Edward Conard

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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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The 'Common Carrier' Solution to Social-Media Censorship

AI Summary. Social media platforms are argued to exhibit strong monopoly elements that would justify regulating them like common carriers, requiring fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. New entrants face barriers such as app store policies, and ideologically segmented networks risk increasing political polarization, making market-driven entry preferable to government intervention.

Tunku Varadarajan Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
January 18, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Social media platforms exhibit strong monopoly elements, necessitating regulation akin to common carriers. Nondiscrimination principle suggests fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. Market-driven solutions preferable to government intervention.

Social media platforms exhibit strong monopoly elements, necessitating regulation akin to common carriers. Nondiscrimination...

Should social media platforms be regulated as common carriers?

Core argument: Richard Epstein argues that Twitter and Facebook, though not pure monopolies, exhibit strong monopoly elements that warrant common-carrier-style regulation requiring service on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.

Richard Epstein argues that social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, while not pure monopolies, exhibit strong monopoly elements that necessitate regulation akin to common carriers. The nondiscrimination principle, historically applied to monopolies, suggests these platforms should operate on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. Epstein highlights the paradox of asserting monopoly power while new entrants like Parler and Gab emerge, albeit with limited reach due to barriers like Apple's app store policies. This situation risks increasing political polarization as networks become ideologically segmented. Epstein suggests that market-driven solutions, such as new entry, are preferable to government intervention, which is unlikely given the political landscape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Richard Epstein argues that Twitter and Facebook, though not pure monopolies, exhibit strong monopoly elements that warrant common-carrier-style regulation requiring service on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.
  2. Epstein notes the paradox of asserting platform monopoly power while entrants such as Parler and Gab emerge, their reach limited by barriers including Apple's app store policies.
  3. Epstein holds that market-driven new entry is preferable to government intervention, which he views as unlikely given the political landscape, while ideologically segmented networks risk greater political polarization.

Richard Epstein highlights potential competition policy issues around social media firms limiting access to their platforms, but still thinks a market based solution is best policy, “…But the nondiscrimination side of the formula is still with us,” Mr. Epstein says, “and it is that duty that’s at issue today with Trump and Twitter. And if the monopoly constraint applies, then it is not a defense to say that these companies are privately owned.”Mr. Epstein admits the tech companies aren’t “pure monopolies in the way in which you might’ve thought in the 17th century, because Twitter’s got some competition from Facebook.” But there is still pushback, he says, when “these companies decide that they’re going to exercise their sovereign power as if they were ordinary private companies, because people believe that there are strong monopoly elements associated with their operation.” This view is shared by both left and right: “As these companies become more imperious, there’s a greater insistence that they be treated as monopolies.”The argument becomes stronger, Mr. Epstein says, “when those who are policing the entry into the networks” make their political preferences clear: “You cannot be both a platform operator and a partisan. Jack Dorsey is not, shall we say, a neutral party.” Mr. Epstein thinks Mr. Zuckerberg is also partisan, but “in a cagey way. He is certainly no Republican, but he is smart enough to mute his hostility relative to, say, Dorsey.”Mr. Epstein has two recommendations for Twitter and Facebook, which he’s sure they won’t follow: “First, they should take the control of access to their networks and give it to somebody who doesn’t care about the outcome. And then, to have a relatively narrow, consistently applied, definition of what counts as violence and threats of force.” In regard to the latter point, Mr. Epstein points to how Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has more than 880,000 Twitter followers, “gets to promise the death of America on his account 20 times a day. All sorts of other zealots get to do that. You can’t select the violence you don’t like from the violence that you do like, or choose to ignore.”…Yet such a market solution may be the best we can hope for. “The safest control against a monopoly—in every market that you’d care to invent—is new entry,” Mr. Epstein says. In any case, who would the enforcers be for a potential nondiscrimination rule against social-media monopolies? The answer underscores the unlikelihood of such action: “It’s going to be essentially the Biden administration telling the Twitter company that they can’t discriminate against Trump.”..”

The ‘Common Carrier’ Solution to Social-Media Censorship

The punitive banishment of Donald Trump from Facebook and Twitter has met with almost uniform approval from the president’s critics. So has the decision by Apple and Google to remove Parler, a Twitter alternative favored by Mr. Trump’s supporters, from their app stores. Many Democrats see these actions as a righteous and justified silencing, especially in light of Mr. Trump’s encouraging words for the mob that violently invaded the Capitol on Jan. 6. Even many of Mr. Trump’s supporters concede that Twitter and Facebook owe him no platform—that only the government has a legal obligation to respect the First Amendment.

Richard Epstein takes a different view. The gagging of the president by America’s digital behemoths provokes in him a mix of indignation and distress. A professor at the New York University Law School, he is the foremost libertarian legal scholar in the common-law world. (Mr. Epstein, 77, directs NYU’s Classical Liberal Institute, where I am a fellow.) We converse by Zoom, and he says that he’d tell Jack Dorsey and Mark Zuckerberg of Twitter and Facebook, respectively, to “give Trump his account back.”

The punitive banishment of Donald Trump from Facebook and Twitter has met with almost uniform approval from the president’s critics. So has the decision by Apple and Google to remove Parler, a Twitter alternative favored by Mr. Trump’s supporters, from their app stores. Many Democrats see these actions as a righteous and justified silencing, especially in light of Mr. Trump’s encouraging words for the mob that violently invaded the Capitol on Jan. 6. Even many of Mr. Trump’s supporters concede that Twitter and Facebook owe him no platform—that only the government has a legal obligation to respect the First Amendment.

Richard Epstein takes a different view. The gagging of the president by America’s digital behemoths provokes in him a mix of indignation and distress. A professor at the New York University Law School, he is the foremost libertarian legal scholar in the common-law world. (Mr. Epstein, 77, directs NYU’s Classical Liberal Institute, where I am a fellow.) We converse by Zoom, and he says that he’d tell Jack Dorsey and Mark Zuckerberg of Twitter and Facebook, respectively, to “give Trump his account back.”

Mr. Epstein emphasizes that he’s been frequently critical of Mr. Trump and called on the president to resign as early as February 2017: “I thought his style was so confrontational that you couldn’t keep peace in the land.” Yet he’s been struck by the “one-sided” nature of the debate over Mr. Trump’s ban from social media, focusing almost solely on the First Amendment and how it “applies only to Congress and to the states and doesn’t apply to private parties.” Largely absent from the debate, he says, has been the word “monopoly.”

“Look,” he says, “there are private companies and there are private companies.” The conventional argument about the First Amendment is right when it comes to a company like Simon & Schuster, which pulled the plug on a book by Sen. Josh Hawley of Missouri in disapproval of his challenge to the presidential election results. Mr. Hawley can take the book somewhere else. “There are lots of alternatives, lots of publishers of one kind or another,” Mr. Epstein says. If it turns out that publishers all collude so that none will take him, Mr. Epstein says, “that gets you into an antitrust violation. So there’s a remedy.”

The situation with Mr. Trump and the social-media giants is different. If they are monopolies—not “an easy question,” Mr. Epstein acknowledges—the common-law rule is that “no private monopoly has the right to turn away customers.” It must take them all on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” terms. This principle, which sometimes goes by the acronym Frand, dates back to the writings of Sir Matthew Hale (1609-76), an English jurist.

“The question of media control,” Mr. Epstein says, “can only be understood by going back to the historical regulation of common carriers and public utilities.” Hale didn’t use the word “monopoly,” but instead wrote of a party “affected with the public interest,” such as a harbor with only one landing space. Its owners, he argued, had a duty to serve on terms that were fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. “They couldn’t just charge what the market could bear, but had to face that constraint.” This notion of “rate regulation,” Mr. Epstein says, was incorporated into American law in 1876, when the Supreme Court decided in Munn v. Illinois that the state had the authority to regulate a grain warehouse’s prices.

Munn began the development of a body of law concerning “common carriers,” such as railroads, which offer services to the general public for which there is no alternative. In Mr. Epstein’s view, the near-monopoly position of Twitter and Facebook may generate common-carrier obligations. “These are common-law rules,” he says. “It’s not as though you can post a little notice on top of your website that says, ‘Not subject to common-carrier rules.’”

Unlike harbors, warehouses and railroads, social-media monopolies don’t raise an issue of rates. Their content is free. “But the nondiscrimination side of the formula is still with us,” Mr. Epstein says, “and it is that duty that’s at issue today with Trump and Twitter. And if the monopoly constraint applies, then it is not a defense to say that these companies are privately owned.”

Mr. Epstein admits the tech companies aren’t “pure monopolies in the way in which you might’ve thought in the 17th century, because Twitter’s got some competition from Facebook.” But there is still pushback, he says, when “these companies decide that they’re going to exercise their sovereign power as if they were ordinary private companies, because people believe that there are strong monopoly elements associated with their operation.” This view is shared by both left and right: “As these companies become more imperious, there’s a greater insistence that they be treated as monopolies.”

The argument becomes stronger, Mr. Epstein says, “when those who are policing the entry into the networks” make their political preferences clear: “You cannot be both a platform operator and a partisan. Jack Dorsey is not, shall we say, a neutral party.” Mr. Epstein thinks Mr. Zuckerberg is also partisan, but “in a cagey way. He is certainly no Republican, but he is smart enough to mute his hostility relative to, say, Dorsey.”

Mr. Epstein has two recommendations for Twitter and Facebook, which he’s sure they won’t follow: “First, they should take the control of access to their networks and give it to somebody who doesn’t care about the outcome. And then, to have a relatively narrow, consistently applied, definition of what counts as violence and threats of force.” In regard to the latter point, Mr. Epstein points to how Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has more than 880,000 Twitter followers, “gets to promise the death of America on his account 20 times a day. All sorts of other zealots get to do that. You can’t select the violence you don’t like from the violence that you do like, or choose to ignore.”

Ultimately, Mr. Epstein says, those berating Twitter and Facebook for their abuse of “monopoly power” will lead the market to rebel, as happened when entrepreneurs responded to railroad monopolies by developing spur lines and other alternatives. “And that’s Parler,” he says, “and Gab,” another upstart that is kicking at Mr. Dorsey’s shins.

Yet Parler is in a bind. Apple’s refusal to carry its app means that it can’t get onto an iPhone. “The iPhone is 40% of the market,” Mr. Epstein says. “So unless people with iPhones have two phones—which is a huge inconvenience—they’re going to be denied the service altogether.” Gab has “decided to build a fully integrated network, their own servers—to become completely self-sufficient.”

This gives rise to a paradox. “You assert there’s a monopoly,” Mr. Epstein says, “and then you act to do something about it, and then you have an industry that’s competitive, at least in part. But it’s imperfect competition, because these guys don’t have the reach.”

Mr. Trump had 89 million Twitter followers. “They are not going to go away, whether Twitter likes them or not,” Mr. Epstein says. “So he’s literally going to start to integrate with another network.” Mr. Epstein sees this as “a funny chicken-and-egg situation”: “Twitter is, we’re saying, a serious monopoly we have to regulate. But now that it’s abusive, it’s no longer a monopoly because we have these other guys coming in, and they’re going to try to do Twitter in.”

Mr. Epstein warns of ugly political consequences: “What you’re seeing now is an unwillingness of companies like Twitter and Facebook to tolerate conservative talk on their networks. What you’ll now get is conservative networks and liberal networks, and they won’t overlap.” This will heighten political polarization, as “each group starts to listen to its own, and they get madder and madder about what’s going on.”

Yet such a market solution may be the best we can hope for. “The safest control against a monopoly—in every market that you’d care to invent—is new entry,” Mr. Epstein says. In any case, who would the enforcers be for a potential nondiscrimination rule against social-media monopolies? The answer underscores the unlikelihood of such action: “It’s going to be essentially the Biden administration telling the Twitter company that they can’t discriminate against Trump.”

Tunku Varadarajan, "The ‘Common Carrier’ Solution to Social-Media Censorship,"Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-common-carrier-solution-to-social-media-censorship-11610732343

  • Politics
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Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?

Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
  2. Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
  3. About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

AI Summary. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?

Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
  2. Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
  3. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. Gallup polling shows the share of Democrats who are extremely proud to be American has fallen from an average of 58% to 14%. Republicans report higher pride overall, but their responses also shift with which party holds the presidency, ranging from an average of 79% down to 60% and back to 74%.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Has American pride declined and shifted with the ruling party?

Core argument: The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.
  2. Republicans extremely proud to be American averaged 79% during Bush's second term, fell to 60% during Biden's term, and rebounded to 74% after Trump retook office, according to Gallup.
  3. Gallup found Democrats and independents at an identical 58% extremely proud to be American during Bush's second term, with that rough parity lasting through Obama's second term.

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  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
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Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all US states in business investment and population growth, created roughly a fifth of all net new US jobs from 2020 to 2025, and is on course to overtake California as America's largest state economy. Other states are copying its approach, including plans to eliminate corporate income taxes and offer shovel-ready mega-sites.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas becoming the center of American business investment and growth?

Core argument: Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.
  2. ExxonMobil's shareholders approved a plan to cut ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where the oil giant has long had its headquarters.
  3. Other states are imitating Texas: North Carolina's legislators passed a plan to eliminate its corporate-income tax by 2030, Tennessee offers firms shovel-ready mega-sites, and Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

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  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Politics
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Growth
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