Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
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Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?

Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
June 28, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Since 1990, real median American wages grew by 34% since 1990, with the 10th, 20th, and 30th percentiles experiencing 50%, 48%, and 38% growth, respectively.

Contrary to the widespread belief of wage stagnation, real median wages in the US have grown by 34% since 1990. Notably, real wages at the lower end of the income distribution have seen even more significant increases, with the tenth percentile experiencing a 50% rise, the twentieth percentile a 48% increase, and the thirtieth percentile a 38% growth. These figures suggest that while average wage growth may appear modest when viewed over a longer historical period, particularly when using earlier base years like 1973, the past three decades have seen substantial real wage improvements for many American workers. This data challenges the narrative of stagnation and highlights the importance of selecting appropriate base years and inflation measures when analyzing wage trends.

“…Figure 3 shows real wage growth for the median worker and at other points in the distribution. Since 1990, real median wages grew by 34 percent. Real wages at the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth percentiles grew over this period by 50, 48, and 38 percent, respectively….”

Michael Strain, "Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?,"American Enterprise Institute, June 27, 2022, https://www.aei.org/articles/have-wages-stagnated-for-decades-in-the-us/

Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?

In the United States, it is conventional wisdom that wages have stagnated for decades.

A few examples to illustrate the point: In a recent story in “The New York Times’s” Business section, an article began with this statement: “One of the most urgent questions in economics is why pay for middle-income workers has increased only slightly since the 1970s, even as pay for those near the top has escalated” (Scheiber, 2021). Conservative commentator David Brooks declared in 2017 that “middle-class wage stagnation is the biggest economic fact driving American politics.” A 2018 analysis by the Pew Research Center had this headline: “For most U.S. workers, real wages have barely budged in decades.” Populist politicians on the political right and progressives on the political left share this view, as well.

Many economists agree. Economists assume wage stagnation as a fact in commentary written for the public (e.g., Krugman, 2021; Stiglitz, 2020) and in academic and policy papers (e.g., Azar et. al, 2020; Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019; Sachs et. al, 2015; Benmelech et. al, 2022; Benmelech et. al, 2019).

Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


This view has empirical support. See the growth of inflation-adjusted average wages for production and nonsupervisory workers, shown in Figure 1. A startling fact is that average real wages have grown by only 0.7 percent over the half century beginning in February 1973. In February 2022 dollars, wages have grown over this period by $0.18. There is no question that an $0.18 increase over a half century is correctly interpreted as stagnant.

Selecting the base year

Many descriptions of U.S. wage stagnation begin in 1973 (or 1979) because that was the previous peak in the series, the rapid growth in inequality that began around that time, and due to perceived shifts in the economy during the 1980s away from organized labor and towards a greater emphasis on economic efficiency (e.g., Mishel et. al, 2015).

The starting year for wage growth calculations is crucially important, but has received relatively little attention in the academic and policy debates around wage stagnation. See my recent bookOpens in new window, for more detailed discussion of this issue.

Calculating wage growth using 1973 (or 1979) as a base year mechanically produces smaller growth magnitudes because 1973 was a previous peak of the series and because 1978/1979 was a local maximum of the series.

A quick glance at Figure 1 — which contains the full available time series for average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers — does not lead one to conclude that 1973 is the obvious base year for economists or analysts to choose. The year the series begins, 1964, might be more natural. With that as the base year, wages have grown by 17 percent. That may still be interpreted as stagnant, but still much faster than growth calculated from 1973.

In Strain (2020), I make several arguments that — at least for the purpose of the policy debate — July 1990 is a sensible base period. First, I argue that when political leaders and political leaders argue that “wages have been stagnant for decades,” many people hear that as referring to their own wages. But 1973 was a half century ago. Choosing a more recent base year is more sensible, and even one three decades ago may be too far in the past because it would apply to too few current workers. Second, July 1990 was a business cycle peak, which helps to avoid overstating wage growth by estimating it from a trough.

The third reason I argue in Strain (2020) for 1990 as the base year rests on the fact that the U.S. experienced two decades of stagnating - actually, declining - average real wage growth, beginning in the early 1970s and ending in the early 1990s. Averaging wage growth from that period with the decades that followed - i.e., averaging economic outcomes from two different economic regimes - arguably distorts our understanding of wage growth over time. Finally, the earlier the base year, the harder it is to adequately adjust for inflation. Measuring changes in a typical consumption bundle from 1990 to 2022 is challenging enough given quality improvements in continuing products and the vast number of new goods and services that have entered the typical bundle during that period. Going back a half century is even harder, still.

Selecting the price index

In addition to selecting the base year, the issue of inflation adjustment is of first-order importance. So far, I have been using the consumer price index, which is arguably the most prominent measure of inflation. There is widespread recognition that the headline CPI may overstate the rate of inflation, particularly over longer periods of time (Boskin et. al, 1998; Broda et. al, 2009). Given that, many economists use a CPI research series (known as the CPI-U-RS) that attempts to account for some of these issues, though the CPI-U-RS does not deal adequately with substitution bias over the periods of time in question (Moulton, 2018).

An alternative to the CPI is the personal consumption expenditure price index (PCE). There are numerous technical differences between the two indices, and each has strengths and weaknesses. The CPI is specifically designed to capture price changes in a typical consumption bundle, whereas the PCE includes all expenditures made for consumption, including those made by third parties (e.g., employer-provided health insurance premiums). The CPI focuses on urban consumers, while the PCE tries to capture all consumers, and does a better job capturing price changes faced by rural populations.

The most important advantage of the PCE is its more realistic treatment of consumer substitution across goods in response to price changes. For example, if the prices of strawberries goes up, consumers will buy fewer strawberries and more raspberries. Because of the PCE’s ability to better capture this type of substitution, it is the measure used by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office when analyzing trends in wages over time. The PCE is also the Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of consumer price inflation (though of course the Fed studies many measures of price changes across several distinct markets, including consumer goods and services).

Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Because the CPI overstates inflation, calculations using the CPI for inflation adjustment understate real wage growth. Figure 2 shows two series for the average real wage for production and nonsupervisory workers. One is deflated by the CPI and one by the PCE. Both are expressed in February 2022 dollars, so the closer the series is to February 2022 the closer real wages are to nominal wages.

The presentation in Figure 2 highlights how conclusions — quantitative, but perhaps also qualitative — are driven in part by the choice of price index, and how the further in the past the base year, the larger the role the choice of price index plays.

Have wages stagnated for decades?

Using July 1990 as the base period, average real wages using the CPI grew by 21 percent over the three-decade period ending in February 2022. Real wages grew by 39 percent using the PCE.

So far, I have been discussing average wages. Because the analysis has focused on production and nonsupervisory workers — workers who are not managers, roughly speaking — there is less reason than usual to be concerned that average wages produce a distorted picture of what is happening to “typical” workers because of growing inequality. Still, some concern may remain. Figure 3 shows real wage growth for the median worker and at other points in the distribution.

Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Since 1990, real median wages grew by 34 percent. Real wages at the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth percentiles grew over this period by 50, 48, and 38 percent, respectively.

The ubiquity of 1973 might argue for economists and analysts to adopt a new standard base year. But it would be better still for scholars and commentators to take a more nuanced approached when describing wage growth over time. Wage trends over the past half century are too nuanced to be succinctly summarized without considering the 1970s and 1980s separately from the three decades that followed.

Thirty-nine percent growth in average wages over the past three decades (and 34 percent median wage growth) is slower than wage growth at the top of the distribution. But given the choice between “stagnant” or “not stagnant,” the latter is the more accurate characterization.

A 39 percent increase in purchasing power is a significant increase. My characterization of wage growth over this period would be “solid, but not spectacular.” Of course, policy should not be content with this pace of growth. It is not “fast enough.” Policymakers should focus on policies to boost productivity, which will quicken the pace of wage growth, along with measures to increase competition in the labor market.

References

Azar, José A., Ioana Marinescu, Marshall I. Steinbaum, Bledi Taska, “Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data,” Labour Economics, vol. 66, 2020.

Benmelech, Efraim, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim, “Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 57, 2022.

Benmelech, Efraim, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim, “What’s Causing Wage Stagnation in America,” Kellogg Insight, December 2, 2019.

Boskin, Michael J., Ellen R. Dulberger, Robert J. Gordon, Zvi Griliches, and Dale W. Jorgenson, “Consumer Prices, the Consumer Price Index, and the Cost of Living,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 1998.

Broda, Christian, Ephraim Leibtag, and David E. Weinstein, “The Role of Prices in Measuring the Poor’s Living Standards,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 2, Spring 2009.

Brooks, David, “The Economy Isn’t Broken,” The New York Times, September 15, 2017.

Desilver, Drew, “For most U.S. workers, real wages have barely budged in decades,” Pew Research Center, August 7, 2018.

Hoynes, Hilary W. and Jesse Rothstein, “Universal Basic Income in the United States and advanced countries, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 11, 2019.

Krugman, Paul, “Pumps and Dumps and Chumps,” The New York Times, February 4, 2021.

Mishel, Lawrence, Elise Gould, and Josh Bivens, “Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts,” Economic Policy Institute, January 6, 2015.

Moulton, Brent R., “The Measurement of Output, Prices, and Productivity: What’s Changed Since the Boskin Commission?” Brookings Institution, July 2018.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., Seth G. Benzell, and Guillermo LaGarda, “Robots: Curse or Blessing? A Basic Framework,” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 21091, April 2015.

Scheiber, Noam, “Middle-Class Pay Lost Pace. Is Washington to Blame?” The New York Times, May 13, 2021.

Stiglitz, Joseph E., “The Truth About the Trump Economy”, Project Syndicate, January 17, 2020.

Strain, Michael R., The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It), Templeton Press, 2020.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleJune 28, 2022Leaked Amazon memo warns the company is running out of people to hireAmazon’s attrition rate soared to 159% in 2020, outpacing the 59% US warehouse sector turnover, highlighting a critical labor challenge. @JasonDelReyNext articleJune 28, 2022Quantifying the commodity consumer shock at 5-6 of global GDP its as big as the early 1970sOngoing commodity shock is on track to be a similar order of magnitude as the first oil shock in terms of share of global GDP. US commodities consumers will pay ~ $1T more relative to 2019 or -3.4% of US GDP.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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    • Innovation/Research
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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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