitability triggers further automation. This conceptual structure is useful for two related reasons. First, it helps us identify the forces that act as stabilisers — so that once automation pulls ahead of the creation of new labour-intensive tasks, there will be economic forces that induce a faster creation of new tasks as well. Second, it helps us delineate conditions under which the torrent of new automation technologies that we are currently witnessing will not self-correct and will thus have long-term adverse consequences for the prospects of labour.

The stabilising forces in the model stem from ‘price effects’. Because automation tends to reduce payments to labour, it also increases the profitability of the creation of new complex tasks relative to further automation. This stabilising force implies that rapid automation tends to self-correct itself, provided that it takes place within an environment in which the technology for creating future innovations and R&D of different types remains unchanged. Under these circumstances, the economy will ultimately return back to its state before the arrival of these automation technologies. If so, the current difficulties of workers in the face of new technologies notwithstanding, the future may not be bleak for labour. Nevertheless, this stabilising force does not imply that all sorts of changes will necessarily reverse themselves. If what has changed is the technology for creating future innovations, and in particular, if automation-related innovations have become easier than creating new tasks, then the wave of new automation technologies we are now seeing will be just the first stage before the economy settles into a new long-run equilibrium with worse prospects for labour. Overall, the extent to which the future will validate concerns about rising technological non-employment will depend on whether we are witnessing a period of rapid discovery of new automation technologies or a fundamental shift in how we are able to produce technologies for the future.

We also highlight a new implication of our conceptual structure regarding the efficiency of the market equilibrium. It is well-known that models with endogenous technology have various sources of inefficiencies resulting from monopoly markups charged by firms with market power (which are typically those firms that introduce new products and technologies to the market). In addition to these well-known sources of inefficiency, we identify a new type of inefficiency, which leads to too much automation and too few new complex tasks being created. This inefficiency arises because automation, which enables firms to economise on wage payments, responds to high wages. When some of the wage payments accruing to workers are rents (e.g. efficiency wages or quasi-rents created by labour market frictions), there will be more automation than what the social planner would desire, and technology becomes inefficiently biased towards replacing labour.

Finally, we use our framework to explore the implications of automation for inequality. When different workers have different amounts of skills, both automation and the creation of new tasks may lead to greater inequality — in the first case, because machines compete more strongly against less skilled labour; and in the second, because the more skilled workers have greater competitive advantage than the less skilled in new complex tasks. However, we show that as long as over time, tasks become standardised and are more easily performed by less skilled labour (e.g. as in Acemoglu et al. 2010), the introduction of new complex tasks benefits those workers as well as the more skilled ones. Depending on how rapidly this standardisation process takes place, the economy might generate powerful forces self-correcting the inequality implications of automation technologies as well.

We view our work as a first step towards a systematic investigation of different types of technological changes that impact capital and labour differentially. Several areas of research appear fruitful based on this step. First, a more systematic analysis of the efficiency implications and how this interplays with different types of labour market imperfections (which create wedges between the opportunity cost of labour and wages) is an important area for future work. Second, a richer analysis of tasks at different parts of the complexity distribution being automated is an important area for research, especially in light of much evidence that automation will affect not just low-skilled but increasingly also high-skilled workers in the near future. Third, since there may be major differences in the ability of technology to automate and also to create new tasks across industries (e.g. Polanyi 1966, Autor et al. 2003), the extent to which these differences become constraining factors needs to be investigated. Finally, and most importantly, there is great need for empirical evidence on the impact of automation and robotics on employment. Indeed, whether rapid automation does act as an impetus for the creation of new complex tasks is of the utmost importance to provide greater empirical content to the framework developed here. Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs," Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 5, 2016, https://voxeu.org/article/job-race-machines-versus-humans
You've read this, contradictory to their theoretical model finds that, "... one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment to population ratio by about 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.37 percent..."however they suspect it's a short term thing, and only at the margins. "... As robots and automation technologies take over tasks performed by labor, there is increasing concern about the future of jobs and wages. We analyze the effect of the increase in industrial robot usage between 1990 and 2007 on US labor markets. Using a model in which robots compete against human labor in the production of tasks, we show that advances in robotics technology may reduce employment and wages, and that the local labor market impacts of robots can be estimated by regressing the change in employment and wages on the exposure to robots in each local labor market—defined from advances in robotics technology in each industry and the local distribution of employment across industries. Using this approach, we estimate robust negative effects of robots on employment and wages across commuting zones. We bolster this evidence by showing that the commuting zones most exposed to robots in the post-1990 era do not exhibit any differential trends before 1990. The impact of robots is distinct from the effects of overall productivity increases, other types of IT capital and the total capital stock. According to our estimates, one more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment to population ratio by about 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.37 percent....Overall, our summary of the quantitative magnitudes implied by our analysis is that one more robot reduces employment in a commuting zone with the average exposure to robots by 6.2 workers and one more robot per thousand employees reduce wages in such a commuting zone by about 0.73 percent (relative to a commuting zone with no exposure). Translating this into aggregate effects requires a range of assumptions, and our best-case range puts these aggregate effects between 3 and 5.6 workers losing their jobs as a result of the introduction of one more robot in the national economy, and wages declining between 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent as a result of one more robot per thousand employees."..."Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,"National Bureau of Economic Research, July 16, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/15254Good blog post on the "Robots and Jobs" paper putting it's findings into context, just a rounding error in the grand arch of things"....We believe as well that the negative effects we estimate are both interesting and surprising, because of the small offsetting employment increases in other industries and occupations. So far, there are relatively few robots in the US economy, and so the number of jobs lost due to robots has been limited to between 360,000 and 670,000 jobs. If the robots spread as predicted, future aggregate job losses will be much larger. For example, BCG (2015) has an 'aggressive' scenario in which the world stock of industrial robots would quadruple by 2025. In our estimates, that would imply a 0.94-1.76 percentage points lower employment to population ratio, and 1.3-2.6% lower wage growth between 2015 and 2025. These are sizable effects. But it should also be noted that even under the most aggressive scenario, we are talking about a relatively small fraction of employment in the US economy being affected by robots.There is nothing here to support the view that new technologies will make most jobs disappear and humans largely redundant...."Robots and jobs: Evidence from the US “We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come," John Maynard Keynes wrote almost a century ago, "namely, technological unemployment.”
(Keynes 1930)

If Keynes' original readers found those worries were misplaced, today there is concern that these gloomy predictions may soon come true (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, Ford 2016). Bolstering such concerns, a range of low-skill and medium-skill occupations exposed to automation have suffered employment declines and sluggish or even negative wage growth (Autor et al. 2003, Goos and Manning 2007, Michaels et al. 2014).

Plenty of research speculates on what might happen when the robots arrive. Frey and Osborne (2013), classified occupations by how susceptible they are to automation and concluded that 47% of US workers are at risk in the next 20 years. McKinsey (2016) claims the same statistic is 45%, and The World Bank estimates that this number for the OECD as a whole is 57% of workers. Arntz et al. (2016), however, disagree. They argue that, within an occupation, many workers specialise in tasks that cannot be automated easily, and so their estimate for OECD jobs at risk is only 9%.

Whether 9% or 57% or jobs are at risk, there is no guarantee that firms would replace those workers with robots. That would depend on the costs of automation, and how much wages change in response to this threat. Additionally, even if an industry introduces robots to do specific jobs, productivity improvements may create new jobs in the firm, or other occupations might be able to expand.

Research

In Research, we go beyond these feasibility studies, and estimate what is already happening due to the introduction of robots (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017). We investigate the equilibrium impact of industrial robots in local US labour markets. These machines are defined by The International Federation of Robotics as “an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, and multipurpose” (IFR 2014; see also Graetz and Michaels, 2015). Industrial robots are fully autonomous machines that can be programmed to perform several manual tasks such as welding, painting, assembling, handling materials, or packaging. This definition excludes other types of capital, such as software, that may also replace labour, and machines designed for a single function, such as cranes, circuit printers, textile looms or coffee machines.

In 2007 there were four times as many industrial robots in the US and Western Europe as in 1993 (Figure 1). The IFR estimates that there are currently between 1.5 and 1.75 million industrial robots in operation, a number that could increase to 4 to 6 million by 2025 (Boston Consulting Group 2015).
Robot usage is far from evenly spread across the economy. The automotive industry employs 39% of existing industrial robots, followed by the electronics industry (19%), metal products (9%), and the plastic and chemicals industry (9%). Some of these industries were also exposed to import competition from Mexico; whereas Chinese imports and offshoring affected a different set of industries. The actual facts are shown in Figure 2.
Basic theory guiding the empirics

We use a simple model in which robots and workers compete in the production of different tasks (after Acemoglu and Autor 2011, Acemoglu and Restrepo 2016). In this model, the share of tasks performed by robots varies across industries, and there is trade between labour markets specialising in different industries. The model decomposes the aggregate impact on employment and wages into a negative displacement effect on workers who lose their jobs, and a positive productivity effect across the wider economy.

The model also shows that we can summarize the net impact of robots on local labour markets - commuting zones in our application - through a measure of the exposure of these areas to robots. The exposure is defined as the sum over industries of the national penetration of robots into 19 industries, multiplied by the employment share of that industry in that labour market. To compute it, we calculate employment shares by industry in each zone from Census data. Figure 3 shows that US commuting zones differ substantially in their exposure to robots. This variation allows us to estimate the impact of industrial robots on wages and employment in these local labour markets.
When computing our measure of exposure to robots, one concern is that the adoption of robots by US industries might be a response to problems (or opportunities) in these industries or the local economy of commuting zones that house them. To remove the influence of these confounding factors, we focus on the spread of robots coming from advances in technology, which we proxy using the industry-level spread of robots in other advanced economies (this is similar to what Autor et al. 2013 and Bloom et al. 2016 do for the increase in imports from China).

The impact on employment and wages

Our results show a strong relationship between a commuting zone’s exposure to robots and employment. In the areas most exposed to robots, between 1990 and 2007 both employment and wages declined in a robust and significant way. During this period, we estimate that, relative to other areas, the introduction of a new robot per 1,000 workers in a commuting zone reduced the local employment-to-population ratio by 0.37 percentage points and local wages by 0.73%. This is equivalent to 6.2 workers losing their jobs for every robot.

Although these numbers suggest that exposed commuting zones are doing worse than the rest in terms of employment and wages, they do not necessarily reflect the US-wide effects of robots. The adoption of robots in one commuting zone could lower production costs, and via trade, enable other industries to create employment in the rest of the economy. Such indirect benefits would be missed in our cross-sectional comparisons. To account for these gains, we use our model to recompute the impact of robots allowing for trade between commuting zones, and found that the employment and wage effects were smaller - but not by much. The exact impact depends on how easy it was to substitute between goods produced in different places, the cost savings from robots and the elasticity of the local labour supply. Using reasonable estimates for these elasticities and our estimates to discipline the calibration of the remaining parameters in our model, we found that allowing for trade still implies each new robot per thousand workers reduced employment to population ratio by 0.34 percentage points and cut wages by about 0.5% (as opposed to 0.73%). If we further take account of the potential spillovers from reduced employment and wages in industries adopting the robots onto other local non-tradable industries, these numbers might be even smaller: about 0.18 percentage points lower employment to population ratio and 0.25% slower wage growth for every one robot per thousand workers (corresponding to about three workers losing their jobs because of one more robot).

Clearly industrial robots are not the only innovations being implemented at any time, and we might have erroneously attributed to robots the effects of many other technologies that could also displace labour. This is not the case: our results are the same when we control for the increase in overall capital intensity and IT capital by industry. Note also that exposure to robots is only weakly correlated with various other trends. Nor is our measure of exposure to robots related to past trends in employment and wages in the pre-robot era from 1970 to 1990. Indeed, controlling for broad industry composition (shares of manufacturing, durables, construction and so on), for detailed demographics, for exposure to Chinese and Mexican imports, for the decline in routine jobs, and for offshoring opportunities does not change our results.

In the commuting zones most exposed to robots, the employment effect is strongest for routine manual, blue collar, assembly and related occupations, and for workers with less than college education. But no one, it seems, has escaped entirely. Slicing the data by type of employment or education (Figure 2), we find no overall positive impact on any group.
Future impacts

This is only a first step. Alternative strategies for estimating the aggregate implications of the spread of robots and other labour-replacing technologies would complement our approach.

We believe as well that the negative effects we estimate are both interesting and surprising, because of the small offsetting employment increases in other industries and occupations. So far, there are relatively few robots in the US economy, and so the number of jobs lost due to robots has been limited to between 360,000 and 670,000 jobs. If the robots spread as predicted, future aggregate job losses will be much larger. For example, BCG (2015) has an 'aggressive' scenario in which the world stock of industrial robots would quadruple by 2025. In our estimates, that would imply a 0.94-1.76 percentage points lower employment to population ratio, and 1.3-2.6% lower wage growth between 2015 and 2025. These are sizable effects. But it should also be noted that even under the most aggressive scenario, we are talking about a relatively small fraction of employment in the US economy being affected by robots. There is nothing here to support the view that new technologies will make most jobs disappear and humans largely redundant.

Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Robots and jobs: Evidence from the US," Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 10, 2017, https://voxeu.org/article/robots-and-jobs-evidence-usNote they assume labor has a comparative advantage in new tasks

"...We examine the concerns that new technologies will render labor redundant in a framework in which tasks previously performed by labor can be automated and new versions of existing tasks, in which labor has a comparative advantage, can be created. In a static version where capital is fixed and technology is exogenous, automation reduces employment and the labor share, and may even reduce wages, while the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects. Our full model endogenizes capital accumulation and the direction of research towards automation and the creation of new tasks. If the long-run rental rate of capital relative to the wage is sufficiently low, the long-run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks. Otherwise, there exists a stable balanced growth path in which the two types of innovations go hand-in-hand. Stability is a consequence of the fact that automation reduces the cost of producing using labor, and thus discourages further automation and encourages the creation of new tasks. In an extension with heterogeneous skills, we show that inequality increases during transitions driven both by faster automation and introduction of new tasks, and characterize the conditions under which inequality is increasing or stable in the long run...."
Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "The Race Between Machine and Man: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment," National Bureau of Economic Growth, June 2017, https://www.nber.org/papers/w22252
framework that implies "automation always reduces the labor share in value added and may reduce labor demand even as it raises productivity"....This paper develops a task-based model to study the effects of different technologies on labor demand.....Our conceptual framework offers several lessons. First, the presumption that all technologies increase (aggregate) labor demand simply because they raise productivity is wrong. Some automation technologies may in fact reduce labor demand because they bring sizable displacement effects but modest productivity gains (especially when substituted workers were cheap to begin with and the automated technology is only marginally better than them). Second, because of the displacement effect, we should not expect au tomation to create wage increases commensurate with productivity growth. In fact, as we noted already, automation by itself always reduces the labor share in industry value added and tends to reduce the overall labor share in the economy (meaning that it leads to slower wage growth than productivity growth). The reason why we have had rapid wage growth and stable labor shares in the past is a consequence of other technologicalchanges that generated new tasks for labor and counterbalanced the effects of automationon the task content of production. Some technologies displaced labor from automatedtasks while others reinstated labor into new ones. On net, labor retained a key role inproduction. By the same token, our framework suggests that the future of work dependson the mixture of new technologies and how these change the task content of production.....At the center of our framework is the task content of production—measuring the allocation of tasks to factors of production. Automation, by creating a displacement effect, shifts the task content of production against labor, while the introduction of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage improves it via the reinstatement effect. These technologies are qualitatively different from factor-augmenting ones which do not impact the task content of production.For example, automation always reduces the labor share and may reduce labor demand, and new tasks always increase the labor share.We then show how changes in the task content of production and other contributors to labor demand can be inferred from data on labor shares, value added and factor prices at the industry level.The main implication of our empirical exercise using this methodology is that the recent stagnation of labor demand is explained by an acceleration of automation, particularly in manufacturing, and a deceleration in the creation of new tasks. In addition, and perhaps reflecting this shift in the composition of technological advances, the economy also experienced a marked slowdown in productivity growth, contributing to sluggish labor demand.Our framework has clear implications for the future of work too. Our evidence and conceptual approach support neither the claims that the end of human work is imminent nor the presumption that technological change will always and everywhere be favorable to labor.Rather, it suggests that if the origin of productivity growth in the future continues to be automation, the relative standing of labor, together with the task content of production, will decline. The creation of new tasks and other technologies raising the labor intensity of production and the labor share are vital for continued wage growth commensurate with productivity growth.Whether such technologies will be forthcoming depends not just on our innovation capabilities but also on the supply of different skills, demographic changes, labor market institutions, tax and R&D policies of governments, market competition, corporate strategies and the ecosystem of innovative clusters. We have also pointed out a number of reasons why the balance between automation and new tasks may have become inefficiently tilted in favor of the former, with potentially adverse implications for jobs and productivity and some directions for policy interventions to redress this imbalance.
Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor," National Bureau of Economic Research, March 5, 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25684Restrepo makes the point that the cure for high prices remains high prices
"We argue theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater (industrial) automation, and in particular, to more intensive use and development of robots. Using US data,we document that robots substitute for middle-aged workers (those between the ages of 36 and 55). We then show thatdemographic change—corresponding to an increasing ratio of older to middle-aged workers—is associated with greater adoption of robots and other automation technologies across countries and with more robotics-related activities across US commuting zones. We also provide evidence of more rapid development of automation technologies in countries undergoing greater demographic change. Our directed technological change model further predicts that the induced adoption of automation technology should be more pronounced in industries that rely more on middle-aged workers and those that present greater opportunities for automation. Both of these predictions receive support from country-industry variation in the adoption of robots. Our model also implies that the productivity implications of aging are ambiguous when technology responds to demographic change, but we should expect productivity to increase and labor share to decline relatively in industries that are most amenable to automation, and this is indeed the pattern we find in the data."

The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The race between machines and humans: Implications for growth, factor shares and jobs: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Demographics and Automation," National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018, http://www.nber.org/papers/w24421Here Restrepo ~ makes our "it's a soul cycle economy" argument only he calls it the "Reinstatement effect" which is basically two components diffusion (which increases workers productively creating new more productive jobs and an income effect workers can consume more creating more service jobs.) that offset the displacement effect of automation. "Our framework also emphasizes that....first-order countervailing forces are generally insufficient to totally balance out the implications of automation. In particular, even if these forces are strong, the displacement effect of automation tends to cause a decline in the share of labor in national income. But we know from the history of technology and industrial development that despite several waves of rapid automation,the growth process has been more or less balanced, with no secular downward trend in the share of labor in national income. We argue this is because another powerful force is balancing the implications of automation: the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage, which fosters a countervailing reinstatement effect for labor.These tasks increase the demand for labor and tend to raise the labor share. When they go hand-in-hand with automation, the growth process is balanced, and it need not imply a dismal scenario for labor.Nevertheless, the adjustment process is likely to be slower and more painful than this account of balance between automation and new tasks at first suggests. Thisis because the reallocation of labor from its existing jobs and tasks to new ones is a slow process, in part owing to time-consuming search and other labor market imperfections. But even more ominously, new tasks require new skills, and especially when the education sector does not keep up with the demand for new skills, a mismatch between skills and technologies is bound to complicate the adjustment process.We have also argued why such a mismatch will hinder the productivity gains from new technologies.Our framework further suggests that there are additional reasons for the productivity slowdown. At the center of these is a tendency for excessive automation because of the tax treatment of capital investments and labor market imperfections.Excessive automation directly reduces productivity, but may have even more powerful indirect effects, because it redirects technological improvements away from productivity-enhancing activities that lead to the creation of new tasks and deepening automation to excessive efforts at the extensive margin of automation, a picture that receives informal support from the current singular focus on AI and deep learning. We would like to conclude by pointing out a number of additional issues that may be important in understanding the full impact of AI and other automation technologies on future prospects of labor. We believe that these issues can be studied using simple extensions of the framework presented here. First, we have emphasized the role of the productivity effect in partially counterbalancing the displacement effect created by automation. However, this countervailing effect works by increasing the demand for products. As we have also seen, automation tends to increase inequality. If, as a consequence of this distributional impact, the rise in real incomes resulting from automation ends up in the hands of an narrow segment of the population with much lower marginal propensity to consume than those losing incomes and their jobs, these countervailing forces would be weakened and might operate much more slowly. This imbalance in the distribution of the gains from automation might slow down the creation of new tasks as well. Second, our analysis highlighted the negative consequences of a shortage of skills for realizing the productivity gains from automation and for inequality. In practice, the problem may be workers acquiring the wrong types of skills rather than a general lack of skills. For example, if AI and other new automation technologies necessitate a mix of numeracy, communication, and problem-solving skills different than those emphasized in current curricula, this would have implications similar to those of a shortage of skills, but it cannot be overcome by just increasing educational spending with current educational practices remaining intact. One important consideration in this respect is that there is little concrete information about what types of skills new technologies will complement, underscoring the importance of further empirical work in this area. Third, government policies and labor market institutions may impact not just the speed of automation (and thus whether there is excessive automation), but what types of automation technologies will receive more investments. To the extent that some uses of AI may complement labor more or generate opportunities for more rapid creation of new tasks, an understanding of the impact of various policies, including support for academic and applied research, and social factors on the path of development of AI is critical.Last but not least, the development and adoption of productivity-enhancing AI technologies cannot be taken for granted. If we do not find a way of creating shared prosperity from the productivity gains generated by AI, there is a danger that the political reaction to these new technologies may slow down or even completely stop their adoption and development. This underscores the importance of studying the distributional implications of AI, the political economy reactions to it, and the design of new and improved institutions for creating more broadly shared gains from these new technologies....During an eighty year period extending from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to the middle of the 19th century, wages stagnated and the labor share fell, even as technological advances and productivity growth were ongoing in the British economy, a phenomenon which Allen (2009) dubs the “Engel’s pause” (previously referred to as the “living standards paradox”, see Mokyr, 1990).""The productivity effect also leads to higher real incomes and thus to greater demand for all products, including those not experiencing (much) automation. The greater demand for labor from other industries might then counteract the negative displacement effect of automation. The clearest historical example of this comes from the adjustment of the US and many European economies to the mechanization of agriculture.By reducing food prices, mechanization enriched consumers who then demanded more non-agricultural goods (Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2013), and created employment opportunities for many of the workers dislocated by the mechanization process in the first place."
Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work," National Bureau of Economic Research April 19, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/14641"...We present a task-based model in which high- and low-skill workers compete against machines in the production of tasks. Low-skill (high-skill) automation corresponds to tasks performed by low-skill (high-skill) labor being taken over by capital. Automation displaces the type of labor it directly affects, depressing its wage. Through ripple effects, automation also affects the real wage of other workers. Counteracting these forces, automation creates a positive productivity effect, pushing up the price of all factors. Because capital adjusts to keep the interest rate constant, the productivity effect dominates in the long run. Finally, low skill (high-skill) automation increases (reduces) wage inequality...."Daron Acemoğlu and Pascual Restrepo, "Low Skill and High Skill Automation,"Journal of Human Capital, 2018, https://economics.mit.edu/files/15118

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The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era

AI Summary. S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.

José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-Espín Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.

Is the college degree losing its economic value to artificial intelligence?

Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.

After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.
  2. Moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 0.086 log points by 2026.
  3. the college–non-college AI-exposure gap accounts for roughly 28% of the total premium compression over that period.

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  • How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI — Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year…
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Since the summer of 2023, the employment rate for Americans 22–25 has declined for both college grads and non-college workers, a phenomenon beyond both…
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Gross and Net US Investment

AI Summary. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.

Timothy Taylor Conversable Economist
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

U.S. real net private domestic investment—which adds to the American capital stock—is now only ~25% as large as gross investment, down from ~40% in the 1970s. Taylor suggests the widening gap between gross and net investment reflects the relatively rapid depreciation of IT-related capital.

Does faster asset depreciation explain slowing productivity growth?

Core argument: Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.

The figure divides net investment by gross investment. Back in the 1970s, net investment was often around 40% of gross investment, but the share has been slumping over time. For the last decade or so, net investment has been about 25% of the gross–that is, about three-quarters of gross investment is just making up for depreciation of the pre-existing capital stock. The likely reason for the growing gap between gross and net investment is that modern investment is more likely to be related to information technology [which] depreciates more rapidly and thus needs to be replaced and updated more often. If we want the average US worker to be using a greater amount of capital on the job–which was one of the key drivers of rising labor productivity in the past–it now takes a bigger rise in gross investment to lead to a given rise in net investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.
  2. The shift toward information technology — which depreciates faster than physical machinery — is the primary driver of the widening gap between gross and net investment.
  3. Raising capital per worker, a historic engine of labor productivity growth, now requires a substantially larger increase in gross investment than it did several decades ago.

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The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t

AI Summary. 615). Claims of re-acceleration result from cherry-picking frontier observations, selecting a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky argues AI capabilities continue to improve, but “the full composite data shows flattening relative gains, not acceleration…rolling relative model gains have fallen from their 2024 peak, while model dispersion has narrowed sharply.”

Are AI performance gains accelerating or just appearing to through selective measurement?

Core argument: Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.

Using all Epoch’s Capabilities Index observations, and controlling for developer and model family, there is no statistically significant breakpoint. A piecewise model—which splits the series into intervals and applies a sub-function to each segment—does not improve on a purely linear trend: p = 0.615, The estimated change in slope has a confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 points per year. In short, the maths shows there is no model acceleration, contrary to claims, and as expected. The result comes from selecting frontier observations only, choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.
  2. Claims of AI re-acceleration rest on a methodological artifact: selecting only frontier model observations, pre-choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on each side of that breakpoint.

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  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — As AI model performance converges toward a ceiling, relative gains per improvement cycle shrink, transforming frontier capability from a pricing moat into a commodity where price becomes the primary differentiator and margin pressure intensifies across leading providers.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
  • Anthropic’s Best AI Model Struggles To Attract Users As Cheaper Tools Thrive — Spending on the most expensive AI model from a leading provider has plateaued at 11% of total outlay, as cheaper, older models prove capable of handling most business tasks.
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Understanding AI and Productivity

AI Summary. U.S. productivity growth has accelerated to ~2.2% annually since mid-2022, above the 2010s baseline, though pandemic-era labor market and business formation dynamics likely contributed alongside AI. Historical general-purpose technology booms sustained labor productivity growth above 2.5% for a decade or more, making the current acceleration substantial but not unprecedented.

Chad Syverson Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Syverson is skeptical that AI initiated the rise in productivity growth that began in 2023. The acceleration began while AI investment was small, and pandemic-era labor market churn and business dynamism match the acceleration’s start.

Is AI-driven productivity growth sustainable at historical technology boom levels?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.

Productivity from mid-2022 on has maintained a faster-than-2010s trajectory involving annual growth of about 2.2%. Could this acceleration be due to AI? Perhaps. The timing leans against AI being the sole initial cause. Additionally, there were well-documented increases in economic dynamism (labor market churn and business formation) during the pandemic emergence whose timing matches the acceleration’s start. Regardless of AI’s current effect, the longer the aggregate productivity acceleration continues, the more plausible it is that AI is an important driver. As for the magnitude, a sustained increase from 1.5 to 2.2% annual productivity growth would be substantial (after a decade, GDP per capita would be 7% higher than otherwise), but hardly unprecedented. The 1995–2004 productivity boom saw annual productivity growth of nearly 3% per year, and other past general-purpose-technology-related productivity boosts saw labor productivity growth in excess of 2.5% for a decade or longer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.
  2. The 1995–2004 productivity boom averaged nearly 3.0% annual growth, establishing that a durable AI-driven acceleration to 2.2% would be meaningful but well within historical precedent for general-purpose-technology cycles.
  3. Pandemic-era surges in labor market churn and business formation align more precisely with the productivity acceleration’s start date than AI adoption does, complicating AI-as-sole-cause narratives.

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US Widens AI-Driven Investment Gap With Europe

AI Summary. US corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to grow 40% in real terms by the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area, widening a productivity gap where output per hour worked rose $14 in the US compared with $2 in Europe since 2018.

Sam Fleming, Amy Borrett and Olaf Storbeck Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Oxford Economics projects US real business investment will rise 40% over 2021–2027, ~3x the euro area’s 12%. US investment growth since 2024 has been largely information processing and software, but high US growth in GDP/hour is not “merely digital.”

Is artificial intelligence investment widening the transatlantic productivity divide?

Core argument: U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.

Corporate spending on new equipment and facilities in the US is projected to increase 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, according to forecasts from Oxford Economics. The US surge compared with a real-terms increase of just 12% in the euro area, while German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated over the same period. Europe also faces a large and growing productivity gap with the US. “The United States has recently pulled further ahead of Europe,” Bart van Ark, a professor at the University of Manchester, told policymakers at the ECB Forum in Sintra. GDP per hour worked increased $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025, compared with just $2 in Europe. “The gap is not only a digital sector story,” added van Ark, stressing that the US outperformance extended to other sectors, including wholesale and retail as well as professional services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.
  2. U.S. labor productivity rose $14 per hour worked between 2018 and 2025, versus $2 in Europe, with outperformance spanning wholesale, retail, and professional services—not solely the digital sector.

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Why Big Tech’s AI Spending Is $3 Trillion Higher Than It Seems

AI Summary. Nine major technology companies carry ~$3tn in off-balance-sheet AI commitments — 5x their ~$600bn in reported capital spending — obligations that are growing faster than traditional investment and triple their combined lease and debt liabilities.

Peter Rudegeair and Peter Santilli Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
August 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A WSJ analysis finds 9 firms involved in the data center buildout have ~$3T in off-balance-sheet commitments largely tied to AI infrastructure. The growth in such obligations has outpaced the firms’ capex growth over the last year.

Are technology companies hiding the true cost of artificial intelligence?

Nine top tech companies had some $3 trillion of off-balance-sheet commitments mostly related to AI, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of footnotes in their most recent securities filings. Those obligations are growing faster than traditional “capex,” which totaled about $600 billion over the past year they reported, and were about triple what the companies owe under their outstanding leases and long-term borrowings.

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  • The Market Is Asking Questions — AI infrastructure debt spreads are widening as markets question whether returns on massive, front-loaded capital spending will outpace financing costs before assets depreciate. If compute demand plateaus from efficiency gains or slow adoption, the industry faces a glut of expensive, rapidly depreciating capacity.
  • Big Tech Credit Risks Rise Sharply As AI Spending Soars — The cost of insuring major technology companies' debt against default has reached record highs, driven by surging AI infrastructure spending that is straining balance sheets and pushing credit ratings toward junk status.
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