Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 94
  • Primary focus 14
Showing 14 database articles primarily about Incentives/Risk-Taking
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Remove "primary topics only" restriction
  • Remove 'Database'
Show all 7,192 articles
For whatever topics you select (currently: Incentives/Risk-Taking):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas

Charles Jones National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 17, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Raising top marginal tax rate from 50% to 75% in the US could generate 2.5% of GDP in revenue but reduce innovation & lower GDP per person by 6% in the long run.

Raising top marginal tax rate from 50% to 75% in the US could generate 2.5% of GDP in revenue but reduce innovation &...
Raising the top marginal tax rate from 50% to 75% in the US, which applies to about 10% of income, could generate 2.5% of GDP in revenue before behavioral responses. However, this increase may reduce innovation and lower GDP per person by around 6% in the long run, negatively impacting social welfare. The nonrival nature of ideas means that reducing idea production affects everyone's income, not just the inventor's. High incomes incentivize entrepreneurs to transform research insights into consumer-benefiting products, but high marginal tax rates can diminish this effort. A model incorporating innovation suggests the optimal top tax rate is significantly lower than traditional calculations, potentially even negative, as subsidizing innovation could increase overall income more than redistribution gains. This highlights the importance of considering idea-driven growth when setting top income tax rates.

model of the optimum tax rate which a new constraint, ideas. 1) new ideas drive economic growth, 2) the reward for creating a successful innovation is a top income, and 3) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a separate research subsidy finds that,"...For example, consider raising the top marginal tax rate from 50% to 75%. As we discuss below, in the United States, the share of income that this top marginal rate applies to is around 10%, so the change raises about 2.5% of GDP in revenue before the behavioral response. In our baseline calibration, such an increase in the top marginal rate reduces innovation and lowers GDP per person in the long run by around 6 percent...."

"...The nonrivalry of ideas is key to this result and illustrates why incorporating physical capital or human capital into the top tax calculation is insufficient. If you add one unit of human capital or one unit of physical capital to an economy—think of adding a computer or an extra year of education for one person—youmake one workermore productive, because these goods are rival. But if you add a new idea — think of the computer code for the original spreadsheet or the blueprint for the electric generator —you can make any number of workers more productive. Because ideas are nonrival, each person’s wage is an increasing function of the entire stock of ideas. A distortion that reduces the production of new ideas therefore impacts everyone’s income, not just the income of the inventor herself.....The idea creation and implementation that occurs beyond formal R&D may be distorted by the tax system. In particular, high incomes are the prize that motivates entrepreneurs to turn a basic research insight that results from formal R&D into a product or process that ultimately benefits consumers. High marginal tax rates reduce this effort and therefore reduce innovation and the incomes of everyone in the economy....Taking this force into account is important quantitatively. For example, consider raising the top marginal tax rate from 50% to 75%. As we discuss below, in the United States, the share of income that this top marginal rate applies to is around 10%, so the change raises about 2.5% of GDP in revenue before the behavioral response. In our baseline calibration, such an increase in the top marginal rate reduces innovation and lowers GDP per person in the long run by around 6 percent. With a utilitarian welfare criterion, this obviously reduces welfare. But even redistributing the 2.5% of GDP to the bottom half of the population would leave them worse off on average: the 6% decline in their incomes is not offset by the 5% increase from redistribution. In other words, unless the social welfare function puts enormous weight on the poorest people in society, raising the top marginal rate from 50% to 75% reduces social welfare.....For example, in a baseline calculation, the revenue-maximizing top tax rate that ignores the innovation spillover is 92%. In contrast, the rate that incorporates innovation and maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function is just 29%. Moreover, if ideas play an even more important role than assumed in this baseline, it is possible for the optimal top income tax rate to turn negative: the increase in everyone’s income associated with subsidizing innovation exceeds the gains associated with redistribution.....This paper considers the taxation of top incomes when the following conditions apply: (i) new ideas drive economic growth, (ii) the reward for creating a successful innovation is a top income, and (iii) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a separate research subsidy — think about the business methods of Walmart, the creation of Uber, or the “idea” of Amazon.com. These conditions lead to a new term in the Saez (2001) formula for the optimal top tax rate: by slowing the creation of the new ideas that drive aggregate GDP, top income taxation reduces everyone’s income, not just the income at the top. When the creation of ideas is the ultimate source of economic growth, this force sharply constrains both revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing top tax rates. For example, for extreme parameter values, maximizing the welfare of the middle class requires a negative top tax rate: the higher income that results from the subsidy to innovation more than makes up for the lost redistribution. More generally, the calibrated model suggests that incorporating ideas and economic growth cuts the optimal top marginal tax rate substantially relative to the basic Saez calculation.... "
Charles Jones, "Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas," National Bureau of Economic Research (Preliminary), September 6, 2018, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty-research/sites/faculty-research/files/finance/Macro%20Workshop/toptax.pdf

  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • High vs Low Skill
Previous articleJanuary 16, 2019From Immigrants to Robots: The Changing Locus of Substitutes for WorkersAccording to @GeorgeBorjas @nberpubs, the influx of industrial robots has been modest but is poised to surpass the impact of additional immigration on labor markets.Next articleJanuary 17, 2019Taxing Top Incomes in a World of IdeasA top marginal tax rate above 30% may suboptimize social welfare by stifling idea creation, reducing GDP & overall income. A utilitarian welfare function suggests a top tax rate of just 29% maximizes social welfare. @CharlesJones
Showing 13 database articles primarily about Incentives/Risk-Taking

Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?

AI Summary. The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.

Serdar Birinci, Loukas Karabarbounis, and Kurt See National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Work hours of Americans and Europeans were ~ equal in the early 1970s, but by the mid 1990s, Europeans worked much less than Americans. Half of this hours gap had vanished by 2019. The drop in US hours was collinear with an ~ doubling of Medicaid enrollment.

Core argument: American work hours declined after 2000 primarily because expanded health benefits reduced employment incentives for non-workers.

Whereas Americans and Europeans were working roughly the same hours in the early 1970s, by the mid 1990s, Americans were working much more than Europeans. We update Prescott’s observations on hours worked for advanced economies and document that about half of the hours gap in the 1990s has reversed by the end of the 2010s. While the decline in the U.S. hours is well documented in the literature, the increase in non-U.S. hours in the past two decades, both relative to the United States and in absolute levels, has not yet been analyzed systematically. The convergence in hours worked is concentrated on the extensive margin and is observed for both men and women. We offer a comparative study on the convergence of hours worked and ask, “Why do Americans no longer work so much more than non-Americans?” [Employing both nonstructural correlation analysis and a structural model of labor supply, we suggest that] U.S. hours per person declined after the 2000s because of the rise of benefits provided to the non-employed. Among these benefits, we find the most important role for health benefits and, in particular, Medicaid. For non-U.S. countries, the rise of labor supply is generally accounted for by a rise of wages and falling fixed costs and disutility of work.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American work hours declined after 2000 primarily because expanded health benefits reduced employment incentives for non-workers.
  2. European and other developed nations increased work hours due to rising wages and lower barriers to employment participation.
  3. The transatlantic work-hour gap that peaked in the 1990s has substantially reversed over the past two decades.

Related Articles:

  • Hours Worked and Lifetime Earnings Inequality — Richard Rogerson and team infer 20% of the inequality in lifetime earnings among American men can be explained by differences in hours worked, and that 90% of…
  • Comparing EU-to-US Output Per Hour — Overall GDP per hour worked in Europe is about 82% of US levels. German productivity per hour worked is on par with the US, and lower per capita GDP is…
  • Europeans ‘Less Hard-Working’ Than Americans, Says Norway Oil Fund Boss — The CEO of Norway’s $1.6T oil fund notes that US companies have outpaced their European rivals in innovation and technology; “There’s a mindset issue in…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

What’s Missing in the Fed’s Data about Ultrarich Portfolios

AI Summary. Federal Reserve wealth data overstates the role of public stocks in top portfolios because private corporations and private equity funds are counted alongside publicly traded shares, making the ultra-wealthy appear more like stock market investors than business owners.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
April 6, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Zidar and Zwick find SCF data show ownership share in private businesses make up between 45–50% of top 0.1% American wealth, and ~80% of US households worth $30mm+ are business owners.

Core argument: The ultra-wealthy derive substantial wealth from private business ownership, not primarily from public stock holdings as commonly assumed.

“Private businesses” make up a declining and now-modest share of top 0.1% wealth in the Federal Reserve’s Distribution of Financial Accounts (DFA), with corporate equities dominating portfolios at the very top. The misleading implication is that the rich are primarily stockholders. In fact, they are not. The issue, we learned, is that the DFA’s “private business” category is much narrower than what most people mean by the term. It covers only proprietor’s equity in noncorporate businesses — partnerships and sole proprietorships. Not S-corporations. Not other private corporations. Not financial partnerships like private equity or hedge funds. Just noncorporate, nonfinancial businesses. Private corporations are valued separately, but the Fed can’t distinguish households’ holdings of private corporate equity from their holdings of publicly traded stocks. They’re all lumped together into “corporate equities.” The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) tells a different story about what the top 0.1% actually owns. Private business shows up as roughly 45 to 50% of top wealth — far larger than the DFA’s “private business” label suggests. About 80% of households worth $30 million or more are business owners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The ultra-wealthy derive substantial wealth from private business ownership, not primarily from public stock holdings as commonly assumed.
  2. Federal data limitations obscure the true composition of top earners’ portfolios by combining private and public corporate equity into one.
  3. Accurate wealth distribution analysis requires distinguishing between private business stakes and public market investments to understand inequality drivers.

Related Articles:

  • Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich — The top 0.1% share of wealth in the US increased from 12.9% to 15% btw 2001-2016, according to @MatthewSmith @nberpubs.
  • They’re Rich but Not Famous—and They’re Suddenly Everywhere — At the end of 2022, ~430,000 American households had a net worth of at least $30mm, of which ~74,000 were worth $100mm or more. As of Q3 2025, ~72% of the top…
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets

Hendrik Bessembinder Arizona State University
Date Posted:
March 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Btw January 1926 and December 2025, 60% of US firms had negative total returns relative to T-bills. 46 firms accounted for half of the $91T in net wealth creation over the period, and 1,082 firms, 3.7%, accounted for 100% of net wealth creation.

Two central conclusions emerge from this study of long-term investment outcomes in the CRSP data. First, stocks publicly traded in the U.S. markets were, despite periodic volatility, a tremendous source of wealth enhancement, totaling some $91 trillion by my calculations over the 100-year period. Second, long-term stock market outcomes demonstrate strong positive skewness, and the success of the overall markets is attributable to a substantial extent to very strong outcomes for a relatively few firms. This skewness is of practical importance. Financial planning is often based on expected or mean future returns. The outcome of such an exercise is informative, but it should be recognized that in a skewed distribution most possible future outcomes are less than the expected or mean outcome. While the distribution of possible outcomes to diversified portfolios is less skewed than for individual stocks, positive skewness is present at long time horizons in any case. Analyses focused on the median outcome, or better yet on the entire distribution of potential outcomes, are more informative. The historical U.S. stock return data shows that both buy-and-hold returns and dollar based measures of shareholder wealth enhancement are dominated by relatively few high performing firms.

Related Articles:

  • Which U.S. Stocks Generated the Highest Long-Term Returns? — Hendrik Bessembinder finds that from 1925 to 2023 51.6% of equities had a negative return; however, 17 stocks had cumulative returns greater than $50,000 per…
  • Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks — Hendrik Bessembinder finds that the best-performing 1,526 global firms (2.4% of total) accounted for all of the $75.7T in net global stock market wealth…
  • Entire Market Structure Exposed To A Big Move — An uptick in the share of S&P 500 firms moving >10% in a single day, with a lower correlation of returns across firms and bigger gaps between winners…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Growth
    • US Business Dynamism
  • Productivity

The Net Present Value of the Billionaire Tax Act: An Assessment of the Fiscal Effects of California's Proposed Wealth Tax

Benjamin Jaros, Joshua Rauh, Greg Kearney, John Doran, et al. Stanford University
Date Posted:
March 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A simulation study of the proposed CA wealth tax on billionaires, finds a 71% chance that it will have a negative NPV, with a mean of −$24.7 billion. The PV of permanently lost income tax revenue more than offsets the one-time wealth tax collection.

The California Billionaire Tax Act of 2026 proposes a one-time 5% tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals exceeding $1 billion. This measure applies to tangible and intangible assets, including those held through trusts and certain recent transfers. Our proxy for these taxable assets in this dataset is the “Net Worth” of each California-based billionaire listed in the 2025 Forbes Billionaires listing. Our preferred revenue estimate implies that approximately 55% of the billionaire income tax base has or will avoid the tax, nearly double the 30.7% break-even threshold under even [proponent’s optimistic] assumption of six confirmed departures at a 1.5% real discount rate, and approaching the 61.4% threshold at 3%. The wealth tax has positive net present value only if the one-time revenue exceeds the present value of foregone income taxes from departing billionaires. We simulate draws from uniform distributions over the plausible ranges for discount rates, revenue from the wealth tax, and lost income tax collections; 71% of draws yield a negative net present value, with a mean of [-]$24.7 billion, with a median of −$19.1 billion, and standard deviation of $38.4 billion. [See Figure 3 in gallery]. These estimates are conservative in that we exclude all non-income-tax fiscal spillovers, including lost sales tax, property tax, and business activity, such as employing other income taxpayers.

Related Articles:

  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — After a 2012 increase in marginal tax rates of up to 3% for high-income California households 0.8% of the impacted tax base left the state in 2013 and others…
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • The Robin Hood State Is Coming For The Rich — Advanced economies have become increasingly redistributive. “While the share of US taxable income going to the top 1% of earners soared, their share of…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Politics
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

The Limits of New York’s “Tax the Rich” Policy

E. J. McMahon Manhattan Institute
Date Posted:
March 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2010 and 2022, New York State’s share of realized capital gains among income millionaires declined 5.1pp to 8.9%, while Florida’s increased 8.7pp to 16.7% – above California’s 14.9%.

As the nation emerged from the Great Recession in 2010, the capital gains of income millionaires were disproportionately concentrated in the four most populous states: California, New York, Texas, and Florida. Between 2010 and 2022, taxpayers earning $1 million or more in these states accounted, on average, for 50% of the nation’s total capital gains realizations. At the start of the period, California led all states, with 16% of capital gains among all U.S. income millionaires. New York ranked second, at 14%, while Texas and Florida trailed at 8.7% and 8%, respectively. The next 12 years saw a significant shift in the rankings. By 2022, Florida had topped the list, with 16.7% of capital gains income among millionaire earners, followed by California at 14.9% and Texas at 9.7%. New York had dropped to fourth place, with 8.9%—essentially changing places with Florida.

Related Articles:

  • Supply and The Mam — At ~15%, NYC has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US, and the top marginal corporate income tax rate at 17.4%. The city also has the…
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
  • The Stationary Bandits of New York City — New York City’s elevated infrastructure costs relative to peers such as Paris are due to “stationary bandits” extracting wealth from the “tradable private…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Politics
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

The Robin Hood State Is Coming For The Rich

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
February 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Advanced economies have become increasingly redistributive. “While the share of US taxable income going to the top 1% of earners soared, their share of post-tax income has risen only slightly; the 1% paid 40% of income tax in 2022, up from 33% in 2001.”

The vigour of the Robin Hood state varies across countries. In America more redistribution has merely offset rising pre-tax inequality. According to the Congressional Budget Office, for example, 2022—the most recent year for which detailed data are available—was the fourth-most unequal year on record, as measured by the Gini coefficient of taxable income, behind only 2021, 2020 and 2012. But inequality after taxes and transfers was lower than in 2000, 2005-07, 2012, 2014, and 2017-18 and 2021. It was also only a shade higher than in 1986. Even as the share of America’s taxable income going to the top 1% of earners has soared, their share of post-tax income has risen only slightly. Today’s combination of higher pre-tax inequality and higher tax rates on top earners has left governments astonishingly dependent on the wealthiest for their revenue. In America, the 1% paid 40% of income tax in 2022, up from 33% in 2001.

Related Articles:

  • Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends — Gerald Auten and David Splinter have updated their income inequality estimate and find that the after-tax income share of the top 1% in the US has been steady…
  • Across The Rich World, Fiscal Crises Loom — At current 5-year yields, stabilizing debt/GDP would require a reduction in the primary deficit of 2.3% of GDP in the UK and the US, and 3% in France. Maturing…
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Incentives/Risk-Taking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • Politics
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms