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The Change in Poverty from 1995 to 2016 Among Single Parent Families

Kevin Corinth Becker Friedman Institute

Date Posted:: April 12, 2022
Is Database:: Database

Single parent family poverty declined by 62% btw 1995 and 2016, according to the Comprehensive Income Dataset (CID). @KevinCorinth

Between 1995 and 2016, single parent family poverty declined by 62% when using the Comprehensive Income Dataset (CID), which corrects for survey misreporting and includes a broader set of income sources. This decline is more pronounced than the 45% reduction observed using survey data alone. The CID approach shows that poverty based on post-tax/in-kind transfer income fell by 56% when adjusting for inflation using the preferred CPI-U-RS measure. The inclusion of administrative SNAP data further supports this significant reduction, resulting in a 2016 poverty rate of 9.8% among single parent families. These findings highlight the impact of increased spending on tax credits and in-kind transfers over time, as well as the importance of accurate income reporting and inflation adjustments in assessing poverty trends.

Core finding, "...This paper is the first to examine changes in poverty over time using a comprehensive set of linked survey and administrative data, implementing recommendations of the Interagency Technical Working Group on Evaluating Alternative Measures of Poverty. Using the Comprehensive Income Dataset (CID), we correct for measurement error in survey-reported incomes, focusing on single parent families from 1995 to 2016. Our preferred estimates indicate that single parent family poverty declined by 62% over time, while it fell by only 45% using survey data alone. Moreover, survey-reported deep poverty among single parent families increased over time, while it fell using the CID...."

Their Poverty Thresholds, "...To construct absolute poverty thresholds in 1995 and 2016, we use as a starting point the official threshold in each year for a family of two adults and two children multiplied by the SPM 3-parameter equivalence scale to account for family size and composition. Note that the official thresholds are updated for inflation using the CPI-U, which has a widely documented upward bias (see Moulton 2018 for a recent review and additional citations). We therefore also construct alternative poverty thresholds in 2016, which use an adjusted inflation measure that subtracts 0.8
percentage points off the annual growth in the CPI-U-RS each year starting from the 1995 baseline (Meyer and Sullivan 2012). We also show poverty estimates that use the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price index to adjust for inflation, which has been used by several prior studies to update thresholds over time and corrects for some but not all of the bias in the CPI-U. While the level of the baseline thresholds is fundamentally arbitrary,we use the 1995 official thresholds because they allow us to show how the poverty rate in 1995 falls after using a broader income definition and correcting for survey misreporting. We focus on poverty (income below 100% of the threshold) and deep poverty (income below 50% of the threshold). We also focus on single parent families rather than single mother families, although - as Appendix Table A2 shows - the percentage of single parent families headed
by a female remains largely consistent over time (85% in 1995 and 84% in 2016). We define single parent families as sharing units with a single adult (aged 18 or over) and at least one child (under age 18), and we estimate that there were 7.2 million single parent families in 1995 and 6.4 million single parent families in 2016..”

The Evidence

“…Table 2 shows poverty rates in 1995 and 2016 Focusing first on 1995 survey levels, we find that the poverty rate for single parent families using survey-reported pre-tax money income is 47.4% (Column 1). While this rate is calculated using the reweighted sample of individuals in PIKed and non-whole imputed families, it is virtually identical to the rate (47.0%) calculated using the full survey sample and original survey weights (Appendix Table A3). Incorporating tax liabilities and credits in the resource measure leads to a reduction of 3.8 percentage points (8%), while the combination of taxes and non-medical in-kind transfers reduces survey poverty by 17.1 percentage points (36%) to a rate of 30.3%. Switching to the CID further reduces the poverty rate (relative to the survey baseline) for each income concept, as it falls by 5% for pre-tax money income, 2% for post-tax money income, and 14% for post-tax/in-kind transfer income - yielding a final rate of 26.1%. In 2016, using thresholds adjusted by the CPI-U, the poverty rate for single parent families is 39.9% using survey-reported pre-tax money income (Column 2). The poverty rate falls by 7.6 percentage points (19%) after incorporating taxes, and by 18.3 percentage points (46%) after incorporating both taxes and in-kind transfers. Again, switching to the CID causes the poverty rate to fall for each income concept, with post-tax/in-kind transfer poverty falling the most by 28% to a final rate of 15.5%. Not only is the percent decline in poverty due to changes in the income concept larger in 2016 (reflecting increased spending on tax credits and in-kind transfers over time), but the percent decline due to employing the CID is also larger in 2016 than in 1995. The latter result is consistent with increased underreporting of survey incomes, indicating that survey estimates of changes in poverty - regardless of income concept - will be biased upward. Changes in poverty from 1995 to 2016 are explicitly shown in Column 5, 6, and 7 of Table 2. When updating thresholds based on the CPI-U, the percent decline in poverty is greater using the CID than using the survey alone. Poverty based on pre-tax money income fell by 21% using the CID, compared to 16% using the survey. Poverty based on post-tax money income fell by 38% using the CID, compared to 26% using the survey. And poverty based on post-tax/in-kind transfer income fell by 41% using the CID, compared to 29% using the survey. The poverty reductions are even larger after correcting for the upward bias in the CPI-U by updating thresholds using either the PCE price index or the adjusted CPI-U-RS. Using the PCE price index, CID poverty fell by 28% using pre-tax money income, 44% using post-tax money income, and 49% using post-tax/in-kind transfer income. Using the adjusted CPI-U-RS (our preferred inflation adjustment), CID poverty fell by 37% using pre-tax money income, 51% using post-tax money income, and 56% using post-tax/in-kind transfer income. Further accounting for administrative SNAP in 2016 leads to a 62% decrease in poverty over time and a 2016 poverty rate among single parent families of 9.8%.This final estimate of the change in poverty is our preferred estimate because it reflects the broadest set of income sources available for consumption, corrects for survey misreporting using the CID, and corrects for bias in the inflation measure used to adjust official poverty thresholds. Given the large increase in aggregate SNAP underreporting and its bias toward poverty rate increases, we prefer estimates that include administrative SNAP data for 2016 even though we do not have administrative data available for 1995. Table 2 also reports results for deep poverty. Based on pre-tax money income, deep poverty between 1995 and 2016 fell by 8 to 21% (depending on the inflation measure used to update thresholds) when relying only on the survey and by 31 to 46% when relying on the CID. After incorporating both taxes and in-kind transfers into the resource measure, survey-reported deep poverty rose between 1995 and 2016 by 9 to 23% (depending on the inflation measure used to update thresholds). In contrast, CID deep poverty fell either slightly (when using the CPI-U) or by more than 20% when using the adjusted CPI-U-RS…”

Kevin Corinth, Bruce D. Meyer, and Derek Wu, "The Change in Poverty from 1995 to 2016 Among Single Parent Families,"Becker Friedman Institute, March 2022, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/BFI_WP_2022-45.pdf

The Fairest Way to Reform Social Security May Also Be the Worst Way to Grow the Economy

Andrew Biggs American Enterprise Institute

Date Posted:: May 28, 2026
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Is Important:: Important

Biggs argues that “fair” approaches to restoring Social Security solvency – those that do not cut already accrued benefits – are less effective than “unfair” ones that do, because the latter incentivize increased work effort, raising growth and revenue.

Imagine that Social Security reform follows the fairness model, in which accrued benefits are paid in full but the rate at which future benefits are earned is reduced. A simple way to do this is to increase the payroll tax rate To keep Social Security permanently solvent, meaning through 75 years and beyond, would require an immediate and permanent increase in the payroll tax rate [from] 12.4% to 17.6%. The higher rate would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth. [Consider] an alternate reform, which looks clearly unfair: fix Social Security’s funding gap entirely by reducing accrued benefits that Americans already have earned. As of 2025, Americans had accrued $54 trillion in Social Security benefits. Social Security’s unfunded obligation as of 2025 was $26 trillion. So, roughly, this means cutting Americans’ “earned benefits” in half. [Analyzing the 1977 reform that undid the notorious 1972 “double-indexing” of benefits, a group of economists], using SSA earnings data, found that, for every dollar of lost benefits, the affected Americans increased their earnings by 61 cents. Moreover, these additional earnings would be taxed by Social Security, further strengthening the program’s finances. In effect, this makes cutting benefits a “cheaper” way to fix Social Security than raising taxes, because people respond in ways that also increase tax revenues.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

A 5.2 pts payroll tax increase to 17.6% drives reduced labor supply and slower economic growth vs. the status quo.
$54 trillion in accrued Social Security benefits vs. the unfunded obligation reveals that benefit cuts would reduce growth drag but.

The World’s Most Surprising Capitalist Makeover Is Under Way in Sweden

Tom Fairless Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: May 12, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Swedish public social spending is now 23.7% of GDP, just 1pp above that of the US and well under France’s 31.6%. Market-based reforms in the 1990s brought overall government spending down from 69.4% to 49.3% in 2024.

For decades, Sweden was shorthand for the brand of high-tax, high-spend government that managed people’s lives from cradle to grave through state-run hospitals, schools and care homes. No longer. With little fanfare, this Nordic country of 11 million has embraced capitalism. Today, nearly half of primary healthcare clinics are privately owned, many by private-equity firms. One in three public high schools is privately run, up from 20% in 2011. School operators are listed on the stock exchange. The capitalist makeover has allowed Sweden to do what few industrialized countries have managed in recent years: shrink the size of the state. That has enabled the government to sharply lower taxes and, economists say, sparked a surge in entrepreneurship and economic growth. Its total public social spending bill—which includes healthcare, education and all welfare payments—has fallen to 24% of gross domestic product, similar to the U.S. and well below the over 30% for nations like France and Italy. Sweden’s economy is expected to grow by around 2% a year through 2030, roughly the same pace as the U.S. and double the growth rates of France and Germany, according to an April forecast by the International Monetary Fund.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Sweden’s public social spending fell to 24% of GDP, matching the U.S. and 6+ pts below France/Italy, driving lower taxes.
Privately-run primary healthcare clinics reached nearly 50% of the market vs. 20% for high schools in 2011, demonstrating accelerating privatization.
Sweden’s projected 2% annual GDP growth through 2030 doubles France and Germany’s rates, resulting from state downsizing and capitalist sector.

How Policy and Demographics Are Reshaping SNAP: From Families with Children to Older Adults

Angela Rachidi American Enterprise Institute

Date Posted:: May 1, 2026
Is Database:: Database

About 40mm Americans, 12% of the population, receive SNAP benefits, up from 6% in 2000. In 2023, only 34% of these households included children, down from 49% in 2010, while 36% contained an elderly person, up from 16% in FY2010.

Comparing FY2000 with FY2025, the share of the population receiving SNAP doubled from 6% to 12%, while real SNAP costs per capita increased by 179%—from roughly $100 per year to $279 (in 2024 dollars). Despite this growth, per capita participation and costs in FY2025 remained below their pre-pandemic peak in 2013, which coincided with the aftermath of the Great Recession and changes in eligibility and other policies stemming from the 2008 Farm Bill. SNAP is countercyclical, meaning that all else equal, the number of people receiving SNAP should rise during recessions because of increased unemployment and decline as the economy recovers, [though] overall SNAP participation has grown faster than changes in the unemployment rate alone would predict. Over the long run, and especially since FY2020 (due to the Thrifty Food Plan’s increase in the maximum SNAP benefit), costs per capita have not returned to prerecession levels after a period of high unemployment. In FY2023, the share of SNAP households containing an elderly person (36%) exceeded the share containing a child (34%) for the first time. This was a sharp departure from the early 2000s, when more than half of SNAP households contained a child and less than 20% included an elderly person (Figure 2).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

SNAP participation doubled from 6% to 12% of the population between FY2000–FY2025, driven by policy expansions and demographic shifts outpacing.
Real per capita SNAP costs rose 179% from $100 to $279 (2024 dollars) over 25 years, with the Thrifty Food.
FY2025 SNAP enrollment remains 8–12% below the FY2013 peak despite 25-year growth, indicating countercyclical policy design successfully targets recession-driven need.

Washington’s Growing Portfolio: Tracking U.S. Government Investments

Jonathan Hillman Council On Foreign Relations

Date Posted:: April 23, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Since January 2025, the USG has taken equity stakes totaling $20.9B in 16 American businesses. $8.6B, ~41% of the total, was invested in critical mineral miners and processors, while $8.9B, ~43% of the total, funded the government’s 10% stake in Intel.

Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit that has traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Commerce has participated in six such deals, including taking a 10% stake in Intel. The Development Finance Corporation, the United States’ development bank, has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure. The Department of Defense leads the way with seven such deals. The U.S. government is also working with a range of partners and has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment. Private co-investors include J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and others.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The U.S. government deployed $20.9bn in direct equity investments since January 2025, expanding beyond traditional grants and loans to drive.
The Department of Defense leads with seven equity deals of the sixteen total, establishing direct ownership as a core national.
Commerce Department’s 10% Intel stake exemplifies government equity participation in critical infrastructure, mobilizing private capital alongside public investment to strengthen.

How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age

Kent Smetters University of Pennsylvania

Date Posted:: April 2, 2026
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Is Important:: Important

In 2025, of the 62.5% of Federal spending that is age-assignable on a per-capita basis, US retirees aged 65+ were given $43,700, working-age adults 26–64 got $7,300, and children and young adults got $4,300.

We trace spending items within 52 general spending categories, totalling $7T for the 2025 Fiscal Year. We are able to classify a total of $4.4T across three broad age categories and assign the remaining $2.6T to an all-ages residual. Retirees (adults age 65 and older) receive $2.7T, equal to 38.6% of total federal outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending. Working-age adults (ages 26-64) receive $1.2T (27.9% of age-assignable), and children and young adults (under age 26) receive $449B (10.3%). The dominance of the retiree category reflects two programs above all others: Social Security and Medicare. Social Security directs $1.3T to retirees, and Medicare sends $835B. Together, they account for 80% of all age-assignable spending on older adults. But the retiree total extends beyond these two entitlements. Federal employee retirement benefits ($169B), housing assistance for older households, Medicaid long-term-care spending, and VA medical care all contribute, making the federal budget more retiree-focused than a Social Security–only lens would suggest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Federal spending heavily favors retirees, who receive 38.6 percent of total outlays through Social Security, Medicare, and related programs.
Working-age adults and children combined receive less than half the spending directed to retirees despite representing larger population segments.
Social Security and Medicare alone account for 80 percent of all federal spending on older Americans, dominating the retiree budget.

Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve?

David Cutler and Lev Klarnet Brookings Papers On Economic Activity

Date Posted:: March 30, 2026
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In 2024, medical spending as a share of GDP was just above its 2010 level and 15% ($977B) below its 2010 forecast; 21% of the gap was due to technology, 24% to price reductions, and 11–27% to reforms such as prior authorization and higher deductibles.

Five factors are important in the slowdown in spending [Figure 16]. The first is technology-associated changes in health and site of care. These correspond to the subsequent innovations in our model. Together, technologies along these lines account for 21% of the overall cost slowdown and double that in Medicare. Second, long-run supply is more elastic than short-run supply, which lowers spending over time. This is particularly apparent in the impact of patent expiration for pharmaceuticals and in relative declines in imaging reimbursement. We estimate that greater long-run supply explains 6% of the spending slowdown. Third, a variety of market changes contribute to reduced and more elastic demand, including increased cost sharing paid by consumers, physicians not paid as much for using technologies, and insurers imposing restrictions on technology use - a rough guess is that these account for 11 to 27% of the spending slowdown. Fourth, the population is healthier in ways that reduce spending. This includes fewer hospitalizations for smoking-related conditions and reduced need for formal home health care. The birth rate has fallen as well, which reduces the need for care. We estimate improved population health explains 7% of the spending slowdown. A major component is slower price growth. Net of upcoding, we estimate lower price growth explains 24% of the spending slowdown.

Single parent family poverty declined by 62% btw 1995 and 2016, according to the Comprehensive Income Dataset (CID). @KevinCorinth

Biggs argues that “fair” approaches to restoring Social Security solvency – those that do not cut already accrued benefits – are less effective than “unfair” ones that do, because the latter incentivize increased work effort, raising growth and revenue.

Does preserving Social Security benefits require sacrificing economic growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Swedish public social spending is now 23.7% of GDP, just 1pp above that of the US and well under France’s 31.6%. Market-based reforms in the 1990s brought overall government spending down from 69.4% to 49.3% in 2024.

How is Sweden's shift to privatization impacting its economic growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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About 40mm Americans, 12% of the population, receive SNAP benefits, up from 6% in 2000. In 2023, only 34% of these households included children, down from 49% in 2010, while 36% contained an elderly person, up from 16% in FY2010.

How Are Policy Changes and Demographic Shifts Impacting SNAP Enrollment?

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Since January 2025, the USG has taken equity stakes totaling $20.9B in 16 American businesses. $8.6B, ~41% of the total, was invested in critical mineral miners and processors, while $8.9B, ~43% of the total, funded the government’s 10% stake in Intel.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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In 2025, of the 62.5% of Federal spending that is age-assignable on a per-capita basis, US retirees aged 65+ were given $43,700, working-age adults 26–64 got $7,300, and children and young adults got $4,300.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

In 2024, medical spending as a share of GDP was just above its 2010 level and 15% ($977B) below its 2010 forecast; 21% of the gap was due to technology, 24% to price reductions, and 11–27% to reforms such as prior authorization and higher deductibles.

Related Articles:

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