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Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before

Economist Staff Amazon
Date Posted:
December 10, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Non-Financial Firms Raised $3.6T In Capital In 2020, VC Still Investing 3x What Public Investors Do Into Startups But Proceeds From Listing Now Growing Faster Than Private Rounds.

In 2020, non-financial firms globally raised a record $3.6tn in capital from public investors, driven by unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus. This surge included $2.4tn in investment-grade bonds and $426bn in junk bonds, alongside a 70% increase in secondary stock sales to $538bn, reversing the trend of share buybacks. Initial public offerings (IPOs) approached all-time highs as startups sought to capitalize on high valuations, with venture capitalists investing three times more into American startups than public investors. However, proceeds from public listings are now growing faster than private funding rounds, indicating a shift in capital-raising dynamics. The global boom saw significant activity in markets like Hong Kong and Shanghai, with IPO proceeds reaching $63bn and $44bn, respectively. Despite near-zero interest rates, investors continue to fund firms with potential to thrive post-pandemic, contributing to a liquidity surge on corporate balance sheets, which swelled to $7.6tn from $5.7tn in 2019.

Economist Staff, “Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before,”The Economist, December 9, 2020, https://www.economist.com/business/2020/12/09/companies-have-raised-more-capital-in-2020-than-ever-before

Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before

IN MARCH THE corporate world found itself staring into the abyss, recalls Susie Scher. From her perch overseeing global capital markets at Goldman Sachs, a bank, she witnessed firms scrambling for money to keep going as the wheels of commerce ground to a halt amid the pandemic. Many investors panicked. Surely, the thinking went, public markets would freeze in the frigid fog of covid-19 uncertainty—and then stay frozen.

Instead, within weeks they began to thaw, then simmer, kindled by trillions of dollars in monetary and fiscal stimulus from governments desperate to avert an economic nuclear winter. In the past few months they have turned boiling hot.

Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before: Extended Excerpt Image 1


According to Refinitiv, a data provider, this year the world’s non-financial firms have raised an eye-popping $3.6trn in capital from public investors (see chart 1). Issuance of both investment-grade and riskier junk bonds set records, of $2.4trn and $426bn, respectively. So did the $538bn in secondary stock sales by listed stalwarts, which leapt by 70% from last year, reversing a recent trend to buy back shares rather than issue new ones.

Initial public offerings (IPOs), too, are flirting with all-time highs, as startups hope to cash in on rich valuations lest stockmarkets lose their frothiness, and venture capitalists (VCs) patience with loss-making business models. VCs still plough three times as much into American startup stars than public investors do. But proceeds from listings are now growing faster than private funding rounds (see chart 2). The boom is global (see chart 3). On December 2nd JD Health, a Chinese online pharmacy, raked in $3.5bn in Hong Kong. A week later DoorDash, an American food-delivery darling, and Airbnb, a home-rental platform, both more or less matched it in New York.

Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before: Extended Excerpt Image 2


In a world of near-zero interest rates, it appears, investors will bankroll just about anyone with a shot at outliving covid-19. Some of that money will go up in smoke, with or without the corona crisis. What does not get torched will bolster corporate haves, sharpening the contrast between them and the have-nots.

The original spark that lit capital markets on fire was the $6.25bn in debt and equity that Carnival Cruise Lines secured in April, remembers Carlos Hernandez of JPMorgan Chase, a bank. Investors reasoned that cruises will one day sail again—by which time some of Carnival’s flimsier rivals will have sunk. Other dominant firms have benefited from this logic. Boeing, part of a planemaking duopoly, has sold $25bn in bonds this year, even as its bestselling 737 MAX jetliner has remained on the ground and the near-term future of travel up in the air. Many Chinese companies have taken to issuing perpetual bonds, which are never redeemed but pay interest for ever, to repair their balance-sheets.

Companies have raised more capital in 2020 than ever before: Extended Excerpt Image 3


By the summer, notes Ms Scher, “rescue capital-raising” had given way to something less defensive. Investors’ ultraloose purse-strings allowed opportunistic firms to lock in historically low coupons. S&P Global, a ratings agency, calculates that the average investment-grade bond paid interest of 2.6% in this year’s covid recession, down from 2.8% in 2019. Thanks to a boom in online shopping and cloud computing, Amazon, which is a leader in both areas, can now borrow at 1.5% for ten years, more cheaply than any American firm since at least 1980—and than some governments. Indebted giants like AT&T, a telecoms-and-entertainment group, are lengthening debt maturities. In November Saudi Aramco, an oil colossus, sold $2.3bn-worth of 50-year bonds, in spite of looming climate policies that may cripple its business of selling crude long before 2070.

Even cheap debt, of course, must be rolled over and, perpetuities aside, eventually paid back. With stockmarket valuations propped up by loose monetary policy, and only a slim prospect of tightening, many firms opted to shore up their balance-sheets with new share issues. Danaher, a high-rolling industrial conglomerate, raised over $1.5bn by selling new stock just after its share price returned to its pre-pandemic highs in May; it has risen by 39% since. On December 8th Tesla, an electric-car maker whose market value has grown eight-fold this year, to $616bn, said it plans to issue $5bn-worth of shares.

With shareholder payouts trimmed or suspended until the covid fog lifts, the cash held by the world’s 3,000 most valuable listed non-financial firms has exploded to $7.6trn, from $5.7trn last year (see chart 4). Even if you exclude America’s abnormally cash-rich technology giants—Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet and Facebook—corporate balance-sheets are brimming with liquidity.

It is still too early to tell what firms will do with all that cash. The merger market is showing signs of life, though mostly as deals put on ice during the pandemic are being revived. Many companies will content themselves with maintaining liquidity, at least until a covid-19 vaccine becomes more widely available.

Startups, for their part, will use IPO proceeds to blitzscale their way to profitability. The pandemic has made business models that might not have matured for years, such as digital health, suddenly viable. Many will fail. But for now giddy investors are pouring money into any firm whose IPO prospectus features the words “digital”, “cloud” or “health”. Headier still, “special purpose acquisition companies”, which go public with nothing but a promise to merge with a sexy startup later on, and which have raised $70bn in 2020, mostly on Wall Street, are shattering previous records.

Markets seem no more discerning in mainland China, where proceeds from listings hit $63bn, the most since 2010. Hong Kong added another $46bn. Shanghai’s STAR Market, a year-old technology board, this week welcomed its 200th member, bringing its IPO haul to $44bn. In September demand for shares to be traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange by Nongfu Spring, a water-bottler, outstripped supply by 1,148 times. Even the authorities’ last-minute suspension of Ant Group’s record-breaking $40bn IPO in Hong Kong and Shanghai, after the fintech titan’s co-founder annoyed regulators, may not frighten other listers. And so long as geopolitical tensions between America and China persist, more Chinese firms with an American stock ticker may avail themselves of a Hong Kong one, observes Julien Begasse de Dhaem of Morgan Stanley, a bank.

For now, capital is likely to keep flowing. Mr Hernandez says his bank’s pipeline of IPOs looks “the most robust in years”. The ten-year Treasury yield is below 1% and the spreads between American government and corporate bonds have narrowed to pre-pandemic levels. As a result, even riskier firms’ paper yields less than 5%, according to JPMorgan Chase. Investors expecting meaningful returns are therefore eyeing stocks. For the pandemic’s corporate winners, the choice between cheap debt and cheap equity is a win-win.

Record cash on hand, “…,the cash held by the world’s 3,000 most valuable listed non-financial firms has exploded to $7.6trn, from $5.7trn last year (see chart 4).Even if you exclude America’s abnormally cash-rich technology giants—Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet and Facebook—corporate balance-sheets are brimming with liquidity….

Factoids on record capital formation in 2020, “…. According to Refinitiv, a data provider,this year the world’s non-financial firms have raised an eye-popping $3.6trn in capital from public investors(see chart 1). Issuance of both investment-grade and riskier junk bonds set records, of $2.4trn and $426bn, respectively. So did the $538bn in secondary stock sales by listed stalwarts, which leapt by 70% from last year, reversing a recent trend to buy back shares rather than issue new ones. Initial public offerings (IPOs), too, are flirting with all-time highs, as startups hope to cash in on rich valuations lest stockmarkets lose their frothiness, and venture capitalists (VCs) patience with loss-making business models. VCs still plough three times as much into American startup stars than public investors do. But proceeds from listings are now growing faster than private funding rounds (see chart 2).The boom is global (see chart 3)….”

Ed Comment:would be nice if we could net out refinancing of debt. Does the fed do that? (getting out the mailing is a higher priority at the moment).

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Productivity
    • Investment
Previous articleDecember 8, 2020Why do wealthy parents have wealthy children?A 10% increase in parent net wealth is associated with a 2.4% increase in biological child’s net wealth & 1.6% increase in adoptees net wealth, with stronger dependence at top of net wealth distribution @AndreasFagerengNext articleDecember 16, 2020Do Enlarged Fiscal Deficits Cause Inflation: The Historical RecordHistorical analysis reveals that fiscal deficits often lead to inflation, particularly during wartime. Record-breaking deficits in the post-pandemic era raise the risk of sustained money growth fueling excess demand & fiscal dominance over monetary policy.
Showing 114 database articles primarily about Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

How To Buy A Trade Surplus

Joseph Gagnon and Nishtha Agrawal Peterson Institute For International Economics
Date Posted:
July 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.

Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Obstfeld @PIIE argues that current account deficits have not been forcibly “imposed” on the US from abroad since 2002. Rejecting Pettis’ tax on capital flows…
  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP

Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus?

AI Summary. Foreign investors hold $69tn in U.S. assets against $41tn held abroad, creating a $15tn net liability gap that subtracts $150bn from U.S. investment income for every 1% rise in interest rates — 50% more sensitive than five years ago.

Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard Liberty Street Economics
Date Posted:
May 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US net international investment position worsened by about $16tn between 2019 and 2025, driven by roughly $5.5tn in net inflows and $10tn in valuation losses, as higher rates hit a larger net liability stock, raising interest rate-sensitivity.

Is rising interest rates widening America's foreign investment income gap?

Core argument: The $28tn gap between foreign holdings of U.S. assets ($69tn) and U.S. foreign holdings ($41tn) drives mounting income payments abroad.

Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. Payments on U.S. assets owned by foreign investors represent a servicing burden for the U.S. economy. Profits, dividends, and interest payments that would otherwise accrue to domestic investors instead flow abroad. Given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits, this servicing burden seems likely to mount. The related buildup in the U.S. net liability position in interest-bearing assets will also make the income balance more sensitive to swings in interest rates. This increased sensitivity is already in evidence. At present, with the asset-liability gap at -$15 trillion, a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150 billion from the U.S. net income balance. (A 1pp fall in rates would result in a similar improvement.) Only five years ago, a 1 percentage point rise in rates would have subtracted $100 billion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The $28tn gap between foreign holdings of U.S. assets ($69tn) and U.S. foreign holdings ($41tn) drives mounting income payments abroad.
  2. A 1pp interest rate rise now subtracts $150bn from U.S. net income—50% more than five years ago—as the $15tn net.
  3. Ongoing trade deficits force asset sales to foreign investors, leading to larger servicing burdens and greater exposure to interest rate.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • Tariffs and “International Payments Problems” — The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3…
  • Foreigners Rebuff ‘Sell America’ and Buy a Net $1.6 Trillion in Assets — Foreign investors bought a net $1.55T of American long-term US financial assets in 2025, including $720B of net equity purchases and $409B in Treasury notes…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Monetary Policy

Don't Blame America's Current Account Deficit On the Dollar

AI Summary. The United States current account deficit is not required to supply the world with dollars, because foreign entities can acquire dollar assets by selling financial assets to Americans rather than goods, leaving the current account balance unchanged.

Maurice Obstfeld Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
April 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Noting the minimal relationship between official liabilities and the CA, Obstfeld argues that the reserve currency role of the dollar is not the cause of the trade deficit. He urges reduction in the US fiscal deficit to increase national saving.

Is the current account deficit driven by dollar demand or asset sales?

Core argument: I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the source material contains no quantitative data, numerical findings, or comparative metrics. The.

Critics of the dollar's global role have argued that foreign official dollar purchases (labeled US incurrence of official liabilities in the figure) feed one-for-one into US current account deficits. To illustrate the true loose relationship between these two variables, the figure shows both of them over the 2003–25 period, as percentages of GDP. US net incurrence of liabilities to official holders, reported with a minus sign as in standard balance-of-payments methodology, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit. And since roughly 2014, net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero as the current account deficit has widened. To be sure, the strong international demand for dollars may make the dollar stronger against foreign currencies than it would be otherwise, [but] while they imply a smaller current account balance, they do not necessarily imply a negative balance and certainly not a rising negative balance, especially when foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity (as figure 1 also implies). The euro is the world's second reserve currency, yet the euro area has a current account surplus. Britain had surpluses up until World War I despite issuing the world's premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center. Reducing the US fiscal deficit materially and sustainably is the most important US policy prerequisite for global current account rebalancing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the source material contains no quantitative data, numerical findings, or comparative metrics. The.
  2. To produce compliant takeaways, I would need data such as: current account deficit figures, dollar reserve holdings, asset sale volumes.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Obstfeld @PIIE argues that current account deficits have not been forcibly “imposed” on the US from abroad since 2002. Rejecting Pettis’ tax on capital flows…
  • Pettis on Obstfeld — Responding to Maurice Obstfeld, @michaelxpettis argues that the chronic US current account deficit reflects deep and open US capital markets, which encourage…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP

Understanding Global Imbalances

AI Summary. Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities

IMF Staff International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
April 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As of 2024, the US, China, Germany, and Japan accounted for ~2/3 of total global imbalances (the sum of the absolute value of each economy’s current account deficit and surplus). The US CA deficit is between 0.8 and 1% of world GDP.

Core argument: Surplus durations have doubled since the 1980s, accumulating massive foreign asset positions for China, Germany, and Japan.

Four economies—the US, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances. The US deficit—equivalent to 4% of GDP as of 2024—has been financed by capital inflows and portfolio investors seeking dollar assets. Germany and Japan’s surpluses have been driven by high saving rates, joined by substantial surpluses in China beginning in the 2000s. Oil-exporting countries’ surpluses fluctuate with commodity prices, creating episodic contributions to global imbalances. In earlier decades, surpluses and deficits were more cyclical: countries moved in and out of surplus depending on business cycles, commodity shocks, and exchange rate movements. While there is no standard definition of persistence, the average duration of a deficit or surplus spell roughly doubled since the 1980s. Persistent surpluses over the past two decades have accumulated into very large net foreign asset positions for economies such as China, Germany, and Japan, with each holding net foreign assets equivalent to 3–3.5% of global GDP in 2024. Similarly, persistent deficits have built up into large net liability positions, most notably in the US where the NIIP stands at about -25% of global GDP in 2024, underscoring the central role of the US position in global balances (Figure 6).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Surplus durations have doubled since the 1980s, accumulating massive foreign asset positions for China, Germany, and Japan.
  2. Understanding Global Imbalances.
  3. Germany and Japan’s surpluses have been driven by high saving rates, joined by substantial surpluses in China beginning in the.

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  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
  • Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances — JPM reports on a Princeton conference on the prospects for reducing global imbalances by means of policies directly impacting the capital account, such as…
  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Cheap Money Is Shaking $9.5 Trillion Global Loan Market

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:
March 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s savings glut and “monetary easing to counter slowing growth” are manifesting themselves in credit expansion overseas, as bankers seek higher yields than they can get at home amidst deflationary pressure.

Chinese banks, flush with low-cost funds, are reshaping parts of the global loan market, underscoring how deflationary pressures in the world’s second-largest economy are increasingly influencing competition with international lenders. Much like US and European manufacturers who have long complained about being undercut by cheaper Chinese rivals, bankers at global institutions now say they’re facing the financial equivalent: being priced out of some of Asia’s most sought-after borrowers as Chinese lenders extend cheaper credit across borders. Enabled by Beijing’s monetary easing to counter slowing growth, Chinese banks are expanding overseas lending amid weakening domestic credit demand. That edge may prove even more significant as the Iran crisis threatens to upend global energy markets, raising the likelihood that major central banks will hold off easing interest rates amid mounting uncertainty.

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  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
  • The True Cost of China’s Falling Prices — A Bloomberg analysis finds that prices dropped on 51 of 67 products and services in China over the past two years. 34% of Chinese firms are unable to cover…
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  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Tariffs and "International Payments Problems"

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
March 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3 – reflects valuation gains on US stocks relative to stocks in the rest of the world.

Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are accumulating on foreigners across every single category: FDI, stocks, bonds, physical currency, deposits, and loans. Foreign official investors supposedly have been mild sellers of U.S. assets over the past 12 months, but the standard measure does not include state-affiliated institutions that operate on behalf of foreign governments. Meanwhile, the U.S. net international investment position has swung massively over the past few years, from -20% of U.S. GDP in 2010, to -53% of U.S. GDP on the eve of the pandemic to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3. Almost all of that reflects massive valuation gains on U.S. stocks relative to stock markets in the rest of the world. The good news is that actual U.S. indebtedness has not meaningfully increased, and the methods used to assign market values to FDI in the U.S. and abroad make the situation look more extreme than it is. (U.S. FDI assets in Ireland are overwhelmingly big tech and big pharma, for example, but the market value of those assets is imputed based on the performance of the maker of Kerrygold.) The bad news is that, if the current level of the NIIP is unsustainable, the easiest way for it to revert is for U.S. stock prices to fall dramatically.

Related Articles:

  • The US Trade Deficit and Foreign Borrowing — Persistent trade deficits at current levels would push our net international investment position beyond levels sustained in any advanced economy. Stabilization…
  • The End of Privilege: A Reexamination of the Net Foreign Asset Position of the United States — .@Jonheathcote finds the deterioration of America’s net foreign asset position was driven by the overperformance of American equities held by overseas…
  • United States’ Changing Net IIP — Net foreign claims on US assets are now 80% of US GDP, the most negative in history. @GeneralTheorist notes that this is partly a result of elevated U.S…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
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