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The post-COVID stock listing boom

AI Summary. The number of U.S. publicly listed companies rose 28%, from 4,144 to 5,301, with blank-check acquisition companies accounting for 53% of new listings. Traditional non-blank-check listings also grew at a 7.5% annualized rate, compared with -2.8% from 1997 to 2020.

Berardino Palazzo Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:
June 27, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The post-COVID stock listing boom saw a 28% increase in publicly listed US firms from Aug 2020 to Dec 2021, driven by SPACs & traditional IPOs.

Has the decline in U.S. publicly listed companies reversed?

Core argument: U.S. publicly listed companies rose 28% from 4,144 in August 2020 to 5,301 in December 2021, with Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) accounting for 53% of new listings over that period.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. equity markets experienced a significant surge in publicly listed companies, with numbers rising from 4,144 in August 2020 to 5,301 by December 2021, marking a 28% increase. This growth was driven by the popularity of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), which accounted for 53% of new listings during this period. The SPAC phenomenon altered market composition, with small-size SPAC stocks increasing from 8% to 28% and foreign-incorporated shares rising from 14% to 18%. Despite the SPAC influence, traditional IPOs also contributed to the boom, with non-SPAC listings growing at an annualized rate of 7.5%, a stark contrast to the -2.8% rate from 1997 to 2020. This post-COVID environment, characterized by low interest rates and ample liquidity, proved favorable for new IPOs, reshaping the U.S. equity landscape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. publicly listed companies rose 28% from 4,144 in August 2020 to 5,301 in December 2021, with Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) accounting for 53% of new listings over that period.
  2. Non-SPAC listings grew at a 7.5% annualized rate after COVID-19, against -2.8% annually from 1997 to 2020, in an environment of low interest rates and ample liquidity.
  3. SPAC activity shifted U.S. market composition, with small-size SPAC stocks rising from 8% to 28% and foreign-incorporated shares from 14% to 18%.

In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the U.S. equity markets have witnessed a surge in the number of publicly listed companies. Using data for the three major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ), we find that the number of publicly traded companies went from 4,144 at the end of August 2020 to 5,301 at the end of December 2021, a staggering increase of about 28 percent.Figure 1 reports the trend in the number of public companies since 1973, two years after the NASDAQ started its operations. The number of publicly traded firms peaked in 1997, reaching 7,842 at the end of November, and has since steadily declined through 2012, after which it remained nearly flat until about the first half of 2020. Given the importance of the SPAC phenomenon, we manually classify the newly listed companies into SPACs and non-SPACs, that is, companies that go public with a traditional IPO process, and report in Figure 3 the number of newly listed firms in each category. During the period from the end of August 2020 to December 2021, there were 736 newly listed firms classified as SPACs and 646 newly listed non-SPAC firms; that is, SPACs accounted for about 53% of total newly listed firms.The number of newly listed SPACs took off in the second half of 2020 and peaked in the months of March and April 2021 We document that the entry of SPACs has significantly modified the composition of U.S. equity markets over the period from August 2020 to the end of 2021. First, the fraction of small size stocks classified as SPACs had increased from about 8% to about 28%. Second, the fraction of ordinary common shares of foreign-incorporated companies has jumped from about 14 percent to about 18 percent. Third, at the end of 2021, companies in the Other Financial Investment Activities industry (4-digit NAICS code 5239) represented 15 percent of listed companies, up from about 4 percent in August 2020.

Christine Dobridge, Rebecca John and Berardino Palazzo, "The post-COVID stock listing boom,"Federal Reserve Board, June 17, 2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-post-covid-stock-listing-boom-20220617.htm

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the U.S. equity markets have witnessed a surge in the number of publicly listed companies. Using data for the three major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ), we find that the number of publicly traded companies went from 4,144 at the end of August 2020 to 5,301 at the end of December 2021, a staggering increase of about 28 percent.1

Figure 1 reports the trend in the number of public companies since 1973, two years after the NASDAQ started its operations. The number of publicly traded firms peaked in 1997, reaching 7,842 at the end of November, and has since steadily declined through 2012, after which it remained nearly flat until about the first half of 2020.2

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The small net change in the number of publicly listed companies in the last 50 years is the by-product of (1) an early period during which the number of publicly traded firms steadily increased at an average annualized monthly rate of about 1.5% (January 1973 to November 1997), (2) a subsequent period during which the number of publicly traded firms steadily decreased at an average annualized monthly rate of about -2.8% (from November 1997 to August 2020), and (3) a recent period that has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of listed firms (from August 2020 to December 2021). During this latter period, the average annualized growth rate has been an astonishing 20%.

Figure 2 reports the 12-month moving average of the monthly growth rate for the NASDAQ and NYSE+AMEX, respectively. As the figure shows, the recent increase in the number of companies is a phenomenon that is equally important for firms traded in the NASDAQ and firms traded in the NYSE and AMEX platforms.

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 2


In the section that follows, we provide a description of the newly listed stocks that have entered during the post-COVID-19 listing boom and analyze their effect on the composition of U.S. equity markets.

What is responsible for the recent listing boom?

The obvious answer to the above question is the huge popularity of investing in Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs). Starting in the second half of 2020, U.S. equity markets have witnessed an explosion in the number of so-called blank check companies' (or SPACs') stocks. These companies are effectively holding cash to acquire private companies and take them public, bypassing the traditional IPO process.3

Given the importance of the SPAC phenomenon, we manually classify the newly listed companies into SPACs and non-SPACs, that is, companies that go public with a traditional IPO process, and report in Figure 3 the number of newly listed firms in each category.4 During the period from the end of August 2020 to December 2021, there were 736 newly listed firms classified as SPACs and 646 newly listed non-SPAC firms; that is, SPACs accounted for about 53% of total newly listed firms. The number of newly listed SPACs took off in the second half of 2020 and peaked in the months of March and April 2021.5

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 3


In addition to highlighting the prominence of SPACs in driving newly listed firms, Figure 3 also makes clear that even without the surge in SPACs, we would have seen a historically large increase in the number of publicly traded companies. If we exclude all SPACs from the sample and calculate the counterfactual growth rate generated by the entry of non-SPAC companies, the number of publicly traded companies would have grown at an annualized average growth rate of about 7.5% over the period August 2020 to December 2021, a substantially larger growth rate than the one recorded over the period November 1997-August 2020 (-2.8% at an annual rate). In short, the U.S. economy would have witnessed a post-COVID-19 listing boom even without the SPAC frenzy.6

Newly listed firms during the post-Covid listing boom: Some stylized facts

In what follows, we compare the characteristics of the about 1,400 newly publicly listed companies that entered the U.S. equity markets during the SPAC listing boom, between the end of August 2020 and December 2021, with the approximately same number of newly publicly listed companies that entered over the period December 2014 to August 2020.

Table 1 shows that companies that entered during the SPAC listing boom tended to have the same size distribution of the companies that had entered since the end of 2014; that is, about 30% of newly listed firms are small in terms of their market capitalization.7 However, Table 1 highlights that there is a significant difference in the size distribution of SPACs versus non-SPACs, with the former tending to be significantly smaller: out of 10 newly listed SPACs, 9 belong to the small size category.

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 4


In this note, we consider ordinary common shares of both domestically and foreign incorporated companies. Table 2 shows that the more recent wave of entrants is more likely to be incorporated abroad (34%) than newly listed companies in the period December 2014 to August 2020 (about 21%). The difference is entirely due to newly listed SPACs, which are much more likely to be incorporated abroad (about 44%) than non-SPAC firms (about 24%).8

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 5


We also use NAICS codes at the 4-digit level (i.e., NAICS industries) to examine the industry distribution of newly listed firms during the SPAC boom. Table 3 shows that the industry distribution of non-SPAC firms is broadly similar to the industry distribution in the preceding period. For example, in both periods, the fraction of newly listed firms belonging to the Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing sector and to the Scientific Research and Development Services industry is very similar. Not surprisingly, the industry composition of newly entered SPACs is heavily tilted toward the financial services industry, with about 84% of SPACs belonging to the Other Financial Investment Activities industry.

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 6


We conclude this note by highlighting an important difference in equity price dynamics between newly listed SPACS and more traditional newly listed companies. SPACs enter capital markets before performing a merger or an acquisition, hence we can identify three distinct stages in a SPAC lifecycle: the period from entering capital markets to the first day a deal announcement is made, the subsequent period from the deal announcement day to the day the SPAC becomes a regular operating company (an event known as De-SPAC), and the final period that follows the De-SPAC.

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 7


Table 4 reports daily equity returns statistics for all the companies that entered U.S. equity markets in the period between September 2020 and December 2021. For SPACs, we calculate daily returns statistics for each of the three subperiods described above. Before a SPAC becomes an operating company, its daily returns show a much smaller variability, as illustrated by the lower volatility and the (much) smaller values for interdecile range (the difference between the top and bottom 10 percent of the equity returns distribution). Additionally, the market beta is close to zero for the pre-announcement period and about 0.6 after the announcement but before De-SPAC. After the SPAC becomes an operating company, both the equity returns variability and the stock market beta are comparable to the ones of non-SPAC companies that entered over the same period.

Table 4 also highlights that SPAC stocks are more volatile after the announcement (but before De-SPAC). Figure 4 helps us understand why this is the case. We consider only the subset of SPACs that entered between the end of August 2020 and December 2021, have become an operating company, and depict some of the quantities reported in Table 4 around the period that goes from 60 days prior to 180 days after the day of the deal announcement. The shaded area is the interdecile range, the solid blue line is the median daily return, and the red dashed line is the fraction of SPACs that have become an operating company.

The post-COVID stock listing boom: Extended Excerpt Image 8


Some interesting facts emerge by looking at the relatively short life-cycle of a publicly traded SPAC. First, stock returns have very little volatility in the days preceding a deal announcement, as the narrow interdecile range shows. On the announcement day, the volatility of returns spikes up significantly and then slowly declines to the pre-announcement level. This happens because after the announcement it takes time for SPACs to become operating companies. As the fraction of De-SPACs increase, stock returns volatility also goes up, and the interdecile range converges toward the values of the interdecile range of non-SPAC stocks (see also Table 4).

Concluding remarks

The number of publicly listed firms in the three major U.S. stock exchanges increased by about 1,100 in the period August 2020 to December 2021. This surge has been driven both by an unprecedented increase in the number of SPAC listings and by a large inflow of more traditional companies, thus suggesting that the post-COVID financial market environment has been particularly favorable for new IPOs amid low interest rates and ample market liquidity.

We document that the entry of SPACs has significantly modified the composition of U.S. equity markets over the period from August 2020 to the end of 2021. First, the fraction of small size stocks classified as SPACs had increased from about 8% to about 28%. Second, the fraction of ordinary common shares of foreign-incorporated companies has jumped from about 14 percent to about 18 percent. Third, at the end of 2021, companies in the Other Financial Investment Activities industry (4-digit NAICS code 5239) represented 15 percent of listed companies, up from about 4 percent in August 2020.

These compositional changes are very likely to be temporary since most SPACs are required to enter into a merger usually within 2 years from the IPO (or the SPAC must return shareholders' investments). As a consequence, we expect the fraction of firms in the Other Financial Investment Activities industry sector to decline as SPACs merge with companies operating in different industries. At the same time, we expect the fraction of ordinary common shares of foreign-incorporated companies to decline as more SPACs will become operating companies incorporated in the United States.

The fraction of SPACs in the small size stock category will also decrease. However, in the near future, having a large fraction of SPACs in small size portfolios might have implications for cross-sectional asset pricing given the peculiar properties of SPACs' returns before these investment vehicles become operating companies.9

References

Bulley, David and Dean Bennet (2020)," The use of Cayman Islands Structures for SPAC IPOS," webpage:https://www.applebyglobal.com/publications/the-use-of-cayman-islands-structures-for-spac-ipos/.

Doidge, Craig G., Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz (2017), "The U.S. listing gap," Journal of Financial Economicshttps://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-financial-economics, vol. 123 (3),pp. 464-487.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.12.002

Doidge, Craig G., Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz (2004), "New lists: Fundamentals and survival rates," Journal of Financial Economicshttps://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-financial-economics, vol. 73 (2),pp. 229-269.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.04.001

Gahng, Minmo, Jay R. Ritter, and Donghang Zhang (2021), "SPACs." Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3775847.

________________________________

1. We measure the number of traded firms as the number of unique PERMCOs in the CRSP database with a non-missing value for price and number of shares outstanding. We only consider ordinary common shares of companies incorporated in the U.S. and outside the U.S. (share codes in CRSP equal to 10, 11, and 12) and traded in the three major U.S. stock exchanges: NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchange codes in CRSP equal to 1, 2, and 3, respectively). If a SPAC changes its PERMCO after an acquisition, we do not consider the new PERMCO to be a new traded entity. Return to text

2. Fama and French (2004) suggest that the increase in the number of publicly listed firms in the period 1980-2001 is due to a decline in the cost of equity that has prompted smaller and more financially fragile firms to go public. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) calculate that about 46% of the decline in the number of publicly traded firms from 1996 through 2012 was due to delisting, while the remaining fraction was due to a lower listing rate. Return to text

3. Santilli, Peter and Amrith Ramkumar (2021), "SPACs Are the Stock Market's Hottest Trend. Here's How They Work," The Wall Street Journal, March 29, https://www.wsj.com/articles/spacs-are-the-stock-markets-hottest-trend-heres-how-they-work-11617010202. With the total number of publicly listed firms increasing by 1,157 from the end of August 2020 to the end of December 2021 and 1,382 new entrants over the period, we estimate that 225 firms delisted over the period. Return to text

4. We used the NASDAQ IPO calendar to manually classify newly listed firms into SPACs and non-SPACs (https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/ipos). We also use data from the website spacresearch.com (https://www.spacresearch.com/) to identify SPACs that have finalized an acquisition by the end of February 2022. In this note, we focus on the first time a SPAC appears on one of the three major U.S. stock exchanges. Return to text

5. Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang (2021) provide one of the first analysis of SPACs in U.S. equity markets. Their sample of SPACs ends in December 2019, prior to the recent SPAC listing boom. Return to text

6. Specifically, the number of non-SPAC firms increased from 3,952 in August 2020 to 4,377 in December 2021, an increase of about 11 percent. Return to text

7. We measure size using market capitalization at the end of the first month of trade. Small firms belong to the bottom quintile of the market capitalization distribution. Market capitalization quintiles are calculated each month using only companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Return to text

8. Many SPACs choose to incorporate in the Cayman Islands to take advantage of their more favorable statutory merger regime (Bulley and Bennet, 2020). Return to text

9. Excluding SPACs from portfolio formation before they become an operating company could be a potential solution to mitigate their effect on the return properties of small size portfolios. Return to text

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3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. The direct lending market is roughly $2tn, or about 3% of total US household and business debt outstanding, compared with mortgages accounting for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Is direct lending too small to threaten the financial system?

Core argument: The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.
  2. Mortgages accounted for about 60% of total US household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006, compared with direct lending's roughly 3% share.

Related Articles:

  • JPMorgan Marking Down Loan Portfolios Of Private Credit Groups — JPMorgan has marked down the value of certain loans in private credit funds' portfolios that serve as collateral for the funds' borrowing from the bank, limiting how much it will lend against them. Unlike most banks, which require triggers such as missed interest payments, JPMorgan reserves the right to revalue those assets at any time.
  • Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes — The author argues that companies are collectively over-investing in artificial intelligence and that markets will correct when that belief dissipates. Because debt, particularly private credit, now finances much of this investment, the author contends a correction would spread beyond equity holders and produce a banking-style crisis driven by non-bank lenders.
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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

AI Summary. An analysis of Federal Reserve data found the top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending, up from 48.5% the prior quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989. Spending by the bottom 80%, those making under roughly $175,000, has merely kept pace with inflation.

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Are top earners accounting for a record share of consumer spending?

Core argument: The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.
  2. Consumers in the bottom 80% of the income distribution, making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic, according to Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Economy Depends More Than Ever on Rich People — Moody's Analytics estimates the top 10% of earners account for 49.7% of all U.S. consumer spending, a record in data going back to 1989, up from about 36% three decades ago, with their spending alone equal to almost one-third of gross domestic product.
  • To Understand America Today, Study the Zero-Sum Mindset — Younger generations in the United States and other rich countries hold more zero-sum views than older ones, a pattern researchers link to growing up amid slower economic growth and lower mobility. People who have surpassed their parents, or whose families rose over generations, are less likely to think in zero-sum terms.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

AI Summary. Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
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Database
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Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Does America's building slowdown reflect structural shifts rather than lawyerly culture?

Core argument: Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.
  2. US urbanization rose from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, then grew more incrementally to 85% by 2020, with America's breakneck building phase winding down by the 1960s.
  3. The US building and investment slowdown that began after the 1970s may owe more to structural economic shifts than to lawyers, qualifying Dan Wang's contrast between China's engineering state and America's lawyerly society.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Colossus: China vs 1950s America — China's growth in its share of global manufacturing has slowed from roughly 1.5 percentage points per year in the early 2010s to just over 0.5 percentage points annually, about one-third the earlier pace. The author argues China's share of global manufacturing is likely near its peak.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

AI Summary. About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
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Database
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As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Is the AI investment boom crowding out the rest of the economy?

Core argument: Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.
  2. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • The AI Boom’s Hidden Risk to the Economy — Net income at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft rose 73% to $91bn in a quarter two years on, while their combined free cash flow fell 30% to $40bn, as heavy AI investment absorbs cash these firms once recycled into financial markets. That spare cash previously helped hold down long-term interest rates despite large federal deficits.
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Is it Over?

AI Summary. Benchmark scores show only modest capability gains in the latest large language model releases compared with the larger jump seen two generations earlier, alongside a broader convergence in performance across competing AI models. Commentators attribute this to inherent limits of the technology and the exhaustion of new training data, raising doubts that the spending on AI hardware is justified.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

Are AI capability gains slowing enough to question hardware spending?

Core argument: GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.
  2. Benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in AI model capabilities, with commentary attributing this to inherent limitations of large language model technology and exhaustion of new training data.
  3. Companies appear to be spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs producing a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from, and the entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • AI’s $600B Question — Comparing spending on AI chips to historical railroad construction overlooks that high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost businesses without monopoly or oligopoly power tend to see prices competed down to marginal cost, and that semiconductors continually improve in cost versus performance, unlike physical infrastructure. Speculative frenzies accompany technology, but the payoff will take a long time.
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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

AI Summary. Household and banking sector leverage in the US have declined significantly since 2008, while corporate leverage has moved sideways and federal government leverage has risen significantly. On this measure, the US private sector is in strong financial shape.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Is the US private sector in strong financial shape?

Core argument: US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.
  2. US federal government leverage has increased significantly since 2008, moving in the opposite direction from the deleveraging in the household and banking sectors.
  3. US corporate leverage has moved sideways since 2008, neither declining like household and banking leverage nor rising like federal government leverage.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the 10-year Treasury note interest rate will average 3.8% over 2025–2055, close to its 3.7% average over the prior three decades, with the inflation-adjusted rate averaging 1.5%. It assesses that long-run rates are largely set by structural factors including demographics, saving and investment behavior, and federal debt.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.
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