Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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QE May Be Over, But the Feds U.S. Debt Hoard Is About to Soar

Liz McCormick Bloomberg
Date Posted:
May 28, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Fed’s balance sheet is set to expand significantly, with Treasuries holdings expected to double from $2tn to $4.4tn by the end of the decade, according to Wells Fargo estimates @LizMcCM

The Federal Reserve's balance sheet is set to expand significantly, with its holdings of U.S. Treasuries expected to more than double from $2tn to $4.4tn by the end of the decade, according to Wells Fargo estimates. This growth is driven by the need to balance increasing liabilities, such as currency in circulation and bank reserves, which naturally rise with the economy. In 2024 alone, the Fed is projected to purchase about $300bn of Treasuries from the open market, covering roughly 30% of the over $1tn the U.S. is forecast to issue to address its growing deficit. Additionally, the Fed will replace nearly $300bn of maturing Treasuries by buying directly from the government. The Fed's strategy may include skewing purchases toward shorter maturities to influence yield curves and manage recession indicators. This ongoing expansion reflects a broader strategy to maintain an appropriate level of bank reserves and manage financial stability post-crisis.

".... Chair Jerome Powell has said the Fed was never likely to get the size of its balance sheet back down to pre-crisis levels.But what officials haven’t really detailed is how large it will grow and how much U.S. debt the central bank will gobble up. The Fed will have around $2 trillion in Treasuries by year-end. By mid-2020 though, most Wall Street dealers expect the bank to start accumulating Treasuries once again, à la QE. And by the end of the coming decade, it will have more than doubled its holdings of the debt to roughly $4.4 trillion, leaving the overall size of its balance sheet close to $5 trillion, a Wells Fargo estimate showed. (Its MBS holdings will shrink from over $1.4 trillion to under $400 billion in that span.) Next year alone, TD’s Misra expects the Fed will purchase about $300 billion of Treasuries from the open market, or roughly 30% of the over $1 trillion that the U.S. is forecast to issue to cover its ballooning deficit. That’s in addition to the nearly $300 billion of maturing Treasuries the Fed will replace by buying directly from the government. What the Fed buys matters. Officials have said they may skew purchases toward shorter maturities, but no final plan has been set. The Fed holds no T-bills after swapping them out earlier this decade to drive down longer-term yields. Bill purchases could help lower short-term funding costs and widen the gap between 3-month and 10-year rates -- a key bond-market recession indicator -- after that part of the yield curve sporadically inverted since March, says Margaret Steinbach, a fixed-income investment specialist at Capital Group. “As part of normalization, we will have to decide what the maturity structure should be in the longer term,” Powell said at a May 1 press conference. So why exactly is the Fed getting back into the business of buying bonds? Part of it simply has to do with accounting. While attention has been focused on the asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet, it also has liabilities, which mainly come in the form of currency in circulation and bank reserves. As with any balance sheet, the two sides need to net out. Since those liabilities tend to naturally increase over time with the economy, so too must the Fed’s assets. It was this balancing act that prompted some on Wall Street to say the QE unwind was creating reserve scarcity. That by shrinking its asset base, the Fed squeezed reserves as currency grew on the liability side of its ledger. Lorie Logan, a key New York Fed official, said in April it’s monitoring indicators for changes in reserve conditions. Once the Fed decides the banking system has an appropriate level of reserves, it will need to start buying Treasuries again. Morgan Stanley’s Matthew Hornbach, who estimates the Fed will buy about $278 billion of Treasuries from the open market next year, says a third of that will be needed to prevent currency growth from squeezing bank reserves. Post-crisis regulations to curb financial risk-taking, as well as the fact the Fed pays interest on excess reserves as a policy tool, have also prompted banks to hold far more cash than before. That all suggests the Fed likely will keep growing its asset base -- indefinitely -- by continually buying Treasuries..."
Liz McCormick and Alex Harris, "QE May Be Over, But the Fed’s U.S. Debt Hoard Is About to Soar,"Bloomberg, May 21, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-21/qe-may-be-over-but-the-fed-s-u-s-debt-hoard-is-set-to-double

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Previous articleMay 28, 2019Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. MarplesThe CBO projected 3.3% real GDP growth for 2018, but actual growth was 2.9%, suggesting a smaller-than-anticipated effect of the tax revision.Next articleMay 29, 2019The insatiable appetite for dour data about a decent economyA Federal Reserve survey shows 75% of U.S. adults feel they are “doing okay or living comfortably,” & 64% rate local economic conditions as “good” or “excellent.”.
Showing 45 database articles primarily about Other Comparison

The 2020 Census of American Religion

Robert Jones The Public Religion Research Institute
Date Posted:
July 12, 2021
Is Database:
Database

The proportion of Americans identifying as white and Christian has seen a significant decline over the past few decades, dropping from 65% in 1996 to 54% in 2006, and further to 43% by 2017.

The proportion of Americans identifying as white and Christian has seen a significant decline over the past few decades, dropping from 65% in 1996 to 54% in 2006, and further to 43% by 2017. This trend reflects broader demographic shifts and cultural changes within the U.S., with the white Christian population decreasing by nearly one-third. In 2020, the percentage slightly rebounded to 44%, indicating a potential slowing of this decline. Meanwhile, religiously unaffiliated Americans have grown to comprise nearly one in four (23%), highlighting a shift towards secularism. These changes have implications for economic and policy considerations, as religious affiliation can influence consumer behavior, political preferences, and social values. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for businesses and policymakers aiming to navigate the evolving cultural landscape.

Lay of the land of Americans religiosity in 2020, "....According to PRRI’s 2020 American Values Atlas, seven in ten Americans (70%) identify as Christian, including more than four in ten who identify as white Christian and more than one quarter who identify as Christian of color. Nearlyone in four Americans (23%) are religiously unaffiliated, and 5% identify with non-Christian religions. The most substantial cultural and political divides are between white Christians and Christians of color. More than four in ten Americans (44%) identify as white Christian, including white evangelical Protestants (14%), white mainline (non-evangelical) Protestants (16%), and white Catholics (12%), as well as small percentages who identify as Latter-day Saint (Mormon), Jehovah’s Witness, and Orthodox Christian.2 Christians of color include Hispanic Catholics (8%), Black Protestants (7%), Hispanic Protestants (4%), other Protestants of color (4%), and other Catholics of color (2%).3 The rest of religiously affiliated Americans belong to non-Christian groups, including 1% who are Jewish, 1% Muslim, 1% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 1% who identify with other religions. Religiously unaffiliated Americans comprise those who do not claim any particular religious affiliation (17%) and those who identify as atheist (3%) or agnostic (3%). Over the last few decades, the proportion of the U.S. population that is white Christian has declined by nearly one-third. As recently as 1996, almost two-thirds of Americans (65%) identified as white and Christian. By 2006, that had declined to 54%, and by 2017 it was down to 43%.4 The proportion of white Christians hit a low point in 2018, at 42%, and rebounded slightly in 2019 and 2020, to 44%. That tick upward indicates the decline is slowing from its pace of losing roughly 11% per decade...."

The 2020 Census of American Religion: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Robert Jones Natalie Jackson, Diana Orcés and Ian Huff, "The 2020 Census of American Religion," The Public Religion Research Institute, July 2021, https://www.prri.org/research/2020-census-of-american-religion/

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Money really can buy happiness and recessions can take it away

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 31, 2020
Is Database:
Database

A 10% rise in GDP/person is associated with a 0.5-point increase in life satisfaction on a 10-point scale, according to @TheEconomist. Recessions can drop life satisfaction scores by 1 point, highlighting the importance of economic growth & stability.

Economic data reveals a strong correlation between GDP per person and life satisfaction, indicating that higher income levels often lead to increased happiness. Studies show that a 10% rise in GDP per person is associated with a 0.5-point increase in life satisfaction on a 10-point scale. Conversely, during economic downturns, such as the 2008 financial crisis, life satisfaction scores dropped by an average of 1 point in affected countries. This suggests that recessions not only impact financial stability but also significantly affect overall well-being. Policymakers should consider these findings when designing economic policies, as boosting GDP could enhance societal happiness, while mitigating recession impacts could preserve it. The data underscores the importance of economic growth and stability in improving quality of life across populations.

Economist Staff, "Money really can buy happiness and recessions can take it away,"The Economist, July 11, 2020, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/07/11/money-really-can-buy-happiness-and-recessions-can-take-it-away

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  • Workforce
    • Inequality
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Tax Myths Of Warrenomics

Laurence Kotlikoff Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 25, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@LaurenceKotlikoff, The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity assessments, focusing on gross rather than net taxes & overlooking transfer payments like Social Security that benefit the poor.

@LaurenceKotlikoff, The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity...
The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity assessments. A major error is focusing on gross rather than net taxes, overlooking transfer payments like Social Security that benefit the poor. Saez and Zucman's approach, which measures progressivity on a one-year basis, fails to account for double taxation on future income from savings, understating taxes for the wealthy who save more. Age adjustments are also neglected, skewing perceptions of tax fairness as older individuals appear to pay less due to past tax contributions. For 40-year-olds, the top 1% face a 34.5% net tax rate on remaining lifetime resources, while the bottom quintile receives a 46.6% net subsidy. Current-year net rates further misrepresent progressivity, ranging from -9.8% for the bottom 20% to 38.2% for the top 1%. These insights challenge prevailing narratives and underscore the complexity of accurately assessing tax burdens across different demographics.

The biggest mistake is to focus on gross, not net, taxes. They ignore transfer payments, like Social Security, which are disproportionately paid to the poor. In doing so, they mistake language for economics.

Messrs. Saez and Zucman’s second mistake is measuring progressivity on a one-year rather than a remaining-lifetime basis. That ignores the fiscal system’s double taxation: Income earned, taxed and saved this year will be subject to future taxation on interest, dividends and capital gains. This omission disproportionately understates taxes for the rich, who save at a higher rate. The current-year focus also understates benefits paid to the poor, since future benefits are a bigger share of their resources.

Their third mistake is failing to adjust for age. The old have paid most of their lifetime taxes, which makes them now look like tax cheats, particularly those who saved out of previously highly taxed labor income. With changing demographics, this problem will deeply confuse tax progressivity comparisons over time.

I’ll focus on 40-year-olds, but the results are similar for all age groups. Each dollar of pretax remaining lifetime resources of those in the top 1% of the resource distribution is, on average, taxed on net at a 34.5% rate. For those in the top quintile, the average net tax rate is 28.4%. For those in the bottom quintile, every dollar of pre-tax resources is matched by a 46.6% netsubsidy. (The tax rises steadily to 4.2% for the second quintile, 12.6% for the third and 18.5% for the fourth.)

The average net rates for the current year only (not including future net taxes) for this cohort understate true progressivity. They range from negative 9.8% for the bottom 20% to positive 38.2% for the top 1%.

40 to 50 year olds:

Richest 1%

Poorest 25%

40 to 49 years

Net tax rate

Share of consumption

Share of income

Share of wealth

Richest 1%

34.5%

14.5%

17.9%

34.3%

Highest 20%

28.5%

Lowest 20%

(46.6)

7.3

4.0

0.6

Laurence Kotlikoff, “Tax Myths Of Warrenomics,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-myths-of-warrenomics-11571351806

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  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade

B. Ravikumar and Brian Reinbold Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
June 25, 2020
Is Database:
Database

US Bilateral Trade Balance Adjusted For Valued Added Versus Gross Trade Shrinks Deficit 40% With Canada And Mexico, 20% WIth China, Grows Deficit 40% With Japan, Twice As Large WIth ROK.

The U.S. bilateral trade balance shows significant variation when comparing value-added trade to gross trade. With Canada and Mexico, the U.S. trade deficit is 40% smaller on average when considering value-added trade, reflecting the reliance on U.S. content in exports. In 2015, the deficit with Mexico was halved under this measure. Conversely, the deficit with China is 20% smaller, while it grows 40% with Japan and doubles with South Korea, highlighting the role of high value-added foreign content in Chinese exports. These shifts underscore the importance of accounting for global supply chain complexities in trade statistics.

New FRBSL note:“…U.S. bilateral trade balance can vary significantly depending on whether one looks at value-added trade or gross trade. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico shrinks considerably and is on average 40 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance. Futhermore, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was cut in half in 2015. These changes likely reflect the fact that many exports to the U.S. rely on content from other countries including the U.S., as we saw in the vehicle example. Also, the U.S. trade deficit with China is on average 20 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance, but it is 40 percent larger with Japan and twice as large with South Korea. Again, these changes likely reflect the fact that many Chinese exports to the U.S. rely on higher value-added foreign content(e.g., from Japan and South Korea)….”B. Ravikumar and Brian Reinbold, "Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade," Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, June 2020, https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020/02/14/value-added-trade-vs-gross-tradeValue-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade

2"Measuring Trade in Value Added," inInterconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains. OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013.

1de Gortari, Alonso. "Disentangling Global Value Chains." Working Paper, November 2019.

Notes

Conventional trade statistics may have been sufficient when goods were produced entirely within a nation's borders and then exported to other countries; but with increasingly complicated supply chains and an increasingly interconnected global economy, value-added trade can provide a more accurate picture of global trade.

Also, the U.S. trade deficit with China is on average 20 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance, but it is 40 percent larger with Japan and twice as large with South Korea. Again, these changes likely reflect the fact that many Chinese exports to the U.S. rely on higher value-added foreign content (e.g., from Japan and South Korea).

For example, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico shrinks considerably and is on average 40 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance. Futhermore, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was cut in half in 2015. These changes likely reflect the fact that many exports to the U.S. rely on content from other countries including the U.S., as we saw in the vehicle example.

Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade: Extended Excerpt Image 1


We see from the figure that the U.S. bilateral trade balance can vary significantly depending on whether one looks at value-added trade or gross trade.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development provides value-added trade statistics from 2005-15.2The figure shows the U.S. trade balance from 2005-15 with several major trading partners in terms of real gross trade and real value-added trade.

Additionally, as we saw in the vehicle example above, such measures neglect the role of other countries in the supply chain. One way to combat this issue is to look at the value added, such as labor compensation and profits, by each country at each step of the production process. This provides a better way of incorporating the intricacies of today's global supply chain into trade accounting.

Traditional trade measures record gross, or total, flows of goods and services every time they cross a border. This includes the cost of inputs plus the value added by each country. Such traditional trade measures lead to double counting because countries trade intermediate goods for further processing.

For example, when Mexico assembles a vehicle, only one-third of the vehicle's value is derived from Mexican parts and labor. The rest is due to foreign components; about 74 percent of these foreign parts is imported from the U.S.1However, when Mexico ships this vehicle to the U.S., the entire factory cost of the vehicle, which includes the cost ofall of the partsand assembly, will be added to the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico despite the fact that much of the vehicle's value comes from U.S. parts. In other words, the U.S. would run a much larger trade deficit in terms of gross trade with Mexico than in terms of value-­added trade.

The rise of globalization has led to increasingly complicated supply chains. Raw materials and intermediate goods now move strategically throughout the world before a final good reaches the consumer. Traditional measures of trade often do a poor job of capturing this complexity.

  • Other Comparison
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  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

The Distribution of Household Income, 2016

CBO Staff Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
June 12, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The share of pretax income for households in the 80th to 99th % increased modestly from 29% to 31% btw 1979 and 2016, @USCBOOffice reports.

Between 1979 and 2016, the share of pretax income for households in the 80th to 99th % increased modestly, reflecting a shift in income distribution. This group saw their share rise from 29% to 31%, indicating a gradual concentration of income among higher earners. In contrast, the bottom 20% experienced a decline in their share from 7% to 5%, highlighting growing income inequality. The top 1% saw a more significant increase, with their share rising from 9% to 16%, underscoring the disproportionate gains at the very top. These changes suggest that while the middle-upper income brackets have seen some growth, the most substantial gains have been concentrated among the wealthiest, raising concerns about economic disparity and its implications for economic policy and social equity.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). July 9, 2019. “The Distribution of Household Income, 2016.”https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55413

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Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry

Drew Desilver Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
June 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Immigrants made up 17.1% of the US workforce in 2014, but didn’t form a majority in any industry. They were most prevalent in private households (45%), followed by textile manufacturing (36%) and agriculture (33%).

In 2014, immigrants constituted 17.1% of the U.S. workforce, totaling approximately 27.6m workers out of 161.4m, with 12.1% being lawful immigrants and 5% unauthorized. Despite their significant presence, immigrants did not form a majority in any U.S. industry. The most immigrant-intensive industry was private households, where 45% of workers were immigrants, followed by textile, apparel, and leather manufacturing (36%) and agriculture (33%). In terms of occupations, nearly half (46%) of those in farming, fishing, and forestry were immigrants. While lawful immigrants were predominantly employed in retail (10%), educational services (8%), and non-hospital health care services (7%), unauthorized immigrants were mainly in construction (16%), eating and drinking places (14%), and administrative support services (9%). The immigrant share of the workforce has grown from 12% in 1995 to 17.1% in 2014, indicating their increasing role in the U.S. labor market.

Drew Desilver, "Immigrants don’t make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry,"Pew Research Center, March 16, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/16/immigrants-dont-make-up-a-majority-of-workers-in-any-u-s-industry/

Immigrants don’t make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry

Immigrants are more likely than U.S.-born workers to be employed in a number of specific jobs, including sewing machine operators, plasterers, stucco masons and manicurists. But there are no major U.S. industries in which immigrants outnumber the U.S. born, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of government data.

Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry: Extended Excerpt Image 1


All told, immigrants made up 17.1% of the total U.S. workforce in 2014, or about 27.6 million workers out of 161.4 million. About 19.6 million workers, or 12.1% of the total workforce, were in the U.S. legally; about 8 million, or 5%, entered the country without legal permission or overstayed their visas. (Roughly 10% of unauthorized immigrants have been granted temporary protection from deportation and eligibility to work under two federal programs, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and Temporary Protected Status.)

There are two main ways to look at the kinds of work people do: by industry (that is, the business their employer is engaged in) and by occupation (the kind of work they do on the job). To get a sense of the work immigrants to the U.S. do most frequently, we relied on 2014 workforce estimates by Pew Research Center. The estimates, based on augmented data from the Census Bureau’s 2014 American Community Survey, cover all workers ages 16 and older who reported being in a civilian industry or occupation, including both lawful and unauthorized immigrants.

Private households were the most immigrant-intensive “industry” in 2014. Of the 947,000 people working for private households, 45% were immigrants, with lawful immigrants slightly outnumbering unauthorized immigrants. The industries with the next-biggest shares of immigrant workers were textile, apparel and leather manufacturers (36%) and the farm sector: A third (33%) of the nearly 2 million agriculture workers in 2014 were born outside the U.S.

While these industries had the biggest share of immigrant workers, they weren’t the biggest overall employers of immigrants, since industries with a smaller share of immigrants may have more of them in absolute numbers.

The overall U.S. workforce - U.S.-born and immigrant (both lawful and unauthorized) - is concentrated in a relatively small number of industries. But while the 10 biggest-employing industries are the same for U.S.-born and lawful immigrant workers (and in almost the same order), the employment pattern among unauthorized immigrants is markedly different.

Retail, for instance, was the single biggest employer of lawful immigrants (10% of all lawful immigrant workers), followed by educational services (8%) and non-hospital health care services (7%). By contrast, the top industry for unauthorized immigrant workers was construction, which included 16% of all unauthorized immigrant workers. Construction was followed by eating and drinking places, which had 14% of unauthorized immigrant workers, and administrative and support services (9%). Those three industries each included between 5% and 7% of lawful immigrants.

Any given industry employs workers in many different occupations, and people may do much the same job in any number of different industries. The occupational group with the highest share of immigrants in 2014 was farming, fishing and forestry: Nearly half (46%) of the 1.2 million people in those occupations were foreign born. More than a third (35%) of the 6.7 million people in building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations were immigrants, as were 27% of the 8.3 million people in construction and extraction occupations.

And as with industries, the distribution of occupations differs significantly between lawful and unauthorized immigrants. More than half of all unauthorized immigrant workers in 2014 were in just four occupational groups: construction and extraction; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; food preparation and serving; and production. In contrast, those four groups accounted for only about a quarter of lawful immigrants’ jobs. The biggest occupational sectors for lawful immigrant workers were office and administrative support, sales, and management (each with 9% to 10% of the total).

Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Looking at specific occupations, an estimated 63% of “miscellaneous personal appearance workers” (a category that includes manicurists and pedicurists, makeup artists, shampooers and skin care specialists) are immigrants, the highest share of any occupation. Immigrants account for about 60% of graders and sorters of agricultural products as well as plasterers and stucco masons, 55% of sewing machine operators, and about half of maids and housekeepers, tailors and dressmakers, and miscellaneous agricultural workers.

The immigrant share of the U.S. workforce has grown over time. Back in 1995, according to Pew Research Center estimates, immigrants (lawful and unauthorized) made up about 12% of the total civilian workforce. The lawful-immigrant share has risen gradually, from an estimated 9% in 1995 to 12% in 2014; the unauthorized-immigrant share rose from about 3% in 1995 to 5% in 2005, but has been roughly stable ever since. Immigrants, and their U.S.-born children, are projected to drive growth in the nation’s working-age population for at least the next two decades.

Views on immigration’s impact on U.S.-born workers have shifted significantly over the past decade, according to a Pew Research Center survey released last year. Americans then were almost evenly divided, with 42% saying the growing number of immigrants working in the U.S. helps American workers and 45% saying it hurts workers who were born in the U.S. In 2006, 55% said having more immigrants hurt U.S. workers, with just 28% saying it helped them.

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    • Immigration
    • Unemployment/Participation
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