Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 203
  • Primary focus 114
For whatever topics you select (currently: Inflation):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

How Much Are We “Taxed” by Surprise Inflation?

AI Summary. The authors estimate that surprise inflation cut the real value of US government debt by 3.3% of GDP, an effective 6.5% "tax" on wealth held in nominal Treasury securities, with the largest effect on securities maturing in two to five years. About 38% of that debt is held by foreigners and 62% by US households.

Yu-Ting Chiang and Jesse LaBelle Federal Reserve Bank Of St Louis
Date Posted:
April 18, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Surprise inflation in 2021 reduced the real value of US government debt by 3.3% of GDP, a 6.5% “tax” on wealth held in nominal Treasuries, 62% of which is held by US households.

How much does surprise inflation reduce the real value of government debt?

Core argument: Surprise inflation in 2021 cut the real value of U.S. government debt by 3.3% of GDP, amounting to a 6.5% "tax" on wealth held in nominal Treasuries.

In 2021, surprise inflation significantly reduced the real value of U.S. government debt by 3.3% of GDP, effectively imposing a 6.5% "tax" on wealth held in nominal Treasuries. This inflation shock, the largest in four decades, benefited the U.S. government as a major nominal borrower, redistributing wealth from debtholders to the government. With U.S. government debt exceeding 100% of GDP, the impact was substantial, particularly affecting Treasury securities maturing in two to five years. While 38% of this debt is owned by foreigners, 62% is held by U.S. households, highlighting the domestic impact of this inflation-induced wealth transfer. Historically, such effects have been minimal, but the scale of recent inflation surprises has led to unprecedented redistribution, underscoring the significant economic implications for both policymakers and investors.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Surprise inflation in 2021 cut the real value of U.S. government debt by 3.3% of GDP, amounting to a 6.5% "tax" on wealth held in nominal Treasuries.
  2. The 2021 inflation shock, the largest in four decades, redistributed wealth from debtholders to the U.S. government as a major nominal borrower, with the effect concentrated in Treasury securities maturing in two to five years.
  3. Foreigners own 38% of U.S. government debt and U.S. households hold 62%, placing most of the inflation-induced wealth transfer on domestic holders, with that debt exceeding 100% of GDP.

we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how much the U.S. government gains and loses from inflation shocks. With total U.S. government debt increasing to more than 100% of U.S. GDP last year and with the large surprise increase in inflation in 2021, the U.S. government is a big winner. The decrease in the real value of debt amounts to 3.3% of U.S. GDP—at the expense of the debtholders, who were effectively hit by a 6.5% tax on the wealth held in nominal Treasury....In the next figure, we plotted the year-end nominal value of Treasury debt as a percentage of nominal GDP by payment horizons, for all Treasury debt due in one year or further. As shown in the figure, the largest share of current outstanding Treasury debt is debt maturing in three to five years, followed closely by two-year maturities. This means that the two-year and five-year inflation expectation shocks will have the largest redistributive impact on the government budget....In the next figure, we plotted how much inflation surprises have decreased the real value of U.S. government debt as a percentage of U.S. GDP each year over the previous four decades. A positive number means a redistribution from debtholders to the U.S. government, an inflation tax on the debt holders. Historically, the effects of inflation shocks, both positive and negative, have been small—barely exceeding 1% of U.S. GDP in the most extreme cases. However, the large inflation surprises we experienced last year, together with the ever-increasing Treasury debt in recent years, has led to an unprecedented, large-scale redistribution. This has resulted in an inflation tax that amounts to 3.3% of U.S. GDP imposed on Treasury debtholders—that is, a tax rate of 6.5% on wealth invested in Treasury securities due in one year or further. While 38% of the Treasury debt, not counting that which is held by the Federal Reserve, is owned by foreigners, nearly 62% of this debt is held by U.S. households, either directly or indirectly, according to the most recent release of the Financial Accounts of the United States.

Yu-Ting Chiang and Jesse LaBelle, "How Much Are We “Taxed” by Surprise Inflation?"Federal Reserve Bank Of St Louis, March 2, 2022, https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2022/mar/how-much-are-we-taxed-surprise-inflation

In an economy, borrowing and lending are typically conducted in nominal terms: A lender provides a loan for a certain sum of money and a borrower repays that exact sum plus interest. This means that, whenever the price level of goods and services is different from what people expected—an “inflation shock”—each transaction has a “winner” and a “loser” in terms of the real value delivered (in comparison to what was agreed upon).

In particular, when inflation turns out to be higher than expected (a positive inflation shock), then what the borrower needs to repay will be much less valuable than what was expected when the agreement was made, that is, a positive inflation shock benefits nominal borrowers at the expense of lenders.

The U.S. government is one of the largest of these nominal borrowers in the world. Over the past 40 years, the nominal U.S. government outstanding debt averaged around 57% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). In this article, we used inflation expectation data from the Cleveland Fed to calculate inflation surprises over the past four decades, and together with data on U.S. Treasury debt from the Center for Research in Security Prices, we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how much the U.S. government gains and loses from inflation shocks.

With total U.S. government debt increasing to more than 100% of U.S. GDP last year and with the large surprise increase in inflation in 2021, the U.S. government is a big winner. The decrease in the real value of debt amounts to 3.3% of U.S. GDP—at the expense of the debtholders, who were effectively hit by a 6.5% tax on the wealth held in nominal Treasury.

Inflation Shocks: From 1984 to 2021

The Cleveland Fed provides estimates of inflation expectations each month over different horizons.1 For each year, we calculate how much the initial expectation has changed over the course of one year because of new information about the economy. For example, if last year you expected inflation to be 2%, but actual inflation over the year turns out to be 4%, then that is an inflation shock of 2 percentage points.

Similar logic can be applied to longer horizons as well. For example, if last year (say, January 2021) you expected inflation to be 2% per year on average for the next five years (the period January 2021 to January 2026), but with new information that arrived over the previous year, now today, in January 2022, you update your inflation expectations for the same period (January 2021 to January 2026) to average 4% instead. That represents an inflation shock of 2 percentage points annually for the five-year horizon.

In the next figure, we plotted the annualized inflation shocks in the United States over five different horizons.

How Much Are We “Taxed” by Surprise Inflation?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The inflation shock people experienced in 2021 was the largest over the last four decades in terms of one-year, two-year, five-year and 10-year horizons, while the shock to 30-year horizons is the largest since 2000.

To illustrate how inflation shocks redistribute between borrowers and lenders of nominal contracts, consider the following example: Suppose you are wanting to buy a car that costs $10,000 today. You agree to borrow the $10,000 from your bank today and pay it back, with 5% interest—for a total of $10,500—one year from today. Suppose the bank and you both expect inflation to be zero percent. However, if after a year, realized inflation turns out to be 10%, then the $10,500 you promised to pay is worth only $9,450 in today’s dollars, and you are actually paying back less than the principle you borrowed.

This example illustrates the redistributive effect of surprises in inflation. This phenomenon also holds for longer horizon shocks—the original value of contracts changes when agreements are made based on the expected cumulative inflation rate over the agreed horizon, and the market updates its expectation over time with the arrival of new information.

U.S. Treasury Debt

The U.S. government is one of the largest nominal borrowers in the world. This means the same redistribution happens between the U.S. government and its debtholders when the U.S. government borrows money in nominal terms today and pays it back at agreed-upon dates in the future.

Rather than a single lump-sum payment, as in the earlier example, Treasury securities mature in a wide range of horizons. To understand how Treasury debts of different maturities are exposed to inflation shocks, we calculate, for each year, the year-end nominal value of Treasury debt that is outstanding and priced at the beginning of each year.2

Consider an example: If in January 2021, the U.S. government needs to make a payment of $10,500 in one year, in January 2022, and $10,500 in two years, in January 2023, and the market nominal interest rate (the forward rate) is expected to be 5% between January 2022 and January 2023; then in January 2021, the year-end value for the one-year horizon is $10,500, and the year-end value for the two-year horizon is $10,000 ($10,500/1.05).

These values represent the year-end amounts the U.S. government agrees to pay in January 2021 that are exposed to inflation shocks, and they allow us to understand how changes in the real value of nominal amounts from over the year affect the real value of outstanding debt of different horizons that the U.S. government had promised to pay—that is, how inflation shocks of different horizons affect the total real value of the U.S. government debt.

In the next figure, we plotted the year-end nominal value of Treasury debt as a percentage of nominal GDP by payment horizons, for all Treasury debt due in one year or further. As shown in the figure, the largest share of current outstanding Treasury debt is debt maturing in three to five years, followed closely by two-year maturities. This means that the two-year and five-year inflation expectation shocks will have the largest redistributive impact on the government budget.

How Much Are We “Taxed” by Surprise Inflation?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


The Implied “Inflation Tax”

How do inflation surprises affect the real value of Treasury debt? Suppose that in January 2021, when people agreed to lend money to the government, inflation was expected to be zero percent for the next two years; to keep this example simple, we also assume a forward rate of zero. However, over the first year, inflation was actually 5%, and people now expect inflation to average 3% in the two-year horizon: an inflation shock of 5% for the one-year horizon and 1% for the second year. As a result, payment of $1 at the end of the first year loses around 4.76% of its originally expected value (-4.76% ≈ 1/1.05 − 1), and a payment at the end of the second year with value of $1 loses around 5.7% of its originally expected value (-5.7% ≈ 1/1.032 − 1).

If we apply the logic from the previous example to a larger scale, in January 2021, the government promised two payments with one- and two-year maturities to bond holders that have nominal value equivalent to $1.6 trillion and $3.15 trillion respectively in January 2022. With these amounts, the inflation shocks considered above for the one- and two-year horizons will lead to a 4.76% decrease in real value for the first payment—a loss of $76.2 billion ($1.6 trillion ×4.76%)—and a decrease of 5.7% for the second payment—for a loss of $179.55 billion ($3.15 trillion ×5.7%)—relative to their original values. Following this logic, we calculate how inflation shocks redistribute between the U.S. Treasury and its debtholders each year.

In the next figure, we plotted how much inflation surprises have decreased the real value of U.S. government debt as a percentage of U.S. GDP each year over the previous four decades. A positive number means a redistribution from debtholders to the U.S. government, an inflation tax on the debt holders.

How Much Are We “Taxed” by Surprise Inflation?: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Historically, the effects of inflation shocks, both positive and negative, have been small—barely exceeding 1% of U.S. GDP in the most extreme cases. However, the large inflation surprises we experienced last year, together with the ever-increasing Treasury debt in recent years, has led to an unprecedented, large-scale redistribution. This has resulted in an inflation tax that amounts to 3.3% of U.S. GDP imposed on Treasury debtholders—that is, a tax rate of 6.5% on wealth invested in Treasury securities due in one year or further. While 38% of the Treasury debt, not counting that which is held by the Federal Reserve, is owned by foreigners, nearly 62% of this debt is held by U.S. households, either directly or indirectly, according to the most recent release of the Financial Accounts of the United States.

Conclusion

The federal government is the largest nominal debtor in the economy. This means it is either the biggest winner or loser from every inflation shock. With the unprecedented positive inflation shock we have experienced over the last year, the federal government has come out as a big winner, with an inflation tax that amounts to around 3.3% of GDP, equivalent to a 6.5% tax on wealth held in Treasury securities. These numbers can be expected to change if there are more surprises in inflation.

Notes and References

These values are computed by a model based on Treasury yields, inflation data, inflation swaps, and survey-based measures of inflation expectations.
We exclude debt held by the Federal Reserve.

  • Inflation
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • GDP
    • Growth
Previous articleApril 18, 2022Has the Willingness to Work Fallen during the Covid Pandemic?Surveys suggest a 4.6% decline in desired hours worked during pandemic, double the decline in LFPR.Next articleApril 18, 2022Inclusive Monetary Policy: How Tight Labor Markets Facilitate Broad-Based Employment GrowthExpansionary monetary policy boosts employment for workers with weak labor force attachment, such as Blacks, high school dropouts, and women, especially in tight labor markets.
Showing 114 database articles primarily about Inflation
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove 'Database'

The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices

AI Summary. Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.

Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David Weinstein Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.

How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?

Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.

Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
  2. The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
  3. Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.

Related Articles:

  • The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026 — The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Choking Iran's Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy — US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
  • Inflation
  • Energy
  • GDP
  • Politics
  • Security

A Return To Monetarism?

AI Summary. The author argues that a surge in money growth beginning in 2020 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the sample period since 1967, and that subsequent monetary tightening produced strong disinflationary pressures. Had policymakers tracked money growth using a price-target model, they might have tightened sooner and avoided some of the inflation.

Peter Ireland, Stephen Miran and Nouriel Roubini Hudson Bay Capital
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Ireland, Miran, and Roubini compare the actual price level to the predictions of an equilibrium model relating prices to money supply. Predicted inflation hit a 60-year high in 2020–21, months before inflation surged and then crashed once the Fed hiked.

Would tracking money growth have helped policymakers tighten sooner?

Core argument: The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.

The graphs in Figure 3 show quite clearly how the surge in money growth starting in 2020 and continuing in 2021 put enormous upward pressure on inflation, to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period. And while the large and negative price gaps that followed in 2022 and 2023 are likewise indicative of strong disinflationary pressures applied through subsequent monetary tightening, one can’t see these graphs without asking: Had Federal Open Market Committee members been monitoring measures of money growth with the help of the P-star [price target based on monetary aggregates] model, might they have ended QE and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly, thereby avoiding at least some of the post-2020 inflation? Of course, massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 surge in inflation, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level. The model simply observes that regardless of its originating source, excessive money growth signals that inappropriate macroeconomic policies are fueling higher inflation. Fiscal expansions that expand money supply will be reflected in a P-star model.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.
  2. The large negative price gaps of 2022 and 2023 indicate strong disinflationary pressures from subsequent monetary tightening, raising the question of whether FOMC members using the P-star model would have ended quantitative easing and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly.
  3. Massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 inflation surge, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level, and fiscal expansions that expand the money supply are reflected in a P-star model.

Related Articles:

  • Money and Inflation — The M2 money supply has contracted for the first time in sixty years, shrinking at an annual rate of nearly 5%, yet inflation has remained high rather than turning to deflation. The author argues this undercuts the claim that money supply growth drives inflation, since the same logic implies severe deflation should now follow.
  • State Dependence of Monetary Policy During Global Supply Chain Disruptions — The authors present descriptive evidence that global supply chain disruptions were associated with elevated transportation costs, goods supply-demand imbalances, and a surge in goods prices, steepening the aggregate supply curve. In the disrupted state, a contractionary monetary policy shock produces muted responses in real output and spare capacity but a substantially stronger decline in goods prices.
  • What Next for r*? A Capital Market Equilibrium Perspective On The Natural Rate of Interest — A capital-market equilibrium model estimates that the steady-state safe natural rate of interest across advanced economies has fallen from about 5% to about 0%, driven by slower growth, demographics, higher mark-ups, and rising risk premia. The author estimates that artificial-intelligence-driven growth and heightened inflation risk could each raise it by about 1 percentage point.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Home Alone: Inflation And The New Fed Chair

AI Summary. Current readings on labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness and the output gap resemble conditions that have historically preceded Federal Reserve rate increases rather than cuts, and futures markets are pricing in hikes. Averaging several monetary policy rules implies a policy rate of 4.00%–4.85% versus the current 3.50%–3.75%.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
May 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Cembalest notes labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector and the implied output gap are “much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them.”

Do current inflation indicators point toward rate hikes rather than cuts?

Core argument: Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.

Inflation indicators the Fed watches include labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector, supply chain tightness and the “output gap” which measures how far actual growth is above/below potential growth. [The two] charts plot these four variables at the time of prior Fed decisions to increase or cut policy rates; green dots indicate when the Fed cut, red dots indicate when the Fed tightened and yellow circles show today’s values. In other words: current values are much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them. That may be why the futures curve is now pricing in Fed hikes instead of the cuts that were priced in at the start of the year. Superwonky: averaging several different monetary rules of thumb (Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, forward-looking) yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00% - 4.85% compared to the current range of 3.50% - 3.75%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.
  2. Labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness, and the output gap sit much closer to conditions that historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates than to cut them.
  3. The futures curve is pricing in Fed hikes rather than the cuts priced in at the start of the year.

Related Articles:

  • US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns — The University of Michigan's consumer sentiment index fell 5 points to 44.8, a record low and weaker than all economist projections in a Bloomberg survey. Consumers expect prices to rise 3.9% annually over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5%, and 4.8% over the coming year.
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — U.S. inflation has remained above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022 while government borrowing runs high and companies borrow heavily to fund AI build-out. Even so, the 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% while the 10-year yield, at 4.67%, sat below its October 2023 level.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms