The Covid Pandemic Left an Extra 13 Million Americans Single
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Showing 40 database articles primarily about Family/Marriage
America's Demoralized Men, Part II: Lost Pathways, Greater Struggles
AI Summary. Over 40% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography use and daily gambling each associated with failure self-perception rates above 60%.
Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family Studies- Date Posted:
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An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.
Are young men's struggles with addiction driving their sense of failure?
Core argument: 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- 42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
- More than half of young men gamble at some frequency, with 23% doing so daily—a pattern concentrated among those also exhibiting compulsive pornography use and self-perceived failure.
- 43% of young men consume pornography daily or several times a week, with daily users (27%) disproportionately represented among those who describe themselves as failures (63%).
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The Child Cost Index
AI Summary. The relative price of raising children has not risen substantially compared to adult consumption, as rapid increases in childcare and tuition costs were offset by other components of household spending, leaving the overall child cost index roughly in line with adult benchmarks.
Christina Patterson and Heather Sarsons National Bureau of Economic Research- Date Posted:
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A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.
Core argument: The Child Cost Index tracked closely with adult consumption benchmarks, as rapid childcare and tuition price increases were offset by other components of the child-rearing basket, leaving the relative price of children largely stable.
Figure 6 shows that real spending on children has increased substantially. Panel (a) plots real spending per child, deflated [by the authors’ new] child cost index, together with real spending per parent, deflated by [their adult cost index.] Both series rise by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023 and move closely together over the medium run. Thus, households devote more real resources to children today than in 1990, but this increase appears to be part of a broader rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific expansion in required market inputs. Panel (b) reinforces this interpretation by plotting the share of total household spending allocated to children, separately by family size. Children absorb a large share of household resources in every year of the sample, but that share is strikingly stable over time within family size. Households with one child allocate just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023. The sacrifice of adult consumption associated with children is therefore large, but it is not a recent development. Panel (b) also reveals clear economies of scale in child-rearing. Moving from one to two children raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, and the incremental spending share falls further for larger families.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- The Child Cost Index tracked closely with adult consumption benchmarks, as rapid childcare and tuition price increases were offset by other components of the child-rearing basket, leaving the relative price of children largely stable.
- Parental time costs shift the level of the Child Cost Index but contribute little to its growth rate, because mothers today forgo fewer market-work hours than prior generations, reducing the forgone-earnings penalty of child-rearing.
- The full child-rearing cost bundle rose roughly in step with adult spending rather than outpacing it, making a large increase in the relative price of children an insufficient explanation for the recent fertility decline.
Related Articles:
- America’s Big Cities Are Rapidly Losing Kids — Children under 18 in large U.S. cities have declined 6x faster than the national rate, with children under 5 falling 15% in big cities versus 7% nationwide, even in cities with overall population growth.
- City Parenting Has Become A Financial Flex — The child population in major U.S. cities has fallen sharply, but wealthy urban neighborhoods are seeing growth in white children, reversing the broader decline and concentrating family life among high-income residents in premium zip codes.
- The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — CBO forecasts US population growth over the next decade will be 0.3% annually. Starting in 2030, net immigration will be the sole driver of population growth…
GLP-1–Induced Weight Loss and the Female Obesity Penalty
AI Summary. GLP-1-driven weight loss reduces the female obesity penalty in marriage markets, with single women gaining an 18% higher probability of partnering and previously unemployed women gaining a 27% higher employment rate after 1.5+ years of treatment.
Rebecca Diamond Harvard University- Date Posted:
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Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.
Core argument: The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market.
BMI is flat before women start [GLP-1 treatment] and then falls (Figure 2, Panel A). All groups lose between 1.4 and 2.5 BMI points in the post period. These effects grow to between 2.7 and 4.2 BMI points at 1.5+ years after initiation. The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market. Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with a partner by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight. Partnered women’s relationships, by contrast, are stable. Their partnership probability barely moves (0.1 points, s.e. 1.8), and there is no excess relationship dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7). The marriage-market response is the making of new matches, not the breaking or remaking of old ones. In contrast, single women’s weight loss seems to dramatically affect first impressions of potential partners, leading to a large increase in marriage and cohabitation. This is consistent with prior work on the obesity penalty negatively affecting women in the marriage market. Figure 2, panels C and D show that women not employed at baseline move into work: their employment rate rises 13pp overall and 27pp after six or more quarters, and their weekly hours rise by nearly ten hours at the longer horizon.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market.
- Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with.
- 1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight.
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- National-Level and State-Level Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity Among Children, Adolescents, and Adults in the USA — Almost 75% of American adults were overweight or obese in 2021, up from ~ 50% in 1990.
The Collapse of Teen Fertility in the Digital Era
AI Summary. Teen birth rates fell sharply across high-income countries after 2007 as smartphone adoption shifted peer interaction from in-person to digital, reducing unstructured contact where most unintended teen conceptions occur. Each 10% rise in broadband or 4G coverage correlated with ~10–19 percentage point larger declines in teen birth rates, while teen
Nathan Hudson and Hernan Moscoso Boedo University of Cincinnati- Date Posted:
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US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.
Does digital connectivity reduce teen pregnancy by limiting in-person contact?
Core argument: U.S. teen birth rates fell 71% for ages 15–19 between 2007–2024 vs. 9% increase for ages 35–39, driven by smartphone-mediated.
Teen fertility collapsed almost everywhere in the world starting around 2007. This is a striking fact. Countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends all saw similar breaks in the same window. Whatever caused it was something global—something that arrived in roughly the same form in all of these places at roughly the same time… between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell by 71 percent, 20–24 by 43 percent, 25–29 by 23 percent, 30–34 by 1 percent, and 35–39 rose by 9 percent… U.S. teens reduced in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer-leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes… Under-18 conception rates accelerated from −1.3 percent per year pre-2007 to −8.9 percent post-2007, a 6.8x acceleration that nearly matches the U.S. 5.6x acceleration.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- U.S. teen birth rates fell 71% for ages 15–19 between 2007–2024 vs. 9% increase for ages 35–39, driven by smartphone-mediated.
- Counties with 10 percentage points higher broadband penetration experienced teen birth rate declines 18.9 pts larger during 2003–2018, establishing digital.
- Teen in-person socializing collapsed 44% from 68 to 38 minutes daily (2003–2019) while computer leisure quadrupled, with 0.97 correlation to.
Related Articles:
- The Happiness Crash of 2020 — The racial gap in happiness narrowed sharply after 2020, while the happiness advantage of married people over unmarried people remained unchanged at over 30 points, and confidence in public and private institutions fell by double digits across the board.
- Why U.S. Test Scores Are in a ‘Generation-Long Decline’ — U.S. student test scores have fallen across 83% of school districts in reading and 70% in math over the past decade, with declines affecting rich and poor districts equally. Reading scores were already falling as fast before the pandemic as during it, and recovery since has been slow.
- US College Students’ Well-Being — Blanchflower and Sacerdote found that in 2021-2022, 10% of Dartmouth students reported suicidal ideation. Those reporting frequent financial stress were 8 ppts…
Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once
AI Summary. Global birth rates are falling faster than predicted, driven primarily by fewer people forming couples rather than couples having fewer children. Smartphone adoption timing correlates with birth rate declines across countries at different income levels, while housing costs, education gaps, and government subsidies explain only part of the trend.
John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times- Date Posted:
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The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).
Is smartphone adoption reshaping how people form relationships globally?
Core argument: Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once.
US, British and Australian birth rates for teens and young adults were broadly flat during the early 2000s but began to fall markedly from 2007. The same slide began in France and Poland around 2009, and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012. What had been steady declines in fertility in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal became precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015. All of these inflection points coincided with the mass adoption of smartphones in local markets — as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. In country after country the birth rate plunged after the introduction of smartphones, no matter what the previous trend was. The younger the age group, the more pronounced the downturn — a mirror image of smartphone usage patterns.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once.
- Japan’s working-age population shrinkage explains its economic stagnation since the 1990s, with GDP per working-age adult remaining productive while total.
- The primary driver is fewer couple formation rather than couples having fewer children.
Related Articles:
- The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
- Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Nicholas Eberstadt warns that depopulation will stress families as smaller families “become ever less able to bear weight—even as the demands that might…
- The Collapse of Teen Fertility in the Digital Era — Teen birth rates fell sharply across high-income countries after 2007 as smartphone adoption shifted peer interaction from in-person to digital, reducing unstructured contact where most unintended teen conceptions occur. Each 10% rise in broadband or 4G coverage correlated with ~10–19 percentage point larger declines in teen birth rates, while teen
Record High Number of 18-Year-Olds in the US Today
AI Summary. The US currently has more 18-year-olds than at any point in history, but that population will decline 14% over the next decade.
Torsten Sløk Apollo- Date Posted:
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The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.
What implications does a declining youth population have for the economy?
Core argument: The 18-year-old population peaks today before declining 14% through 2034, reducing workforce entry cohorts and straining labor-dependent sectors.
America is at peak 18, and the number of 18-year-olds will fall 14% over the coming decade.Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
- The 18-year-old population peaks today before declining 14% through 2034, reducing workforce entry cohorts and straining labor-dependent sectors.
- Declining youth cohorts lead to tighter labor markets and higher wage pressure for entry-level positions relative to the prior 20-year.
Related Articles:
- Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — Eberstadt finds as of the summer of 2025 ~7mm American men 25–54 were not in the labor force. Despite record high prime age female LFP, ~3.5mm prime age women…
- The Happiness Crash of 2020 — The racial gap in happiness narrowed sharply after 2020, while the happiness advantage of married people over unmarried people remained unchanged at over 30 points, and confidence in public and private institutions fell by double digits across the board.
- The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — CBO forecasts US population growth over the next decade will be 0.3% annually. Starting in 2030, net immigration will be the sole driver of population growth…