Edward Conard

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The Race of the AI Labs Heats Up

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
January 31, 2023
Is Database:
Database

The @economist notes that “almost all” recent AI breakthroughs have come from large firms, in large part due to their access to the computing power required to develop state-of-the-art AI models.

Almost all recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence globally have come from large companies, in large part because they have the computing power. Amazon, whose AI powers its Alexa voice assistant, and Meta, which made waves recently when one of its models beat human players at “Diplomacy,” a strategy board game, respectively produce two-thirds and four-fifths as much AI research as Stanford University, a bastion of computer-science eggheads. Alphabet and Microsoft churn out considerably more, and that is not including DeepMind, Google Research’s sister lab which the parent company acquired in 2014, and the Microsoft-affiliated OpenAI.

The @economist notes that “almost all” recent AI breakthroughs have come from large firms, in large part due to their access to the computing power required to develop state-of-the-art AI models, “…Almost all recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence globally have come from large companies, in large part because they have the computing power. Amazon, whose AI powers its Alexa voice assistant, and Meta, which made waves recently when one of its models beat human players at “Diplomacy,” a strategy board game, respectively produce two-thirds and four-fifths as much AI research as Stanford University, a bastion of computer-science eggheads. Alphabet and Microsoft churn out considerably more, and that is not including DeepMind, Google Research’s sister lab which the parent company acquired in 2014, and the Microsoft-affiliated OpenAI….”

Economist Staff, “The race of the AI labs heats up,” The Economist, January 30, 2023, https://www.economist.com/business/2023/01/30/the-race-of-the-ai-labs-heats-up

The race of the AI labs heats up

Every so often a new technology captures the world’s imagination. The latest example, judging by the chatter in Silicon Valley, as well as on Wall Street and in corporate corner offices, newsrooms and classrooms around the world, is Chatgpt. In just five days after its unveiling in November the artificially intelligent chatbot, created by a startup called Openai, drew 1m users, making it one of the fastest consumer-product launches in history. Microsoft, which has just invested $10bn in Openai, wants Chatgpt-like powers, which include generating text, images, music and video that seem like they could have been created by humans, to infuse much of the software it sells. On January 26th Google published a paper describing a similar model that can create new music from a text description of a song. When Alphabet, its parent company, presents quarterly earnings on February 2nd, investors will be listening out for its answer to Chatgpt. On January 29th Bloomberg reported that Baidu, a Chinese search giant, wants to incorporate a chatbot into its search engine in March.

It is too early to say how much of the early hype is justified. Regardless of the extent to which the generative ai models that underpin Chatgpt and its rivals actually transform business, culture and society, however, it is already transforming how the tech industry thinks about innovation and its engines—the corporate research labs which, like Openai and Google Research, are combining big tech’s processing power with the brain power of some of computer science’s brightest sparks. These rival labs—be they part of big tech firms, affiliated with them or run by independent startups—are engaged in an epic race for ai supremacy (see chart 1). The result of that race will determine how quickly the age of ai will dawn for computer users everywhere—and who will dominate it.

Corporate research-and-development (r&d) organisations have long been a source of scientific advances, especially in America. A century and a half ago Thomas Edison used the proceeds from his inventions, including the telegraph and the lightbulb, to bankroll his workshop in Menlo Park, New Jersey. After the second world war, America Inc invested heavily in basic science in the hope that this would yield practical products. DuPont (a maker of chemicals), ibm and Xerox (which both manufactured hardware) all housed big research laboratories. at&t’s Bell Labs produced, among other inventions, the transistor, laser and the photovoltaic cell, earning its researchers nine Nobel prizes.

In the late 20th century, though, corporate r&d became steadily less about the r than the d. In 2017 Ashish Arora, an economist, and colleagues examined the period from 1980 to 2006 and found that firms had moved away from basic science towards developing existing ideas. The reason, Mr Arora and his co-authors argued, was the rising cost of research and the increasing difficulty of capturing its fruits. Xerox developed the icons and windows now familiar to pc-users but it was Apple and Microsoft that made most of the money from it. Science remained important to innovation, but it became the dominion of not-for-profit universities.

That rings a Bell

The rise of ai is shaking things up once again. Big corporations are not the only game in town. Startups such as Anthropic and Character ai have built their own Chatgpt challengers. Stability ai, a startup that has assembled an open-source consortium of other small firms, universities and non-profits to pool computing resources, has created a popular model that converts text to images. In China, government-backed outfits such as the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (baai) are pre-eminent.


But almost all recent breakthroughs in the field globally have come from large companies, in large part because they have the computing power (see chart 2). Amazon, whose ai powers its Alexa voice assistant, and Meta, which made waves recently when one of its models beat human players at “Diplomacy”, a strategy board game, respectively produce two-thirds and four-fifths as much ai research as Stanford University, a bastion of computer-science eggheads. Alphabet and Microsoft churn out considerably more, and that is not including DeepMind, Google Research’s sister lab which the parent company acquired in 2014, and the Microsoft-affiliated Openai (see chart 3).

Expert opinion varies on who is actually ahead on the merits. The Chinese labs, for example, appear to have a big lead in the subdiscipline of computer vision, which involves analysing images, where they are responsible for the largest share of the most highly cited papers. According to a ranking devised by Microsoft, the top five computer-vision teams in the world are all Chinese. The baai has also built what it says is the world’s biggest natural-language model, Wu Dao 2.0. Meta’s “Diplomacy” player, Cicero, gets kudos for its use of strategic reasoning and deception against human opponents. DeepMind’s models have beat human champions at Go, a notoriously difficult board game, and can predict the shape of proteins, a long-standing challenge in the life sciences.


All these are jaw-dropping feats. Still, when it comes to the “generative” ai that is all the rage thanks to Chatgpt, the biggest battle is between Microsoft and Alphabet. To get a sense of whose tech is superior, The Economist has put both firms’ ais through their paces. With the help of an engineer at Google, we asked Chatgpt, based on an Openai model called gpt-3.5, and Google’s yet-to-be launched chatbot, built upon one called Lamda, a broad array of questions. These included ten problems from an American mathematics competition (“Find the number of ordered pairs of prime numbers that sum to 60”), and ten reading questions from the sat, an American school-leavers’ exam (“Read the passage and determine which choice best describes what happens in it”). To spice things up, we also asked each model for some dating advice (“Given the following conversation from a dating app, what is the best way to ask someone out on a first date?”).

Neither ai was clearly superior. Google’s was slightly better at maths, answering five questions correctly, compared with three for Chatgpt. Their dating advice was uneven: fed some actual exchanges in a dating app each gave specific suggestions on one occasion, and generic platitudes such as “be open minded” and “communicate effectively” on another. Chatgpt, meanwhile, answered nine sat questions correctly compared with seven for its Google rival. It also appeared more responsive to our feedback and got a few questions right on a second try. Another test by Riley Goodside of Scale ai, an AI startup, suggests Anthropic’s chatbot, Claude, might perform better than Chatgpt at realistic-sounding conversation, though it performs worse at generating computer code.

The reason that, at least so far, no model enjoys an unassailable advantage is that ai knowledge diffuses quickly. The researchers from all the competing labs “all hang out with each other”, says David Ha of Stability ai. Many, like Mr Ha, who used to work at Google, move between organisations, bringing their expertise and experience with them. Moreover, since the best ai brains are scientists at heart, they often made their defection to the private sector conditional on a continued ability to publish their research and present results at conferences. That is one reason that Google made public big advances including the “transformer”, a key building block in ai models, giving its rivals a leg-up. (The “t” in Chatgpt stands for transformer.) As a result of all this, reckons Yann LeCun, Meta’s top ai boffin, “Nobody is ahead of anybody else by more than two to six months.”

These are, though, early days. The labs may not remain neck-and-neck for ever. One variable that may help determine the ultimate outcome of the contest is how they are organised. Openai, a small startup with few revenue streams to protect, may find itself with more latitude than its competitors to release its products to the public. That in turn is generating tonnes of user data that could make its models better (“reinforcement learning with human feedback”, if you must know)—and thus attract more users.

This early-mover advantage could be self-reinforcing in another way, too. Insiders note that Openai’s rapid progress in recent years has allowed it to poach a handful of experts from rivals including DeepMind, which despite its various achievements may launch a version of its chatbot, called Sparrow, only later this year. To keep up, Alphabet, Amazon and Meta may need to rediscover their ability to move fast and break things—a delicate task given all the regulatory scrutiny they are receiving from governments around the world.

Another deciding factor may be the path of technological development. So far in generative ai, bigger has been better. That has given rich tech giants a huge advantage. But size may not be everything in the future. For one thing, there are limits to how big the models can conceivably get. Epoch, a non-profit research institute, estimates that at current rates, big language models will run out of high-quality text on the internet by 2026 (though other less-tapped formats, like video, will remain abundant for a while). More important, as Mr Ha of Stability ai points out, there are ways to fine-tune a model to a specific task that “dramatically reduce the need to scale up”. And novel methods to do more with less are being developed all the time.

The capital flowing into generative-ai startups, which last year collectively raised $2.7bn in 110 deals, suggests that venture capitalists are betting that not all the value will be captured by big tech. Alphabet, Microsoft, their fellow technology titans and the Chinese Communist Party will all try to prove these investors wrong. The ai race is only just getting started.

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Showing 77 database articles primarily about Innovation/Research

The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era

AI Summary. S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.

José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-Espín Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.

Is the college degree losing its economic value to artificial intelligence?

Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.

After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026—the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor after four decades of uninterrupted expansion.
  2. Moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 0.086 log points by 2026.
  3. the college–non-college AI-exposure gap accounts for roughly 28% of the total premium compression over that period.

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  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI — Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year…
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Since the summer of 2023, the employment rate for Americans 22–25 has declined for both college grads and non-college workers, a phenomenon beyond both…
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The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t

AI Summary. 615). Claims of re-acceleration result from cherry-picking frontier observations, selecting a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky argues AI capabilities continue to improve, but “the full composite data shows flattening relative gains, not acceleration…rolling relative model gains have fallen from their 2024 peak, while model dispersion has narrowed sharply.”

Are AI performance gains accelerating or just appearing to through selective measurement?

Core argument: Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.

Using all Epoch’s Capabilities Index observations, and controlling for developer and model family, there is no statistically significant breakpoint. A piecewise model—which splits the series into intervals and applies a sub-function to each segment—does not improve on a purely linear trend: p = 0.615, The estimated change in slope has a confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 points per year. In short, the maths shows there is no model acceleration, contrary to claims, and as expected. The result comes from selecting frontier observations only, choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.
  2. Claims of AI re-acceleration rest on a methodological artifact: selecting only frontier model observations, pre-choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on each side of that breakpoint.

Related Articles:

  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — As AI model performance converges toward a ceiling, relative gains per improvement cycle shrink, transforming frontier capability from a pricing moat into a commodity where price becomes the primary differentiator and margin pressure intensifies across leading providers.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
  • Anthropic’s Best AI Model Struggles To Attract Users As Cheaper Tools Thrive — Spending on the most expensive AI model from a leading provider has plateaued at 11% of total outlay, as cheaper, older models prove capable of handling most business tasks.
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The AI Trade Is Losing One of Its Key Signals

AI Summary. AI token prices have fallen over 90% while total spending has roughly doubled, expanding the market overall. However, a 46% gap between AI investment and actual sales — wider than the 32% divergence seen during the 2001 telecom collapse — raises the risk that current infrastructure spending is outpacing real

Jan-Patrick Barnert and Michael Msika Bloomberg
Date Posted:
July 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Silicon Data LLM Token Expenditure Index, which tracks AI token prices, is down ~20% from its recent peak in May. The metric is a rough “proxy for marginal willingness to pay.”

Is artificial intelligence investment growing faster than actual demand?

Core argument: Token prices collapsed 90% since 2023 while total spending doubled, driving market expansion despite index softening.

A softer index doesn’t mean AI is getting cheaper. The gauge blends prices and usage, meaning a dip can imply very different scenarios: either list prices are falling, or demand is shifting toward cheaper models. It could also point to a genuine softening in what buyers are prepared to shoulder. Each of these possibilities carries different implications. Let’s start with a benign read: While token prices have collapsed more than 90% since 2023, total spend has roughly doubled since last year. Cheaper tokens have expanded the market. This means that an index pause is simply digestion, while demand is real and capex is money well spent. The bull case for Nvidia rests here. Now for the interpretation that’s keeping people up at night: Bears warn that sustained weakness in the index could end the trade that saw nearly the entire AI cohort rally hard this cycle. It’s token spending that justifies the next capex order, and the bill is already looking stretched. Allianz Research said there’s nearly a 46% growth gap between AI investment and sales. That’s worse than the 32% divergence measured during the 2001 telecom bust.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Token prices collapsed 90% since 2023 while total spending doubled, driving market expansion despite index softening.
  2. Index weakness signals either benign demand shift toward cheaper models or stretched capex justification, leading to divergent bull/bear interpretations.

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  • AI: The ROI Runway Could Be Long Outside the Tech Sector — AI valuations embed assumptions of rapid profit growth across the broader economy, but outside the tech sector, returns on AI investment are slow to materialize, creating a gap between current market prices and actual cash flows that could force a sharp repricing.
  • Semiquincententacles — Frontier AI labs are shifting to usage-based pricing that reflects total costs, raising token prices and pushing some enterprises toward cheaper open models for routine tasks, while frontier models remain essential for high-performance applications like cybersecurity and scientific discovery.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
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The Age Of The Solopreneur

AI Summary. AI tools are lowering barriers to business formation, driving a structural rise in solo-operator startups that could accelerate small business growth across the broader economy.

Ernie Tedeschi, Marisa Rama and Chris Cruickshank Stripe Economics
Date Posted:
June 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

New US business applications have surged since late 2024, driven mainly by “likely nonemployer” filings representing “solopreneurs” rather than businesses expected to hire. Data suggest AI may be enabling this by filling capability gaps without hiring.

Are AI tools fundamentally reshaping the economics of starting a business?

While the recent surge in US business formation is not reflected in high-propensity applications, the evidence points toward a structural increase in genuine small business activity over 2025 and 2026, driven by solopreneurs. Preliminary evidence of growth in AI tool usage and solopreneur growth in high-AI-adoption sectors suggests that advances in AI are responsible for a meaningful portion of this growth. We believe AI is lowering barriers to business formation and growth by expanding the capabilities of solopreneurs, further improving tools and platforms that cater to new businesses, and creating a new set of opportunities for entrepreneurs to pursue. Whether the magnitude of this effect is as large as the most optimistic readings of the data suggest remains to be seen, but we believe we might be in the early innings of a fundamental acceleration in business formation—which could have ripple effects throughout the economy.

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  • Solopreneurs, Solow, and the SaaSpocalypse — New business formations are rising sharply, but applications likely to create payroll jobs remain flat, indicating growth is concentrated among solo founders rather than employer firms. Historical technology transitions show productivity gains can lag adoption by decades, so the absence of near-term AI productivity acceleration in aggregate data does not
  • AI-Native Firms∗ — AI-native startups are 25% smaller than comparable non-AI firms yet achieve similar valuations, implying higher value per employee. Embedding AI into products—rather than using AI tools internally—is the primary mechanism allowing these firms to scale knowledge work without large knowledge-worker headcounts.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — Danish data show that the propensity to become an R&D worker or a “transformative entrepreneur” who pursues innovation is highly correlated with IQ…
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Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI

AI Summary. Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
June 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Small models have increasingly closed the performance gap with frontier models. To Kedrosky, this implies “edge compute becomes real,” which in turn, at the margin, means reduced relative demand for data center-based versus local compute.

Are smaller AI models making cloud computing less essential for artificial intelligence?

Core argument: Inference migration from data centers to devices results in a fundamentally different supply chain, threatening capex-heavy frontier model providers lacking.

A quiet story in AI isn't that large models keep getting better, it's that small ones are catching up quickly. In 2022, reaching 60% on MMLU, a test of academic reasoning, required a 540-billion-parameter model. By 2024, a 3.8-billion-parameter model hit the same threshold — a 142-fold parameter reduction in two years. The direction is clear, and the implications are wide-ranging. Edge compute becomes real. Models that fit on a phone or a sensor don't need a data center. Inference shifts from hyperscaler to device, which is a different supply chain and a different competitive moat than anyone has built for. The data center API business model has a half-life. If a fine-tuned 7B model running locally can handle 80% of enterprise use cases, the case for paying per-token to a cloud provider shrinks fast. The most exposed providers are those whose moats are model quality rather than distribution, i.e., the capex-heavy frontier models. Compute becomes less scarce.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inference migration from data centers to devices results in a fundamentally different supply chain, threatening capex-heavy frontier model providers lacking.
  2. By 2024, a 3.8-billion-parameter model hit the same threshold — a 142-fold parameter reduction in two years.
  3. The direction is clear, and the implications are wide-ranging.

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Challenging the Narrative of European Decline, Continued

AI Summary. European economic decline relative to the US is a measurement illusion: when output is compared using current purchasing power rather than fixed prices, the euro area has held its own or gained ground, indicating European economies apply technology effectively even if they do not lead in creating it.

Paul Krugman Paul Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2021 prices, per capita GDP in the Euro area is falling relative to that of the US, but the opposite is true if one takes into account the benefits to Europe from falling tech prices. “The big benefits of IT come from applying it, [not] creating it.”

Does measuring European economic output differently change the decline narrative?

Core argument: If we do this using constant prices — the World Bank uses 2021 prices — we get the line in.

Let’s start by looking at GDP per capita in Europe (actually the euro area) as a percentage of GDP per capita in the US. If we do this using constant prices — the World Bank uses 2021 prices — we get the line in Chart 1 labeled “2021 prices.” This line shows Europe falling behind over the past 25 years. If, however, we simply use prices in each given year, we get the line labeled “PPP,” which shows Europe gaining on the US. We get a similar picture if we look at GDP per worker-hour, where the black line is calculated using 2021 prices and the blue line is calculated using PPP. IT progress is passed on to all consumers via lower prices. The big benefits of IT come from applying it, rather than creating it. And as I’ve tried to show, the data show Europe holding its own in the relative value of the goods it produces, indicating that European economies are doing fine when it comes to applying technological advances. What should worry Europe, instead, are the geopolitical implications of US/Chinese leadership in advanced technology. The risk of being cut off from strategically important technologies, once minimal, is now very real. And that risk, rather than misleading numbers about trends in real GDP per worker hour, is what should concern European policymakers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. If we do this using constant prices — the World Bank uses 2021 prices — we get the line in.
  2. If, however, we simply use prices in each given year, we get the line labeled “PPP,” which shows Europe gaining.
  3. We get a similar picture if we look at GDP per worker-hour, where the black line is calculated using 2021.

Related Articles:

  • Europe v America: Who’s Really Winning? — Since the US leads in the high-growth tech sectors, real GDP comparisons show Europe falling far behind. Yet PPP-adjusted gaps have barely moved. Europe’s GDP…
  • Europe’s Tech Lag: Does It Matter? — The US–EU productivity divergence over the past 25+ years was largely due to the tech sector. Notably, California’s outperformance relative to non-CA USA was…
  • From IT to AI: What Explains US Productivity Outperformance? — Since 1995, US labor productivity has grown at a 2.1% mean annual rate, 2x that of the Euro area. Growth in capital input accounts for .55pp of the gap…
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