Edward Conard

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A Cross-Cohort Analysis of Human Capital Specialization and the College Gender Wage Gap

AI Summary. College-educated women still choose majors associated with lower potential wages than men, and the authors find major choice has strong predictive power for the gender wage gap independent of occupation. Controlling for both major and occupation accounts for roughly 40% of the wage gap's decline across birth cohorts, with women's preference for fewer hours worked partially explaining these patterns.

Erik Hurst National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
December 18, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Research by @ErikHurst finds college major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps, independent of occupation choice, accounting for 40% of the decline in the wage gap across birth cohorts.

Research by @ErikHurst finds college major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps, independent of...

How much does college major choice explain the gender wage gap?

Core argument: Controlling for both college major and occupational choices accounts for roughly 40% of the decline in the college gender wage gap across birth cohorts, the study finds.

Despite a convergence in college major choices over the past 40 years, women still select majors linked to lower potential wages than men, contributing to the gender wage gap. This gap persists even as women increasingly enter occupations with potential wages closer to those chosen by male peers with the same major. The study finds that college major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps, independent of occupation choice. Controlling for both major and occupational choices accounts for roughly 40% of the decline in the wage gap across birth cohorts. Additionally, women's preference for lower hours worked partially explains these patterns, highlighting the complex interplay between education, occupation, and gender wage disparities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Controlling for both college major and occupational choices accounts for roughly 40% of the decline in the college gender wage gap across birth cohorts, the study finds.
  2. Despite convergence in college major choices over the past 40 years, women still select majors linked to lower potential wages than men, contributing to the gender wage gap.
  3. The study finds that college major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps independent of occupation choice, and that women's preference for lower hours worked partially explains these patterns.

Erik Hurst finds women today still choose college majors associated with lower potential wages than men and college major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps independent of occupation choice

“…In this paper, we document....(1) Over the past 40 years, men and women have chosen more similar undergraduate majors. (2) Women have historically chosen college majors associated with lower potential wages than men. Although these gaps have narrowed over time, this is still true for women in the youngest birth cohorts. (3) There are gender differences in the mapping of major to occupation. Women systematically choose lower potential wage and lower potential hours-worked occupations than men even conditional on major. (4) There is a modest convergence between the 1950 and 1990 birth cohorts in the gendered mapping of major to occupation. (5) College major choice has strong predictive power in explaining gender wage gaps independent of occupation choice. These trends arise in an era where both labor force participation of women and the fraction of women that have graduated from universities has increased dramatically, fundamentally changing the composition of the educated workforce....These results show that not only has their been a gender convergence in pre-labor market specialization (college major) and post-schooling specialization (occupational choice), there has also been a gender convergence in the mapping from major choice to occupation. Compared to their predecessors, younger women are in occupations that are closer in potential wages to those chosen by male peers with the same major. We also show that the potential desire for lower hours worked on the part of women explains part, but not all, of these patterns...Over all, we find that controlling jointly for major choice and occupational choice explains roughly 40 percent of the cross-birth cohort decline in the wage gap….”

Carolyn Sloane, Erik Hurst, and Dan Black, " A Cross-Cohort Analysis of Human Capital Specialization and the College Gender Wage Gap," National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26348

  • College
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Gender Pay Gap
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleDecember 18, 2019A Decade of Unicorns Ends With a Little Less MagicUnicorns that IPOed btw 2015-2019 were valued at $203.7 billion in their final private funding rounds and $211.4 billion at the end of the years in which they went public.Next articleDecember 27, 2019Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan, Oh MyElizabeth Warren’s comprehensive policy proposals reveal the American left’s ambitious agenda, aiming to transform government, business, and society. Her wealth tax targets net worths over $50m at 2% annually, with a 6% rate above $1bn, potentially raising $3.75tn over a decade.
Showing 44 database articles primarily about College

Easy A’s, Less Pay: The Long-Term Effects of Grade Inflation

AI Summary. The authors estimate that students assigned teachers who inflate average grades have lower future test scores, high school graduation, college enrollment, and earnings, with a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's average grade inflation reducing the present value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872. Inflating passing grades instead raises graduation with limited long-run effects.

Jeffrey Denning, Rachel Nesbit, Nolan Pope and Merrill Warnick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Data from Los Angeles and Maryland linking high school, postsecondary, and earnings records suggest that one class-year with a teacher with 1 SD higher mean grade inflation reduces the PDV of their students’ lifetime earnings by ~$213,872.

How does teacher grade inflation affect students' long-term outcomes and earnings?

Core argument: The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.

We develop two teacher-level measures of grade inflation: one measuring average grade inflation (the year-specific teacher fixed effect showing the teacher’s average contribution to grades after controlling for the student's contemporaneous performance in the focal subject as measured by the corresponding subject test score as well as prior test scores, prior grades, and other background characteristics), and another measuring a teacher's propensity to give a passing grade [which affects primarily students near the bottom of the distribution]. A [separate] cognitive value-added measure [included in the regressions] is a teacher fixed effect capturing how much a teacher raises students' standardized test scores relative to what would be predicted from the students' prior test scores and background characteristics. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added and slightly higher noncognitive value-added. The two [grade-inflation] measures differentially impact students' long-term outcomes. Being assigned a higher average grade inflating teacher reduces a student's future test scores, the likelihood of graduating from high school, college enrollment, and ultimately earnings. A teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value [PDV] of lifetime earnings of their students by $213,872 per year.  In contrast, passing grade inflation reduces the likelihood of being held back and increases high school graduation, with limited long-run effects. [Figure 7 in the gallery].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.
  2. Higher average grade inflation by teachers lowers students' future test scores, high school graduation likelihood, college enrollment, and earnings, while passing-grade inflation instead reduces grade retention and raises high school graduation with limited long-run effects.
  3. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added, measured as a teacher's contribution to standardized test scores beyond what students' prior scores and background characteristics predict, and slightly higher noncognitive value-added.

Related Articles:

  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — Administrative data on over 350,000 men each in Finland and Norway show a convex relationship between earnings rank and cognitive ability measured by military conscription tests: top-percentile earners score about 1 standard deviation above median earners, who score about 0.5 above bottom-percentile earners. The lowest scores are almost absent among top earners.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Wages/Income

Master’s Programs Are Cash Cows for Universities. Do They Pay Off for Students?

AI Summary. Adjusting for time spent, tuition costs, and completion probability drastically reduces the estimated return on a master's degree, leaving master's programs with the lowest adjusted return among degree types. Averages mask wide variation: business master's degrees show a negative return on average, while top programs' graduates can earn millions more.

Mark Schneider American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 10, 2024
Is Database:
Database
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Mark Schneider @AEIecon reviews the ROI of master’s degree programs and finds “vast differences among fields of study and among programs in the same field of study.” He argues that policymakers need to provide accurate ROI metrics to applicants.

Do master's degrees pay off for students after accounting for costs?

Core argument: Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.

The absolute increase in lifetime earnings is the average gain in income between students completing the degree and the counterfactual earnings of similarly situated students without the degree. Incorporating the time spent getting a master’s degree, the cost of obtaining the degree, and the probability of completing a program generates an “adjusted ROI.” Taking these costs into account drastically reduces the return to the student—and puts the return for master’s degrees dead last. [But] Averages Hide Lots of Information. Business is the single largest field of study for master’s students; but, on average, business master’s degrees have a negative ROI. But graduates from the top performing programs—including Dartmouth, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pennsylvania— can earn millions more than graduates from other business programs. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million. Even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates from some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.
  2. Business, the single largest field of study for master's students, has a negative ROI on average, while graduates of top-performing programs at Dartmouth, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania can earn millions more than graduates of other business programs.
  3. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million, and even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates of some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education

Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life?

AI Summary. Living in an area with more college graduates is associated with lower mortality even after accounting for individuals' own education, and more than half of that correlation can be explained by area differences in smoking and obesity rates. The authors find evidence for both regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans and peer effects about the harms of smoking.

Jacob Bor, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser and Ljubica Ristovska National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bor, @Cutler_econ, Glaeser, and @lj_ristovska find a strong negative correlation between the % of college graduates in an area and all-cause mortality, even after controlling for individual education.

Does living around college graduates lengthen life?

Core argument: The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.

[There is] a strong and robust relationship between area human capital and mortality, even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas, and that [these effects are] strong even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas. We find empirical evidence for [both] regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects about the harms of smoking. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating the role of changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic gaps in health between high and low human capital areas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.
  2. The authors find empirical evidence for both regulatory policies, such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects regarding the harms of smoking.
  3. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic health gaps between high and low human capital areas.

Related Articles:

  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • How Disadvantage Became Deadly in America — The author calculates that the average age of death among the shortest-lived 10% of Americans is 36, versus 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden, after falling by about eight years over the past decade. Wealthy Americans live equally long regardless of local opioid use and gun violence, while poor Americans in those areas live far shorter lives.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Education
      • K-12

Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton

AI Summary. Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.

Caroline Hoxby Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 10, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by a compositional shift that has occurred as more Americans have graduated college.

Does selection explain the widening mortality gap by education?

Core argument: Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.

I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.
  2. Comparing the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth cohorts of 1979 and 1997, the distribution of ASVAB percentiles among adults without a BA is shifted leftward for 1997, suggesting non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected.
  3. Measures of achievement among 12th graders and other high school students have not risen since consistent measurement began in the early 1970s, while the share obtaining a BA degree rose dramatically over the same period.

Related Articles:

  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • Why Are Americans Dying So Young? — One in 25 American five-year-olds is projected not to reach age 40, making deaths among the young a defining feature of US mortality. These deaths are overwhelmingly caused by external factors such as drug overdoses, gun violence, and dangerous driving.
  • Who Won the Cold War? Part II — Americans born around 1990 had higher death rates in their 20s than peers in affluent allied countries, and the gap widened across young adulthood. By age 29, US mortality for that cohort was about 2x New Zealand's, 2.5x France's, 3x Japan's, and 4x Italy's or Spain's.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Education
      • K-12

Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges

AI Summary. Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.

Raj Chetty, David Deming and John Friedman National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 24, 2023
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

.@OppInsights finds that the “Ivy-Plus” (Ivy League, plus UChicago, Duke, MIT, Stanford) admit students from the highest income families scoring in the top 1% of SAT/ACT at far greater rates than those from lower-income families.

Why are high-income students likelier to attend highly selective private colleges?

Core argument: Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.

Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families. Highly selective public colleges that follow more standardized processes to evaluate applications exhibit smaller disparities in admissions rates by parental income than private colleges that use more holistic evaluations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.
  2. Two-thirds of that attendance gap comes from higher admissions rates for high-income students with comparable test scores, and the remaining third from differences in application and matriculation rates.
  3. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges reflects preferences for alumni children, weight on non-academic credentials that tend to be stronger among applicants from affluent private high schools, and recruitment of athletes, while highly selective public colleges using more standardized evaluation show smaller disparities by parental income.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • Test Scores

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

AI Summary. Wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, with wages at the 95th percentile gaining substantially as real income for the median male college graduate stagnated or declined. This pattern challenges the view that education is a primary driver of rising economic inequality.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 11, 2022
Is Database:
Database

@PaulKrugman, according to his Wonk Out piece, the gap btw median male college graduate wages and the 95th percentile has widened since 2000, with the latter seeing substantial gains while the former’s real income has stagnated or declined.

Is education a primary driver of rising wage inequality?

Core argument: Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.

Since 2000, wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the notion that education is a primary driver of economic inequality. Data shows that the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with the former seeing substantial gains while the latter's real income has stagnated or declined. This suggests that a college degree is no longer a reliable path to financial success for many, contradicting the belief that college-educated individuals are part of the economic elite. The disparity highlights that factors beyond education, such as structural economic changes, play a significant role in rising inequality. This insight is crucial for policymakers considering student debt relief and broader economic reforms, as it underscores the need to address systemic issues rather than focusing solely on educational attainment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.
  2. The gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with top earners posting substantial gains while median college-graduate real income stagnated or declined.
  3. The stagnation of college-graduate incomes suggests that policymakers weighing student debt relief and broader economic reforms should address structural economic changes rather than educational attainment alone.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed... my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate. Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

Paul Krugman, "Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think,"Krugman Wonks Out, April 29, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/29/opinion/college-student-loan-debt.html

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

President Biden says that he is taking a “hard look” at student debt relief, which probably means that some significant relief is coming. For one thing, Biden promised relief during the 2020 campaign. For another, it’s one progressive priority he can address by executive action, which is important given the extreme difficulty of getting anything through an evenly divided Senate.

How much relief will he offer? I have no idea. How much relief should he offer? I’m for going as big as political realities allow, but I understand that too generous a debt write-off might produce a backlash. And I have no confidence that I know where the line should be drawn.

What I think I do know is that much of the backlash to proposals for student debt relief is based on a false premise: the belief that Americans who have gone to college are, in general, members of the economic elite.

The falsity of this proposition is obvious for those who were exploited by predatory for-profit institutions that encouraged them to go into debt to get more or less worthless credentials. The same applies to those who took on educational debt but never managed to get a degree — not a small group. In fact, around 40 percent of student loan borrowers never finish their education.

But even among those who make it through, a college degree is hardly a guarantee of economic success. And I’m not sure how widely that reality is understood.

What is widely understood is that America has become a far more unequal society over the past 40 years or so. The nature of rising inequality, however, isn’t as broadly known. I keep encountering seemingly well-informed people who believe that we’re mainly looking at a widening gap between the college-educated and everyone else.

This story had some truth to it in the 1980s and 1990s, although even then it didn’t account for the huge income gains at the top of the distribution — the rise of the 1 percent and even more among the 0.01 percent. Since 2000, however, most college graduates have actually seen their real incomes stagnate or even decline.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Furthermore, not all college graduates have had the same experience. Some have done pretty well, but many have seen no gains at all:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 2


I have my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

So here’s how I see it: Much of the student debt weighing down millions of Americans can be attributed to false promises.

Some of these promises were scams pure and simple; think Trump University. Even those who weren’t outright cheated, however, were pulled in by elite messaging assuring them that a college degree was a ticket to financial success. Too many didn’t realize that their life circumstances might make it impossible to finish their education — it’s hard for comfortable, upper-middle-class Americans to realize how difficult staying in school can be for young people from poorer families with unstable incomes. Many of those who did manage to finish found that the financial rewards were far smaller than they expected.

And all too many of those who fell victim to these false promises ended up saddled with large debts.

Of course, there are many Americans who have suffered from rising inequality. I wouldn’t argue that college debtors are greater victims than, say, truck drivers who have seen their real wages plunge or families stuck in declining rural areas and small towns. And we should be helping all of these people.

Unfortunately, most things we could and should be doing for Americans in need — like extending the expanded child tax credit — can’t be done in the face of 50 Republican senators, plus Joe Manchin. Student debt relief, by contrast, is something President Biden can do. So he should.

  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
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