Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Superstar Stocks

Anuser Farooqui Policy Tensor
Date Posted:
January 5, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The recent outperformance of the top 10 US equities is a notable shift, doubling in value since 2020, compared to a 50% increase for broader large-cap portfolios.

The recent outperformance of the ten largest US equities is a notable shift, as a monthly rebalanced portfolio of these stocks has doubled in value since 2020, compared to a 50% increase for broader large-cap portfolios. This trend is attributed to structural changes post-Covid-19, marking a departure from the past decade where the top 10 underperformed more diversified portfolios. Over the past two years, the top 10 portfolio achieved a 39% annual return with a Sharpe ratio of 1.32, outperforming the top 500 portfolio's 24% return and 0.90 Sharpe ratio. Historically, since 1992, the top 10 averaged a 10% return, slightly above the top 500's 9.5%, but with higher volatility and lower risk-adjusted returns. This recent dominance of the largest firms is an unexpected development in equity markets.

Anuser Farooqui, "Superstar Stocks," Policy Tensor, December 21, 2021, https://policytensor.substack.com/p/superstar-stocks

Superstar Stocks

‘Only ten stocks really matter’, declared Robert Armstrong in a recent FT Unhedged newsletter. He showed that the returns on the 10 largest stocks have handily beaten the S&P 500 index over the past two years. Apple is closing in on a $3tn valuation. That’s larger than the GDP of India, France, the United Kingdom, Canada or Australia. Indeed, it is larger than the GDP of all but the four largest national economies in the world. At $2.5tn, Microsoft is not far behind. Following close on the heels, Amazon is at $1.8tn and Tesla at roughly $1tn (all market caps and returns are as of Dec 15, 2021). The top 10 stocks account for $12.5tn of market capitalization. That’s 30 percent of the market cap of the largest 500 companies, and 25 percent of the market cap of all publicly-traded American companies. The US stock market has never been this top heavy since at least 1992.

A portfolio that rebalances monthly to track the largest ten stocks has doubled in value since the beginning of 2020, even as broader portfolios that track large-cap stocks have increased by roughly 50 percent. The dramatic outperformance of the very largest companies is due to the structural changes that ensued in the economy after the arrival of Covid-19.

Superstar Stocks: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Indeed, zooming out reveals that this is a new development. For most of the past decade, the top 10 portfolio has underperformed more diversified portfolios of the largest US equities.

Following up on Robert Armstrong’s note on the outperformance of the ten largest US firms Anuser Farooqui reports that skewness in equity returns of those firms has increased in the aftermath of the pandemic. He looks at a monthly rebalanced portfolio of the 10, 100 and 500 largest US stocks and finds the outperformance of the top 10 is a recent phenomenon (see second chart 2012-2022), "... A portfolio that rebalances monthly to track the largest ten stocks has doubled in value since the beginning of 2020, even as broader portfolios that track large-cap stocks have increased by roughly 50 percent. The dramatic outperformance of the very largest companies is due to the structural changes that ensued in the economy after the arrival of Covid-19. Indeed, zooming out reveals that this is a new development. For most of the past decade, the top 10 portfolio has underperformed more diversified portfolios of the largest US equities. In fact, if we go back thirty years, we find that the top 10 portfolio usually lagged behind more diversified portfolios of large-cap equities. The size of companies has been one of the most commonly used investment factors since the 1990s when Fama and French documented the existence of a premium associated with this risk factor. But here’s the kicker: smaller stocks are supposed to sport a risk premium over larger stocks. So, the recent outperformance of the very largest companies is not only not to be expected, but the order of expected returns is upside-down. Just how much premium the largest companies have commanded is documented in what follows. Table 1 shows the mean annualized returns, volatility, Sharpe ratios, max drawdowns, tracking error and adjusted means for monthly-rebalanced portfolios of the largest US companies. The tracking error is the volatility of the difference between returns on the monthly-rebalanced portfolios and the market capitalization indices. Less diversified portfolios are harder to track, meaning that you may not, in practice, be able to match the returns on the index being tracked. The adjusted mean is the annualized mean return less the tracking error. You can think of it as a penalized expected return that accounts for the difficulty of tracking less diversified portfolios. Over the past two years, the top 10 portfolio has returned 39 percent per annum, compared to 24 percent per annum for the top 500 portfolio. It has outperformed the latter portfolio even in risk-adjusted terms, sporting a Sharpe ratio of 1.32 compared to 0.90 for the latter. Adjusted means also show a robust outperformance: 38 percent vs 23 percent. Over the past decade, the top 10 portfolio has returned 19 percent per annum, compared to 14 percent for the top 500 portfolio. The risk-adjusted performance is less dramatic: a Sharpe ratio of 1.0 vs 0.9. But over a longer period, the premium at the top vanishes. Since 1992, the top 10 portfolio has averaged a 10 percent return vs. 9.5 for the top 500 portfolio. The Sharpe ratio of the top 10 portfolio is actually lower over this horizon: 0.51 vs. 0.52. The max drawdown is also painfully larger: 70 percent instead of 57 percent. And the tracking error is much higher, 3.7 percent vs 1.9 percent, with the result that the adjusted mean return is much lower: 6.4 percent vs. 7.6 percent. So, there’s no outperformance of the top 10 since George H.W. Bush was last in the White House. What we have, in fact, is a brave new world dominated by the very largest corporations...."

Ed Comment:Suggests there is a long runway for the expansion of product offerings and insights in the info (surveillance!) sector.

In fact, if we go back thirty years, we find that the top 10 portfolio usually lagged behind more diversified portfolios of large-cap equities.

Superstar Stocks: Comments Image 1


The size of companies has been one of the most commonly used investment factors since the 1990s when Fama and French documented the existence of a premium associated with this risk factor. But here’s the kicker: smaller stocks are supposed to sport a risk premium over larger stocks. So, the recent outperformance of the very largest companies is not only not to be expected, but the order of expected returns is upside-down. Just how much premium the largest companies have commanded is documented in what follows.

Table 1 shows the mean annualized returns, volatility, Sharpe ratios, max drawdowns, tracking error and adjusted means for monthly-rebalanced portfolios of the largest US companies. The tracking error is the volatility of the difference between returns on the monthly-rebalanced portfolios and the market capitalization indices. Less diversified portfolios are harder to track, meaning that you may not, in practice, be able to match the returns on the index being tracked. The adjusted mean is the annualized mean return less the tracking error. You can think of it as a penalized expected return that accounts for the difficulty of tracking less diversified portfolios.

Superstar Stocks: Comments Image 2


Over the past two years, the top 10 portfolio has returned 39 percent per annum, compared to 24 percent per annum for the top 500 portfolio. It has outperformed the latter portfolio even in risk-adjusted terms, sporting a Sharpe ratio of 1.32 compared to 0.90 for the latter. Adjusted means also show a robust outperformance: 38 percent vs 23 percent.

Over the past decade, the top 10 portfolio has returned 19 percent per annum, compared to 14 percent for the top 500 portfolio. The risk-adjusted performance is less dramatic: a Sharpe ratio of 1.0 vs 0.9.

Superstar Stocks: Comments Image 3


But over a longer period, the premium at the top vanishes. Since 1992, the top 10 portfolio has averaged a 10 percent return vs. 9.5 for the top 500 portfolio. The Sharpe ratio of the top 10 portfolio is actually lower over this horizon: 0.51 vs. 0.52. The max drawdown is also painfully larger: 70 percent instead of 57 percent. And the tracking error is much higher, 3.7 percent vs 1.9 percent, with the result that the adjusted mean return is much lower: 6.4 percent vs. 7.6 percent. So, there’s no outperformance of the top 10 since George H.W. Bush was last in the White House.

Superstar Stocks: Comments Image 4


What we have, in fact, is a brave new world dominated by the very largest corporations. The top heavy structure of the stock market is a testament to the unprecedented concentration of economic power in the very largest institutions of organized greed.

How long can this world last? We should expect at least some of the economic transformations induced by the pandemic to reverse as the pandemic fizzles out. But we cannot be certain of the degree of such a reversal. Indeed, the top-heavy stock market may be with us for awhile longer.

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Previous articleJanuary 4, 2022Are Rising Corporate Profit Margins Causing Inflation?Pre-tax corporate profit margins remain within historical levels, albeit high by modern standards, despite a 7% CPI rise over the past year. @JosephPolitanoNext articleJanuary 7, 2022Corporate Taxes and the Earnings Distribution: Effects of the Domestic Production Activities DeductionThe 2005 U.S. corporate tax cut, particularly the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), significantly impacted wage distribution. A 1% cut in marginal tax rates increased average earnings by 1.1%, with small firms seeing higher gains at the top of the earnings distribution.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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  • GDP
  • Workforce
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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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