Does granting a fixed number of stock options explain rising CEO pay?
Core argument: CEO pay has risen since the 1990s as firms grant a rigid number of stock options whose value tracks firm equity returns, which averaged 30% annually during the Tech Boom.
Since the 1990s, CEO pay has increased significantly due to firms granting a consistent number of stock options, whose value has risen with firm equity returns, averaging 30% annually during the Tech Boom. This rigidity in the number of shares granted, coupled with downward nominal rigidity in salary and bonuses, has led to a rise in executive compensation. The phenomenon explains the increased pay dispersion across firms, the disparity in growth rates between the US and other countries, and the heightened correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. Regulatory changes mandating disclosure of option grant values contributed to a moderation in executive pay in the late 2000s. Additionally, evidence suggests that number-rigidity in executive pay is influenced by money illusion and reference-dependent motivation.

