Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation

AI Summary. Dollar strength is attributed to sustained U.S. capital spending, with private fixed investment excluding housing holding a high share of GDP, a 10-year average for private investment at its highest since the Reagan era, and research-and-development spending at all-time highs as a share of GDP. This investment and U.S. leadership in innovation and energy production attract foreign capital.

James Mackintosh Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
September 15, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The persistent strength of the dollar is largely driven by a long-term increase in American capital spending, with U.S. private fixed investment, excluding housing, stabilizing at a high share of GDP. @JamesMackintosh @WSJ.

Does strong U.S. investment and innovation explain the dollar's strength?

Core argument: The 10-year average of U.S. private sector investment is the highest since the Reagan era, and research-and-development spending has reached all-time highs as a share of GDP.

The persistent strength of the dollar is largely driven by a long-term increase in American capital spending, with U.S. private fixed investment, excluding housing, stabilizing at a high share of GDP. This trend avoids the boom-and-bust cycles seen in past dollar fluctuations. The 10-year average for private sector investment is now the highest since the Reagan era, and research-and-development spending has reached all-time highs as a share of GDP. This sustained investment, coupled with U.S. leadership in innovation and energy production, attracts foreign capital and supports the dollar's strength. Additionally, deglobalization may further extend this cycle by necessitating more domestic capital deployment and slowing the spread of new inventions. Despite short-term fluctuations due to interest rates and recession fears, the U.S.'s economic vitality relative to other developed nations suggests the dollar could remain strong for an extended period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 10-year average of U.S. private sector investment is the highest since the Reagan era, and research-and-development spending has reached all-time highs as a share of GDP.
  2. U.S. private fixed investment excluding housing has stabilized at a high share of GDP, avoiding the boom-and-bust cycles that accompanied past dollar fluctuations.
  3. Sustained American capital spending, innovation leadership, and energy production attract foreign capital and support the dollar, and deglobalization may extend this cycle by requiring more domestic capital deployment and slowing the spread of new inventions.

"...This latest dollar uptrend has already run longer than each of the periods of multiyear gains since the greenback was taken off the gold standard by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s.Mr. Barth thinks it could run much longer still, because something interesting has happened with capital spending. U.S. private fixed investment, excluding housing, has stabilized at a fairly high share of GDP, avoiding the boom-and-bust of past dollar cycles. Despite frequent complaints that the private sector doesn’t invest enough, the 10-year average is now the highest since Ronald Reagan left office. Research-and-development spending is also at all-time highs as a share of GDP..."

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation: Extended Excerpt Image 2


James Mackintosh, "Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation,"Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-is-the-dollar-so-strong-american-innovation-11662903959

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation

The dollar is having a once-in-a-generation surge of supremacy over the world. After 11 years and a 40% gain on a real trade-weighted basis, some are starting to wonder if it is time for a fall.

In the short run a weaker dollar is plausible, as Europe’s governments absorb the financial threat to their economies from energy prices and foreign central banksrush to catch up with the Federal Reserve on rate rises. The burst of optimism in the markets on Friday led the dollar to fall back, as money that had sought it out as a haven left again.

But the long periods of strengthening or weakening in the past haven’t obviously coincided with the economic or monetary policy cycles. Something else has been going on, and to try to spot the end of this megacycle in the dollar we need to consider what.

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Marvin Barth, a former U.S. Treasury economist, thinks it is all about innovation. He now runs an independent research firm called Thematic Markets and his basic thesis is that the U.S.’s leading position in academic research, and the close links of universities and business, gave the country a head start in computerization in the 1970s and early 1980s, in the internet in the 1990s and in newer internet applications and artificial intelligence more recently.

Each innovation sparked a wave of investment to take advantage of it. This improved profitability and attracted foreign capital—pushing up the dollar.

Inventions don’t stay in one country for long. But in each case America’s head start gave it a few years’ lead before investments elsewhere looked as profitable. By then, the earnings generated had flowed out into society and funded a consumption boom that eventually turned into a housing boom. To finance housebuilding, the U.S. sucked in capital even after losing its competitive advantage—so the dollar had to fall to make it attractive to foreign money.

The story is a nice one, and helps explain how the dollar’s long-run trends can carry on even through the temporary interruption of recessions.

As evidence, Mr. Barth studied the length of cycles for various economic variables by using a frequency-analysis technique from engineering. The cycle for the share of capital spending in gross domestic product matches that of the dollar, at about 17 years, while things important in the short term, such as monetary policy, have little influence at such a long horizon.

There’s nothing magical about past cycles having been 17 years long, and no reason to think future ones will be the same length. This latest dollar uptrend has already run longer than each of the periods of multiyear gains since the greenback was taken off the gold standard by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s.

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation: Extended Excerpt Image 4

Why Is the Dollar So Strong? American Innovation: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Mr. Barth thinks it could run much longer still, because something interesting has happened with capital spending. U.S. private fixed investment, excluding housing, has stabilized at a fairly high share of GDP, avoiding the boom-and-bust of past dollar cycles. Despite frequent complaints that the private sector doesn’t invest enough, the 10-year average is now the highest since Ronald Reagan left office. Research-and-development spending is also at all-time highs as a share of GDP.

Also potentially extending the cycle is deglobalization, which will both require more capital to be deployed domestically to replace international supply chains and hinder the spread of new inventions.

Even investors who don’t buy the innovation story can’t deny that the U.S. has done a far better job than the rest of the developed world in rebuilding its economy since the financial crisis. It now has the advantage of being an energy powerhouse too, thanks to another U.S.-led innovation, fracking.

“This cycle is very much about U.S. economic supremacy,” says Kit Juckes, head of FX strategy at Société Générale, who thinks it might be nearing its top.

In the short term, the usual issues of interest rates and recession fears will swing the dollar around. But if the U.S. can maintain its economic vitality relative to the rest of the world, the dollar could stay high for a long time yet.

  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Investment
Previous articleSeptember 15, 2022The 55-and-Older Labor Market Exodus Is a Statistical MirageRestoring prime-age male labor force participation to 1970 levels would add 4.5mm workers to the US labor force, according to @JustinFox at @Bloomberg.Next articleSeptember 15, 2022Measuring US fiscal capacity using discounted cash flow analysisUS fiscal capacity constrained by duration mismatch btw projected primary surpluses & Treasury portfolio. Upper bound on fiscal capacity is $12.38tn, $10tn short of $22.28tn value of US Treasuries in 2021.
Showing 113 database articles primarily about Inflation

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Choking Iran's Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy — US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
  • Inflation
  • Energy
  • GDP
  • Politics
  • Security

A Return To Monetarism?

AI Summary. The author argues that a surge in money growth beginning in 2020 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the sample period since 1967, and that subsequent monetary tightening produced strong disinflationary pressures. Had policymakers tracked money growth using a price-target model, they might have tightened sooner and avoided some of the inflation.

Peter Ireland, Stephen Miran and Nouriel Roubini Hudson Bay Capital
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Ireland, Miran, and Roubini compare the actual price level to the predictions of an equilibrium model relating prices to money supply. Predicted inflation hit a 60-year high in 2020–21, months before inflation surged and then crashed once the Fed hiked.

Would tracking money growth have helped policymakers tighten sooner?

Core argument: The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.

The graphs in Figure 3 show quite clearly how the surge in money growth starting in 2020 and continuing in 2021 put enormous upward pressure on inflation, to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period. And while the large and negative price gaps that followed in 2022 and 2023 are likewise indicative of strong disinflationary pressures applied through subsequent monetary tightening, one can’t see these graphs without asking: Had Federal Open Market Committee members been monitoring measures of money growth with the help of the P-star [price target based on monetary aggregates] model, might they have ended QE and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly, thereby avoiding at least some of the post-2020 inflation? Of course, massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 surge in inflation, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level. The model simply observes that regardless of its originating source, excessive money growth signals that inappropriate macroeconomic policies are fueling higher inflation. Fiscal expansions that expand money supply will be reflected in a P-star model.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.
  2. The large negative price gaps of 2022 and 2023 indicate strong disinflationary pressures from subsequent monetary tightening, raising the question of whether FOMC members using the P-star model would have ended quantitative easing and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly.
  3. Massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 inflation surge, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level, and fiscal expansions that expand the money supply are reflected in a P-star model.

Related Articles:

  • Money and Inflation — The M2 money supply has contracted for the first time in sixty years, shrinking at an annual rate of nearly 5%, yet inflation has remained high rather than turning to deflation. The author argues this undercuts the claim that money supply growth drives inflation, since the same logic implies severe deflation should now follow.
  • State Dependence of Monetary Policy During Global Supply Chain Disruptions — The authors present descriptive evidence that global supply chain disruptions were associated with elevated transportation costs, goods supply-demand imbalances, and a surge in goods prices, steepening the aggregate supply curve. In the disrupted state, a contractionary monetary policy shock produces muted responses in real output and spare capacity but a substantially stronger decline in goods prices.
  • What Next for r*? A Capital Market Equilibrium Perspective On The Natural Rate of Interest — A capital-market equilibrium model estimates that the steady-state safe natural rate of interest across advanced economies has fallen from about 5% to about 0%, driven by slower growth, demographics, higher mark-ups, and rising risk premia. The author estimates that artificial-intelligence-driven growth and heightened inflation risk could each raise it by about 1 percentage point.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Home Alone: Inflation And The New Fed Chair

AI Summary. Current readings on labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness and the output gap resemble conditions that have historically preceded Federal Reserve rate increases rather than cuts, and futures markets are pricing in hikes. Averaging several monetary policy rules implies a policy rate of 4.00%–4.85% versus the current 3.50%–3.75%.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
May 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Cembalest notes labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector and the implied output gap are “much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them.”

Do current inflation indicators point toward rate hikes rather than cuts?

Core argument: Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.

Inflation indicators the Fed watches include labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector, supply chain tightness and the “output gap” which measures how far actual growth is above/below potential growth. [The two] charts plot these four variables at the time of prior Fed decisions to increase or cut policy rates; green dots indicate when the Fed cut, red dots indicate when the Fed tightened and yellow circles show today’s values. In other words: current values are much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them. That may be why the futures curve is now pricing in Fed hikes instead of the cuts that were priced in at the start of the year. Superwonky: averaging several different monetary rules of thumb (Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, forward-looking) yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00% - 4.85% compared to the current range of 3.50% - 3.75%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.
  2. Labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness, and the output gap sit much closer to conditions that historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates than to cut them.
  3. The futures curve is pricing in Fed hikes rather than the cuts priced in at the start of the year.

Related Articles:

  • US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns — The University of Michigan's consumer sentiment index fell 5 points to 44.8, a record low and weaker than all economist projections in a Bloomberg survey. Consumers expect prices to rise 3.9% annually over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5%, and 4.8% over the coming year.
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — U.S. inflation has remained above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022 while government borrowing runs high and companies borrow heavily to fund AI build-out. Even so, the 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% while the 10-year yield, at 4.67%, sat below its October 2023 level.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns

AI Summary. The University of Michigan's consumer sentiment index fell 5 points to 44.8, a record low and weaker than all economist projections in a Bloomberg survey. Consumers expect prices to rise 3.9% annually over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5%, and 4.8% over the coming year.

María Paula Mijares Torres Bloomberg
Date Posted:
May 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index hit a record low in May, falling ~10% month over month. Consumers foresee prices advancing 4.8% over the next year. Inflation and high gas prices have long been major causes of sentiment drops.

Are price expectations pushing consumer sentiment to a record low?

Core argument: The University of Michigan's final May consumer sentiment index fell 5 points from April to 44.8, a record low and weaker than every forecast in a Bloomberg survey of economists as well as the preliminary reading of 48.2.

The University of Michigan’s final May sentiment index decreased 5 points to 44.8 from April. The gauge was weaker than all projections in a Bloomberg survey of economists as well as the preliminary reading of 48.2. Consumers expect prices to rise an annualized 3.9% over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5% in April and the highest in seven months. They also saw costs advancing 4.8% over the next year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The University of Michigan's final May consumer sentiment index fell 5 points from April to 44.8, a record low and weaker than every forecast in a Bloomberg survey of economists as well as the preliminary reading of 48.2.
  2. Consumers expect prices to rise an annualized 3.9% over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5% in April and the highest in seven months.
  3. Consumers expect costs to advance 4.8% over the next year, according to the University of Michigan's final May survey.

Related Articles:

  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — U.S. inflation has remained above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022 while government borrowing runs high and companies borrow heavily to fund AI build-out. Even so, the 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% while the 10-year yield, at 4.67%, sat below its October 2023 level.
  • $50 Trillion Safe-Haven Debt Market Upended by Iran War Inflation — Long-term yields in the $50tn-plus market for Group of Seven government bonds reached a two-decade high, as investors demand compensation for the risk that higher inflation persists and central banks must raise interest rates to contain it. Pandemic-era inflation has not fully faded and government debts keep increasing.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Politics
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