Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Matthew Sh, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick

Matthew Smith MIT
Date Posted:
April 29, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Only 25% of the rise in top 1% share of wealth is due to capital income, with 2.4% of 8.1% growth attributed to capital income, @MatthewSmith, @OwenZidar, @EricZwick,

The rise in the top 1% share of wealth from 1980 to 2014 is primarily driven by human capital rather than financial capital, with only 2.4% of the 8.1% growth attributed to capital income. This suggests that the labor income of private business owners, often reported as capital income for tax purposes, plays a significant role in wealth accumulation. The top 0.1% share of wealth increased from 7% to 14% between 1978 and 2016, yet this rise is half as large as previous estimates. Policymakers should consider reforms targeting pass-through business income to address inequality effectively, as the current tax structure may not adequately capture the true sources of wealth growth among the ultra-wealthy.

Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick have a new update to Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich. Basically further highlighting that the primary driver behind rising incomes of ultra rich isn't a concentration of financial capital, but is a return to human capital

"...One of the most important takeaways from the research is that the primary driving force behind inequality between the richest Americans and everyone else isn’t, as many have argued, a concentration of financial wealth or capital. From 1980 to 2014, the rise in the top 1% share in national income due to capital income is only 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points in total growth. Rather, the authors argue that much of the recent rise of top incomes and wealth represents a return to human capital, including the labor income of private business owners—for example consultants, lawyers, or doctors—often characterized as capital income of pass-through businesses for tax purposes...."
Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick, "Wealth gaps are smaller than previous estimates suggest, and capital isn’t entirely to blame for rising inequality," Princeton University, April 29, 2020, https://economics.princeton.edu/2020/04/29/wealth-gaps-are-smaller-than-previous-estimates-suggest-and-capital-isnt-entirely-to-blame-for-rising-inequality/

Wealth gaps are smaller than previous estimates suggest, and capital isn’t entirely to blame for rising inequality

How rich are the richest Americans? A thorough answer to this question is necessary to address public concern over rising inequality, whether the distribution of resources is fair, and how policy ought to respond.

While over the last several years the U.S. has seen increased interest in addressing inequality through taxes on wealth or capital income (for example a capital gains tax), several questions remain. How much revenue could such taxes raise and, given the composition of wealth among the richest Americans, are these taxes the most effective way to reduce gaps in wealth and income? As the burden of coronavirus grows and policymakers start considering new tax policies, it’s important that the public have the most accurate estimates of top wealth and income available.

In a new update to their paper on measuring top wealth and inequality in the U.S. (PDF), Princeton’s Owen Zidar, Chicago Booth’s Eric Zwick, and Treasury’s Matt Smith find that the increase in wealth among the top 0.1% over the last 40 years is half as large as previous estimates would indicate.

Furthermore, they find that the financial assets and capital of the ultra-wealthy amount to a smaller share of national income than previously believed. Instead, they argue a bigger driver of top incomes is human capital and returns on labor often characterized in tax filings as private business profit.

Main findings

The authors find that the top 0.1% share of wealth increased from 7% to 14% from 1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, Americans in the 90th to 99th percentile, a group with more than $660,000 in wealth but less than $3.1 million, hold 36% of total wealth. Their wealth exceeds that of the bottom 90% or the top 1%. The chart below compares the authors’ new estimates to those produced in previous studies and using different approaches and data sources.

Matthew Sh, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Implications for inequality and tax policy

One of the most important takeaways from the research is that the primary driving force behind inequality between the richest Americans and everyone else isn’t, as many have argued, a concentration of financial wealth or capital. From 1980 to 2014, the rise in the top 1% share in national income due to capital income is only 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points in total growth.

Matthew Sh, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Rather, the authors argue that much of the recent rise of top incomes and wealth represents a return to human capital, including the labor income of private business owners—for example consultants, lawyers, or doctors—often characterized as capital income of pass-through businesses for tax purposes.

Matthew Sh, Owen Zidar, Princeton and Eric Zwick: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Given this finding, the authors suggest policymakers aiming to reduce inequality through the tax code should consider, among other reforms, repealing the recently enacted deduction for people who receive income from pass-through businesses and eliminating the so-called Gingrich-Edwards loophole. These reforms would increase taxes on private business owners who are often at the top of the income distribution, while also helping ensure that people who receive labor income in different forms will come closer to all paying the same tax rate. For more on how to harmonize labor and capital income taxes and improve tax policy, see Owen Zidar’s and Eric Zwick’s recent tax reform proposal to roll back federal tax policy to 1997.

The paper also has implications for how much revenue a wealth tax might raise. These new estimates of top wealth suggest total revenues would be far less than many expect. A one percent tax on the top 0.1% in 2016 would generate $112 billion assuming taxpayers didn’t change their behavior in response. A graduated tax, which taxes wealth above $50 million at 2% and adds a surtax of 1% of wealth exceeding $1 billion, would raise $117 billion in 2016 (assuming no change in behavior). Prior estimates, calculated using an “equal-returns” approach (see next section for more detail), estimated $207 billion in revenue from such a graduated tax. The new estimates suggest a graduated tax would bring in only 57% of that estimated revenue before accounting for behavioral responses, which would lower revenue estimates further.

Why the new estimates differ from previous estimates

The approach the authors take to estimate wealth builds on an approach first employed by others (Giffen, 1913; Stewart, 1939; Saez and Zucman, 2016) to scale up or “capitalize” income observed on tax returns to estimate top wealth. That is, they take an individual’s income, reported in official fiscal statistics, and estimate how much wealth created it.

The strength in the authors’ new approach, however, is that they use new data to discipline how income maps to wealth for different groups of people. They start by looking at several types of income: fixed income (from liquid assets, deposits, bonds, etc.), public equity income, private business income, etc.

Then, in estimating the amount of wealth that creates these different types of income, they allow for the possibility that rates of returns for each income type can vary across people. Accounting for this empirically relevant variation produces different wealth estimates than earlier work that assumes equal rates of return across people.

As one example, they show that fixed income portfolios of the rich skew toward high-yield bonds and loans, whereas the fixed income portfolios of the non-wealthy are mostly bank deposits. Simply put, fixed income portfolios for the wealthy differ in nature, risk, and liquidity from those for the less wealthy. This difference in the composition of people’s portfolios means there are unequal effective returns on fixed income for the rich and everyone else.

While the authors are not the first to argue that the rich earn higher rates of return on their income (it’s a key point of Thomas Piketty’s Capital), an important contribution of the research is the extent to which they test both their assumptions and previous assumptions against administrative and survey data that does exist.

When the authors produce wealth estimates using their assumption that the rich earn higher rates of return, their results line up nicely with estate tax data and the wealth data reported by the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). When they produce estimates using the assumption that everyone earns equal rates of return, their results overstate fixed income assets reported by the SCF, especially at the top. For more detail on how the authors’ new approach differs from the 2016 study by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, read section 10.1 of the full paper or the authors’ response to comments on their earlier draft.

Another contribution of the Research is showing how the authors’ updated wealth estimates change what we know about income inequality and how national income is distributed across income groups. For more detail on how wealth estimates relate to distributional national accounts and inequality statistics, read Eric Zwick’s recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Senate (PDF).

Conclusion

While there are many ways to continue improving estimates of wealth and income, this Research further improves our understanding of why inequality has increased and the most effective ways to address growing gaps in wealth and income.

To learn more about the findings and methodology, please download the full paper.

  • Inequality
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
Previous articleApril 28, 2020What if rising concentration were an indication of more competition, not less?Technology has led to increased productivity as well as greater specialization by large firms, challenging the narrative that concentration harms the economy. @GeoffreyManneNext articleApril 29, 2020Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the RichThe top 0.1% share of wealth in the U.S. doubled from 7% to 14% btw 1978 and 2016, highlighting a significant concentration of wealth.
Showing 156 database articles primarily about Inequality

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

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Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. A shift of ~$200bn in worker pay into corporate profits as stock-based compensation could explain roughly one-third of the long-run decline in labor's share of income, as stock ownership allows high earners to receive tax-preferred pay recorded as profits rather than wages.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does tax-preferred stock compensation explain the labor share decline?

Core argument: $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.
  2. Top 10% of public company employees ($40k additional implicit pay via equity ownership) concentrate gains that would equal $200bn aggregate.
  3. $12.2tn corporate value added vs. $7.2tn employee compensation reveals labor’s shrinking claim on output, as tax-preferred equity arrangements redirect worker.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity Based Compensation ~45% Of Total Comp Of High-Skilled Labor, Including It In Labor Share Cuts Decline of Labor Share Since The 1980’s By 60%.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

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  • 00 to 2022 — Gregory Clark @PNASNews finds that social status in England was strongly correlated across generations between 1600 and 2022, consistent with a theory of…
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Raj Chetty @OppInsights finds that a white child born into the bottom household income quintile in 1992 had a 29.7% chance of remaining there, up from 24.9% in…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Mobility/Assortative Mating

The Great $110 Trillion Wealth Transfer Won’t Happen Any Time Soon

AI Summary. Bequeathable wealth in the U.S. rose from 256% to 424% of GDP between 1997 and 2021, with 97% of that increase concentrated in households headed by someone 55 or older. The wealthiest 10% of that age group drove 75% of the total gain, meaning inherited wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated

Rachel Louise Ensign and James Benedict Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The age at which Americans are inheriting money has risen. According to Federal Reserve surveys, btw 1998 and 2010, Americans in their late 50s were most likely to report receiving an inheritance; by 2013–2022, that age had ticked up to the mid 60’s.

Will the concentration of inherited wealth impact economic equality?

Core argument: Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.

Fed data [indicates] that what is known as the bequeathable wealth rose from 256% of gross domestic product in 1997 to 424% in 2021, the last year of available data. A staggering 97% of that increase was due to wealth gains in households where the head of household was 55 or older. Older Americans may keep accumulating wealth, especially if the stock market keeps rising. But some will spend it on living costs and expensive long-term care, leaving less for heirs. When they die, many will leave their money to their spouses, who are often in their same generation. This year, around $1.3 trillion is expected to be passed onto spouses, compared with about $2 trillion to heirs in Gen X and younger generations, according to projections from research firm Cerulli Associates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.
  2. The wealthiest 10% of households age 55+ captured 75% of total bequeathable wealth gains since 1997, resulting in widening inequality.
  3. Boomers accumulated $1tn+ in wealth during Q4 alone, outpacing all other generational groups, as stock and business valuations drive outsized.

Related Articles:

  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an…
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  • How To Get Rich in 2025 — As baby boomers die, inheritances as a share of US output are over 10% which is just off a post-WW II high. For every $100 paid in wages, the dead leave behind…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Has Generational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans

AI Summary. Generational income growth in the United States has slowed across five successive generations, with each cohort earning less relative to the previous one by their late 30s.

Kevin Corinth and Jeff Larrimore Demography
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As measured by the 36–40 cohort across generations, Americans’ real market income has continued to rise but at a slower pace. Accounting for taxes and transfers partially offsets the slowdown in the growth of market income.

Core argument: Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).

We zoom in on a focal age range in peo­ple’s late 30s—an age at which we observe the five gen­er­a­tions from the Greatest Generation (born 1901–1927) through the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996)—and assess both whether gen­er­a­tional prog­ress is positive and the extent to which the rate of growth is speeding up or slowing down. Focusing first on median market income, there are two notable takeaways that apply for both the individual/couple and the household sharing units.The first is that generational progress has clearly slowed since the Baby Boom Generation, although it remains positive. Second, despite the perception that slowing generational progress is a recent phenomenon, the substantial slowdown did not start with Millennials but began a generation earlier with Generation X. Looking at the patterns formed in household market income by generation, the income of Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that for similarly aged adults in the Silent Generation. Progress slowed substantially for Generation X—their incomes increased by 10% relative to Baby Boomers—and then ticked up for Millennials, whose incomes rose by 15% relative to Generation X. Although market income is an important indicator of progress, it does not reflect the full set of resources that individuals have available for consumption. The slowdown in generational progress is softened when accounting for taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).
  2. Wage growth deceleration across five generations results in widening inequality, with top earners capturing disproportionate income gains while median earners.
  3. Workforce participation shifts and wage stagnation for Millennials vs. prior generations lead to delayed wealth accumulation and reduced intergenerational economic.

Related Articles:

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  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
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