Edward Conard

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Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent

Howard R. Gold Chicago Booth Review
Date Posted:
May 17, 2019
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The 0.01% of earners now hold 11% of US wealth & 5% of total income, outpacing the rest of the 1%. Their posttax income surged 423% from 1980 to 2014, compared to a 61% rise for the general population.

The focus on the 0.01% reveals stark disparities within the top earners, with their share of total income rising from 0.5% in 1973 to 5% by 2015, outpacing the rest of the 1%. This group's wealth quadrupled to 11% of total US wealth by 2012. The 0.01% comprises about 16,000 households with annual incomes of $7m or more, often driven by business income, particularly in finance and technology sectors. Their posttax income surged 423% from 1980 to 2014, compared to a 61% rise for the general population. This concentration of wealth raises policy questions about taxation and economic inequality, as some economists argue for more progressive tax codes while others emphasize enhancing skills and opportunities for the broader population. The debate continues on whether to curb the growth of the 0.01% or uplift the remaining 99.99%, highlighting the complexity of addressing income inequality in a globalized economy.

Great charts

Howard R. Gold, "Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent," Chicago Booth Review, 2017, https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/never-mind-1-percent-lets-talk-about-001-percent

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent

Since the Great Recession, America’s wealthiest 1 percent have been demonized as fat cats who have grown ever richer while the middle class has stagnated. While protesters have called for the 1 percent to be taxed more heavily, economists have been digging into data to develop a better understanding of who the top earners are.

These economists have been seeking to measure income inequality and wealth inequality, and to understand the nature of the 1 percent’s income and assets. And views differ. Some say the 1 percent are predominantly entrepreneurs and the “working rich,” people who made their money by starting and running successful businesses. Other economists note that a significant proportion of the 1 percent are the heirs of wealth accumulated over time.

But the data also reveal disparities within the 1 percent. The 1 percent, it turns out, have their own 1 percent.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 1


“Since the 1970s, average incomes have grown, but the growth has not been uniform across the income distribution. The incomes at the top, especially in the top 1 percent, have grown much faster than average,” wrote Harvard’s N. Gregory Mankiw, in a 2013 paper entitled “Defending the One Percent.” “These high earners have made significant economic contributions, but they have also reaped large gains. The question for public policy is what, if anything, to do about it. This development is one of the largest challenges facing the body politic.”

Mankiw noted that the 1 percent’s share of total income, excluding capital gains, rose from about 8 percent in 1973 to 17 percent in 2010, the latest figures available at the time. “Even more striking is the share earned by the top 0.01 percent.... This group’s share of total income rose from 0.5 percent in 1973 to 3.3 percent in 2010. These numbers are not easily ignored. Indeed, they in no small part motivated the Occupy movement, and they have led to calls from policymakers on the left to make the tax code more progressive.”

In the nearly five years since Mankiw’s paper, economists have assembled more data with which to analyze the 0.01 percent. In the 35 years ending in 2015, the share of total income has accrued faster to the 0.01 percent than it has to the rest of the 1 percent. The share of total income has risen, according to 2015 data, to 5 percent for the 0.01 percent and 22 percent for the 1 percent. The 0.01 percent’s share of total US wealth quadrupled in the 35 years ending in 2012 to 11 percent, argue University of California at Berkeley’s Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, who have made wealth calculations through 2012.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Not all economists agree that the 0.01 percent are the most significant slice of the distribution. New York University’s Edward N. Wolff, using different data, notes that the wealth of the top 5 percent has grown faster than that of the 1 percent over the past 30 years. Chicago Booth’s Steve Kaplan says that income share for the 1 percent stagnated between 2000 and 2015.

But the disparities within the 1 percent have intrigued other economists. Who are the 0.01 percent? How well are they really doing? How are they making their money? And how, if at all, should policy makers respond?

The 0.01 percent, by the numbers

The United States has 325 million people—in 160 million households, as viewed by the Internal Revenue Service. That means 1.6 million households fall into the 1 percent category.

The threshold for membership in the 1 percent in 2014 was an annual household income of $386,000, excluding any capital gains, according to Chicago Booth’s Eric Zwick. That’s more than seven times the median household income that year of $54,000. The 0.1 percent, 160,000 families, in 2014 made at least $1.5 million a year. The top 0.01 percent, 16,000 families, had annual income of $7 million.

Income share is another way to assess how the strata of the 1 percent are doing.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Between 1995 and 2015, the income share (including capital gains) of the top 1 percent rose from roughly 15 percent to 22 percent, according to Piketty and Saez’s data. The income share of the top 0.1 percent rose from 6 percent to 11 percent, and the income share of the top 0.01 percent rose from 2.5 percent to about 5 percent. In terms of percentage points, the top 1 percent’s rose the most. In terms of the rate of increase, the 0.01 percent’s did.

After-tax income tells a similar story. For the top 1 percent, it nearly tripled between 1980 and 2014, according to research by Paris School of Economics’ Thomas Piketty and UC Berkeley’s Saez and Zucman. For the top 0.1 percent, it almost quadrupled in the same period. And posttax income for the 0.01 percent rose 423 percent. Posttax income for the entire US population rose by only 61 percent during this time, the study demonstrates.

The 0.01 percent also perform best in comparisons of wealth. Saez and Zucman, in an influential 2014 study, used income data from the IRS to “capitalize,” or derive, wealth based on the expected aggregate rate of return from every asset class or source of income reported on tax returns. They say the share of total wealth of the top 1 percent has increased steadily, from below 25 percent in 1978 to 42 percent in 2012. The share of total wealth of the top 0.1 percent has roughly tripled, and the share of the 0.01 percent has more than quintupled. The top 0.01 percent of US households had at least $111 million in net worth in 2012, compared to $4 million for the 1 percent.

The top 1%...

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Not everyone slices the data the same way, or draws the same conclusions. New York University’s Wolff, using data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances, finds that between 1983 and 2013, the top 5 percent of households saw their wealth grow faster than the top 1 percent did. This would challenge the notion that wealth is increasingly concentrating at the top. He also argues that the rise in overall wealth inequality in the US from 2007 to 2010 is due less to very wealthy people’s success than to the middle class’s failures, chief of all taking on debt only to lose value in their homes.

And Piketty and Saez’s income-share data show that long-term growth has stagnated since 2000 for the 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent, argues Chicago Booth’s Kaplan. All three groups saw their income shares and inflation-adjusted incomes peak in 2007, and those shares have yet to recover to those pre-Great Recession levels, he points out.

University of Chicago’s Greg Kaplan says the main point of recent research he did with University of Minnesota’s Fatih Guvenen is to highlight that there’s variety in the group so many know as the 1 percent. “When I hear people talk about top income inequality, I hear words and phrases such as ‘top 1 percent,’ ‘top 0.1 percent,’ ‘top earners,’ ‘CEOs’... thrown around all the time,” he says. “I think we need to keep in mind that these are very different people. They get their income from very different sources. They live in different parts of the country.... There is a huge amount of diversity, even within a group that we think is small but is actually very big, which is the top 1 percent.”

Who’s in the 0.01 percent?

When discussing the super-rich, many bring up family dynasties such as the Waltons of Wal-Mart, or the Rockefellers and Koch brothers of energy fortunes. They may think, too, of highly paid corporate executives such as Apple CEO Tim Cook (who made $150 million in 2016, according to Bloomberg), celebrities such as Diddy (who took home $130 million pretax in the year through June 2017, per Forbes), and entrepreneurs such as Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg (No. 5 on Forbes’ 2017 list of the world’s billionaires).

But who is actually in the 0.01 percent? Researchers are developing a better understanding of how people in various rungs of the 1 percent make their money. And some research suggests business income plays a big part.

Since the late 1990s, “nearly all of the recent rise in top incomes has come in the form of business income,” write Matthew Smith of the US Treasury Department, Danny Yagan of UC Berkeley, and Chicago Booth’s Owen Zidar and Zwick, whose work focuses on the 1 percent and 0.1 percent. “The demand for top skill has outpaced its supply, with the returns to top skill increasingly taking the form of business income.”

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 5


This income is broad-based among the 1 percent. “What’s covered on CNBC or in the Wall Street Journal or New York Times might be overemphasizing the drivers of wealth in Wall Street and Silicon Valley, and the economy is much bigger and more diverse than that,” Zwick says. “There are a few Carnegies and Rockefellers, a Bill Gates and a Jeff Bezos here and there, but there are a lot more people earning between $300,000 and a few million dollars doing a lot of different things.”

Smith, Yagan, Zidar, and Zwick find that the 1 percent’s income is being driven by owner-managers, mostly of small and medium-sized companies—specifically S corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies. These are talented managers: the researchers find that profits of companies run by these 1 percent-ers are far higher than those of businesses owned by people in the top 5--10 percent. In the researchers’ sample, when these businesses’ owners died prematurely, while still running their companies, profits plunged by more than half.

The average company in the top 1 percent of income has $7 million in sales and 57 employees, according to the research. “If that firm has, say, a 10 percent profit margin to split between two owners, it’s enough to put someone in the top 1 percent category,” says Zwick. The businesses earning the most profits in the bulk of the top 1 percent were physicians’ and dentists’ offices, professional and technical services, specialty trade contractors, and legal services.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 6


To reach the top 0.1 percent of income, the average company has $30 million in sales and 150 employees. “If you’re an auto dealer and you have five or six dealerships and you’re doing $30 million in sales, you have a bunch of workers and you split $3 million in profits between one or two owners, that would put you in that top 0.1 percent group,” says Zwick. In the top 0.1 percent, physicians’ offices ranked only sixth in profits—behind managements of private companies, financial and investment activities, auto dealers, professional and technical services, and oil and gas extraction.

It’s harder to get at the source of income for the top 0.01 percent, but several studies indicate that finance could be an important sector for the group. Williams College’s Jon Bakija, the US Treasury Department’s Adam Cole, and Indiana University’s Bradley T. Heim find that one-fifth of the primary taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent of income (including capital gains) work in finance. The latest data used in this study are from 2005, before the 2007-10 financial crisis altered the landscape. But between 2008 and 2012, “finance and insurance is by far the most highly represented industry among the highest earners,” find Guvenen and Kaplan, who looked at the 0.1 percent. In the rest of the 1 percent, health care is the most represented sector.

Beyond that, there’s more detailed information about only the very richest of the 0.01 percent, and it seems to suggest that the richest members of the group may own large, successful businesses. Kaplan and Stanford’s Joshua Rauh used Forbes’ “rich list” as a data set on the wealth of the richest Americans. Since 1982, Forbes has compiled an annual list of the 400 wealthiest Americans, using public information, private interviews, and valuations of comparable assets. As the rich list comprised 400 households, it represents the top 2.5 percent of the 0.01 percent—the top 0.00025 percent of US households.

But this small group could control more than a quarter of the income in the 0.01 percent. According to Saez and Zucman’s calculations, in 2012 the top 0.01 percent had an average wealth of $371 million, which would imply a collective total of $6 trillion. That same year, the estimated combined net worth of the individuals on the Forbes 400 list was $1.7 trillion.

Among the group who made the rich list, for almost one in four, finance—especially hedge funds and private equity—was the source of wealth, while 15 percent came from technology-based companies. Food and beverage companies accounted for 10 percent.

And these sectors were on the upswing. “The ‘finance and investments’ category grew in representation by around 16 percentage points, technology (both computer and medical) by 11 percentage points, and retail/restaurant by 10 percentage points,” Kaplan and Rauh write.

On the 2016 rich list, two-thirds were self-made and one-third had inherited at least part of their fortune. More than 10 percent were immigrants to the US.

How did they get so wealthy?

Piketty and Saez have theorized that investments grow faster than the economy, giving entrenched dynasties insuperable advantages. But Kaplan and Rauh argue that the super-rich are predominantly creating rather than inheriting wealth. Kaplan also says that wealth in this group has been fueled by a marriage of in-demand skills, globalization, and technology—the combination of which are allowing businesses to scale up as never before.

Skills, say many economists, are critical to the modern economy. As the US economy grows, jobs are going unfilled as companies scramble to find skilled people to hire. There’s a flip side to this: as certain skills have become scarce, this has raised the amount companies are willing to pay people who have them. The situation has similarly raised the amount of profits skilled company owners can make, and technology and globalization are further magnifying the value of in-demand skills.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 7


If this is true, the 0.01 percent are most likely benefiting from what economists call “skill-biased technological change”—the increasing return on certain skills in an economy driven by technology and globalization. Under this well-established theory, a shortage of in-demand skills raises the value of those skills in rapidly expanding markets, and new technology helps some workers’ productivity grow much more than others’, exacerbating inequality.

In the Information Age, the change has been particularly pronounced. “In business, you can use technology to do things you couldn’t do 30 years ago,” says Steve Kaplan. “You can scale your business using technology, and you can use people in India and China and all over the world—you couldn’t do that as effectively 30 years ago.” This, he argues, has been spectacularly positive for poorer people in developing countries. In 1990, the World Bank estimated that roughly 35 percent of the world lived in extreme poverty. Today, less than 11 percent of the world’s population is so impoverished.

And it has been good for wealthy residents of developed countries. For them, the result has taken the form of the “superstar” or “winner-take-all” phenomenon, first identified in a landmark 1981 paper by the late Sherwin Rosen, who taught at the University of Chicago. “In certain kinds of economic activity there is concentration of output among a few individuals,” wrote Rosen. “Relatively small numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money and dominate the activities in which they engage.”

Technology, from the internet to media such as ESPN and Bloomberg terminals, has given elite athletes, entertainers, entrepreneurs, and financiers the ability to profit on a much larger, global scale, making the fruits of their labor more valuable than what previous superstars, such as, say, Pelé or Babe Ruth, brought in. Ruth’s peak salary of $80,000 would be worth about $1.1 million in 2016 dollars, around one-thirtieth of the $33 million the highest-paid Major League Baseball player, pitcher Clayton Kershaw of the Los Angeles Dodgers, made in salary alone in 2016.

The world’s hundred highest-paid athletes, led by Cristiano Ronaldo and LeBron James, stars of soccer and basketball, respectively, “banked a cumulative $3.11 billion” over the past 12 months, Forbes calculated this past June. Among entertainers, rapper/entrepreneur Diddy and singer Beyoncé each raked in more than $100 million over the same period, Forbes estimated.

And hedge-fund managers make multiples more than top athletes and entertainers. James Simons of Renaissance Technologies and Ray Dalio of Bridgewater Associates each made more than $1 billion in 2016, even though, as Institutional Investor’s Alpha reported, the top-25 hedge-fund earners took in the least as a group since 2005, largely because of the industry’s overall poor investment performance.

“Technology allows a hedge fund to be able to manage $20 billion and invest it,” says Steve Kaplan. “I don’t think people had the systems and information to do that 20 to 30 years ago. Now they have the systems and the information to do that. That technological change is here and is not going away. If anything, it’s getting stronger.”

What should policy makers do (if anything)?

The question of what, if anything, should be done in response to the spectacular rise of the 0.01 percent is a thorny one, as Mankiw acknowledged. “At the outset, it is worth noting that addressing the issue of rising inequality necessarily involves not just economics but a healthy dose of political philosophy,” he wrote.

When policy makers want to address the concentration of income and wealth, the first place some have looked is the top marginal tax rate, which slid in the US and other developed countries after the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions. The US and UK had tax rates as high as 80 percent, wrote Saez and Piketty in the Guardian in 2013. “The job of economists should be to make a top rate tax level of 80 percent at least ‘thinkable’ again.” But on this, Steve Kaplan disagrees. Raising the top marginal rate could send people and their money scurrying for tax havens, he says, pointing to France as an example.

Raising the top tax rates in the US could also send people to take advantage of more favorable tax rules within the code itself. And closing perceived loopholes can be controversial. For example, some people working in finance benefit from the code’s treatment of carried interest, where income flowing to the general partner of an investment fund is typically treated as capital gains and therefore taxed at a lower rate.

Never mind the 1 percent Let's talk about the 0.01 percent: Extended Excerpt Image 8


“This tax preference is viewed as an unfair, market-distorting loophole by some but consistent with the tax treatment of other entrepreneurial income by others,” writes the Tax Policy Center.

Then there’s the issue of whether raising the top marginal rate could discourage business activity. The marginal rate is intended to tax individuals on their earnings, and it rises with income. But a lot of business income is being taxed at that marginal rate rather than a corporate rate. Because the top US marginal personal tax rate was lower than the corporate rate for some time, business owners had an incentive to change their form of corporate organization from the traditional C corporation, which has profits taxed at the higher, corporate rate, to a partnership, limited liability corporation, or S corporation, taxed at the lower, individual rate. By 2011, these pass-through entities accounted for most of the business income earned in the US. (For more, see “The $100 billion tax dodge,” Summer 2016.)

Policy makers should design an income-tax system that takes into account the nature of the income, and design a system that harmonizes taxes to discourage people from shopping the code for the best tax rates, Zwick suggests—recognizing this is a tall order.

And despite his research interest, Greg Kaplan says we should be careful about populist reactions that lead us to focus too much on the super-rich: “We are better off concentrating on how to improve the lives of those in the bottom 50 percent.” In this group, many workers are in desperate need of a skills upgrade. As these workers fall behind, many economists say, policy makers need to focus on better preparing them for the workforce, perhaps by investing in education, working more closely with local companies to determine what skills their workers need, and removing barriers such as onerous regulations preventing people from entering certain professions. (For more, see “How to create middle-class jobs,” Summer 2017.)

In short, there’s a split among economists. Some argue that income needs to be distributed more equitably, while others say governments should focus less on taking actions that could inhibit top earners and more on addressing the reasons others aren’t as successful. Do we slow the 0.01 percent or lift the 99.99 percent, which could be a heavier and more complex assignment? As the debate continues, members of the 0.01 percent continue on their course.

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Previous articleMay 17, 2019The Story of Stagnating Wages Was Mostly WrongData from @MichaelStrain challenges the narrative of wage stagnation, showing a 32% increase in wages of a typical worker over the past three decades, with a 25% rise for median wages and a 1/3 increase for the bottom 20%.Next articleMay 17, 2019Foreign-Born Workers Make Up Highest Percentage of U.S. Employment Since 1996Foreign-born workers accounted for 17.5% of all U.S. employees in 2018, up from 17.1% in 2017, marking the highest percentage since 1996.
Showing 45 database articles primarily about Other Comparison

The 2020 Census of American Religion

Robert Jones The Public Religion Research Institute
Date Posted:
July 12, 2021
Is Database:
Database

The proportion of Americans identifying as white and Christian has seen a significant decline over the past few decades, dropping from 65% in 1996 to 54% in 2006, and further to 43% by 2017.

The proportion of Americans identifying as white and Christian has seen a significant decline over the past few decades, dropping from 65% in 1996 to 54% in 2006, and further to 43% by 2017. This trend reflects broader demographic shifts and cultural changes within the U.S., with the white Christian population decreasing by nearly one-third. In 2020, the percentage slightly rebounded to 44%, indicating a potential slowing of this decline. Meanwhile, religiously unaffiliated Americans have grown to comprise nearly one in four (23%), highlighting a shift towards secularism. These changes have implications for economic and policy considerations, as religious affiliation can influence consumer behavior, political preferences, and social values. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for businesses and policymakers aiming to navigate the evolving cultural landscape.

Lay of the land of Americans religiosity in 2020, "....According to PRRI’s 2020 American Values Atlas, seven in ten Americans (70%) identify as Christian, including more than four in ten who identify as white Christian and more than one quarter who identify as Christian of color. Nearlyone in four Americans (23%) are religiously unaffiliated, and 5% identify with non-Christian religions. The most substantial cultural and political divides are between white Christians and Christians of color. More than four in ten Americans (44%) identify as white Christian, including white evangelical Protestants (14%), white mainline (non-evangelical) Protestants (16%), and white Catholics (12%), as well as small percentages who identify as Latter-day Saint (Mormon), Jehovah’s Witness, and Orthodox Christian.2 Christians of color include Hispanic Catholics (8%), Black Protestants (7%), Hispanic Protestants (4%), other Protestants of color (4%), and other Catholics of color (2%).3 The rest of religiously affiliated Americans belong to non-Christian groups, including 1% who are Jewish, 1% Muslim, 1% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 1% who identify with other religions. Religiously unaffiliated Americans comprise those who do not claim any particular religious affiliation (17%) and those who identify as atheist (3%) or agnostic (3%). Over the last few decades, the proportion of the U.S. population that is white Christian has declined by nearly one-third. As recently as 1996, almost two-thirds of Americans (65%) identified as white and Christian. By 2006, that had declined to 54%, and by 2017 it was down to 43%.4 The proportion of white Christians hit a low point in 2018, at 42%, and rebounded slightly in 2019 and 2020, to 44%. That tick upward indicates the decline is slowing from its pace of losing roughly 11% per decade...."

The 2020 Census of American Religion: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Robert Jones Natalie Jackson, Diana Orcés and Ian Huff, "The 2020 Census of American Religion," The Public Religion Research Institute, July 2021, https://www.prri.org/research/2020-census-of-american-religion/

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Money really can buy happiness and recessions can take it away

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 31, 2020
Is Database:
Database

A 10% rise in GDP/person is associated with a 0.5-point increase in life satisfaction on a 10-point scale, according to @TheEconomist. Recessions can drop life satisfaction scores by 1 point, highlighting the importance of economic growth & stability.

Economic data reveals a strong correlation between GDP per person and life satisfaction, indicating that higher income levels often lead to increased happiness. Studies show that a 10% rise in GDP per person is associated with a 0.5-point increase in life satisfaction on a 10-point scale. Conversely, during economic downturns, such as the 2008 financial crisis, life satisfaction scores dropped by an average of 1 point in affected countries. This suggests that recessions not only impact financial stability but also significantly affect overall well-being. Policymakers should consider these findings when designing economic policies, as boosting GDP could enhance societal happiness, while mitigating recession impacts could preserve it. The data underscores the importance of economic growth and stability in improving quality of life across populations.

Economist Staff, "Money really can buy happiness and recessions can take it away,"The Economist, July 11, 2020, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/07/11/money-really-can-buy-happiness-and-recessions-can-take-it-away

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Tax Myths Of Warrenomics

Laurence Kotlikoff Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 25, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@LaurenceKotlikoff, The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity assessments, focusing on gross rather than net taxes & overlooking transfer payments like Social Security that benefit the poor.

@LaurenceKotlikoff, The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity...
The analysis of wealth inequality by Kotlikoff highlights key misconceptions in tax progressivity assessments. A major error is focusing on gross rather than net taxes, overlooking transfer payments like Social Security that benefit the poor. Saez and Zucman's approach, which measures progressivity on a one-year basis, fails to account for double taxation on future income from savings, understating taxes for the wealthy who save more. Age adjustments are also neglected, skewing perceptions of tax fairness as older individuals appear to pay less due to past tax contributions. For 40-year-olds, the top 1% face a 34.5% net tax rate on remaining lifetime resources, while the bottom quintile receives a 46.6% net subsidy. Current-year net rates further misrepresent progressivity, ranging from -9.8% for the bottom 20% to 38.2% for the top 1%. These insights challenge prevailing narratives and underscore the complexity of accurately assessing tax burdens across different demographics.

The biggest mistake is to focus on gross, not net, taxes. They ignore transfer payments, like Social Security, which are disproportionately paid to the poor. In doing so, they mistake language for economics.

Messrs. Saez and Zucman’s second mistake is measuring progressivity on a one-year rather than a remaining-lifetime basis. That ignores the fiscal system’s double taxation: Income earned, taxed and saved this year will be subject to future taxation on interest, dividends and capital gains. This omission disproportionately understates taxes for the rich, who save at a higher rate. The current-year focus also understates benefits paid to the poor, since future benefits are a bigger share of their resources.

Their third mistake is failing to adjust for age. The old have paid most of their lifetime taxes, which makes them now look like tax cheats, particularly those who saved out of previously highly taxed labor income. With changing demographics, this problem will deeply confuse tax progressivity comparisons over time.

I’ll focus on 40-year-olds, but the results are similar for all age groups. Each dollar of pretax remaining lifetime resources of those in the top 1% of the resource distribution is, on average, taxed on net at a 34.5% rate. For those in the top quintile, the average net tax rate is 28.4%. For those in the bottom quintile, every dollar of pre-tax resources is matched by a 46.6% netsubsidy. (The tax rises steadily to 4.2% for the second quintile, 12.6% for the third and 18.5% for the fourth.)

The average net rates for the current year only (not including future net taxes) for this cohort understate true progressivity. They range from negative 9.8% for the bottom 20% to positive 38.2% for the top 1%.

40 to 50 year olds:

Richest 1%

Poorest 25%

40 to 49 years

Net tax rate

Share of consumption

Share of income

Share of wealth

Richest 1%

34.5%

14.5%

17.9%

34.3%

Highest 20%

28.5%

Lowest 20%

(46.6)

7.3

4.0

0.6

Laurence Kotlikoff, “Tax Myths Of Warrenomics,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-myths-of-warrenomics-11571351806

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Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade

B. Ravikumar and Brian Reinbold Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
June 25, 2020
Is Database:
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US Bilateral Trade Balance Adjusted For Valued Added Versus Gross Trade Shrinks Deficit 40% With Canada And Mexico, 20% WIth China, Grows Deficit 40% With Japan, Twice As Large WIth ROK.

The U.S. bilateral trade balance shows significant variation when comparing value-added trade to gross trade. With Canada and Mexico, the U.S. trade deficit is 40% smaller on average when considering value-added trade, reflecting the reliance on U.S. content in exports. In 2015, the deficit with Mexico was halved under this measure. Conversely, the deficit with China is 20% smaller, while it grows 40% with Japan and doubles with South Korea, highlighting the role of high value-added foreign content in Chinese exports. These shifts underscore the importance of accounting for global supply chain complexities in trade statistics.

New FRBSL note:“…U.S. bilateral trade balance can vary significantly depending on whether one looks at value-added trade or gross trade. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico shrinks considerably and is on average 40 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance. Futhermore, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was cut in half in 2015. These changes likely reflect the fact that many exports to the U.S. rely on content from other countries including the U.S., as we saw in the vehicle example. Also, the U.S. trade deficit with China is on average 20 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance, but it is 40 percent larger with Japan and twice as large with South Korea. Again, these changes likely reflect the fact that many Chinese exports to the U.S. rely on higher value-added foreign content(e.g., from Japan and South Korea)….”B. Ravikumar and Brian Reinbold, "Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade," Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, June 2020, https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020/02/14/value-added-trade-vs-gross-tradeValue-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade

2"Measuring Trade in Value Added," inInterconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains. OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013.

1de Gortari, Alonso. "Disentangling Global Value Chains." Working Paper, November 2019.

Notes

Conventional trade statistics may have been sufficient when goods were produced entirely within a nation's borders and then exported to other countries; but with increasingly complicated supply chains and an increasingly interconnected global economy, value-added trade can provide a more accurate picture of global trade.

Also, the U.S. trade deficit with China is on average 20 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance, but it is 40 percent larger with Japan and twice as large with South Korea. Again, these changes likely reflect the fact that many Chinese exports to the U.S. rely on higher value-added foreign content (e.g., from Japan and South Korea).

For example, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico shrinks considerably and is on average 40 percent smaller when looking at the value-added trade balance as opposed to the gross trade balance. Futhermore, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was cut in half in 2015. These changes likely reflect the fact that many exports to the U.S. rely on content from other countries including the U.S., as we saw in the vehicle example.

Value-Added Trade vs. Gross Trade: Extended Excerpt Image 1


We see from the figure that the U.S. bilateral trade balance can vary significantly depending on whether one looks at value-added trade or gross trade.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development provides value-added trade statistics from 2005-15.2The figure shows the U.S. trade balance from 2005-15 with several major trading partners in terms of real gross trade and real value-added trade.

Additionally, as we saw in the vehicle example above, such measures neglect the role of other countries in the supply chain. One way to combat this issue is to look at the value added, such as labor compensation and profits, by each country at each step of the production process. This provides a better way of incorporating the intricacies of today's global supply chain into trade accounting.

Traditional trade measures record gross, or total, flows of goods and services every time they cross a border. This includes the cost of inputs plus the value added by each country. Such traditional trade measures lead to double counting because countries trade intermediate goods for further processing.

For example, when Mexico assembles a vehicle, only one-third of the vehicle's value is derived from Mexican parts and labor. The rest is due to foreign components; about 74 percent of these foreign parts is imported from the U.S.1However, when Mexico ships this vehicle to the U.S., the entire factory cost of the vehicle, which includes the cost ofall of the partsand assembly, will be added to the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico despite the fact that much of the vehicle's value comes from U.S. parts. In other words, the U.S. would run a much larger trade deficit in terms of gross trade with Mexico than in terms of value-­added trade.

The rise of globalization has led to increasingly complicated supply chains. Raw materials and intermediate goods now move strategically throughout the world before a final good reaches the consumer. Traditional measures of trade often do a poor job of capturing this complexity.

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The Distribution of Household Income, 2016

CBO Staff Congressional Budget Office
Date Posted:
June 12, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The share of pretax income for households in the 80th to 99th % increased modestly from 29% to 31% btw 1979 and 2016, @USCBOOffice reports.

Between 1979 and 2016, the share of pretax income for households in the 80th to 99th % increased modestly, reflecting a shift in income distribution. This group saw their share rise from 29% to 31%, indicating a gradual concentration of income among higher earners. In contrast, the bottom 20% experienced a decline in their share from 7% to 5%, highlighting growing income inequality. The top 1% saw a more significant increase, with their share rising from 9% to 16%, underscoring the disproportionate gains at the very top. These changes suggest that while the middle-upper income brackets have seen some growth, the most substantial gains have been concentrated among the wealthiest, raising concerns about economic disparity and its implications for economic policy and social equity.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). July 9, 2019. “The Distribution of Household Income, 2016.”https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55413

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Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry

Drew Desilver Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
June 5, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Immigrants made up 17.1% of the US workforce in 2014, but didn’t form a majority in any industry. They were most prevalent in private households (45%), followed by textile manufacturing (36%) and agriculture (33%).

In 2014, immigrants constituted 17.1% of the U.S. workforce, totaling approximately 27.6m workers out of 161.4m, with 12.1% being lawful immigrants and 5% unauthorized. Despite their significant presence, immigrants did not form a majority in any U.S. industry. The most immigrant-intensive industry was private households, where 45% of workers were immigrants, followed by textile, apparel, and leather manufacturing (36%) and agriculture (33%). In terms of occupations, nearly half (46%) of those in farming, fishing, and forestry were immigrants. While lawful immigrants were predominantly employed in retail (10%), educational services (8%), and non-hospital health care services (7%), unauthorized immigrants were mainly in construction (16%), eating and drinking places (14%), and administrative support services (9%). The immigrant share of the workforce has grown from 12% in 1995 to 17.1% in 2014, indicating their increasing role in the U.S. labor market.

Drew Desilver, "Immigrants don’t make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry,"Pew Research Center, March 16, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/16/immigrants-dont-make-up-a-majority-of-workers-in-any-u-s-industry/

Immigrants don’t make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry

Immigrants are more likely than U.S.-born workers to be employed in a number of specific jobs, including sewing machine operators, plasterers, stucco masons and manicurists. But there are no major U.S. industries in which immigrants outnumber the U.S. born, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of government data.

Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry: Extended Excerpt Image 1


All told, immigrants made up 17.1% of the total U.S. workforce in 2014, or about 27.6 million workers out of 161.4 million. About 19.6 million workers, or 12.1% of the total workforce, were in the U.S. legally; about 8 million, or 5%, entered the country without legal permission or overstayed their visas. (Roughly 10% of unauthorized immigrants have been granted temporary protection from deportation and eligibility to work under two federal programs, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and Temporary Protected Status.)

There are two main ways to look at the kinds of work people do: by industry (that is, the business their employer is engaged in) and by occupation (the kind of work they do on the job). To get a sense of the work immigrants to the U.S. do most frequently, we relied on 2014 workforce estimates by Pew Research Center. The estimates, based on augmented data from the Census Bureau’s 2014 American Community Survey, cover all workers ages 16 and older who reported being in a civilian industry or occupation, including both lawful and unauthorized immigrants.

Private households were the most immigrant-intensive “industry” in 2014. Of the 947,000 people working for private households, 45% were immigrants, with lawful immigrants slightly outnumbering unauthorized immigrants. The industries with the next-biggest shares of immigrant workers were textile, apparel and leather manufacturers (36%) and the farm sector: A third (33%) of the nearly 2 million agriculture workers in 2014 were born outside the U.S.

While these industries had the biggest share of immigrant workers, they weren’t the biggest overall employers of immigrants, since industries with a smaller share of immigrants may have more of them in absolute numbers.

The overall U.S. workforce - U.S.-born and immigrant (both lawful and unauthorized) - is concentrated in a relatively small number of industries. But while the 10 biggest-employing industries are the same for U.S.-born and lawful immigrant workers (and in almost the same order), the employment pattern among unauthorized immigrants is markedly different.

Retail, for instance, was the single biggest employer of lawful immigrants (10% of all lawful immigrant workers), followed by educational services (8%) and non-hospital health care services (7%). By contrast, the top industry for unauthorized immigrant workers was construction, which included 16% of all unauthorized immigrant workers. Construction was followed by eating and drinking places, which had 14% of unauthorized immigrant workers, and administrative and support services (9%). Those three industries each included between 5% and 7% of lawful immigrants.

Any given industry employs workers in many different occupations, and people may do much the same job in any number of different industries. The occupational group with the highest share of immigrants in 2014 was farming, fishing and forestry: Nearly half (46%) of the 1.2 million people in those occupations were foreign born. More than a third (35%) of the 6.7 million people in building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations were immigrants, as were 27% of the 8.3 million people in construction and extraction occupations.

And as with industries, the distribution of occupations differs significantly between lawful and unauthorized immigrants. More than half of all unauthorized immigrant workers in 2014 were in just four occupational groups: construction and extraction; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; food preparation and serving; and production. In contrast, those four groups accounted for only about a quarter of lawful immigrants’ jobs. The biggest occupational sectors for lawful immigrant workers were office and administrative support, sales, and management (each with 9% to 10% of the total).

Immigrants dont make up a majority of workers in any U.S. industry: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Looking at specific occupations, an estimated 63% of “miscellaneous personal appearance workers” (a category that includes manicurists and pedicurists, makeup artists, shampooers and skin care specialists) are immigrants, the highest share of any occupation. Immigrants account for about 60% of graders and sorters of agricultural products as well as plasterers and stucco masons, 55% of sewing machine operators, and about half of maids and housekeepers, tailors and dressmakers, and miscellaneous agricultural workers.

The immigrant share of the U.S. workforce has grown over time. Back in 1995, according to Pew Research Center estimates, immigrants (lawful and unauthorized) made up about 12% of the total civilian workforce. The lawful-immigrant share has risen gradually, from an estimated 9% in 1995 to 12% in 2014; the unauthorized-immigrant share rose from about 3% in 1995 to 5% in 2005, but has been roughly stable ever since. Immigrants, and their U.S.-born children, are projected to drive growth in the nation’s working-age population for at least the next two decades.

Views on immigration’s impact on U.S.-born workers have shifted significantly over the past decade, according to a Pew Research Center survey released last year. Americans then were almost evenly divided, with 42% saying the growing number of immigrants working in the U.S. helps American workers and 45% saying it hurts workers who were born in the U.S. In 2006, 55% said having more immigrants hurt U.S. workers, with just 28% saying it helped them.

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