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Economic Shocks and Clinging

Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute

Date Posted:: January 3, 2019
Is Database:: Database

The “China Shock” hardened existing racial and religious views among whites, rather than altering attitudes broadly. @MichaelStrain, American Enterprise Institute.

The "China Shock" significantly hardened existing racial and religious views among whites, rather than altering attitudes broadly. A $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure led to a 4.1% rise in the likelihood of whites favoring fewer immigrants and a 6.3% increase in support for excluding illegal immigrants. In areas with low immigrant populations, these figures rose to 8.3% and 8.6%, respectively. Import exposure also increased the probability of whites identifying as fundamentalist without affecting overall religiosity. In regions with historical racial tensions, increased import competition intensified negative racial attitudes. These findings suggest that economic disruptions from globalization reinforce preexisting social views, particularly in areas with low immigrant presence or racial antipathy, rather than shifting them across the board.

Reviewed the Strain paper, in general he finds the "China Shock" hardened existing views among whites versus changing peoples views across the board. for example increase trade exposure increases the likelihood of an individual identifies as fundamentalist but doesn't make people more religious (table 1) no significant overall effect on views of African Americans (Table 3) however when they look at racial views in commuting zones that contained at least one county mentioned in the voting rights act (table 4) they find that the increase in imports"...significantly harden racial attitudes among whites..."Table 5 looking at the impact on views of immigrants finds the same phenomenon, whites in areas with a relatively low immigrant share had more negative attitudes towards immigrants then those living in areas with a higher immigrant population initially. same thing with guns, "...Overall, increases in import exposure are associated with increases in the likelihood a respondent owns a gun, and appear to harden attitudes against gun ownership in areas where few people own guns...."

Michael Strain and Stan Veuger, "Economic Shocks and Clinging," American Enterprise Institute, January 2019, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Economic_shocks_wp.pdf

".....We find that the sudden surge of import competition during this period did affect social attitudes in important and nuanced ways..... On balance, we interpret our findings as lending only very limited support to the hypothesis that the economic effects of globalization affect the social attitudes of whites towards immigrants, minorities, guns and religion in the aggregate. At the same time, the increase in trade with China seems to materially harden preexisting attitudes. Specifically, the stronger a sudden surge in import competition, the more likely whites are to embrace religious fundamentalism. It is in areas that have a history of racial antipathy that “the China shock” led whites to develop more strongly negative views towards African Americans. Commuting zones with low initial levels of immigration witness a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments following sudden and intense import competition. And gun ownership becomes both even less common and even less popular in areas where gun ownership was low to begin with....Appendix table A3, shows that a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability a white respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 6.3 percentage point increase in the probability a white respondent believes the United States should do more to exclude illegal immigrants. We find no significant effect on the probability a person believes that immigrants are not good for America, immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, or that the United States should let in fewer total immigrants.....Panel A shows that in commuting zones in the bottom quartile of immigrants as a share of total population in 1990, a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with an 8.3 percent increase in the probability a white respondent believes that immigrants are not good for the United States, a 10.2 percent increase in the probability a respondent believes immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, an 8.2 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 8.6 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent believes that the United States should do more to exclude undocumented immigrants. Similarly, from panel B we see that in commuting zones in the bottom decile of immigrants as a share of total population in 1990, a $1,000 increase in per worker import exposure is associated with a 8.1 percent increase in the probability a white respondent believes that immigrants are not good for the United States, a 6.3 percent increase in the probability a respondent believes immigrants take jobs from native-born workers, a 4.8 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent feels the United States should let in fewer immigrants, and a 6.9 percent increase in the likelihood a respondent believes that the United States should do more to exclude undocumented immigrants. Overall increases in import exposure appear to harden attitudes towards immigrants among white Americans, particularly in areas where the preexisting share of immigrants is low.....These results suggest a nuanced relationship between the economic disruption caused by globalization — specifically, a local labor market’s exposure to import penetration from the “China shock” — and social attitudes among whites. Increases in import exposure are associated with an increased probability that white Americans identify as fundamentalist, but appear to have no effect on whether a person views himself as religious or not. Exposure to imports from China has no discernable effect on gun ownership or disapproval of gun regulation overall, but it makes people in areas where guns are not popular to begin with even more skeptical of gun ownership. Among the general white population, an increase in import competition only marginally increases support for restrictions on immigration. However, in areas with small immigrant populations, it both increases support for more restrictive immigration policies and triggers more negative views of immigrants. A similar picture arises when we examine the relationship between a sudden surge in import competition and the racial attitudes of white Americans. While racial attitudes grow slightly more negative in general, in labor markets containing at least one country mentioned in the 1965 Voting Rights Act a sudden increase in the effects of globalization materially increases the probability white respondents report feeling African Americans are lazy, believing African Americans are generally unintelligent, and who believe that African Americans lack education. These results suggest economic disruption from increased competition from abroad may lead to a hardening of racial views in areas with a history of racial tension. Taken as a whole, the economic effects of globalization materially affect the social attitudes of whites towards immigrants, minorities, guns and religion. They do so by hardening existing views, as opposed to altering attitudes across the board. These results are, of course, ultimately derived from variation in import competition. The availability of cheaper goods and services facilitated by increases in foreign output and productivity raises the purchasing power of American consumers, and globalization increases demand for exports, along with labor demand in export-intensive firms and industries. This may well, through these channels, have the opposite effect on the social views we study here, which leaves the aggregate impact of increased globalization on said views in both specific areas and the country as a whole to be determined...."

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center

Date Posted:: September 1, 2026
Is Database:: Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University

Date Posted:: August 20, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin

Date Posted:: July 22, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: July 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin

Date Posted:: July 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

Economist Staff The Economist

Date Posted:: June 2, 2026
Is Database:: Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.
ExxonMobil’s reincorporation in Texas signals a broader corporate migration that leads to revenue losses for high-tax states like California and.
Texas’s economic dominance positions it to surpass California’s GDP, prompting competitive tax and regulatory reforms across North Carolina, Tennessee, and.

The “China Shock” hardened existing racial and religious views among whites, rather than altering attitudes broadly. @MichaelStrain, American Enterprise Institute.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

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Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

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A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

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Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

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According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas replacing California as America's economic powerhouse?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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