Edward Conard

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Labor Productivity in a Pandemic

AI Summary. U.S. labor productivity surged during the pandemic largely because of cyclical factors also seen in past recessions: contraction in sectors employing younger, less-educated workers raised average workforce quality, and fewer workers had more capital to work with. These gains are expected to reverse as the economy recovers rather than mark a lasting break from prior trends.

John Fernald Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
August 23, 2021
Is Database:
Database

The productivity boost during the pandemic might be a mirage, driven by cyclical effects rather than sustained innovation.

Does the pandemic productivity surge reflect temporary cyclical factors?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity surged during the pandemic on cyclical factors resembling those of past recessions including the Great Recession, rather than on a sustained break from pre-pandemic trends.

During the pandemic, U.S. labor productivity surged, driven by cyclical factors similar to those seen in past recessions, such as the Great Recession. The downturn led to a rise in labor quality as sectors employing younger, less-educated workers contracted, increasing the average experience and education of the workforce. Additionally, capital deepening occurred as fewer workers had more capital to work with, particularly in less capital-intensive industries like leisure and hospitality. However, these gains are unlikely to persist as the economy recovers, with labor quality and capital deepening expected to reverse. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) showed typical cyclical movements, with no significant long-term innovation-driven growth. The pandemic's impact on TFP remains uncertain, with potential efficiency gains from remote work balanced by disruptions and cost increases. Overall, the productivity boost appears temporary and not indicative of a sustained break from pre-pandemic trends.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity surged during the pandemic on cyclical factors resembling those of past recessions including the Great Recession, rather than on a sustained break from pre-pandemic trends.
  2. Labor quality rose as sectors employing younger, less-educated workers contracted, raising the workforce's average experience and education, while capital deepening left fewer workers with more capital, notably in less capital-intensive industries such as leisure and hospitality.
  3. Total Factor Productivity showed typical cyclical movements with no significant long-term innovation-driven growth, and the pandemic's effect on it remains uncertain, as potential remote-work efficiency gains are balanced by disruptions and cost increases.

The FRBSF’s John Fernald worries that the pace of productivity growth after this recession looks like the rate of productivity growth after financial panics; cyclical drivers imply the uptick in productivity may not be persistent, "...Our growth-accounting approach highlights thatthe exceptional recent boost to productivity primarily reflects cyclical effects that are unlikely to persist and that could even reverse...The productivity acceleration during the pandemic can be explained primarily by cyclical increases in labor quality and capital deepening. First, the downturn led to strong growth in labor quality, (green bar).The contractions in output and employment were particularly intense in high-contact service sectors, such as restaurants and hotels. These service sectors tend to employ workers who are younger and less educated than the average. Hence, as these sectors contracted, the average experience and education of the people who continued to work rose. This effect was particularly noticeable in the first half of 2020 and has already begun to reverse since that time…. Second, the plunge in employment during the pandemic also caused capital deepening (gold bar) to rise rapidly.While available capital changed little, there were fewer workers, so each worker had more capital to work with. This reflects, in part, that industries that shrank the most in the pandemic, such as leisure and hospitality, tend to be less capital intensive than the average. The movements in labor quality and capital deepening—and thus in overall productivity—are not unusual in recessions. A similar surge occurred in 2008-09, during the Great Recession: employment and hours worked fell sharply, so the workers who kept their jobs had more capital to work with. And younger, less-educated workers disproportionately lost jobs, leading to a sharp rise in labor quality for those who kept working. What about TFP (blue bar), which shows comparatively modest movements overall during the pandemic? In the long run, innovation that shows up in TFP is the source of sustainable growth in productivity. But in the short run, business-cycle factors are typically very important. During the pandemic, TFP, like the other components, shows fairly typical cyclical movements. Indeed, the seemingly healthy pandemic growth in TFP averages across some extreme fluctuations. During the first half of 2020, as the economy contracted, TFP plunged. Starting in the second half of 2020, as the economy was recovering, TFP rebounded strongly. This pattern is typical of recessions, where TFP regularly ebbs and flows for reasons that have nothing to do with the pace of innovation. Indeed, in every postwar recession, measured TFP growth was negative for a time, as in 2008-09 and in the first half of 2020. An important, intuitive reason is known as “labor hoarding.” When the economy goes into recession and demand falls temporarily, businesses want to retain some of their existing workforce—even if they could meet demand with fewer workers—to avoid losing workers with specialized skills and experience that will be needed when the economy recovers. Labor hoarding tends to reduce measured TFP, since output falls without a commensurate fall in measured inputs. When demand recovers, those businesses have idle workers and excess capacity and can quickly ramp up production without substantial hiring or investment. Hence, measured TFP surges, as shown for 2010….”

Labor Productivity in a Pandemic: Extended Excerpt Image 1


John Fernald, Huiyu Li and Mitchell Ochse, "Labor Productivity in a Pandemic," Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco, August 16, 2021, https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2021/august/labor-productivity-in-pandemic/

Labor Productivity in a Pandemic

U.S. labor productivity has grown quickly during the pandemic compared with the past decade. However, this rapid pace is unlikely to be sustained. Similar to the Great Recession, the primary reasons for strong productivity growth now are cyclical effects that are likely to unwind as the economy continues to recover. For example, the number of workers has fallen, so capital per worker has risen—raising labor productivity in the short term. What effect the pandemic itself might have on productivity remains uncertain.

In the 15 years before the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. labor productivity—output per hour worked—grew relatively slowly. This slow pace of productivity growth was a key reason for disappointing GDP growth. It was also a key reason why, on the eve of the pandemic, future growth of the economy was widely expected to remain modest (Fernald and Li 2021).

Since the pandemic started in early 2020, however, labor productivity has risen rapidly. This Letter puts the 2020-21 experience in context by analyzing recent productivity trends for the U.S. business sector. Our growth-accounting approach highlights that the exceptional recent boost to productivity primarily reflects cyclical effects that are unlikely to persist and that could even reverse. While there is a lot of speculation about how the pandemic itself will affect productivity, it is too early to reliably assess how much those effects will matter in the long run.

Recent slow labor productivity growth

To examine trends over the past half century, Figure 1 shows growth in business-sector labor productivity, or output per hour, for selected periods. Colored sections of the bars show the components that contributed to productivity growth. The components sum to the average annual pace of productivity growth during each period. Several periods are relatively long—a decade or two—and correspond to “growth regimes” identified by Fernald (2015). Several others, including 2020-21, correspond to only one or two years that have distinct changes in the composition or pace of growth.

Labor Productivity in a Pandemic: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Productivity growth has averaged 1.8% per year since 1973. The first longer period in the figure averaged somewhat lower. Productivity then accelerated to a 3¼% pace in the 1996-2004 period, reflecting the gains from information and communications technology, including the introduction of the internet (Fernald 2015). However, from 2005 to 2019, productivity growth slowed to only around 1½% per year, shown by the dashed gray line. Productivity fell below that average from 2011 to 2019, growing less than 1% per year.

The three components of productivity growth vary in importance over time. The first is labor quality (green sections), which reflects growth in worker skills arising from education and experience. For example, in 1950, only 34% of Americans age 25 and older had graduated from high school and only 6% had graduated from college. Today, 90% have graduated from high school and 34% have graduated from college. More education and job-specific experience increases the skills and abilities of workers, raising their productivity levels. On average since 1973, rising education and experience have contributed about 0.4 percentage points per year to productivity growth.

The second component, capital deepening (gold sections), arises from growth in the equipment, structures, and intellectual capital that workers use. When companies invest in new plants, purchase new equipment, or automate a process, each worker can apply more or better “tools,” or capital, to the hours they work. As a result, they can produce more. This component explains 0.7 percentage points on average to productivity growth since 1973.

The final component (blue sections) is a broad, indirect measure of innovation known as total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is the residual portion of labor productivity growth that cannot be explained by labor quality or capital deepening. In the long run, TFP captures productivity benefits from many sources. These include formal and informal research and development, improvements in management practices, and reallocation as high-productivity businesses expand while low-productivity businesses contract or exit. Since 1973, TFP growth on average explains the final 0.7 percentage points of average labor productivity growth.

What happens to productivity during and after recessions?

Even during the generally slower-growth period since 2004, the narrow bars show some short-lived spikes in output per hour. These spikes correspond to the Great Recession (2008-09) and its early aftermath (2010), as well as the pandemic period from 2020 through the second quarter of 2021. Productivity growth since the beginning of 2020 has been about 3½%, high by historical standards and much higher than the 2010-19 rate—even as hours worked have, on average, fallen over this period.

These spikes, including during the pandemic, reflect a general pattern in recent decades: productivity rises when economic activity contracts (Fernald and Wang 2016). Thus, the recent movements do not necessarily reflect unusual efficiency gains from the pandemic.

The productivity acceleration during the pandemic can be explained primarily by cyclical increases in labor quality and capital deepening. First, the downturn led to strong growth in labor quality, (green bar). The contractions in output and employment were particularly intense in high-contact service sectors, such as restaurants and hotels. These service sectors tend to employ workers who are younger and less educated than the average. Hence, as these sectors contracted, the average experience and education of the people who continued to work rose. This effect was particularly noticeable in the first half of 2020 and has already begun to reverse since that time.

Second, the plunge in employment during the pandemic also caused capital deepening (gold bar) to rise rapidly. While available capital changed little, there were fewer workers, so each worker had more capital to work with. This reflects, in part, that industries that shrank the most in the pandemic, such as leisure and hospitality, tend to be less capital intensive than the average.

The movements in labor quality and capital deepening—and thus in overall productivity—are not unusual in recessions. A similar surge occurred in 2008-09, during the Great Recession: employment and hours worked fell sharply, so the workers who kept their jobs had more capital to work with. And younger, less-educated workers disproportionately lost jobs, leading to a sharp rise in labor quality for those who kept working.

What about TFP (blue bar), which shows comparatively modest movements overall during the pandemic? In the long run, innovation that shows up in TFP is the source of sustainable growth in productivity. But in the short run, business-cycle factors are typically very important. During the pandemic, TFP, like the other components, shows fairly typical cyclical movements.

Indeed, the seemingly healthy pandemic growth in TFP averages across some extreme fluctuations. During the first half of 2020, as the economy contracted, TFP plunged. Starting in the second half of 2020, as the economy was recovering, TFP rebounded strongly.

This pattern is typical of recessions, where TFP regularly ebbs and flows for reasons that have nothing to do with the pace of innovation. Indeed, in every postwar recession, measured TFP growth was negative for a time, as in 2008-09 and in the first half of 2020. An important, intuitive reason is known as “labor hoarding.” When the economy goes into recession and demand falls temporarily, businesses want to retain some of their existing workforce—even if they could meet demand with fewer workers—to avoid losing workers with specialized skills and experience that will be needed when the economy recovers. Labor hoarding tends to reduce measured TFP, since output falls without a commensurate fall in measured inputs. When demand recovers, those businesses have idle workers and excess capacity and can quickly ramp up production without substantial hiring or investment. Hence, measured TFP surges, as shown for 2010.

It is possible, though challenging, to adjust directly for the measurement effects of the business cycle on TFP. The Fernald (2014) TFP database includes such an adjustment. Over the longer periods in Figure 1, the adjusted measure closely matches TFP growth. But over short periods, the adjusted measure often looks different. Over 2020-21, the adjusted measure of TFP grew only modestly. The business-cycle adjustment is subject to considerable uncertainty—which is why we do not emphasize it in Figure 1. However, the adjusted measure is consistent with the view that underlying TFP growth has not been exceptional.

What do the data imply for future productivity?

Following strong gains in 2008-09 and 2010, labor productivity weakened significantly in 2011-19. As the figure shows, capital deepening was particularly weak—undoing its recession-induced spike. The reason is intuitive. Businesses came out of the recession with a lot of capital relative to labor, so they could meet demand primarily by hiring rather than by investing in new capital. In addition, since many of the people they hired had lower skills than current workers, labor quality growth was somewhat subdued. A similar pattern seems likely following the pandemic. That is, the strong, cyclically induced growth in capital deepening and labor quality that drove the productivity spike in 2020-21 is likely to unwind.

The wild card is TFP growth, which is, in principle, the sustainable source of productivity growth. The particular characteristics of the pandemic might, on their own, affect TFP, though the direction is unclear. On the one hand, many businesses report expecting that short- and medium-term disruptions and cost increases—such as spending more on cleaning and other health measures—will make them less efficient, meaning TFP will be lower than it otherwise would be (Bloom et al. 2020). On the other hand, some workers are more productive at home than in the office (Barrero, Bloom, and Davis 2021), and businesses have learned new ways of operating that may offer ongoing efficiencies, such as remote digital meetings as a substitute for costly business travel. On balance, Fernald and Li (2021) expect these and other effects to be relatively modest. But there is considerable uncertainty.

Conclusion

Productivity growth has been very strong during the pandemic. This does not, however, indicate that changes induced by the pandemic itself—such as the shift to remote work and online shopping—have caused a persistent break from the earlier slow productivity trend. Growth accounting indicates that the major sources of the recent productivity strength are cyclical and are unlikely to be sustained. In particular, the decline in employment boosted capital deepening; the experience after the Great Recession suggests that this temporary boost is likely to reverse. In addition, because the employment decline was more pronounced among workers with lower education and less experience, the average labor quality of those who kept their jobs rose. This effect has already started to reverse and may reverse further as lower-skilled workers increasingly return to work.

Of course, the pandemic itself could influence the pace of TFP growth. However, it is premature to assess any such effects from the aggregate productivity statistics.

Ed Comment:Interesting to see that they agreed with my hunch that the laying off of low-skilled workers gives the false impression that productivity growth has accelerated. Interesting how it seeps into TFP growth via (the hoarding of) hard-to-replace and subsequently underutilized talent that eventually becomes utilized at no apparent cost.

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Previous articleAugust 23, 2021Wage Levels, Incidence Of Low PayThe relationship btw low wage levels and numeracy skills is evident as data shows a significant share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings also score at Level One or below in numeracyNext articleAugust 25, 2021Is the Conventional Wisdom on Educational Spending All Wrong?Despite the belief that lower education expenditures per student contribute to race and income gaps, data shows that schools serving Black and poorer students receive more per-pupil funding than those serving White and wealthier students. @FreddieDeboer
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3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. The direct lending market is roughly $2tn, or about 3% of total US household and business debt outstanding, compared with mortgages accounting for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Is direct lending too small to threaten the financial system?

Core argument: The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.
  2. Mortgages accounted for about 60% of total US household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006, compared with direct lending's roughly 3% share.

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  • JPMorgan Marking Down Loan Portfolios Of Private Credit Groups — JPMorgan has marked down the value of certain loans in private credit funds' portfolios that serve as collateral for the funds' borrowing from the bank, limiting how much it will lend against them. Unlike most banks, which require triggers such as missed interest payments, JPMorgan reserves the right to revalue those assets at any time.
  • Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes — The author argues that companies are collectively over-investing in artificial intelligence and that markets will correct when that belief dissipates. Because debt, particularly private credit, now finances much of this investment, the author contends a correction would spread beyond equity holders and produce a banking-style crisis driven by non-bank lenders.
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    • Financial Markets

Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

AI Summary. An analysis of Federal Reserve data found the top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending, up from 48.5% the prior quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989. Spending by the bottom 80%, those making under roughly $175,000, has merely kept pace with inflation.

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Are top earners accounting for a record share of consumer spending?

Core argument: The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.
  2. Consumers in the bottom 80% of the income distribution, making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic, according to Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Economy Depends More Than Ever on Rich People — Moody's Analytics estimates the top 10% of earners account for 49.7% of all U.S. consumer spending, a record in data going back to 1989, up from about 36% three decades ago, with their spending alone equal to almost one-third of gross domestic product.
  • To Understand America Today, Study the Zero-Sum Mindset — Younger generations in the United States and other rich countries hold more zero-sum views than older ones, a pattern researchers link to growing up amid slower economic growth and lower mobility. People who have surpassed their parents, or whose families rose over generations, are less likely to think in zero-sum terms.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

AI Summary. Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Does America's building slowdown reflect structural shifts rather than lawyerly culture?

Core argument: Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.
  2. US urbanization rose from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, then grew more incrementally to 85% by 2020, with America's breakneck building phase winding down by the 1960s.
  3. The US building and investment slowdown that began after the 1970s may owe more to structural economic shifts than to lawyers, qualifying Dan Wang's contrast between China's engineering state and America's lawyerly society.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Colossus: China vs 1950s America — China's growth in its share of global manufacturing has slowed from roughly 1.5 percentage points per year in the early 2010s to just over 0.5 percentage points annually, about one-third the earlier pace. The author argues China's share of global manufacturing is likely near its peak.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

AI Summary. About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Is the AI investment boom crowding out the rest of the economy?

Core argument: Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.
  2. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid.

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  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • The AI Boom’s Hidden Risk to the Economy — Net income at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft rose 73% to $91bn in a quarter two years on, while their combined free cash flow fell 30% to $40bn, as heavy AI investment absorbs cash these firms once recycled into financial markets. That spare cash previously helped hold down long-term interest rates despite large federal deficits.
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Is it Over?

AI Summary. Benchmark scores show only modest capability gains in the latest large language model releases compared with the larger jump seen two generations earlier, alongside a broader convergence in performance across competing AI models. Commentators attribute this to inherent limits of the technology and the exhaustion of new training data, raising doubts that the spending on AI hardware is justified.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

Are AI capability gains slowing enough to question hardware spending?

Core argument: GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.
  2. Benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in AI model capabilities, with commentary attributing this to inherent limitations of large language model technology and exhaustion of new training data.
  3. Companies appear to be spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs producing a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from, and the entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

AI Summary. Household and banking sector leverage in the US have declined significantly since 2008, while corporate leverage has moved sideways and federal government leverage has risen significantly. On this measure, the US private sector is in strong financial shape.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Is the US private sector in strong financial shape?

Core argument: US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.
  2. US federal government leverage has increased significantly since 2008, moving in the opposite direction from the deleveraging in the household and banking sectors.
  3. US corporate leverage has moved sideways since 2008, neither declining like household and banking leverage nor rising like federal government leverage.

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