We find that the elasticity of US supply has fallen over time, and is much smaller for public producers than for privates. We estimate that a 10% oil price increase boosts US liquids supply by around 1% or 200kb/d. Consolidation is likely to further depress the supply elasticity as inelastic public producers gain market share, and efficiency gains push the US lower on the cost curve. We see two takeaways. First, the trends in the Permian and ongoing capital discipline support our forecasts that US liquids supply growth slows in 2024 to 0.6mb/d (vs.1.4mb/d in 2023), and that Brent reaches $100/bbl in June. Second, our estimates imply that the US supply response to higher prices—caused by any geopolitical supply shock—would offset only about 20-25% of the initial shock, which underscores OPEC’s key role in balancing the market. While core OPEC countries currently have nearly 4mb/d of spare capacity, physical or political barriers to deploying spare capacity are the key upside risk to oil prices.
Related: The Changing Nexus Between Commodity Prices and the Dollar: Causes and Implications and Monday Chart and Portfolio Nuclear
More than three hundred thousand Chinese moved away last year, more than double the pace of migration a decade ago. Some are resorting to extraordinary measures. In August, a man rode a Jet Ski, loaded with extra fuel, nearly two hundred miles to South Korea. According to rights activists, he had served time in prison for wearing a T-shirt that called China’s leader “Xitler.” Others have followed arduous routes through a half-dozen countries, in the hope of reaching the U.S. This summer, authorities at America’s southern border reported a record 17,894 encounters with Chinese migrants in the previous ten months—a thirteenfold increase from a year earlier.
Related: China’s Brain Drain Threatens Its Future and Singapore Asks Banks to Keep Quiet on Wealth Inflows During China Boom and The Mysterious $300 Billion Flow Out of China
In sharp contrast to this prior experience, from 2007 into 2021 the U.S. NFA position declined precipitously — by 60pp of U.S. GDP — before bouncing back somewhat in the first three quarters of 2022. And this has occurred despite the fact that U.S. current account deficits have narrowed relative to the early 2000s. We document that this unprecedented decline in the U.S. NFA position has been driven by a boom in the market valuation of the non-financial assets in U.S. corporations. Because foreigners’ gross holdings of equity in U.S. corporations have grown to be very large, this boom has mechanically increased the market value of U.S. liabilities to the rest of the world (henceforth, ROW). There has not been a similar boom in the valuation of corporations in the ROW over this time period, so U.S. residents have not enjoyed a similar revaluation of their gross foreign equity assets.
Related: The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies and The Case For Continued American Equity Exceptionalism and Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks
At age 25, individuals in the lowest lifetime earnings (LE) bracket earned an average of approximately $12,000, while those in the median and top brackets earned $28,000 and $39,000, respectively. As a result, the earnings gap between the highest and lowest earners—measured as the ratio of their average earnings—already stands at around 3.25 at the beginning of their working lives. Those at the top of the LE distribution witness a remarkable 435% surge in their incomes between ages 25 and 35. In contrast, median earners undergo a comparatively modest increase of over 65%, while those at the bottom experience minimal earnings growth, a mere 16% uptick. Interestingly, during the subsequent 10-year period (ages 35-45), the median LE group witnesses a significant deceleration in their earnings growth, plummeting from the previous decade’s 65% increase to approximately 15%. Meanwhile, the bottom LE group continues to undergo a gradual but consistent earnings growth of around 15%. The top LE group deviates substantially from the rest of the workforce. They once again experience surge in earnings, exceeding 150%, and by the time they reach age 45, they earned more than half a million dollars annually. Consequently, the earnings gap between the highest and lowest earners widens further, expanding from 15.3 to 33.1.
Related: The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies and The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022
Manhattan was the biggest loser at $16.5 billion of outflows to other states, with nearly 28 cents of every dollar—equaling $4.6 billion in total going to the state of Florida. California saw the greatest losses at the state level, while Florida was the biggest beneficiary with a net gain of $39 billion from other states. Meanwhile, Manhattan saw huge outflows to surrounding suburbs and out-of-state destinations, the largest of which being Florida’s coast. Those seeking warmer weather and sunny beaches led the pack, as former New Yorkers took more than $2.9 billion to Miami-Dade County and $1.1 billion in taxable income decamped for Palm Beach County, FL. In fact, 27.7 cents of every dollar leaving Manhattan went to the state of Florida, equaling $4.6 billion in total.
Related: Tax Data Reveals Large Flight of High Earners from Major Cities During the Pandemic and Young Families Have Not Returned to Large Cities Post-Pandemic and Taxing Billionaires: Estate Taxes and the Geographical Location of the Ultra-Wealthy
Global electricity demand is projected to increase at a rate of 2.7% per year in the APS, more than doubling from just under 25,000 TWh in 2021 to nearly 54,000 TWh in 2050. The buildings sector continues to consume the most electricity, followed closely by industry, each accounting for more than one-third of total demand throughout the period. Transport makes up just 2% of global electricity demand currently, but this rises to 15% in 2050. Hydrogen production via electrolysis adds significantly to electricity demand growth, from less than 2 TWh in 2021 to over 5,700 TWh in 2050 in the APS. More rapid electrification of end uses in the NZE Scenario further accelerates electricity demand growth to 3.2% per year to 2050, reaching over 62,000 TWh in 2050. Demand growth is expected to be accompanied by improvements in efficiency. Hydrogen production and EVs account for more than half the growth in electricity demand to 2050.
Related: Gridlock: How a Lack of Power Lines Will Delay the Age of Renewables and Elon Musk’s Latest Mission: Rev Up the Electricity Industry and What Have We Learned About the Neutral Rate?
One reason we believe high-yield spreads haven’t spiked yet is the migration of lower-quality borrowers—those most likely to default—out of high yield and into the private credit market. According to Moody’s, the number of issuers with B3 debt has fallen as these issuers have departed for private credit. According to Moody’s, 62% of its rated universe, which includes both loans and bonds, is rated B2 (also known as B) or below, and, “In general, the high-yield bond market favors better-quality Ba [Moody’s term for BB] issuers, while the leveraged loan market is concentrated in LBOs that have had liquidity constraints on the heels of the Federal Reserve’s aggressive tightening.”
Related: Higher Cost of Capital Continues and Credit Normalization
We estimate that higher rates will increase the interest burden for small businesses by just over 1pp by 2024, from roughly 5.8% of revenues in 2021 to around 7% in 2024. Under our current rates forecasts, we forecast this share would increase further to just under 8% as term loans gradually mature—above the pre-pandemic share of 6.8% but similar to that of the mid-1990s. In 2023, we expect small business interest payments as a share of output to increase by a little under 1pp. Since this sector accounts for around 15% of private-sector gross output and the ratio between private-sector gross output and US GDP is a little under 1.6, this implies a drag on economywide GDP growth of around 0.1pp.
Related: Higher Cost of Capital Continues and Credit Normalization and Soft Landing Summer
The second stage of the tightening cycle can be clearly seen in the market action. Earlier in the tightening cycle, short-term interest rates rose and dragged long-term interest rates higher. Then, beginning in October 2022 and lasting almost a year, there was a reprieve. Hikes in short-term interest rates continued, but bond yields traded sideways, reflecting market expectations for future easing, combined with the Treasury circumventing the pressure on long rates by issuing T-bills funded by excess central bank reserves. In the third quarter, both conditions shifted as described above, initiating the next stage of the tightening cycle, led by long rates.
Related: Soft Landing Summer and Why No Recession (Yet)? and Fool Me Once
The P/E ratio for the S&P493 has fluctuated around 19 in 2023. And the P/E ratio for the S&P7 has increased from 29 to 45. The bottom line is that returns this year in the S&P500 have been driven entirely by returns in the seven biggest stocks, and these seven stocks have become more and more overvalued. What is particularly remarkable is that the ongoing overvaluation of tech stocks has happened during a year when long-term interest rates have increased significantly. Remember, tech companies have cash flows far out in the future, which should be more negatively impacted by increases in the discount rate. In short, something has to give. Either stocks have to go down to be consistent with the current level of interest rates. Or long-term interest rates have to go down to be consistent with the current level of stock prices.
Related: Long-Term Shareholder Returns: Evidence From 64,000 Global Stocks and 7 or 493 Stocks: What Matters for the S&P 500? and A Few Stocks Drive the Stock Market: Dot.com Vs. Today Vs. the Last 100 Years
The strongest reason for weighing this slice towards India is not just that the country has averaged real GDP growth of more than 6% a year for the past 30 years; that growth has also translated into stock market returns in a way that China’s growth, for example, has not. Over the past 30, 20, 10, and five years, the Sensex has performed as well or better than the S&P 500, leaving other big markets far behind. India’s growth story is built on its remarkable increase in total factor productivity, the economy’s ability to generate output from a given amount of labour and capital. Aditya Suresh of Macquarie notes that TFP’s contribution to headline growth has averaged 1.3% between 2007 and 2022, against 0.9% in 1990-2006, far outpacing other EMs. Partly, the TFP boost has come from efficiency improvements in certain sectors, such as services exports (think ecommerce or consulting). But the biggest improvement is undoubtedly from better basic infrastructure.
Related: Indian Stock Market Surges as Foreign Funds Buy Into National Growth Story and India Equity: An Unsung Long-Term Performance Story and The Path to 2075 — Capital Market Size and Opportunity
China is likely heading into a messy and protracted debt debacle that will be at least equal in magnitude to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) debt drama in the late 1990s. Except the outcome this time will likely be a prolonged economic malaise. At a fundamental level, most if not all economic crises are essentially debt crises in various guises. China’s is no exception. We believe the property sector crisis, which has largely peaked, is just a preview of the main event, which will see around 40% of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) default on their debt. Defaults of this magnitude will affect regional banks that are most exposed to LGFV lending. We estimate total loss for LGFV creditors (including financial institutions such as banks and LGFV supplier/contractors) to be in the neighborhood of $5 trillion, or ~30% of China’s GDP.
Related: Can China’s Long-Term Growth Rate Exceed 2–3 Percent? and The Neoclassical Growth of China and China’s Defeated Youth
Combining team-level information on all Ivy League athletes from 1970 to 2021 with resume data for all Ivy League graduates, we examine both post-graduate education and career choices as well as career outcomes. Athletes are far more likely to go into business and finance-related jobs than their non-athlete classmates. Athletes attain higher terminal wages and earn cumulatively more than non-athletes over the course of their careers controlling for school, graduation year, major, and first job. In addition, they attain more senior positions in the organizations they join. Collectively, our results suggest that non-academic human capital developed through athletic participation is valued in the labor market and may support the role that prior athletic achievement plays in admissions at elite colleges.
Related: The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies and Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges and Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers?
The black line shows the level of American labor productivity. The blue dashed line is a statistically estimated trend, estimated through 2019 and then extended. The trend is allowed to change after 2004; the slowdown in trend captures the end of the late-90s/early 2000s Internet-led boom. Starting in 2020, you can see the sizeable productivity boom, as the black line moved well above the trend. Press discussions at the time were often quite exuberant about the possibilities. Unfortunately, since that bump, productivity has retreated right back to its pre-pandemic trend or, even, by early 2023, a little below the trend.
Related: The Productivity Slowdown in Advanced Economies: Common Shocks or Common Trends? and Will A.I. Transform the Economy, and if So, How? and The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies
We use an event study approach, examining what happens when a firm begins supplying a foreign multinational for the first time. We uncover a sharp increase in productivity (which rises by about 8% after three years) and other performance measures (e.g. sales to firms other than the new multinational partner). The fraction of aggregate value accounted for by multinationals declined by about ten percentage points in Belgium in our sample period (2002 and 2014), which would suggest a strong headwind against productivity growth. However, in a novel result we are also able to document that when we look at similar events of starting a serious relationship with other “superstar firms” - defined as those who are in the top thousandth of the size distribution and/or export intensively - we find very similar performance impacts.
Related: The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies and The National Economic Council Gets It Wrong on the Roles of Big and Small Firms in U.S. Innovation and Mega Firms and Recent Trends in the U.S. Innovation: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data
I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.
Related: Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA and Why Are Americans Dying So Young? and Who Won the Cold War? Part II
My calculations suggest the average age of death in [the shortest-lived 10%] is just 36 years old, compared with 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden. It hasn’t always been this way. In the 1980s, the most disadvantaged Americans lived about as long as their counterparts in France. By the early 2000s, lives at the bottom had lengthened considerably, and while a deficit was opening up, it wasn’t worrisome. But in the past decade, the lives of America’s least fortunate have shortened by an astonishing eight years. Wealthy Americans who live in the parts of the country with high opioid use and gun violence live just as long as those who live where fentanyl addiction and gunshot incidents are relatively rare. But poor Americans live far shorter lives if they grow up surrounded by guns and drugs than if they don’t.
Related: Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton and Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA and Why Are Americans Dying So Young?
Gallup suggests that remarkably few people, just about anywhere, are happily engaged with their work. The average of the 73 countries in our filtered version showed that 20% were thriving and 15% were loud quitters. The remaining 65% were quietly dragging their feet. Among big economies, America and India had the highest share of thrivers, though that was only around one-third. In Italy and Japan just 5% were thriving, the lowest shares in the sample.
Related: Where Are the Workers? From Great Resignation to Quiet Quitting and The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies
Nonparticipation rates have increased with each generation of prime-age men. Millennials experience a notably different nonparticipation rate trajectory over their lifetime compared with previous generations, with rates starting at a higher level and declining more steeply until their mid-30s. This temporarily higher level of nonparticipation is driven by school enrollment. Even though nonparticipation rates for millennials are still higher than in previous generations, given the increasing educational attainment for younger generations and the trends we observe by education groups, the pace of the sustained rise in male nonparticipation rates may slow in the future, which could benefit economic growth.
Related: Wage Inequality and the Rise in Labor Force Exit: The Case of US Prime-Age Men and 20-40% of Declining Workforce Participation from Prime Working-Age Men Dropping Out (for Less Than 2 Years) to Increase Their Leisure and Econ Focus: Melissa Kearney
About 4 million baby boomers, or 2% of the working-age population, are turning 65 each year, and while the number of Gen Zers turning 15 each year is 200,000 to 300,000 higher than that, more than 820,000 Americans ages 15 through 64 died last year, and about 700,000 died annually in the years leading up to the pandemic. Immigration is thus the only thing keeping the working-age population from shrinking. Immigration spurs economic growth while in some cases depressing wages for some native-born workers. But in the US, if the forecasts are correct, immigration will only keep the 15-to-64 population just about constant through 2100 (as opposed to the 20% decline forecast for the world’s high-income countries overall and the 62% decline forecast for China). We truly have entered a new era for working-age population growth.
Related: The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Economy and Kaiser Workers Launch Largest-Ever US Health Care Strike and Immigrants & Their Kids Were 70% of U.S. Labor Force Growth Since 1995
We use an event study approach, examining what happens when a firm begins supplying a foreign multinational for the first time. We uncover a sharp increase in productivity (which rises by about 8% after three years) and other performance measures (e.g. sales to firms other than the new multinational partner). The fraction of aggregate value accounted for by multinationals declined by about ten percentage points in Belgium in our sample period (2002 and 2014), which would suggest a strong headwind against productivity growth. However, in a novel result we are also able to document that when we look at similar events of starting a serious relationship with other “superstar firms” - defined as those who are in the top thousandth of the size distribution and/or export intensively - we find very similar performance impacts.
Related: The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies and The National Economic Council Gets It Wrong on the Roles of Big and Small Firms in U.S. Innovation and Mega Firms and Recent Trends in the U.S. Innovation: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data
I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.
Related: Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA and Why Are Americans Dying So Young? and Who Won the Cold War? Part II
My calculations suggest the average age of death in [the shortest-lived 10%] is just 36 years old, compared with 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden. It hasn’t always been this way. In the 1980s, the most disadvantaged Americans lived about as long as their counterparts in France. By the early 2000s, lives at the bottom had lengthened considerably, and while a deficit was opening up, it wasn’t worrisome. But in the past decade, the lives of America’s least fortunate have shortened by an astonishing eight years. Wealthy Americans who live in the parts of the country with high opioid use and gun violence live just as long as those who live where fentanyl addiction and gunshot incidents are relatively rare. But poor Americans live far shorter lives if they grow up surrounded by guns and drugs than if they don’t.
Related: Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton and Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA and Why Are Americans Dying So Young?
About 4 million baby boomers, or 2% of the working-age population, are turning 65 each year, and while the number of Gen Zers turning 15 each year is 200,000 to 300,000 higher than that, more than 820,000 Americans ages 15 through 64 died last year, and about 700,000 died annually in the years leading up to the pandemic. Immigration is thus the only thing keeping the working-age population from shrinking. Immigration spurs economic growth while in some cases depressing wages for some native-born workers. But in the US, if the forecasts are correct, immigration will only keep the 15-to-64 population just about constant through 2100 (as opposed to the 20% decline forecast for the world’s high-income countries overall and the 62% decline forecast for China). We truly have entered a new era for working-age population growth.
Related: The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Economy and Kaiser Workers Launch Largest-Ever US Health Care Strike and Immigrants & Their Kids Were 70% of U.S. Labor Force Growth Since 1995
We estimate that the U.S. debt held by the public cannot exceed about 200% of GDP even under today’s generally favorable market conditions. Under current policy, the United States has about 20 years for corrective action after which no amount of future tax increases or spending cuts could avoid the government defaulting on its debt whether explicitly or implicitly (i.e., debt monetization producing significant inflation). Table 1 then shows the impact on the debt-GDP ratio if financial markets start to demand a larger return before unraveling. However, additional rates closer to 50 to 100 b.p. are more reasonable in the short run, as some borrowing rates are already locked in at a weighted average duration of about 6 years. Table 1 shows that between 2040 and 2045---or in about 20 years---the U.S. debt-GDP ratio will hit between 175 and 200 percent under current fiscal policy, depending on the assumed interest rates.
Related: Interest Expense: A Bigger Impact on Deficits than Debt and The High Cost of Borrowing at Low Rates and Living with High Public Debt
Even if there’s no immediate crisis, high-interest rates will almost surely crowd out private investment, hurting our long-term prospects. I’m especially concerned about the effects of high rates on investments in renewable energy, which are of existential importance. The federal government is essentially an insurance company with an army. Look at spending in fiscal 2023: Social Security, health care and other safety net programs accounted for most government spending. Add military spending and interest payments, and what’s left — NDD, for “nondefense discretionary” spending — is a small slice of the total. Furthermore, NDD has been squeezed by past austerity. So there’s no possibility for major spending cuts unless we slash programs that are extremely popular. The point is that the economics of deficit reduction are straightforward. It can be accomplished either by reducing social benefits or by raising taxes. Given that America has weak social spending compared with other countries, taxes are the most plausible route. But I don’t see any plausible political path to a tax increase that would make a large dent in the deficit.
Related: U.S. Deficit Explodes Even As Economy Grows and American Gothic and The Limits of Taxing the Rich
The average score on the ACT dropped to a new 30-year low, indicating fewer high-school seniors are ready for college, the organization behind the college admissions test said. Test takers had an average score of 19.5 out of 36 in 2023, down 0.3 points from 2022, according to ACT. About 1.4 million high-school seniors took the ACT in 2023, up slightly from the year before, but still down from the more than two million who took it in 2017, according to ACT. Scores for the class of 2023 were down across all the subjects its test covers, ACT said. They fell 0.3 points for math, reading and science. They were down 0.4 points for English.
Related: Krugman’s Misleading Scandinavian Comparison and Looking For Flynn Effects on a Recent Online U.S. Adult Sample: Examining Shifts Within The SAPA Project and NAEP Long-Term Trend Assessment Results: Reading and Mathematics
American Compass has a new survey out in which it finds, among other results, that “only 40% of workers have secure jobs.” This is the latest attempt by the outfit to portray the American economy as in dire need of “rebuilding.” One criterion for assessing whether a worker has a secure job is their indicating either that “I have a regular work schedule that is generally the same from week to week” or that “My work schedule varies from week to week, but I am satisfied with my control over it.” American Compass does not provide the alternative responses workers could give, but 96% of them gave one of these two answers. It is striking that nearly all workers (at least those working 20 or more hours a week) either have a stable work schedule or are OK with their varying schedules.
Related: The Cost of Thriving Has Fallen: Correcting and Rejecting the American Compass Cost of Thriving Index and Upward Mobility Is Alive and Well in America and The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies
The percentage of Bank of America customers who received income from gig platforms through direct deposits or debit cards reached 3% in August 2023, up from 2.7% in April. This increase was driven particularly by ridesharing jobs and younger people, the former of which can be largely explained by strong travel-related spending. We also found that ridesharing gig workers do not tend to also have a traditional job and an increased supply of these workers has driven average monthly ridesharing gig pay down in recent months. Millennials and Gen Z have seen the biggest increase in gig work as they tend to be more exposed to the rising cost of living. But it seems gig work may not provide enough support: younger generations' credit and debit card spending growth has consistently lagged that of Baby Boomers since mid-March, according to Bank of America internal data.
Related: Do 60 Percent Of American Workers Have Insecure Jobs? and Upward Mobility Is Alive and Well in America
Paul Romer’s original model of economic growth assumed that a constant population of researchers would produce a constant growth rate in the economy. For example, if our economy has a million researchers working every year, its output should grow by 1% every year. Bloom et al noticed that the number of researchers in our economy has grown to 23 times its size in 1930 but the growth rate of the economy has been constant, even decreasing, over that period. So Paul Romer’s assumption that constant research input ==> constant growth rate seems unsupported by the data. Bloom et al explain the divergence between growing research input and constant economic growth by assuming that ideas get harder to find as we discover more of them. “Are Ideas Getting Harder To Find?” documents a serious problem with economic growth: our investments into research are growing fast but the rate of economic growth is constant at best.
With about 66,000 students — more than the public school enrollment in Boston or Seattle — the Pentagon’s schools for children of military members and civilian employees quietly achieve results most educators can only dream of. On the National Assessment of Educational Progress, a federal exam that is considered the gold standard for comparing states and large districts, the Defense Department’s schools outscored every jurisdiction in math and reading last year and managed to avoid widespread pandemic losses. While the achievement of U.S. students overall has stagnated over the last decade, the military’s schools have made gains on the national test since 2013.
Related: ACT Scores Fell for Class of 2023, Sixth Consecutive Decline and NAEP Long-Term Trend Assessment Results: Reading and Mathematics and Looking For Flynn Effects on a Recent Online U.S. Adult Sample: Examining Shifts Within The SAPA Project
Before 2014, which is when concerns about police bias began to take center stage after a police killing in the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri, Black Americans were at lower risk of dying in a traffic accident than White Americans (mainly because they drive much less). By 2021, Black Americans’ per-capita fatality rate was 37% higher; last year it was 26% higher. National data on traffic stops is limited, with the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ most recent Police-Public Contact Survey, conducted in 2020, finding that 9% of Americans 16 and older were involved in a traffic stop as a driver or passenger that year, down from 10.3% in 2018 and 11% in 2015.
Related: The Pandemic Drinking Binge Just Keeps Going and Who Won the Cold War? Part II and Who Won the Cold War? Part III
Every five to 10 years, the World Values Survey asks people in dozens of countries where they would place themselves on a scale from the zero-sum belief that “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, to the positive-sum view that “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone”. The average response among those in high-income countries has become 20% more zero-sum over the last century. Moreover, two distinct rises in the prevalence of zero-sum attitudes have coincided with two slowdowns in gross domestic product growth, one in the 1970s and another in the past two decades. The same pattern holds within individual countries. Britons and Americans have become significantly more likely to believe that success is a matter of luck rather than effort precisely as income growth has slowed.
Related: Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides and Is the Surge to the Left Among Young Voters a Trump Blip or the Real Deal? and Millennials are Shattering the Oldest Rule in Politics
Zero-sum thinking is associated with more preference for liberal economic policies in general and with stronger political alignment with the Democratic Party and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. We also find that zero-sum thinking is linked empirically to important political crises experienced in the United States. Specifically, we find that individuals who view the world in zero-sum terms are more likely to believe that the conspiracy theory QAnon holds some truth for U.S. politics. We also find that zero-sum thinking is linked with empathy and understanding for the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol Building, an act that is more justifiable and seen as being less harmful if one presumes the world is zero-sum (rather than positive/negative sum).
Related: Are We Destined For A Zero-Sum Future? and Is the Surge to the Left Among Young Voters a Trump Blip or the Real Deal? and Millennials are Shattering the Oldest Rule in Politics
US exposure to foreign supply chains is much bigger than it appears at face value, but it is not that big on the macro level. By any measure, the US buys at least 80% of all industrial inputs from domestic sources. Thus, at an aggregate level, its foreign exposure is hardly alarming. However, while this may be reassuring, it is important to note that supply chain disruptions rarely occur at the macro level. The 80% figure was not relevant when the US auto sector shuttered factories due to a lack of semiconductors, or when buying home office electronics became problematic due to a demand surge and logistic snarls. Taking account of the Chinese inputs into all the inputs that American manufacturers buy from other foreign suppliers – what we call look through exposure – we see that US exposure to China is almost four times larger than it appears to be at face value.
Related: Setser On Rumors Of Decoupling and How America Is Failing To Break Up With China and US-China Trade is Close to a Record, Defying Talk of Decoupling
This paper hypothesizes that the decline of the Rust Belt was due in large part to the persistent labor market conflict that was prevalent throughout the region’s main industries. [Labor conflict] results in lower investment and productivity growth, which causes employment to move from the Rust Belt to the rest of the country. The model also features rising foreign competition as an alternative source of the Rust Belt’s decline. Quantitatively, labor conflict accounts for around half of the decline in the Rust Belt’s share of manufacturing employment. Consistent with the data, the model predicts that the Rust Belt’s employment share stabilizes by the mid 1980s, once labor conflict subsides. Rising foreign competition plays a more modest role quantitatively, and its effects are concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s, after most of the Rust Belt’s decline had already occurred.
Related: Autoworkers Have Good Reason to Demand a Big Raise and American Labor’s Real Problem: It Isn’t Productive Enough and EV Boom Remakes Rural Towns in the American South
As measured in the CES data, manufacturing average hourly wages for all employees were 3% above wages in the private sector in 2006, a difference commonly known as the manufacturing wage premium. Since then, manufacturing wages have averaged gains of 2.3% per year, while wages in the private sector have risen 2.6% per year. While manufacturing workers used to receive a premium relative to workers in other sectors, that premium has disappeared in recent years for most manufacturing jobs. Our results indicate that the decline in unionization rates is responsible for more than 70% of the drop in the manufacturing wage premium. Notably, the unionization effect remains significant even after accounting for a large set of worker and sectoral characteristics.
Related: American Labor’s Real Problem: It Isn’t Productive Enough and The World Is In The Grip Of A Manufacturing Delusion and Unpacking the Boom in U.S. Construction of Manufacturing Facilities
Gross investment has typically been 20-25% of GDP over time, although in recent years it’s been closer to the lower end of that range. From the 1950s up into the 1980s, net investment was (very roughly) 10% of GDP. Thus, it was plausible to say that in a typical year, a little more than half of gross investment went to replace capital that was wearing out, and a little less than half of gross investment was actually new, net investment growing the capital stock. But in the last decade or so, gross investment has been about 20% of GDP, and net investment has fallen to about 5% of GDP. In other words, gross investment as a share of GDP has fallen a bit, but not too much. The real change is that about three-quarters of investment is now going to replace capital that has worn out, so net investment is much lower.
Related: Capital Allocation
I would suggest that substantial and accumulating deficits and debts are a substantial threat to national security and national power. A reasonable calculation would suggest that our budget prospects are vastly worse than they were at the time of the Clinton administration's successful budget actions and substantially worse than they were at the time of the Simpson-Bowles efforts. The budget deficits a decade out comfortably in double digits as a share of GDP now seem a reasonable projection with primary deficits quite likely in the 5% of GDP range. This is without the assumption of the need for vast mobilization for meeting contingencies, military or non-military. And I think it is reasonable to ask the question. How long can or will the world's greatest debtor be able to maintain its position as the world's greatest power?
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US equities account for nearly 70% of the MSCI World index; the next five largest — in Japan, UK, France, Canada, and Germany — total less than 20%. The top 10 constituent equities of the MSCI World index, which are all US companies including Apple at number one and ExxonMobil at number 10, aggregate to more than 20%. To put it bluntly, the 10 most valuable US equities are larger than the market capitalisations of Japan, UK, France, Canada, and Germany combined. In effect, the US has scaled up the largest companies in the world in its own public markets, creating a colossal pool of recyclable equity capital residing in domestic and non-US investor portfolios. This has created a virtuous cycle of new listings from US and overseas issuers attracted by the depth and liquidity of that equity pool.
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