Edward Conard

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Monetary Policy and Financial Conditions

AI Summary. Surprise monetary tightening is associated with significant, persistent tightening in financial conditions: a 0.1 percentage point policy surprise raises the Goldman Sachs financial conditions index by about 0.07 index points on the announcement day, with further increases over the following two weeks. Macroeconomic news, especially inflation releases, also moves financial conditions by shifting expectations about future policy.

Michael Bauer and Zoë Arnaut Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
March 4, 2024

New @sffed @michaelbauer_hh research suggests monetary policy is a key driver of financial conditions: a policy surprise of 0.1pp drove an increase of 0.07 index points in the Goldman Sachs Financial conditions index.

Do surprise interest rate changes tighten financial conditions persistently?

Core argument: A monetary policy surprise of 0.1 percentage point raises the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index by about 0.07 index points on the day of the announcement, with further increases over the following two weeks.

Monetary policy has significant direct effects on financial conditions, as evident from the response to monetary policy surprises. [For example] a surprise monetary tightening leads to significant and persistent tightening in financial conditions. The size of the impact is moderately large: a policy surprise of 0.1 percentage point leads to an increase in the Goldman Sachs FCI by about 0.07 index points on the day of the announcement and further increases over the following two weeks. In addition, monetary policy also has indirect effects: Macroeconomic news affects financial conditions in part by shifting perceptions about the likely course of future policy. Financial market participants appear to be especially attuned to recent inflation data releases, which has led to unusually strong responses in financial conditions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A monetary policy surprise of 0.1 percentage point raises the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index by about 0.07 index points on the day of the announcement, with further increases over the following two weeks.
  2. Surprise monetary tightening leads to significant and persistent tightening in financial conditions, evidence of monetary policy's direct effects on those conditions.
  3. Monetary policy also works indirectly, as macroeconomic news shifts perceptions of the likely course of future policy, and financial market participants appear especially attuned to recent inflation data releases, which has led to unusually strong responses in financial conditions.

Related Articles:

  • A Status Check on Bank Lending and Bank Balance Sheets — Nominal bank lending growth has slowed from 10% to 2% on a three-month annualized basis, which the authors attribute to deposit outflows and higher deposit rates alongside recession fears, noting that banks building larger loan-loss provisions slowed lending more. The authors expect the growth drag from tighter lending standards to fade.
  • Transitory Disinflation — Recent disinflation likely reflected both improved supply and weaker demand, but supply improvements are largely complete and an anticipated Federal Reserve pivot could revive demand at home and abroad. A weaker dollar eases global financial conditions and is typically associated with higher commodity prices, putting upward pressure on inflation.
  • How Fast Can the Fed Ease? The Private Sector Response to Easier Conditions Will Be a Key Factor — US households have reduced debt over the past 20 years, leaving room to borrow more if incentives improve, while companies that issued debt at low rates hold large liquidity and healthy balance sheets. That gives businesses capacity to raise investment, and business surveys indicate capital-spending sentiment is already improving.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
Previous articleMarch 4, 2024Millennials and Older Gen Zers Made Significant Wealth Gains in 2022According to a @stlouisfed analysis, the 2022 wealth of older millennials (born between 1980-89) was 37% above expectations based on prior generations at the same age, largely driven by real estate gains.Next articleMarch 4, 2024As Texas Burns, Property Insurance Costs SoarThe property insurance industry claims that the cost of rebuilding and replacing homes has surged 55% between 2019 and 2022 contributing to higher insurance premiums. @AzizSunderji
Showing 7 database articles primarily about Banking

The Disparate Outcomes of Bank‑ and Nonbank‑Financed Private Credit Expansions

AI Summary. Bank and nonbank credit often move in opposite directions, and the authors find they predict downside growth risk differently: a one-standard-deviation increase in bank credit raises the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points against a 6% baseline, while the same increase in nonbank credit lowers it by 1.9 percentage points.

Nina Boyarchenko and Leonardo Elias Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
August 22, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A @NewYorkFed analysis of 33 countries over 1966-2020 finds 1 s.d. higher growth rate in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 percentage points, while nonbank credit has the opposite effect.

Do bank and nonbank credit booms predict different downside growth risks?

Core argument: A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.

Credit extended by the banking and nonbanking sector[s] do not always move together. One type of lending is [often] expanding while the other is contracting, which suggests a substitution between bank and nonbank lending. Overall booms in private credit can be driven by either. We find that bank and nonbank credit expansions predict differentially the downside risk to growth—that is, the probability of extreme negative real GDP growth realizations. The blue line in the chart shows that the likelihood of an extreme negative real GDP growth realization —which we define as year-on-year real GDP growth below -2%— increases following expansions in bank credit for horizons of one to three years, while at the same horizon, growth in nonbank credit actually lowers the probability of a large drop in real GDP growth. In particular, a 1 s.d. Increase in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 ppts relative to a baseline 6% probability in our sample. In contrast, a 1 s.d. higher growth rate in nonbank credit lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 1.9 ppts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.
  2. A 1 standard deviation higher nonbank credit growth lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 1.9 percentage points, the opposite sign from bank credit expansions at horizons of one to three years.
  3. Bank and nonbank credit do not always move together, with one often expanding while the other contracts, which the authors read as substitution between the two, and private credit booms can be driven by either.

Related Articles:

  • Corporate Debt, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Financial Crises — Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.
  • Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations — Credit expansions disproportionately channel credit to non-tradable sector firms and households, and the authors find that the sectoral allocation of credit predicts future GDP paths and the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Credit growth to non-tradable industries predicts boom-bust output patterns and elevated financial fragility, while credit to tradable industries is associated with higher future productivity growth.
  • Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks — Private credit loans are negotiated bilaterally outside traditional regulatory requirements and are illiquid because no secondary market exists, leaving investors expected to hold them to maturity or face steep losses if they need to exit. Scarce data on this growing form of nonbank lending makes assessing its risks difficult.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets

Deposit Insurance, Uninsured Depositors, and Liquidity Risk During Panics

AI Summary. Commercial banks located near a post office that accepted federally insured deposits were more likely to close during the Great Depression, and this effect weakened sharply after deposit insurance was extended to commercial banks. The authors interpret this as a competitive liquidity effect arising from incomplete insurance coverage.

Matthew Jaremski and Steven Sprick Schuster National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 9, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Jaremski and Schuster document that before the establishment of the FDIC, deposits fled to the safety of local insured postal banks, illustrating that lack of universal deposit coverage amplifies run risk. @ssprickschuster

Does incomplete deposit insurance coverage make uninsured banks more likely to fail?

Core argument: Matching balance sheets from over 16,000 commercial banks before the Great Depression with post offices that accepted deposits, the authors find banks operating near a deposit-accepting post office were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935.

Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became active in 1934, the only federally insured deposit accounts available to American households were through the U.S. Postal Savings System. To examine the role that postal savings played on bank closure, we collect the balance sheets of over 16,000 commercial banks just before the start of the Great Depression and match them with information on which post offices accepted deposits. We find banks that operated nearby a post office that accepted deposits were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935. The effect of postal savings is severely weakened after deposit insurance was installed across commercial banks in 1934. This lends evidence to the theory that we are capturing a competitive liquidity effect due to the lack of universal coverage.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Matching balance sheets from over 16,000 commercial banks before the Great Depression with post offices that accepted deposits, the authors find banks operating near a deposit-accepting post office were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935.
  2. Before the FDIC became active in 1934, the U.S. Postal Savings System offered the only federally insured deposit accounts available to American households.
  3. The effect of nearby postal savings on bank closure weakened substantially after deposit insurance was extended to commercial banks in 1934, which the authors read as evidence of a competitive liquidity effect stemming from the lack of universal coverage.

Related Articles:

  • The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications — An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.
  • Ameridollars — Dollar deposits in U.S. banks are de facto fully protected by the U.S. government, but that protection does not extend to the trillions of dollar deposits held at foreign banks, which are supervised by home-country regulators that typically cannot insure dollar deposits. Even U.S. branches of foreign banks tend to lack federal deposit insurance.
  • In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s — Unrealized securities losses at recently failed banks reflect the risk of borrowing short and lending long, echoing thrifts that became insolvent as the Federal Reserve raised rates; between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 banks and 1,295 thrifts closed or received government assistance. Uninsured depositors fled fast enough to limit losses, illustrating market discipline.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending

AI Summary. Traditional bank balance sheet lending has declined as a share of credit intermediation, with credit increasingly channeled through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model attributes falling lending shares to lower securitization costs, savers' behavior driving bank balance sheet size, and implicit bank costs and subsidies shaping balance sheet composition.

Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit Seru National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 5, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bank balance sheet lending has declined from 60% of total private lending in 1970 to 35% in 2023. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. @NBERpubs

Why has bank balance sheet lending declined as a share of credit?

Core argument: Traditional bank-led credit intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s, with private credit increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization.

The role of traditional bank-led intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model explores what can explain these shifts [and simulates] implications for macroprudential policies. Declines in securitization cost account for changes in aggregate lending quantities. Savers, rather than borrowers, are the main drivers of bank balance sheet size. Implicit banks’ costs and subsidies explain shifting bank balance sheet composition. Together, these forces explain the fall in the overall share of informationally sensitive bank lending in credit intermediation. Raising capital or liquidity requirements decreases lending in both early (1960s) and recent (2020’s) scenarios, but the effect is less pronounced in the latter. The substitution of bank balance sheet loans with debt securities in response to these policies explains why we observe only a fairly modest decline in aggregate lending despite a large contraction of bank balance sheet lending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Traditional bank-led credit intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s, with private credit increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization.
  2. A structural model attributes changes in aggregate lending quantities to declines in securitization costs, bank balance sheet size mainly to savers rather than borrowers, and shifting balance sheet composition to implicit bank costs and subsidies.
  3. Raising capital or liquidity requirements decreases lending in both 1960s and 2020s scenarios, though less markedly in the latter, as substitution of bank balance sheet loans with debt securities limits the decline in aggregate lending.

Related Articles:

  • The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications — An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.
  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications

AI Summary. An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.

Samuel Hanson, Victoria Ivanshina, Laura Nicolae, Jeremy Stein, Adi Sunderam and Daniel Tarullo Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
April 4, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Deposits – especially uninsured deposits that create run risk – have risen sharply, while banks with the most rapid growth in deposits have shifted assets away from lending towards longer-term MBS and Treasuries. @lauramnicolae

Should regulators strengthen liquidity rules rather than expand deposit insurance?

Core argument: Bank deposits, especially uninsured deposits, have grown rapidly on the liability side of bank balance sheets over the last twenty-five years, according to an examination of banking industry trends.

To inform the ongoing discussion of the appropriate regulatory response to [such events as] the failures of three regional banks 2023, we examine trends in the banking industry over the last twenty-five years. On the liability side of bank balance sheets, deposits—and especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly. On the asset side, there has been a notable shift away from the information-intensive lending traditionally associated with banks and towards longer-term securities such as MBS and long-term Treasuries. We assess the main regulatory options to reduce the risk of destabilizing bank runs—expanding deposit insurance and strengthening liquidity regulation— and argue that the industry trends we document favor the latter option. Regulators may be more comfortable tightening liquidity requirements on uninsured deposits, insofar as the substantial increase in those deposits in recent decades has not been correlated with an increase in information-intensive lending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank deposits, especially uninsured deposits, have grown rapidly on the liability side of bank balance sheets over the last twenty-five years, according to an examination of banking industry trends.
  2. On the asset side, banks have shifted away from the information-intensive lending traditionally associated with them and toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries.
  3. Documented industry trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce the risk of destabilizing bank runs, since the increase in uninsured deposits has not been correlated with an increase in information-intensive lending.

Related Articles:

  • All Clear — Data and commentary indicate the banking panic has ended and had only a limited effect on credit availability, with overall bank lending little changed and still growing, reflecting problems at a few poorly managed banks rather than a systemic crisis. Recognition that the banking sector is not collapsing has already prompted some repricing of expected interest rate cuts.
  • Frankenstein’s Monster — Unrealized losses on bank balance sheets are consistent with a rising interest rate cycle and become a problem only when large deposit outflows force those losses to be realized. Lending rules allowing banks to borrow against securities at book value help, but do not address underwater loans or deposits leaving for higher money market yields.
  • In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s — Unrealized securities losses at recently failed banks reflect the risk of borrowing short and lending long, echoing thrifts that became insolvent as the Federal Reserve raised rates; between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 banks and 1,295 thrifts closed or received government assistance. Uninsured depositors fled fast enough to limit losses, illustrating market discipline.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

Manufacturing Demand

AI Summary. Banks' Treasury holdings have fallen as a share of assets to historically low levels, with banks preferring loans, higher-yielding securities, reserves, and agency mortgage-backed securities to meet liquidity requirements. Revising bank capital rules to revamp the leverage calculation could boost market liquidity and make banks significant Treasury buyers.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
March 13, 2024
Is Database:
Database

.@FedGuy12 endorses a proposed adjustment to the Basel III leverage calculations that would increase demand for Treasuries from US banks as future issuances surge.

Would changing bank capital rules turn banks into major Treasury buyers?

Core argument: Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.

Banks were huge investors in Treasuries during World War II, but steadily reduced their holdings even as Treasury issuance climbed. The share of bank assets in Treasuries remains historically low as banks have preferred to make loans or invest in higher yielding securities. While banks are required to hold high quality liquid assets, they have chosen to meet those requirements with reserves and Agency MBS rather than Treasuries. A revision to Basel in the form of a revamped leverage calculation would not only boost liquidity across markets, but also potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries just in time to meet increased future issuance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.
  2. Banks have preferred making loans or buying higher yielding securities over Treasuries, and have satisfied their high quality liquid asset requirements with reserves and Agency mortgage-backed securities instead.
  3. A revamped leverage calculation under a Basel revision could boost liquidity across markets and potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries in time to meet increased future issuance.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.
  • In 2023 Foreign Demand for Long Term Treasuries Exceed Net Issuances — Foreign demand for long-term US Treasuries, at just over $450bn, exceeded the Treasury's net long-term issuance of just over $400bn, with that demand not coming from China. Net long-term issuance lagged the fiscal deficit—roughly 1.5% of GDP versus 6%—leaving the increase in the stock of long-term "safe" US assets modest.
  • Banking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

Monetary Policy and Innovation

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a 100bps monetary tightening reduces investment in intellectual property by about 1%, research and development spending at public firms by about 3%, venture capital investment by up to 25%, and patenting in important technologies by up to 9%.

Yueran Ma and Kaspar Zimmermann Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Date Posted:
August 29, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Historically monetary tightening has had an impact on risk capital: 100bps of tightening is associated with a 1-3pp decline in R&D spending and a 25% decline in VC investment over the following 1-3 year period.

Does monetary tightening reduce research, venture capital, and patenting?

Core argument: A 100bps monetary tightening shock lowers investment in intellectual property products in the national accounts by about 1%, a magnitude comparable to the decline in traditional physical investment, and cuts R&D spending among Compustat public firms by about 3%.

We normalize the shock to tightening by 100bps. Investment in intellectual property products (IPP) in the national accounts (NIPA) declines by about 1%. The magnitude is comparable to the decline in traditional investment in physical assets. R&D spending in Compustat data for public firms declines by about 3%. VC investment is more volatile, and declines by as much as 25% at a horizon of 1 to 3 years after the monetary policy shock. Patenting in important technologies declines by up to 9% 2 to 4 years after the shock. An aggregate innovation index constructed using estimates of the economic value of patents also declines by up to 9%. Based on estimates of the output and total factor productivity (TFP) sensitivity to the aggregate innovation index, a 9% decline in the index can contribute to 1% lower real output and 0.5% lower TFP 5 years later.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 100bps monetary tightening shock lowers investment in intellectual property products in the national accounts by about 1%, a magnitude comparable to the decline in traditional physical investment, and cuts R&D spending among Compustat public firms by about 3%.
  2. Venture capital investment is more volatile, declining by as much as 25% one to three years after a 100bps tightening shock, while patenting in important technologies falls by up to 9% two to four years after.
  3. An aggregate innovation index built from estimates of the economic value of patents declines by up to 9%, which, based on estimated output and TFP sensitivities, can contribute to 1% lower real output and 0.5% lower total factor productivity five years later.

Related Articles:

  • Data Update 2 for 2023: A Rocky Year for Equities — The implied equity risk premium on the S&P 500 rose from 4.24% to 5.94% over the course of 2022, placing it near the top of its range since 1960, while the expected return on stocks of 9.82% is its highest since 1995. Whether the market is fairly valued turns on whether that risk premium is too high or too low.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
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