Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
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Why school integration works

Valerie Strauss Washington Post
Date Posted:
July 15, 2019
Is Database:
Database

School integration is linked to stronger outcomes in adulthood for children of all races, as evidenced by extensive research using longitudinal data over four decades. @ValerieStrauss/WashingtonPost.

School integration is linked to stronger outcomes in adulthood for children of all races, as evidenced by extensive research using longitudinal data over four decades. African Americans saw significant improvements in educational attainment, earnings, and health status without detriment to whites. The benefits extended to the next generation, with longer exposure to integrated schools correlating with better adult outcomes. For poor children, increased Head Start and K12 spending led to notable gains in education and economic status, reducing incarceration rates. The combined effect of higher Head Start and K12 spending was greater than their individual impacts, highlighting the importance of sustained investment in education. While historical spending levels were lower, suggesting potentially smaller contemporary effects, the returns on education have increased, underscoring the critical role of quality education investments from preK-12.

Ed, the times op-ed on busing (attached) cited the following to support this claim

"....An economist and professor of public policy, Rucker C. Johnson at the University of California, Berkeley, studied the life outcomes of black children who got access to the trifecta of quality Head Start, increased school funding and desegregation. He saw the entire trajectory of their lives change. Compared with kids stuck in segregated schools, even their own siblings, they were more likely to graduate from high school and more likely to get out of poverty. As adults, they earned more, were less likely to go to jail and even lived longer. The earlier and longer these children got access to integrated schools, Dr. Rucker found, the stronger the results....."
the op-ed cites his new book, which I can get a copy of to actually see his metrics, but here is an interview with Johnson characterizing his books findings:

"....Using nationally representative longitudinal data spanning more than four decades, I analyze the life outcomes of cohorts tracked from birth to adulthood across several generations, from the children of Brown to Brown’s grandchildren. The slow and uneven pace of desegregation, school funding reforms, and Head Start programs across the country created a natural “policy lab,” that allowed for rigorous, empirical evaluation of integration, school funding and Head Start. The research findings are clear: African Americans experienced dramatic improvements in educational attainment, earnings and health status — and this improvement that did not come at the expense of whites. Moreover, the longer students were exposed to integration and strong school funding, the better their outcomes in adulthood. This was true for children of all races. The beneficial effects were found not just for the children who attended desegregated schools, but for their children as well. School integration didn’t fail.The only failure is that we stopped pursuing it and allowed the reign of segregation to return......"

".... We use children’s differential exposure to Head Start spending (at age 4) andcourt-ordered school finance reforms (SFRs) (between the ages 5 through 17), depending on place and year of birth, to examine whether the marginal effect of Head Start spending on children’s adult outcomes are larger among individuals who were subsequently exposed to SFR-induced K12 spending increases.We present extensive tests to document that the policy-induced variation in Head Start spending and K12 public school spending we exploit is unrelated to other childhood family, community, or policy changes. For non-poor children, SFR-induced K12 spending increases led to significant improvements in educational and economic outcomes, while increases in Head Start spending had no effect.However, for poor children, both Head Start spending increases and SFR-induced K12 spending increases led to significant improvements in educational outcomes, economic outcomes, and reductions in the likelihood of incarceration. Importantly, the long-run effects of increases in Head Start spending are amplified when followed by attending schools that experienced SFRinduced increases in K12 per-pupil spending. Across all the outcomes, the marginal effect of the same increase in Head Start spending was more than twice as large for students from K12 school districts that spent at the 75th percentile of the distribution than those from K12 school districts that spent at the 25th percentile. Similarly, the benefits of K12 school-spending increases on adult outcomes were larger among poor children who were exposed to higher levels of Head Start spending during their pre-school years. For poor children, the combined benefits of growing up in districts/counties with both greater Head Start spending and K12 per-pupil spending are significantly greater than the sum of the independent effects of the two investments in isolation. There are two important caveats to our work. First, because the counterfactual childcare and pediatric care may be better today than in the late 1960s and 70s, the marginal effect of Head Start may be smaller today than in the earlier period that we study. Second, public school spending levels during the period we study were lower than current levels. If school spending exhibits diminishing marginal product, the effects presented here may be larger than one would observe with similar spending increases today. These caveats do not minimize the importance of the findings or their profound implications for policy. However, they do suggest that the contemporary magnitude of the effects may be smaller than those we present here. At the same time, the returns to education have increased, so the consequences of access to high-quality human capital investments from preK-12 are large...."
Rucker Johnson and C. Kirabo Jackson, "Reducing Inequality Through Dynamic Complementary Evidence From Head Start and Public School Spending," National Bureau of Economic Research June 2017, https://gsppi.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/RJabstract_LRHeadStartSchoolQuality.pdf

Valerie Strauss, "Why school integration works,"Washington Post, May 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/05/16/why-school-integration-works/

going through his CV seem like the support for that claim of the books is likely drawn from a 2017 NEBR paper of his that found

  • Politics
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    • Education
      • K-12
Previous articleJuly 15, 2019Trends in Academic Progress: Reading 1971-2012 | Mathematics 1973-2012Btw 1971/1973 and 2008, the gap btw White and Black students in reading and math narrowed significantly, with Black students making larger gains.Next articleJuly 16, 2019Peter Thiel and the populist rights embrace of broken capitalism theory1973-2016: 1% productivity growth drove 0.7-1% rise in median/avg compensation. Data shows wage-productivity link intact: 1970-2001 growth matched, post-2001 divergence less severe than claimed
Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

Related Articles:

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  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
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The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

Core argument: Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
  2. Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
  3. Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. American patriotism, measured by those "extremely proud" to be American, tracks closely with which party controls the presidency, with partisan gaps widening sharply over time. Republican pride swings ~14 points between administrations, while Democratic pride has collapsed from 58% to 14% across the same period.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

Core argument: Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
  2. Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
  3. Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government — A Pew study finds that only 15% of Americans trust the Federal government to do what is right “most of the time,” down from ~75% in 1960. A secular drop…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Politics

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all U.S. states in business investment and population growth, creating roughly 20% of net new jobs nationally from 2020 to 2025, and is on track to surpass California as the largest U.S. economy.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas replacing California as America's economic powerhouse?

Core argument: Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.
  2. ExxonMobil’s reincorporation in Texas signals a broader corporate migration that leads to revenue losses for high-tax states like California and.
  3. Texas’s economic dominance positions it to surpass California’s GDP, prompting competitive tax and regulatory reforms across North Carolina, Tennessee, and.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
  • Fifty Shades of Growth — Looking at natural population growth @AzizSunderji finds that all five metros with the highest natural population growth, births net deaths, in the entire…
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
  • Politics
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    • Growth
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