Edward Conard

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The global interest bill is about to jump

AI Summary. Global debt rose from $83tn in 2000 to $295tn in 2021, reaching 355% of GDP, while interest costs fell to 12% of GDP from 27% in 1989 as borrowing costs declined. With central banks raising rates to fight inflation, the global interest bill is projected to exceed $16tn by 2026, or 15% of projected GDP.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
February 4, 2022
Is Database:
Database

The global interest bill is set to jump, rising from $10.2tn in 2021 to over $16tn by 2026, or 15% of GDP.

Will rising interest rates sharply increase the global interest bill?

Core argument: Global debt rose from $83tn in 2000 to $295tn in 2021, outpacing GDP growth to reach 355% of GDP.

The global debt stock surged from $83tn in 2000 to $295tn in 2021, outpacing GDP growth and reaching 355% of GDP. Despite this, interest costs as a share of GDP were 12% in 2021, down from 27% in 1989, due to declining borrowing costs. However, with central banks raising rates to combat inflation, the global interest bill could rise from $10.2tn in 2021 to over $16tn by 2026, equating to 15% of projected GDP. If rates rise faster, the bill could hit $20tn, nearly 20% of GDP. This shift will impact borrowers differently, with private sectors in countries like Switzerland and South Korea being highly exposed due to high debt-to-income ratios.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global debt rose from $83tn in 2000 to $295tn in 2021, outpacing GDP growth to reach 355% of GDP.
  2. Global interest costs were 12% of GDP in 2021, down from 27% in 1989, as borrowing costs declined even while debt stocks climbed.
  3. With central banks raising rates to fight inflation, the global interest bill could rise from $10.2tn in 2021 to over $16tn by 2026, or 15% of projected GDP, and to $20tn, nearly 20% of GDP, if rates rise faster.

"...The stock of global debt has gone from $83trn in 2000 to around $295trn in 2021—a rate nearly double the pace of world gdp growth. Debt rose from 230% of gdp in 2000 to 320% on the eve of the pandemic, before covid-19 propelled it to the even greater height of 355% last year....Part of the reason for this explosion has been the steady decline in borrowing costs over the past two decades. In early 2000 a ten-year Treasury offered a yield of 6.5%. Today it pays 1.8%. The Federal Reserve’s effective policy rate has fallen from 6.5% to around 0.08% in that time. Benchmark rates in the euro area and Japan are sub-zero. Declines in government-bond yields and central banks’ policy rates have fed through to loan rates for private borrowers. As a result, even though global debt has rocketed over the years,the world’s interest costs, as a share of gdp, are well below their peak in the 1980s. In America, for instance, they stood at 12% of gdp in 2021, compared with 27% in 1989....The scale of the global interest bill is vast. The Economist estimates that households, companies, financial firms and governments worldwide paid $10.2trn in interest in 2021, equivalent to 12% of gdp. As a guide to the potential impact of rate rises to come, we consider a scenario where the interest rates faced by firms, households and governments in 58 countries rise by a percentage point over the next three years. (By way of comparison, the five-year Treasury yield has risen by a percentage point since spring 2021.)Our calculations suggest that the global interest bill would exceed $16trn by 2026, equivalent to 15% of projected GDP in that year. And if rates were to rise twice as quickly, say because inflation persists and forces central banks to take drastic action, the interest bill could rise to about $20trn by 2026, nearly a fifth of global gdp....To see which borrowers may be more sensitive to interest-rate rises, we rank the household, corporate and government sectors for our countries along two dimensions (for this exercise we exclude the financial sector, which intermediates lending). The first measure is the debt-to-income ratio, which gauges the extent to which debt is affordable. The second is the change in the ratio over the past decade, which captures the extent to which exposure to interest rates has increased over time. We then produce an overall ranking for each sector in each country (see chart)....Overall, our findings for the private sector are broadly consistent with an early indicator of financial stress, the credit-to-gdp gap, calculated by the bis, which measures the degree to which borrowing exceeds its long-run trend. On this measure, the Swiss and South Korean private sectors rank among the five most stretched in the world...."

Economist Staff, "The global interest bill is about to jump,"The Economist, February 5, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/the-global-interest-bill-is-about-to-jump/21807488

Never before has the world economy been so indebted. The stock of global debt has gone from $83trn in 2000 to around $295trn in 2021—a rate nearly double the pace of world gdp growth. Debt rose from 230% of gdp in 2000 to 320% on the eve of the pandemic, before covid-19 propelled it to the even greater height of 355% last year.

Part of the reason for this explosion has been the steady decline in borrowing costs over the past two decades. In early 2000 a ten-year Treasury offered a yield of 6.5%. Today it pays 1.8%. The Federal Reserve’s effective policy rate has fallen from 6.5% to around 0.08% in that time. Benchmark rates in the euro area and Japan are sub-zero. Declines in government-bond yields and central banks’ policy rates have fed through to loan rates for private borrowers.

As a result, even though global debt has rocketed over the years, the world’s interest costs, as a share of gdp, are well below their peak in the 1980s. In America, for instance, they stood at 12% of gdp in 2021, compared with 27% in 1989.

All this could soon change. The era of super-cheap money is ending. Central banks are battling a surge in inflation. Those in some emerging economies have been raising interest rates for some time already: Brazil’s central bank raised rates by 1.5 percentage points after a meeting on February 2nd, its third consecutive such increase. At the time of writing, the Bank of England was expected to deliver its second interest-rate rise. The central bank with the most influence on global capital flows—the Fed—has signalled that it will probably put rates up as soon as March, and investors expect four further quarter-percentage-point increases this year. Real borrowing costs for governments, though still negative in many places, are inching up. In America the yield on the five-year Treasury inflation-protected security (tips), which hovered around -1.7% for much of 2021, now stands at -1.2%.

The scale of the global interest bill is vast. The Economist estimates that households, companies, financial firms and governments worldwide paid $10.2trn in interest in 2021, equivalent to 12% of gdp. As a guide to the potential impact of rate rises to come, we consider a scenario where the interest rates faced by firms, households and governments in 58 countries rise by a percentage point over the next three years. (By way of comparison, the five-year Treasury yield has risen by a percentage point since spring 2021.)

Our calculations suggest that the global interest bill would exceed $16trn by 2026, equivalent to 15% of projected gdp in that year. And if rates were to rise twice as quickly, say because inflation persists and forces central banks to take drastic action, the interest bill could rise to about $20trn by 2026, nearly a fifth of global gdp.

Working out the effect of rate rises on the interest bill is not straightforward. Some debt is tied to a fixed interest rate, such that higher borrowing costs are passed through only when it is rolled over. The median maturity of government debt, for instance, is five years. Companies tend to borrow for a two-year term; households typically borrow over a longer period. Incomes change over time, affecting borrowers’ ability to afford debt payments.

Borrowers could respond to higher interest costs by paying off debt, so lowering their debt-interest costs. But in aggregate, according to research by the Bank for International Settlements (bis), a club of central banks, higher rates raise total debt payments (ie, including interest and principal) relative to income. The higher the level of debt, the greater the squeeze, suggesting that the economy has only become more sensitive to rate rises.

Our calculations assume that interest-rate rises feed through over the course of five years to government and household debt, and over two years to company borrowing. We also assume that nominal incomes rise in line with the imf’s forecasts. As the fund’s projections assume that public debt rises at broadly similar rates, we let debt-to-gdp ratios stay flat. This implies annual budget deficits of around 5% of gdp—narrower than in the years immediately preceding the pandemic.

Picking up the tab

A higher interest burden would not fall on all borrowers equally. Private-sector borrowers in a country tend to foot a much bigger share of the bill than the government, which can borrow more cheaply, for instance. Financial firms and savers, such as wealthier households, receive as well as pay interest. The more exposed the borrower is to rate rises, in terms of higher debt levels, the bigger the interest bill they face, and the more likely it becomes that they cut back spending in order to meet their higher debt costs, or, in more extreme cases, that they fall into distress. That would in turn weigh on economic activity.

To see which borrowers may be more sensitive to interest-rate rises, we rank the household, corporate and government sectors for our countries along two dimensions (for this exercise we exclude the financial sector, which intermediates lending). The first measure is the debt-to-income ratio, which gauges the extent to which debt is affordable. The second is the change in the ratio over the past decade, which captures the extent to which exposure to interest rates has increased over time. We then produce an overall ranking for each sector in each country (see chart).

The global interest bill is about to jump: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Start with governments. Lebanon, which already defaulted on some of its debt at the start of the pandemic, tops the list, with a high debt-to-revenue ratio that has rocketed over the past decade. Despite being a big exporter of oil, Nigeria’s government revenues only just cover its interest costs. Fortunately, most borrowing by emerging-market governments during the pandemic has been in their own currencies, notes Emre Tiftik of the Institute of International Finance, a bankers’ group, which may make them less exposed to flighty foreign capital.

Our next set of borrowers comprises households. Those in South Korea, Norway and Switzerland have the most debt, relative to their income, in our group of countries. Mortgage debt in Sweden is also sizeable. House prices rose by 11% in 2021, and well over half of mortgage lending is done with variable interest rates. When rates rise, therefore, mortgage bills follow suit. Debt-to-income ratios have more than doubled in China and Russia.

Companies are the third set of borrowers. Those in France and Switzerland have the most debt as a share of gross operating profit, leaving them exposed to rate rises. Among emerging markets, Chinese and Russian firms are also weighed down by their bills. Overall, our findings for the private sector are broadly consistent with an early indicator of financial stress, the credit-to-gdp gap, calculated by the bis, which measures the degree to which borrowing exceeds its long-run trend. On this measure, the Swiss and South Korean private sectors rank among the five most stretched in the world.

Our rankings help illustrate who is most exposed to rising interest rates. But they cannot predict which sectors or economies will experience trouble as interest rates rise. That is a far more complex picture, which depends among other things on the prospects for economic growth and the reaction of policymakers. Strains in one part of the economy could interact with those in others, say by weakening the banking system.

The global interest bill is about to jump: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Although households in rich countries are highly indebted, the interest rates they face are low in historical terms. Debt levels in Argentina, by contrast, may not look particularly high, but eye-watering interest rates, of 35% for the private sector, mean that borrowers are experiencing an intense squeeze. Poor countries with gloomy growth prospects may struggle. Rapid rate rises in America could hamper their recoveries, says Gene Frieda of pimco, a bond-fund manager. Incomes may not rise fast enough to meet interest costs.

China faces a combination of threats: the property market has deflated as Evergrande, a large and heavily indebted developer, unravels. Banks have become saddled with bad household debts. But the country’s policymakers have also responded to these risks. The resulting drag on economic growth probably helps explain why the People’s Bank of China is lowering interest rates, not raising them.

Policymakers in the rest of the world may be starting to move in the opposite direction, but the potential of highly indebted borrowers to drag down the economic recovery will nonetheless be weighing on their minds.

Correction (February 2nd): The figure for the total interest bill has been corrected, from $10.5trn to $10.2trn, equivalent to 12% of GDP. We have also edited the text in places to clarify that our ranking shows the exposure of various borrowers to interest-rate rises, rather than vulnerability. Sorry.

  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
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The Midterms’ Message for the Fed: Hike

AI Summary. Despite widespread complaints about high prices, inflation-adjusted consumer spending has grown slightly faster than the pre-pandemic trend, net asset purchases have been stable relative to consumption, and asset-to-liability ratios have risen. The share of spending on groceries has fallen while the share on discretionary items such as recreational vehicles, jewelry, bars, and hotels has risen.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
November 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Despite voters’ bitter complaints about hardship imposed on consumers by “high prices,” Klein notes that real consumption has grown slightly faster than its pre-pandemic trend, net asset purchases are steady relative to spending, and spending shares for groceries and energy goods and services have fallen, while rising for goods and activities associated with recreation.

Does spending data show the hardship that complaints about prices imply?

Core argument: Inflation-adjusted U.S. consumer spending has been growing slightly faster than its pre-pandemic trend, the opposite of the hardship from higher prices implied by midterm exit polls.

If higher prices were causing as much hardship as the exit polls imply, we should see some combination of the following: lower inflation-adjusted consumer spending, either absolute or relative to trend; dissaving via lower asset purchases (or asset sales) and/or higher borrowing, to compensate for incomes not keeping up with prices; or a shift in spending away from discretionary items and towards necessities, especially those rising most in price. Inflation-adjusted consumer spending has been growing slightly faster than the pre-pandemic trend. For all households, net asset purchases have been essentially stable relative to consumption, while the ratio of assets to liabilities has been rising for essentially everyone and remains far higher than in 2019. Despite the rhetoric, the share of spending going towards groceries has fallen steadily relative to the pre-pandemic period, helping pull down the broader share on food and energy even with the recent price spike. Meanwhile, the share going towards “fun things” such as RVs, toys, jewelry, bars, hotels, and spa visits has gone up by about the same amount. These changes are not large, but they are noteworthy as the exact opposite of what the popular narrative about costs would predict.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inflation-adjusted U.S. consumer spending has been growing slightly faster than its pre-pandemic trend, the opposite of the hardship from higher prices implied by midterm exit polls.
  2. The share of U.S. consumer spending going toward groceries has fallen steadily relative to the pre-pandemic period, while the share going toward “fun things” such as RVs, toys, jewelry, bars, hotels, and spa visits has risen by about the same amount.
  3. Net asset purchases have been essentially stable relative to consumption for all U.S. households, and the ratio of assets to liabilities has risen for essentially everyone and remains far above 2019 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation — Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices

AI Summary. Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.

Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David Weinstein Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.

How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?

Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.

Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
  2. The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
  3. Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.

Related Articles:

  • The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026 — The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Choking Iran's Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

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A Return To Monetarism?

AI Summary. The author argues that a surge in money growth beginning in 2020 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the sample period since 1967, and that subsequent monetary tightening produced strong disinflationary pressures. Had policymakers tracked money growth using a price-target model, they might have tightened sooner and avoided some of the inflation.

Peter Ireland, Stephen Miran and Nouriel Roubini Hudson Bay Capital
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Ireland, Miran, and Roubini compare the actual price level to the predictions of an equilibrium model relating prices to money supply. Predicted inflation hit a 60-year high in 2020–21, months before inflation surged and then crashed once the Fed hiked.

Would tracking money growth have helped policymakers tighten sooner?

Core argument: The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.

The graphs in Figure 3 show quite clearly how the surge in money growth starting in 2020 and continuing in 2021 put enormous upward pressure on inflation, to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period. And while the large and negative price gaps that followed in 2022 and 2023 are likewise indicative of strong disinflationary pressures applied through subsequent monetary tightening, one can’t see these graphs without asking: Had Federal Open Market Committee members been monitoring measures of money growth with the help of the P-star [price target based on monetary aggregates] model, might they have ended QE and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly, thereby avoiding at least some of the post-2020 inflation? Of course, massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 surge in inflation, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level. The model simply observes that regardless of its originating source, excessive money growth signals that inappropriate macroeconomic policies are fueling higher inflation. Fiscal expansions that expand money supply will be reflected in a P-star model.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.
  2. The large negative price gaps of 2022 and 2023 indicate strong disinflationary pressures from subsequent monetary tightening, raising the question of whether FOMC members using the P-star model would have ended quantitative easing and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly.
  3. Massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 inflation surge, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level, and fiscal expansions that expand the money supply are reflected in a P-star model.

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