“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Showing 5 database articles primarily about Race

Currently filtering by:

Remove Race

Remove "primary topics only" restriction

Remove 'Database'

Show all 7,326 articles

For whatever topics you select (currently: Race):

Include articles that mention this topic 81

Only articles primarily about this topic 5

Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben

Sheila Murray Tax Policy Center

Date Posted:: September 14, 2020
Is Database:: Database

Non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil by 1982, a trend that has persisted for over 20 years, according to the Tax Policy Center.

Analysis by the Tax Policy Center reveals that differences in per pupil spending between non-white and white students have been minimal over the past decades. In 1972, the ratio of non-white to white spending was 0.98, but by 1982, non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil, a trend that has persisted for over 20 years. Despite efforts to equalize funding following court cases, significant variations remain, though there is little evidence these changes have directly impacted student achievement. However, there has been some narrowing of test score gaps between black, Hispanic, and white students, alongside increased access to AP courses. States are now focusing on ensuring adequate education for all students beyond mere financial equalization.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Tax Policy Center analysis finds the ratio of non-white to white per pupil spending was 0.98 in 1972, and by 1982 non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil, a pattern persisting for over 20 years.
Despite funding equalization efforts following court cases, significant variations in per pupil spending remain, with little evidence that these changes have affected student achievement.
Test score gaps between black, Hispanic, and white students have narrowed somewhat alongside increased access to AP courses, and states are shifting focus from financial equalization to ensuring adequate education for all students.

Tax Policy Center analysis finds differences in spending per pupil btw white and non-white students is small.

"...To examine spending patterns across different populations of students, we compared average per pupil spending across districts weighted by the number of students in each racial or ethnic group. In general, differences in spending per pupil in districts serving nonwhite and white students are very small. In 1972, the ratio of nonwhite to white spending was.98; this trend had reversed by 1982, as spending per pupil for nonwhite students was slightly higher than for white students in most states and in the United States as a whole and has been for the past 20 years (figure 2). Table 2 presents spending per pupil figures for 2002 weighted by the number of students in each subgroup...."

They also finds that differences in spending per pupil have diminished over past 40 years:

".... Differences in spending per pupil have diminished over the past 38 years in the aftermath of court cases, but significant variation still exists. Further, there is little evidence that these efforts have directly affected student achievement. There has been some closing of test score gaps between black and Hispanic students and white students and greater availability of AP courses. States are moving beyond equalization to ensure that each student receives an adequate education...."

Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Sheila Murray and Kim Rueben, "Racial Disparities In Education Finance: Going Beyond Equal Revenues," Tax Policy Center, November 3, 2008, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-disparities-education-finance-going-beyond-equal-revenues/full

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery

William Rodgers III Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Date Posted:: May 25, 2022
Is Database:: Database

Young Black men’s employment-to-population ratio rose to 62.1% surpassing pre-pandemic levels, while young white men and women remain below their pre-pandemic ratios.

During the job recovery from April 2020 to April 2022, the employment-to-population ratio for young Black men rose to 62.1%, surpassing its pre-pandemic level of 56.3%. Similarly, young Latino men have seen their employment ratios return to pre-pandemic levels. However, the recovery remains uneven, with young Black women achieving a 60.0% ratio, 7.4 percentage points above pre-pandemic levels, while young white men and women remain below their pre-pandemic ratios by 2.1 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively. Despite these gains, significant racial employment gaps persist, with young Black men experiencing an average employment gap of 15.0 percentage points compared to young white men from January 2020 to March 2022. This uneven recovery highlights the challenges faced by noncollege-educated youth, particularly in overcoming racial disparities in employment opportunities despite a tight labor market and significant relief efforts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The employment-to-population ratio for young Black men without a college education rose to 62.1% between April 2020 and April 2022, surpassing its pre-pandemic level of 56.3%, while young Latino men returned to pre-pandemic ratios.
Young Black women reached a 60.0% employment-to-population ratio, 7.4 percentage points above pre-pandemic levels, while young white men and women remained 2.1 and 3.2 percentage points below their pre-pandemic ratios.
Young Black men faced an average employment gap of 15.0 percentage points relative to young white men from January 2020 to March 2022, with racial employment gaps persisting despite a tight labor market and relief efforts.

During the nation’s job recovery (April 2020 to April 2022), the overall civilian unemployment rate fell from 14.7% to 3.6%. Payroll employment returned almost to its pre-pandemic level. The employment-to-population ratios of some noncollege-educated men and women have returned to or exceeded their pre-pandemic levels; however, this literally happened since December 2021.* For example, as the following figure shows, the employment-to-population ratio of young Black men reached 62.1%, exceeding its pre-pandemic value of 56.3% and its December 2021* level of 56.1%.3 In recent months, the ratio for young Latino men recovered to its pre-pandemic level.The next figure reports that the employment-to-population ratio of young Black women recovered to 60.0%, 7.4 percentage points above its pre-pandemic value of 52.6%. The ratios of both young white men and young white women were 2.1 percentage points and 3.2 percentage points, respectively, below their pre-pandemic values. The average employment gap—the difference between their employment-to-population ratios—between young Black men and young white men since January 2020 to March 2022 is 15.0 percentage points. Over the same period, the average employment gap between adult Black men and adult white men was 10.9 percentage points, and it was 8.6 percentage points between young Black women and young white women. The only group near parity with its white counterpart is adult Black women. The figure below shows that, throughout the jobs recovery following the COVID-19 recession, the employment gap between young Black men and young white men stayed between about 8.2 percentage points and 21.0 percentage points. The gap between adult Black men and adult white men ranged from 8.1 percentage points to 13.1 percentage points.

William Rodgers III, "Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery,"Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, May 17, 2022, https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2022/may/young-adults-without-college-see-uneven-jobs-recovery

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery

Relief and recovery investments during the pandemic have made this most recent job recovery unique relative to others in past decades. In fact, major efforts to restore the economy’s health and commitments to lessen racial inequality, combined with widespread labor shortages, have helped to create a “moment of opportunity” for young noncollege-educated adults.1 This moment is especially crucial for young noncollege-educated adults because early career opportunities are key for their long-term earnings prospects. They tend to have fewer skills and credentials and weaker job search networks, and face geographic isolation from job opportunities, making a potential toehold in the labor market all the more important to securing their economic futures. Young Black and Latino adults also face additional hurdles, such as discrimination.

The challenges are even greater for the current cohort of noncollege-educated youth who have entered the labor force during the pandemic. Research has shown that in the aftermath of a recession, youth who enter labor markets experience lower income over their lives. The COVID-19 pandemic is the latest example of a public health and economic shock that could adversely impact their futures. This blog post, the first in a two-part series, assesses how well young noncollege-educated adults, especially young Black adults and young Latino adults, are faring during the recovery.2 Simply put, their recovery is one of unevenness.

Noncollege-Educated Youth Experienced an Uneven Recovery

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery: Extended Excerpt Image 1

The next figure reports that the employment-to-population ratio of young Black women recovered to 60.0%, 7.4 percentage points above its pre-pandemic value of 52.6%. The ratios of both young white men and young white women were 2.1 percentage points and 3.2 percentage points, respectively, below their pre-pandemic values.

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Large Racial and Ethnic Employment Gaps Remain after 24 Months of Recovery

The average employment gap—the difference between their employment-to-population ratios—between young Black men and young white men since January 2020 to March 2022 is 15.0 percentage points. Over the same period, the average employment gap between adult Black men and adult white men was 10.9 percentage points, and it was 8.6 percentage points between young Black women and young white women. The only group near parity with its white counterpart is adult Black women.

These gaps are surprising because of the relative gains we would expect young Black and Latino adults to experience as a result of relief and recovery efforts (e.g., the American Rescue Plan and CARES acts) during the pandemic that were particularly impactful for families with the greatest need as well as the “Great Resignation” and its contribution to labor shortages. Furthermore, this most recent recovery is inconsistent with the historical link between overall economic conditions and outcomes for young noncollege-educated adults. In the past, strong economic recoveries have had a disproportionate positive impact on employment among young, noncollege-educated Black men.

Unfortunately, as of March 2022, these conditions did not lead to a narrowing in racial and ethnic employment gaps, and Black and Latino people have experienced persistent disadvantages. The figure below shows that, throughout the jobs recovery following the COVID-19 recession, the employment gap between young Black men and young white men stayed between about 8.2 percentage points and 21.0 percentage points. The gap between adult Black men and adult white men ranged from 8.1 percentage points to 13.1 percentage points.

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery: Extended Excerpt Image 3

The figure below reports that young Black women also experienced a persistent disadvantage relative to their white peers, while adult Black women are close to parity with adult white women. And the sixth figure shows that both young Latina women and adult Latina women faced persistently lower employment than white women. Still, there may be some evidence that young Latina women have narrowed the gap by March 2022. Since the pandemic, adult Latina women have employment-to-population ratios that are 4.7 percentage points to 11.2 percentage points below adult white women.

Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery: Extended Excerpt Image 4

This evidence suggests that noncollege-educated youth are not fully benefiting from this moment of opportunity. Even with one of the tightest labor markets since World War II, large-scale relief and recovery responses, societal pledges to reduce racial inequality and the exit of adult workers from the labor force, young, noncollege-educated Black Americans and Latino Americans have yet to experience a relative improvement in their economic standing, at least as measured by employment.

The second part of this blog series will explore how strong the macroeconomy must be to improve not only the absolute but also the relative economic status of noncollege-educated youth. The post will also discuss ways to narrow the employment gap.

*Editor's Note: This article was updated to correct the year.

Notes and References

1 These young adults are 16- to 24-year-olds who are not enrolled in school, have no more than a high school degree and have no more than 10 years of potential labor market experience. Potential labor market experience equals age minus years of schooling minus 6.

2 This series is published as part of the vulnerable workers initiative from the Institute for Economic Equity. The initiative examines the challenges facing vulnerable workers during the recovery and discusses potential ways to improve their economic security and resiliency in an economy reshaped by the pandemic.

3 These estimates are through March 2022 because the micro data from which these estimates are calculated are only publicly available through March 2022 and not April 2022.

Equity' for Asian-Americans in Practice

WSJ Editorial Board Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: February 4, 2021
Is Database:: Database

A 2019 Pew survey revealed 73% of Americans oppose using race as a factor in college admissions, yet recent policy shifts under Biden emphasize “equity” over equal treatment.

A 2019 Pew survey revealed that 73% of Americans oppose using race as a factor in college admissions, reflecting a broad consensus against racial preferences. Despite this, recent policy shifts under the Biden Administration emphasize "equity" over equal treatment, as seen in the Justice Department's decision to drop its lawsuit against Yale University for race-based admissions. This move aligns with critical race theory, which attributes racial disparities to systemic racism, and aims to achieve specific racial outcomes. However, such policies risk exacerbating social division and resentment, as evidenced by voters in liberal states like Washington and California rejecting initiatives to repeal bans on racial preferences. The ongoing debate underscores the tension between promoting equity and maintaining equality under the law, with potential implications for future Supreme Court rulings on racial bias in admissions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

A 2019 Pew survey found that 73% of Americans oppose using race as a factor in college admissions, which the author characterizes as a broad consensus against racial preferences.
The Justice Department under the Biden Administration dropped its lawsuit against Yale University over race-based admissions, a shift the author ties to prioritizing "equity" over equal treatment.
Voters in Washington and California rejected ballot initiatives to repeal bans on racial preferences, which the author cites as evidence that such policies risk deepening social division and resentment.

WSJ notes, "...Most Americans don’t want the government to pit one race against another. In the last two years voters in two of America’s most liberal states—Washington and California—voted down ballot initiatives that would have repealed bans on racial preferences. A 2019 Pew survey found that 73% of Americans believe race should not be a factor in college admissions...."

The Editorial Board, "‘Equity’ for Asian-Americans in Practice,"Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/equity-for-asian-americans-in-practice-11612395057

Equity’ for Asian-Americans in Practice

President Biden last week singled out Asian-Americans as he issued executive orders devoted to “advancing racial equity.” They include an order banning federal use of terms such as “Wuhan virus,” and another requiring the Justice Department to better track hate crimes against Asian-Americans. In pushing these measures Mr. Biden prefers to speak of promoting “equity” rather than equal treatment.

On Wednesday the Justice Department showed us why when it dropped its lawsuit against Yale University over its race-based admissions. Under former Attorney General Bill Barr, Justice had charged that Yale’s racial preferences violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Justice acted even before the Senate has confirmed a new Attorney General or head of the Civil Rights Division.

A similar but private suit against Harvard continues, this one brought by Students for Fair Admissions. But it’s likely the government will soon withdraw its supporting brief that scores Harvard for “systematically disfavoring Asian-American applicants.”

So Asian-Americans will be watching. While many will be relieved to see the government rejecting terms such as “China flu,” many also appreciate the real and present harm when America’s most competitive colleges and universities reject their children based on their race no matter their other qualifications.

“I am totally shocked by the Biden DOJ’s hasty decision to drop the Yale lawsuit, only eight days after President Biden signed an executive order claiming to combat anti-Asian discrimination,” says the president of the Asian American Coalition for Education, Yukong Zhao.

This is what “equity” means in practice. Traditionally racial justice meant an insistence that every American be treated equally without regard to race. But the Democratic left, with Mr. Biden’s support, has adopted critical race theory from the universities. The theory attributes every disparity between the races to “systemic racism,” whether or not there’s evidence of specific acts of discrimination. The Biden Administration’s policy goal now is to dictate the racial outcomes that progressives want—even if it means discriminating by race to get them.

Dropping the Yale suit is a blow to equality under the law. But Students for Fair Admissions, which lost its Harvard suit at the First Circuit Court of Appeals in November, has always recognized that its best chance for a victory against racial bias in admissions is at the Supreme Court. Meantime, the group says it will file its own suit against Yale.

Most Americans don’t want the government to pit one race against another. In the last two years voters in two of America’s most liberal states—Washington and California—voted down ballot initiatives that would have repealed bans on racial preferences. A 2019 Pew survey found that 73% of Americans believe race should not be a factor in college admissions.

The Biden Administration has signaled in promoting “equity” that it has abandoned fair and equal treatment. This will lead to further social division and resentment, as it has in every society that has practiced favoritism by race. The resulting injustice and confusion will continue until the Supreme Court stops ducking the issue and rules against racial favoritism once and for all.

Hours Worked

OECD Staff Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Date Posted:: June 22, 2020
Is Database:: Database

US black men aged 25-55 worked 1,250 hours annually in 2018, compared to 1,750 hours for white men, highlighting a substantial gap in work hours.

The comparison of living standards between the US and Germany reveals significant differences in work patterns and income disparities. In Germany, 22% of the workforce is employed part-time compared to 15% in the US, indicating a higher prevalence of part-time work. Among US workers, black men aged 25 to 55 worked approximately 1,250 hours annually in 2018, compared to 1,750 hours for white men, highlighting a substantial gap in work hours. This disparity contributes to a median black household income that is 59.2% of the median white household income. When adjusted for government benefits, the black/white wage gap narrows to an estimated 15%. Furthermore, US black disposable income is approximately 96% of German disposable income, suggesting that despite lower work hours, US blacks have comparable disposable income levels to Germans. These insights underscore the complex interplay between work hours, income disparities, and living standards across different demographics and countries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

US black men aged 25–55 worked about 1,250 hours annually in 2018 versus 1,750 hours for white men, a gap that contributes to median black household income equal to 59.2% of median white household income.
Adjusting for government benefits narrows the estimated US black/white wage gap to 15%, and US black disposable income stands at roughly 96% of German disposable income.
Part-time employment accounts for 22% of Germany's workforce compared with 15% in the US.

Although 22% of Germans work part time vs only 15% in the US 20.7/(116.5 + 20.7)https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/part-time-employment

Simonetta Longhi, “Racial Wage Differentials In Developed Countries,” Institute Of Labor Economics, June 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_income_distribution_and_income_inequality

Elise Gould, "Stark Black-White Divide In Wages Is Widening Further," Economic Policy Institute, February 27, 2019, https://www.epi.org/blog/stark-black-white-divide-in-wages-is-widening-further/

Jeff Spross, "The Unexpected Truth About Americans' Work Hours," The Week, February 26, 2018, https://theweek.com/articles/756859/unexpected-truth-about-americans-work-hours

"Real Median Household Income By Race And Hispanic Origin: 1967 to 2017," U.S. Census Bureau, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/demo/p60-263/figure1.pdf

BLS Staff, "Labor Force Characteristics By Race And Ethnicity, 2018," U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics, October 2019, https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm

"United States Part Time Employment," Trading Economics, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/part-time-employment

OECD, "Hours Worked," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm

https://theweek.com/articles/756859/unexpected-truth-about-americans-work-hours

on average black men ages 25 to 55 worked about 1250 hours a year in 2018 vs 1750 for white men 1250/1750 =.714 40.3 median black income/.714 = 56.4/68.1 median white income = 82.8% …suggests the black/white wage gap after adjusting or gov benefits might be closer to 15%, although more household headed by women (who earn less than men on average) among blacks pushes the estimate the other way

https://www.epi.org/blog/stark-black-white-divide-in-wages-is-widening-further/

https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/365/pdfs/racial-wage-differentials-in-developed-countries.pdf

Asian 81.3/61.4 = 1.32 x 1.28 = 1.70

White 68.1/61.4 = 1.11 x 1.28 = 1.42!

Note Hispanics earn 50.5 divided by 61.4 = 82% x 1.28 = 1.05 times average German

2017 dollars 40.3 median black household income/ 68.1 white not Hispanic median household income = 59.2%. Average household income is 61.4. so 40.3/61.4 = 66% x 1.28 = 84% = us black/german. German minorities earning about 15% less than Germans so German minorities and US minorities earn about the samehttps://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/365/pdfs/racial-wage-differentials-in-developed-countries.pdfandhttps://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/demo/p60-263/figure1.pdf

Us worforce 78% white - (89% white Hispanic x 17% of workforce is Hispanic =15%) = 63% + 6% Asian = 69% white or Asian = 31% not white or Asianhttps://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm

Although the us average would be less than the white us average: 31% (approximates blacks and Hispanics) x 75% x X + 69% x X = 50.3; 0.92X=50.3; X= 54.5 x.75 = 40.9/39.4 = 1.04 us black disposable income vs German.

1.28 times the US black/white of 75% =.96 US black disposable income vs German disposable income,

Although part-time is probably lower for 25 to 55 yea olds, since older Germans work more than older Americans

.78 x.85= 66% fulltime German vs.85 x 80 = 68% full time Americans ages 24 to 55

Ed Comment: Black-White wage gap in the US is about 25%—the same as in Europe. However, American disposable incomes, a proxy for real wages (after tax and government benefits) is 15 to 30% more than northern Europe: US $50.3k/Germany $39.4k = 1.28.

Although Americas work more hours (approx. 1786/1363 = 1.31https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm, which accounts for all of the difference

Although more (25 to 55 year old) Germans work than Americans 85%/80% =1.06

Quiz: Let Us Predict Whether Youre a Democrat or a Republican

Sahil Chinoy New York Times

Date Posted:: August 11, 2019
Is Database:: Database

The NYT quiz, based on 140k survey responses, uses demographics to predict political affiliation, highlighting deepening US polarization. Key factors include race, religion, education, gender, and age.

The NYT quiz, based on over 140,000 survey responses, uses demographic questions to predict political affiliation, highlighting the deepening polarization in American politics. Key factors include race, religion, education, gender, and age. For instance, non-white individuals tend to lean Democratic, while white individuals who prioritize religion often align with Republicans. The Republican Party is becoming more homogeneous—whiter and more Christian—while Democrats remain diverse. This demographic sorting has led to increased straight-ticket voting and legislative gridlock. The "diploma divide" shows college-educated whites leaving the GOP, complicating traditional party affiliations. As identity increasingly aligns with party, politics becomes more tribal, with voters motivated by dislike for the opposing party. This polarization threatens to shift politics from policy debates to identity conflicts, potentially leading to more extreme partisan divisions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Drawing on over 140,000 survey responses, the New York Times quiz predicts party affiliation from race, religion, education, gender, and age, with non-white respondents leaning Democratic and white respondents who prioritize religion aligning Republican.
The Republican Party is becoming whiter and more Christian while Democrats remain demographically diverse, a sorting linked to increased straight-ticket voting and legislative gridlock.
The "diploma divide" shows college-educated white voters leaving the GOP, and as identity aligns with party, politics risks shifting from policy debates to identity conflicts, with voters motivated by dislike of the opposing party.

Sahil Chinoy, "Quiz: Let Us Predict Whether You’re a Democrat or a Republican,"New York Times, August 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/08/opinion/sunday/party-polarization-quiz.html

Quiz: Let Us Predict Whether You’re a Democrat or a Republican

Tell us a few details about you and we’ll guess which political party you belong to. It shouldn’t be that simple, right? We’re all complex people with a multiplicity of identities and values. But the reality is that in America today, how you answer a handful of questions is very likely to determine how you vote.

This quiz, based on recent surveys with more than 140,000 responses, presents a series of yes-or-no questions to predict whether someone is more likely to identify as a Democrat or a Republican. It captures divisions that should make you worried about the future of American democracy.

Are you black, Hispanic or Asian?

The first question is the most important: It’s about race. Asking whether someone is black, Hispanic or Asian cleaves the electorate into two groups. Those who answer “yes” lean Democratic; the others are split roughly evenly between the parties. Among those who are not black, Hispanic or Asian (mostly white people), the second most important question is whether the person considers religion important. If they answer “yes,” they are probably Republican.

It’s not just race and religion, though. Party allegiances are now also tied to education, gender and age. Americans have sorted themselves more completely and rigidly than any time in recent history.

This identity-based polarization threatens to make politics “less about what the government should do and more about what it means to be an American,” write John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck in their book, “Identity Crisis.” And while President Trump did not precipitate this shift, he exploits and reinforces it with racist and xenophobic rhetoric.

Racial and religious groups aren’t monolithic, and one lesson from this project is that identities can intersect in intricate and unexpected ways. But today’s charged political climate is in large part explained by how neatly demographics divide Democrats and Republicans.

When identity aligns with party, politics gets more vicious

Sorting has occurred on both sides, but the Republican Party has tended more toward homogeneity: whiter, more Christian and more conservative. Democrats are a far more diverse party. So although the term “identity politics” is often wielded to criticize the Democrats for focusing on race and gender, Republicans are typically more susceptible to appeals based on their shared identity than Democrats, according to research by Julie Wronski and Lilliana Mason, political scientists at the University of Mississippi and the University of Maryland, College Park.

Polarization has encouraged more straight-ticket voting: Once, a voter might have chosen the Republican presidential candidate but a Democrat for the Senate, but now one’s whole ballot tends to align with one’s presidential preference. Polarization has also made voters hesitant to support politicians willing to cooperate with the other side, contributing to legislative gridlock.

Worse, the alignment of party preferences with personal identities has fostered ugly, tribal politics. It’s easier to demonize the opposing side when they look nothing like you. Voters today like their own party less than ever, but are motivated by their even stronger dislike of the other party. “It doesn’t paint a pretty picture,” Dr. Wronski said.

Can a religious, white Republican Party survive?

The partisan gap between black and white voters is the most durable and powerful split in modern American politics. Soon after President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, he remarked, “I think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.” He wasn’t wrong. Afterward, the Republicans courted racist white voters by opposing school and housing integration.

Among white people, religion is the most stable and important determinant of party choice. But the way religion shapes party attachment has changed. Today, the best way to sort the population of white voters is not by which religion they belong to, but by how religious they are.

The number of religious white Americans is plummeting. In the long term, that spells disaster for Republicans. “I don’t think the Republican Party right now has a sustainable business model,” said Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University.

The party knows this. Or at least it should. After Republicans lost the 2012 election, the party leadership commissioned a report on how to move forward. One answer was clear: appeal to nonwhite and less conservative voters. But in the years since, the Republicans — led by Mr. Trump — have doubled down on white identity politics and seem to believe that their path to a majority is through gerrymandering, voter suppression or attempts to skew the census.

The relationship between education and party has flipped

College-educated white people have left the Republican Party over the past decade, but higher-income voters are, as ever, disproportionately Republican. Wealthier people tend to be more educated, too, but now these forces push in opposite directions. That complicates the traditional relationship between Democrats and the white working class.

For decades, working-class people voted for Democrats, but recently, the difference in party affiliation between the white working class and other white people has evaporated. This trend, experts say, might make it difficult for the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee to mobilize voters by appealing to working-class identity.

Some political scientists have attributed the emergent “diploma divide” to less educated white voters’ racial resentment. Dr. Sides, Dr. Tesler and Dr. Vavreck argue that during Barack Obama’s presidency, less-educated white people who may not have followed politics began to link the Democrats to progressive attitudes toward race and fled the party as a result. Even education is, in a sense, a proxy for opinions about race, the brightest line in today’s partisan conflict.

Women aren’t a voting bloc

A person’s gender is not especially good at predicting party affiliation — at least not on its own. When combined with age and marital status, though, it becomes more relevant. Seventy percent of millennial women identify with or lean toward the Democrats, according to a 2018 report from the Pew Research Center, and about 57 percent of unmarried women leaned Democratic in a 2015 Pew report.

The partisan gender gap developed in the 1980s as men drifted toward the Republican Party; it widened in the 2016 Trump versus Clinton election. Much like racial resentment explains support for Mr. Trump, researchers have found that “hostile sexism” — measured by asking questions like whether someone believes women seek to control men — is increasingly dividing the parties.

As issues like sexual assault gain prominence in the national political conversation, the combination of gender with other characteristics like age and marital status helps predict whether a voter describes himself or herself as a feminist — and that directly relates to party affiliation. Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to say the country needs more work to achieve gender equality.

Partisanship can turn violent

Parties don’t just matter in elections. They affect how people identify, not just the other way around. Some people adjust their religious habits to better match their partisanship: For example, Republicans in search of other Republicans might start attending church more often. Put another way, people aren’t just sorting themselves into parties. Parties are sorting people, too, making cultural and racial rifts wider and harder to bridge.

And because partisan identities tend to be deeply held, political events rarely shake adults’ party preferences, which means the resentment from identity-based polarization probably isn’t going to spontaneously dissolve. In fact, it might get worse. Dr. Abramowitz writes in his book “The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump” that polarizing forces — increased racial diversity, the waning influence of religion and the rise of partisan media — are “far from spent.”

Nathan Kalmoe, a political scientist at Louisiana State University, has examined political parties during the most divided period in American history: the Civil War. In his book “With Ballots & Bullets: Partisanship & Violence in the American Civil War,” he demonstrates how newspapers and party leaders encouraged citizens to fight by exploiting their partisan identities, fueling a war that killed 750,000 people.

Though America isn’t facing a civil war right now, he writes, “the country is in an uncomfortably similar position today,” with “racial-religious-partisan alignments, political demonization, rhetoric rejecting fair elections, and even language encouraging violence from prominent leaders, including the president.”

Americans, he says, haven’t fully appreciated the potential of party conflict — inflamed by social sorting and impetuous leadership — to devolve into “organized mass violence.” Partisanship, he says, “has extremes that we haven’t recognized.”

Non-white students received slightly higher funding per pupil by 1982, a trend that has persisted for over 20 years, according to the Tax Policy Center.

Does equalizing school funding across racial groups raise student achievement?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Young Black men’s employment-to-population ratio rose to 62.1% surpassing pre-pandemic levels, while young white men and women remain below their pre-pandemic ratios.

Has the jobs recovery been uneven for young adults without college degrees?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

A 2019 Pew survey revealed 73% of Americans oppose using race as a factor in college admissions, yet recent policy shifts under Biden emphasize “equity” over equal treatment.

Do Americans oppose using race as a factor in college admissions?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

US black men aged 25-55 worked 1,250 hours annually in 2018, compared to 1,750 hours for white men, highlighting a substantial gap in work hours.

How do differences in hours worked shape income gaps?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

The NYT quiz, based on 140k survey responses, uses demographics to predict political affiliation, highlighting deepening US polarization. Key factors include race, religion, education, gender, and age.

Can demographics predict party affiliation, and does identity now drive politics?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI