Edward Conard

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Minimum Wage Increases and Individual Employment Trajectories

Ekaterina Jardim, Mark C. Long, Robert Plotnick, Emma van Inwegen, Jacob Vigdor, Hilary Wething National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 23, 2021
Is Database:
Database

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) acknowledges that increases in the minimum wage disproportionately affect marginal workers, reducing their employment opportunities at three times the rate of adults generally.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) acknowledges that increases in the minimum wage disproportionately affect marginal workers, reducing their employment opportunities at three times the rate of adults generally. For instance, a $15 minimum wage could result in 1.3m job losses, with teenagers and part-time workers without a high school diploma being most affected. The CBO estimates that 50% of newly jobless workers would be teenagers, highlighting the adverse impact on new labor market entrants. Additionally, research indicates that employers tend to substitute less experienced workers with more experienced ones when minimum wages rise, further limiting entry-level opportunities. This shift results in significant employment reductions among the least experienced workers, potentially hindering their long-term career prospects. Overall, while minimum wage hikes may increase earnings for some, they also exacerbate unemployment among low-skilled and young workers.

Steve Note, “Research used to prep for remarks given to The Gunnery School in February 2021”

“…..For my speech on Thursday, broadly which welfare payments are included as income in determining poverty and which are excluded? Can you relate that to our $1.3 T without too much detailed work? Generally, cash payments are included while in-kind payment like Medicare are excluded. Are SNAP payments included? What about child care or section 8 (whatever) housing?I'm guessing not. My sense is that the Census is clever about only counting enough benefits, and setting poverty threshold high enough so most welfare recipients don't cross the ($25,000 a year) threshold. Then they can confuse the public by giving welfare recipients substantially more than the threshold but continuing to say they are poor….”

So the Census uses “Real Median Household Income” as their income measure for their annul “Income and Poverty in the United States” based on ACS data whichcounts 8 types of income, Wage or salary income, Self-employment income, Interest, dividends, net rental income, royalty income, or income from estates and trusts, Social Security or Railroad Retirement income, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Public assistance income, Retirement, survivor, or disability income and All other income. So under public assistance income they are capturing the following, “…Public assistance income includes general assistance and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Separate payments received for hospital or other medical care (vendor payments) are excluded. This does not include Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or noncash benefits such as Food Stamps. The terms “public assistance income” and “cash public assistance” are used interchangeably in the 2019 ACS data products….”

Ekaterina Jardim, Mark C. Long, Robert Plotnick, Emma van Inwegen, Jacob Vigdor, Hilary Wething, "Minimum Wage Increases and Individual Employment Trajectories," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2018, https://www.nber.org/papers/w25182

Ed Comment, “This seems like it. seems I have somewhat misremembered it. this raises an interesting point about worker who don’t have jobs so wont lose their job but they wont get a job in the future. Does the new cbo report speak to this issue? My guess is lots of them don’t have jobs now too.”

You did write twoblogpostson it at the time reporting on their estimates of employment impacts (this language is from the second one) on marginal workers, “…The most damning aspect is the report’s implicit acknowledgment that raising the minimum wage hurts marginal workers by reducing their chances for employment. The report estimates that raising the minimum wage will imposed three times as many job losses on marginal workers as adults generally. Nevertheless, the report concludes that overall job losses suffered by marginal workers are likely to be low because few marginal workers currently have jobs. Twenty-three percent of African-American workers between the ages of 20 and 24 years old, for example, are unemployed. For the least skilled among those workers, the unemployment rate is even higher. Those workers are unable to produce $7.25 of value in an hour of work—the amount of the minimum wage—that customers are willing to buy, and so remain unemployed. Raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour will make it that much harder for those workers to find economically viable work. So in addition to the 500,000 workers who can produce $7.25 of value in an hour but not $10.10—individuals who the CBO expects will lose their jobs outright—there are many currently unemployed workers who will find it even harder to find work, especially low-skilled entry-level work that serves as a gateway to a lifetime of employment….”

So I looked at the2014 CBOreport on “The Effects of A Minimum-Wage Increase On Employment And Family Income” we had read.

Neumark also makes this point, “.. Second, labor-labor substitution may be important, with employers substituting away from the lowest-skilled workers and toward other workers when the minimum wage increases….”

"... Essentially all of the earnings increases accrue to the more experienced half of the low-wage workforce. The less experienced half saw larger proportionate decreases in hours worked, which we estimate to have fully offset their gain in wages, leaving no significant change in earnings. More experienced workers were also more likely to supplement their Seattle income by adding hours outside the city. Finally, conditional on being employed, both less and more experienced workers were more likely to remain employed by their baseline Seattle employer, implying an 8% reduction in labor turnover rates....Using administrative employment data from the state of Washington, we use short-duration longitudinal panels to study the impact of Seattle’s minimum wage ordinance on individuals employed in low-wage jobs immediately before a wage increase. We draw counterfactual observations using nearest-neighbor matching and derive effect estimates by comparing the “treated” cohort to a placebo cohort drawn from earlier data. We attribute significant hourly wage increases and hours reductions to the policy. On net, the minimum wage increase from $9.47 to as much as $13 per hour raised earnings by an average of $8-$12 per week. The entirety of these gains accrued to workers with above-median experience at baseline; less-experienced workers saw no significant change to weekly pay. Approximately one-quarter of the earnings gains can be attributed to experienced workers making up for lost hours in Seattle with work outside the city limits. We associate the minimum wage ordinance with an 8% reduction in job turnover rates as well as a significant reduction in the rate of new entries into the workforce... Overall, evidence suggests that employers responded to higher minimum wages by shifting their workforce toward more experienced workers..Seattle’s minimum wage increase appears to have successfully increased the labor market income of the most experienced workers in low-wage jobs, arguably those for whom low-wage work most resembles the “dead end” archetype. The losses in employment opportunities appear to have been concentrated among the least experienced workers, or those attempting their first entry into the labor market. While this may suggest that the low-wage labor market has lost some of its capacity to serve as an “avenue of advancement,” younger workers may be better able to compensate for this loss through education, training, or other mechanisms that allow them to bypass the low wage labor market entirely.

Bottom line, “…Overall, evidence suggests that employers responded to higher minimum wages by shifting their workforce toward more experienced workers..Seattle’s minimum wage increase appears to have successfully increased the labor market income of the most experienced workers in low-wage jobs, arguably those for whom low-wage work most resembles the “dead end” archetype. The losses in employment opportunities appear to have been concentrated among the least experienced workers, or those attempting their first entry into the labor market….”

Will work on finding the CBO report you mention. However this more recent 2018 (Jardim) study makes your point about the compositional impact of minimum wage hikes (using evidence from the Seattle study) very effectively that would work very well. Let me know if this is what you are thinking of? Do you still need that older CBO report?

“…..I also remember anold CBO report saying something about 3:1 low skilled job losses in the footnotesthat I mentioned on Betty Liu the day after my first IQ 2 debate on inequality. So the 1.4 million job loss is really a much larger number of low skilled losing their jobs offset by more skillful part time housewives and students getting hired to (partially) take their place. I recall a study of San Fran workers making this point. A reference to it might be in one of the blog entries. Please look for it…”

I also saved a comment you made on a Washington Post Op-Ed (attached) on trade offs related to minimum wage, Ed Comment: Lots of misleading stuff here. Politicians often allow min wage to rise when market wages rise (more) and employment is low, so any simple correlation between min wages and employment is misleading. And raising the min wage when it's below the market, should have little if any effect--on wages or employment. Further, market wages have risen over time. What matters is whether you can raise min wages above the market and have it increase wages. If it could, why not raise the wage to $100,000 per year? Let's raise it all over the world and eliminate poverty. You/we know the truth. More importantly, a portion of the essential truth about minimum wages is revealed in the article. Productivity rises when min wages rise. Why? When employers are forced to pay higher wages, they substitute more productivity workers--part time students and mothers, older workers, etc. All workers are paid the wage required to get one more worker of a given skill level to join the workforce, if/when the value that worker can add to a customer is greater than the wage required to get another worker to work (economics calls this the marginal product of labor). In addition, the market pays a very low-skilled worker who requires a lot of supervision the wage of a low-skilled worker who requires less supervision less the cost of the extra supervision to make the very low-skilled worker as productive as the low-skilled worker. So if you raise the wage of a very low skilled worker by fiat (i.e. by raising the min wage), more workers at (all) higher skill levels will join the workforce. Employment won't necessarily go down, and wages of workers will go up (because more higher skilled workers will join the force), so will productivity (because more productive workers join), but so will the unemployment of the least skilled workers, which has been increasingly documented as data has become more avaible

CBO also has an analysis of the current proposal (largely based off their previous report) and continue to find strong employment effects. -1.4mm workers (.9%) at the same time the number of people in poverty would be reduced by almost 1mm (.9mm). Note this is stronger than their last analysis which estimated employment would fall by 1.3mm workers (that change was driven by a decision to use mean as opposed to median) Key takeaway on employment effects, "....Taking those factors into account, CBO projects that, on net, the Raise the Wage Act of 2021 would reduce employment by increasing amounts over the 2021-2025 period. In 2025, when the minimum wage reached $15 per hour, employment would be reduced by 1.4 million workers (or 0.9 percent), according to CBO’s average estimate. In 2021, most workers who would not have a job because of the higher minimum wage would still be looking for work and hence be categorized as unemployed; by 2025, however, half of the 1.4 million people who would be jobless because of the bill would have dropped out of the labor force, CBO estimates. Young, less educated people would account for a disproportionate share of those reductions in employment...."

Second and third I’ve include two recent CBO analysis, one is their reoccurring analyst of the impact of the minimum wage from summer 2019. CBO found, "...In an average week in 2025, the $15 option would boost the wages of 17 million workers who would otherwise earn less than $15 per hour. Another 10 million workers otherwise earning slightly more than $15 per hour might see their wages rise as well. But 1.3 million other workers would become jobless, according to CBO’s median estimate. There is a two thirds chance that the change in employment would be between about zero and a decrease of 3.7 million workers. The number of people with annual income below the poverty threshold in 2025 would fall by 1.3 million....."You commented"... What stuck me is Dems want high min wages because it will hurt employment in red states. Unemployment increases support for Dems..."

Ed, we have a bunch of stuff on the minimum wage, I curated a few of the more recent one (all attached). First Neumark’s recent paper summarizing all the research might be most useful his core takeaway from the existing studies, "... First, there is a clear preponderance of negative estimates in the literature. In our data, 79.3% of the estimated employment elasticities are negative, 55.4% are negative and significant at the 10% level or better, and 47.9% are negative and significant at the 5% level or better…. In its totality, this body of evidence and its conclusions point strongly toward negative effects of minimum wages on employment of less-skilled workers, especially for the types of studies that would be expected to reveal these negative employment effects most clearly..."

“….Plz look up all our prior blog entries on the min wage ( I think there are 3) and send the links to me. I think I commented on the 3:1….”

Steve Comment, “So they don’t carve out a specific estimate of non-workers who would otherwise be working but for the higher wage specifically. “…Under the first option ($15 an hour), according to CBO’s median estimate, about 1.3 million workerswho would otherwise be employed would be joblessin an average week in 2025. That decrease would account for 0.8 percent of all workers and 7 percent of directly affected workers who would otherwise earn less than $15 per hour…The $15 option would alter employment more for some groups than for others. Almost 50 percent of the newly jobless workers in a given week—600,000 of 1.3 million—would be teenagers (some of whom would live in families with income well above the poverty threshold). Employment would also fall disproportionately among part-time workers and adults without a high school diploma….”In the appendix they define affected workers, this definition doesn’t seem to capture those who don’t gain entry into the labor force in the first place, though perhaps the “newly jobless workers” # above given teenagers are new labor market entries might be a proxy?“…For each option, CBO estimated the number of workers whocould be affected. Directly affected workers are those whose hourly wage, in the absence of the change in the minimum wage, would range from just below the old minimum to the new, higher minimum and who therefore would either receive a higher wage or become jobless if the new federal minimum were adopted. Potentially affected workers are those whose wages would otherwise be slightly above the new federal minimum in 2025; their wages would also be affected by a higher minimum.CBO projects that such workers’ employment would not be affected by their newly higher wages, though it might be affected by changes in overall demand induced by the options….”

CBO Staff, "The Effects on Employment and Family Income of Increasing the Federal Minimum Wage," Congressional Budget Office, July 2019, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-07/CBO-55410-MinimumWage2019.pdf

They provide a box on the interplay btw the EITC/Minimum wage but you are correctthey don’t quantify it(2019) nor do they update their 2007 analysis.

Here is the CBO from 2019on $10 impact“…It would raise wages for 1.5 million workers who would otherwise earn less than $10 per hour. Another 2 million workers who would otherwise earn slightly more than $10 per hour might see their wages rise as well. The option would have little effect on employment in an average week in 2025. There is a two-thirds chance that the change in employment would be between about zero and a decrease of 0.1 million workers. This option would have negligible effects on the number of people in poverty…”

Here is how we used thesecond CBO reportinUpside

I went back and looked at CBO’s2014 analysis(that we cited inUpside,attached) that looked at the impact of a $10.10 minimum wage. In a footnote they reference a 2007 CBO report (also cited inUpside) that looked at the EITC versus minimum wage and found the cost to employers of minimum wage was more than the cost of the EITC to the feds (this was in response to $7 minimum wage)“CBO compared the cost to employers of a change in the minimum wage that increased the income of poor families by a given amount to the cost to the federal government of a change in the EITC that increased the income of poor families by roughly the same amount. The cost to employers of the change in the minimum wage was much larger than the cost to the federal government of the change in the EITC. See Congressional Budget Office, Response to a Request by Senator Grassley About the Effects of Increasing the Federal Minimum Wage Versus Expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit…”

“….So the BS in min wage, is that because many welfare recipients are just under the carefully manipulated threshold, if you raise their wage, they cross the threshold and can no longer considered "in poverty". So 1.4mm are out of a job, for much less of a true reduction in poverty, than the CBO claims (because they weren't really below the threshold if you had counted all their benefits. I'm sure someone is going to ask my about (why I don't support an increase in) the min wage, and I need to be able to explain my/this answer. I recall in a prior CBO min wage report (on $10 an hour min wage) the CBO said something like with the job losses it cost the economy $3 to give someone a $1 wage hike whereas giving them the EITC costs closer to $1. (It might have related to obamacare.) Plz find that old report and see what they say in their latest report in comparison. My quick read of the latest report was that it was left unmentioned….”

So your guess is correct SNAP and health care are excluded. They don’t have an itemized list of programs they are summing to line up against the CRS road map we used to calculated the 1.3T #. I will need to spend some time on that aspect given the apple/orange nature.

  • Workforce
    • Minimum Wage
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleFebruary 22, 2021Science Needs Criticism, Not CheerleadingScience is the search for truth, which is often elusive. When we lower our standards to pretend we know what we don’t know, we diminish the work and misinform society.Next articleFebruary 23, 2021People Aren’t Worried About Inflation. Really.Derivative markets, gold markets, and consumer surveys show a lack of significant worry about rising inflation, with expectations returning to 2018 levels.
Showing 763 database articles primarily about either Workforce, Demographics, Education, Family/Marriage, Gender Pay Gap, Immigration, Inequality, Minimum Wage, Poverty/Crime, Unemployment/Participation, or Wages/Income

The Heterogeneous Effects of Large and Small Minimum Wage Changes: Evidence Using a Partially Pre-Committed Analysis Plan

AI Summary. Large minimum wage increases reduce employment among young and low-education workers, while small increases have no measurable effect. Four years after enactment, large increases lower employment by ~5 percentage points for workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and ~3 percentage points for all workers aged 16–21.

Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

While a state-level event study finds no employment effect from small minimum-wage hikes, imputation DiD estimates show that four years after large hikes, employment is ~5pp lower for 16–25-year-olds without a HS degree and ~3pp lower for all 16–21-year-olds.

Do large minimum wage increases harm young workers more than small ones?

Core argument: Large minimum wage increases reduce employment by approximately 5 percentage points among workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and 3 percentage points among all workers aged 16–21 within four years of enactment.

Figure 4 reports our imputation difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of small and large minimum wage changes on employment among individuals aged 16–21 and among individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education. The samples are from the ACS [American Community Survey]. [The data span 2011-2019]. We compare estimates for large versus small increases. The estimates to the left of the vertical dashed lines reveal no concerning evidence of divergent preexisting trends. We find null effects for the states that enacted small minimum wage increases and negative effects for states with large minimum wage increases. By 4 years after the enactment of the first increase, the estimate has approached −5pp for individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education, and −3pp for the sample of all individuals aged 16–21. [Editor's note: The authors note that Section VIII of the paper, which contains the Figure 4 imputation DiD estimates, “presents estimates from a modern difference-in-differences estimator that falls outside of our pre-analysis plan.”  The results are somewhat larger than those reported in the Abstract.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Large minimum wage increases reduce employment by approximately 5 percentage points among workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and 3 percentage points among all workers aged 16–21 within four years of enactment.
  2. small increases produce no measurable employment effect.
  3. Disemployment from minimum wage increases is concentrated among the least-educated young workers and emerges only above a magnitude threshold, identifying wage-floor size—not the policy itself—as the decisive driver of employment loss.

Related Articles:

  • The Heterogeneous Effects of Large and Small Minimum Wage Changes on Hours Worked: Evidence Using a Partially Pre-committed Analysis Plan — In CPS data from 2011–2019, relatively large statutory increases in the minimum wage reduced hours for workers, ages 16–25 with less than a high school…
  • Did California’s Fast Food Minimum Wage Reduce Employment? — The 2024 rise in CA’s minimum wage in fast food restaurants from $16 to $20 raised the sector’s wages ~8% and lowered its employment by 2 to 4% relative to the…
  • Minimum Wages and the Rise of the Robots — Across US states, a 10pp higher growth rate of the minimum wage over 1992–2021 was associated with an ~8% higher-than-expected installation of industrial…
  • Minimum Wage
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

AI Summary. Across wealthy countries, intended fertility and ideal family size fell over the past decade as children came to be seen as constraining freedom rather than conferring status or fulfillment.

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Related Articles:

  • The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch — In countries where women perform significantly more household and care work than men, fertility rates are substantially lower; nations with near-equal domestic labor splits average fertility rates around 1.7, while those with gaps exceeding 3 hours daily average rates below 1.4.
  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — .@PikaGold notes countries with birth rates now below 1.3 saw “rapid growth in GDP per capita after a long period of stagnation or decline” as women’s new…
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • Demographics
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How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
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US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

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America's Demoralized Men, Part II: Lost Pathways, Greater Struggles

AI Summary. Over 40% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography use and daily gambling each associated with failure self-perception rates above 60%.

Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family Studies
Date Posted:
August 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.

Are young men's struggles with addiction driving their sense of failure?

Core argument: 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.

More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
  2. More than half of young men gamble at some frequency, with 23% doing so daily—a pattern concentrated among those also exhibiting compulsive pornography use and self-perceived failure.
  3. 43% of young men consume pornography daily or several times a week, with daily users (27%) disproportionately represented among those who describe themselves as failures (63%).

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