Edward Conard

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The Federal Reserve Says Millennials Are Broke. Pew Says Millennials Are Loaded. Which Is It?

AI Summary. Federal Reserve data show the median net worth of households headed by people born in the 1980s is 34% lower than earlier generations at the same age, while Pew finds millennial households have higher median incomes than young households at any point in the past 50 years. The wealth gap is attributed to high debt levels and economic conditions.

Henry Grabar Slate
Date Posted:
May 20, 2019
Is Database:
Database

The Federal Reserve says millennials are broke, but Pew says they’re loaded. The truth likely lies somewhere in btw, with millennials facing financial challenges despite higher incomes. @HenryGrabar

Do millennials have higher incomes but lower net worth than earlier generations?

Core argument: The Federal Reserve finds median net worth of households headed by people born in the 1980s is 34% lower than earlier generations at the same age, with average net worth for young adult households in 2016 running 20% below boomers in 1989 and 40% below Gen X in 2001.

The Federal Reserve and Pew Research present contrasting views on millennial wealth, highlighting a complex economic landscape. According to the Federal Reserve, millennials face financial challenges, with the median net worth of households headed by those born in the 1980s being 34% lower than previous generations at the same age. Additionally, average net worth for young adult households in 2016 was 20% lower than boomers in 1989 and 40% lower than Gen X in 2001. Conversely, Pew's analysis indicates that millennial households earn more than young households at any time in the last 50 years, with a median adjusted income of $69,000 in 2017. However, this income is not as competitive when compared to national averages, and many millennials still live with parents, skewing household data. These findings suggest that while millennials may have higher incomes, their wealth accumulation is hindered by high debt levels and economic conditions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Federal Reserve finds median net worth of households headed by people born in the 1980s is 34% lower than earlier generations at the same age, with average net worth for young adult households in 2016 running 20% below boomers in 1989 and 40% below Gen X in 2001.
  2. Pew Research finds millennial households earn more than young households at any point in the last 50 years, with median adjusted income of $69,000 in 2017.
  3. Millennial household income figures are skewed by the many millennials still living with parents, and their wealth accumulation is held back by high debt levels and economic conditions.

Okay, I've yet to find a good piece of academic/governemnt research adjudicating btw the Pew and Federal Reserve analysis, this Grabar's piece was useful when the reports came out.

a) Okay will run down Strain's data. b) CBO generally uses PCE, though they may use CPI in some circumstances

"... First, “household income” is a pretty limited proxy for wealth, especially when you consider that millennials are better educated and (not unrelatedly) have a high ratio of debt to income. According to a May study from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the median net worth of households whose heads were born in the 1980s (older millennials) is 34 percent lower than that for people their age in the past. A recent Federal Reserve Board study corroborates this, reporting that average net worth for young adult households in 2016 is 20 percent lower than that of boomers in 1989 and 40 percent lower than that of Gen X in 2001. (The saving grace for millennials: the idea that student debt will get paid off by the increased future earnings associated with a college education.)Second, while millennials’ household income is higher, it’s not great compared with what everyone else is making. In 1978, according to the Fed study from this month, young boomer households were making on average $77,500 in 2016 dollars—compared with the $88,000 national average. In 1998, the average Gen X household made $73,500 versus the national average of $103,800. In 2014, the average millennial household made $78,200—more than Gen X, but less as a percentage of the national household average of $112,000. Relatively speaking, then, millennials are underperforming. Third, household roles are changing. Millennial women work more than their Gen X counterparts did 17 years ago, and they make more money. The median income for young women is up by nearly a third since 1975, to $29,429. The median income for young men has fallen. If you isolate for female-headed households, the trajectory looks great. If you forget the household concept and just look at all young people’s individual income, the numbers were worse in 2015 than they were in 1975.(Things have improved a bit since then, granted.)Fourth, lots of millennials still live with mom and dad—somewhere between one in five and one in four young Americans live with their parents. That’s a big change from previous generations, and it means the pool of “households” is a little skewed. According to census data, nearly 75 percent of the 8.4 million millennials living at home in 2015 made less than $30,000 a year. That share drops to 63 percent among those living with roommates, and 45 percent among those living independently. In other words, there’s a whole segment of millennial households that aren’t getting counted in Pew’s sunny data, mostly because they’re too poor to move into their own place. Mom is buying the avocados...."
Henry Grabar, "The Federal Reserve Says Millennials Are Broke. Pew Says Millennials Are Loaded. Which Is It?"Slate, December 12, 2018, https://slate.com/business/2018/12/millennial-households-are-making-more-money-than-their-parents-or-grandparents-did-but-dont-get-optimistic.html

The Federal Reserve Says Millennials Are Broke. Pew Says Millennials Are Loaded. Which Is It?

On Tuesday, a Pew Research Center analysis of census data revealed a counterintuitive piece of good news about millennials: Relatively speaking, we’re in the money.

According to Pew, households headed by Americans ages 22 to 37 earn more, adjusted for inflation, than young households at any time in the last 50 years.

Avocado toasts all around!

The median adjusted income for millennial households last year was $69,000, according to Pew, putting 2017 narrowly ahead of 2000 as the best recorded year of household income for young people.

But wait: Didn’t the Federal Reserve Board just report last week that, as my colleague Jordan Weissmann put it, “millennials are, in fact, the brokest generation”? (Yes, they did.) So what’s going on here?

First, “household income” is a pretty limited proxy for wealth, especially when you consider that millennials are better educated and (not unrelatedly) have a high ratio of debt to income. According to a May study from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the median net worth of households whose heads were born in the 1980s (older millennials) is 34 percent lower than that for people their age in the past. A recent Federal Reserve Board study corroborates this, reporting that average net worth for young adult households in 2016 is 20 percent lower than that of boomers in 1989 and 40 percent lower than that of Gen X in 2001. (The saving grace for millennials: the idea that student debt will get paid off by the increased future earnings associated with a college education.)

Second, while millennials’ household income is higher, it’s not great compared with what everyone else is making. In 1978, according to the Fed study from this month, young boomer households were making on average $77,500 in 2016 dollars—compared with the $88,000 national average. In 1998, the average Gen X household made $73,500 versus the national average of $103,800. In 2014, the average millennial household made $78,200—more than Gen X, but less as a percentage of the national household average of $112,000. Relatively speaking, then, millennials are underperforming.

Third, household roles are changing. Millennial women work more than their Gen X counterparts did 17 years ago, and they make more money. The median income for young women is up by nearly a third since 1975, to $29,429. The median income for young men has fallen. If you isolate for female-headed households, the trajectory looks great. If you forget the household concept and just look at all young people’s individual income, the numbers were worse in 2015 than they were in 1975. (Things have improved a bit since then, granted.)

Fourth, lots of millennials still live with mom and dad—somewhere between one in five and one in four young Americans live with their parents. That’s a big change from previous generations, and it means the pool of “households” is a little skewed. According to census data, nearly 75 percent of the 8.4 million millennials living at home in 2015 made less than $30,000 a year. That share drops to 63 percent among those living with roommates, and 45 percent among those living independently. In other words, there’s a whole segment of millennial households that aren’t getting counted in Pew’s sunny data, mostly because they’re too poor to move into their own place. Mom is buying the avocados.

See the attached email/link. If hourly nonsupervisory wages grew 5% from 1973 until today but 20% from 1990 until today, then wages must have fallen 12.5% (=1-) from 1973 until 1990. Is that true? I’d like to see the data he is referring too (not just a link where I have to do the work myself). Does the same data base contain benefits? If so, I’d like to see that too. How does the CBO bridge from their (pretax and transfer) data to this data? Does the CBO use CPI or PCE?

If hh incomes have grown 50ish% since their starting point as the CBO claims, it’s hard to believe that millennia aren’t earning the same or more at the same point in their life than prior generations given how large each demographic is relative to the whole. If one group’s earning are down (relative the other groups at the same point in their lifetime), the others would have to be way ahead. Does CBO decompose their data by generations?

Did you ever ask pew (and ernie), and the st louis fed why their numbers were so different? If not, you should.

We have recent stuff on this from Pew, the Federal Reserve and Ernie.

Pew's looked at household incomes in December of last year and found each new generation seems to be doing better than prior ones at most ages, at least in real household money income. "....The median adjusted income in a household headed by a Millennial was $69,000 in 2017. That is a higher figure than for nearly every other year on record, apart from around 2000, when households headed by people ages 22 to 37 earned about the same amount - $67,600 in inflation-adjusted dollars. (A recent study by the Federal Reserve, which also looked at Millennials’ income, used a different methodology and data source.)..."

Richard Fry, "Young adult households are earning more than most older Americans did at the same age," Pew Research Center, December 11, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/11/young-adult-households-are-earning-more-than-most-older-americans-did-at-the-same-age/

Ernie adjusted the Pew household money income for education levels which is also worth noting. Quick write ups follow in descending order.

(note this male head of household number doesn't adjust for single/married or educational attainment)

Ernie Tedeschi adjust the Pew numbers for education attainment which is also worth noting:

However they don't have "apple core" comparison that looks at generational incomes net say the cost of housing, education and child care.

They also found that despite the same preferences"... We showed that millennials do have lower real incomes than members of earlier generations when they were at similar ages, and millennials also appear to have accumulated fewer assets. The comparisons for debt are somewhat mixed, but it seems fair to conclude that millennials have levels of real debt that are about the same as those of members of Generation X when they were young and more than those of the baby boomers....."

The same Fed study found that consumption habits (in terms of car ownership, preference for owning over renting) have not changed generational, "... we find little evidence that millennial households have significantly different tastes and preferences than households of previous generations..."

For context the Fed used laborearningsand found lower real income then their comps (say baby boomers @ the same point during the life cycle) "... In the economic sphere, millennials appear to have paid a price for coming of age during the Great Recession: Millennials tend to have lower income than members of earlier generations at comparable ages, although the income of young households has not changed much; the difference likely reflects, in part, the rising labor force participation of women....."...Specifically, the real average full-time labor earnings of a millennial male household head in 2014 were about the same as those for a comparable male Generation X household head in 1998 and over 10 percent lower than those for a comparable male baby boomer household head in 1978...."

  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleMay 18, 2019The Myth of Wage Stagnation@WSJ @PhilGramm @JohnEarly Inflation mismeasurement hides true compensation gains. Real compensation has grown by at least 69.5% since 1972, not accounting for employer-provided benefits and quality improvements.Next articleMay 21, 2019Richard Carranza held white-supremacy culture training for school adminsNY Post @SusanEdelman reports Richard Carranza’s training for school administrators focused on dismantling “white-supremacy culture” by challenging individualism & objectivity, sparking controversy over racial favoritism in staffing decisions.
Showing 158 database articles primarily about Inequality

Heritability and Social Interaction in Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Population of Twins in the United States

AI Summary. The authors estimate the heritability of labor market outcomes by comparing the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins with the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings. They caution that social interaction between twins, assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or indirect parental effects can bias such estimates upward or make them reflect non-genetic influences.

David Card, Jesse Rothstein and Moises Yi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Analysis of 44,500 twin pairs suggests ~one-third of the variation in log earnings is due to genetic differences – likely an upper bound, because same-sex twins may influence one another and share more similar environments than ordinary same-sex siblings.

How reliable are twin-based estimates of heritability in earnings?

Core argument: The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.

Our model identifies heritability from the difference-in-differences of same-sex vs. opposite-sex twins vs. siblings. [Specifically], the model attributes to genetic differences the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins over and above the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical. The ordinary-sibling comparison is intended to remove family influences that differ between sons and daughters. Social interactions may lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings. The estimated heritability of outcomes may be biased in the presence of assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or violations of the assumption that the home environment is shared to the same degree for MZ as for DZ twins. Even when estimated without bias, heritability need not indicate direct genetic effects – it also may reflect indirect or cultural effects (e.g., effects of the parents’ genes on a child’s outcomes, not operating through the child’s own genes. Twins may [also] influence each other directly – for example in their choice of jobs -- inflating the correlation in their outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.
  2. Social interactions between twins, such as influencing each other’s job choices, may inflate the correlation in their outcomes and lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings.
  3. Estimated heritability may be biased by assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or unequal sharing of the home environment between identical and fraternal twins, and even unbiased estimates may reflect indirect or cultural effects such as parents’ genes.

Related Articles:

  • IQ Differences of Identical Twins Reared Apart Are Significantly Influenced by Educational Differences — An analysis of 87 identical-twin pairs raised apart with individual IQ and biographical data finds that pairs with similar schooling had an average IQ gap of 5.8 points and a correlation of 0.87, while educationally dissimilar pairs averaged a 12.8-point gap and a 0.75 correlation.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • A Chip Off the Old Block? Genetics and the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status — Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

AI Summary. In New York City, income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than nationally, with nearly two-thirds of real income growth accruing to the top 1% versus under 40% nationally, a divergence driven predominantly by non-wage income. Real median income fell, and real average income for the bottom 90% was essentially flat.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is rising income concentration in a major city driven by non-wage income?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.
  2. Real median income in New York City fell between 2019 and 2024 and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat, with local-price-adjusted purchasing power for the lower 90% of New Yorkers close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally.
  3. The divergence at the top of New York City's distribution is predominantly a story of non-wage income, with wage and salary income widening much more mildly and occupational wage data excluding bonuses showing base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than higher-wage ones.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of World War II, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Employees' share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace in recent years.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are corporate profits taking a record share of national income from workers?

Core argument: US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
  2. Employees' share of national income from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace over the past five years and especially the past 12 months.
  3. Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan, said that regardless of the measure used, workers have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. An analysis of about 7,000 billionaires over the past 25 years classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it derives from inheritance or from sectors such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials that often depend on political access. The authors find half of global billionaire wealth now comes from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, an all-time high.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Is a growing share of billionaire wealth self-made in competitive industries?

Core argument: For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.
  2. A list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years, assembled from Forbes, Hurun and Gapminder data, classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence and raw materials, which often depend on political access.
  3. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth, which counts inheritors, rose slightly from 2001 to 2014, and the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined since 2021.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. The authors estimate that about $200bn of “missing” labor compensation would account for roughly a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, which workers owning a bit above 10% of corporate profits through stock compensation would cover. Spread across the 4.2m top-decile public company employees, that implies about $40,000 in additional pay each.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database
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Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does stock compensation explain part of the falling labor share?

Core argument: The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors report 2017 employee compensation of $7.2 trillion against corporate value added of $12.2 trillion after adjusting for the rise of pass-throughs, with unadjusted corporate profits, which exclude partnership profits, at $1.7 trillion.
  2. The authors estimate that roughly $200 billion of "missing" labor compensation would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s, a sum covered if workers owned somewhat above 10% of corporate profits via stock compensation.
  3. Spread across the 4.2 million employees in the top 10% of public company workforces, that amount would imply about $40,000 in additional pay each, which the authors consider plausible as pay shifted into corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

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  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
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Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Do initial wealth disadvantages among immigrant groups persist across generations?

Core argument: Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
  2. Roughly 30 million Europeans arrived during the Age of Mass Migration, spanning about 1850 to 1924, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet all are included in average white wealth.
  3. The United States Immigration Commission Reports, known as the Dillingham Commission Reports, indicate that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth, so a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage.

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