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The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show

William Frey Brookings Institution

Date Posted:: January 13, 2021
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New census estimates show the 2010-2020 period likely saw the slowest population growth in U.S. history, with a growth rate of just 6.6%, the lowest since 1790.

The 2010-2020 period likely saw the slowest population growth in U.S. history, with new census estimates indicating a growth rate of just 6.6%, the lowest since the first census in 1790. The annual growth rate from July 2019 to July 2020 was a mere 0.35%, the lowest since at least 1900. This stagnation is attributed to fewer births, more deaths, and uneven immigration, exacerbated by recent federal restrictions and the COVID-19 pandemic. The aging population, with those over 65 growing faster than youth, further contributes to this trend. These demographic shifts have significant implications for economic growth, labor markets, and congressional reapportionment, with states like California potentially losing a House seat for the first time. The data underscores the critical role of immigration in sustaining population growth and economic vitality, highlighting the need for policies that support healthy immigration levels to counteract demographic stagnation.

Brooking’s Frey looks at new census numbers and finds that this past decade was likely a record low for American population growth, “…The new estimates indicate that over the period from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020, the nation grew by just 0.35%. This is the lowest annual growth rate since at least 1900. The new data also shows that when the 2020 census numbers are announced, the 2010-to-2020 decade growth rate could be the lowest in any decade since the first census was conducted in 1790….Figure 1 depicts annual U.S. population growth rates from 1900-01 to 2019-20. The most recent growth rate of 0.35% is the lowest of any single year since the beginning of the twentieth century, and likely for most of the nation’s history….”

William Frey, "The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show," Brookings Institution, December 22, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/12/22/the-2010s-saw-the-lowest-population-growth-in-u-s-history-new-census-estimates-show/
The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show

Newly released Census Bureau population estimates through mid-year 2020 reveal record lows in U.S. population growth, both annually and for the 2010-to-2020 decade. While these estimates are done independently from the yet-to-be released 2020 decennial census, they provide the most recent preview of what that census may show for the population totals of the nation and individual states, as well as for congressional reapportionment.

The new estimates indicate that over the period from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020, the nation grew by just 0.35%. This is the lowest annual growth rate since at least 1900. The new data also shows that when the 2020 census numbers are announced, the 2010-to-2020 decade growth rate could be the lowest in any decade since the first census was conducted in 1790.

These statistics paint a portrait of a nation that is experiencing unprecedented growth stagnation, even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. The exceptionally low growth rate from 2019 to 2020 reflects the pandemic’s impact over part of that year. The new statistics also provide estimates of state-level population growth between 2010 and 2020.

Finally, this data permits an educated estimate of how members of the House of Representatives could be reapportioned across states as a result of the 2020 census. Consistent with earlier prognostications, it shows that California could lose a House seat for the first time in the state’s history.

THE LOWEST ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH SINCE AT LEAST 1900

Figure 1 depicts annual U.S. population growth rates from 1900-01 to 2019-20. The most recent growth rate of 0.35% is the lowest of any single year since the beginning of the twentieth century, and likely for most of the nation’s history.

Over this period, the nation’s growth experienced ups and downs during wars, economic upheavals, and immigration waves. This includes a dip to below 0.5% during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic and rises to almost 2% during the post-World War II “baby boom.” After sagging to annual levels closer to 1% during the 1970s and 1980s, there was uptick in the 1990s as a consequence of higher immigration.

The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Since 2000, national population growth started to dip again, especially after the Great Recession, and in recent years due to new immigration restrictions. Yet the 2019-to-2020 rate is well below most growth rates over the past 102 years, and less than half the level observed as recently as 2000 (see downloadable Table A).

Part of last year’s sharp decline can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, which brought with it more deaths and further restrictions in immigration. Among states, 16 lost population in 2019-20 including California for the first time, and 34 showed lower growth or greater declines than in the previous year (downloadable Table B).

THE LOWEST DECADE GROWTH IN U.S. HISTORY

The new statistics permit an estimate of the U.S. population on Census Day (April 1, 2020) to have been 329.2 million people. If that turns out to be the case, the decade growth rate between 2010 and 2020 will be the lowest decade growth in U.S. history.

The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Figure 2 displays population growth rates for 10-year periods between the first U.S. census (taken in 1790) and projected results for the 2020 census (downloadable Table A). The projected growth of 6.6% between 2010 and 2020 is lower than in any previous decade, including the Great Depression years of the 1930s, when the nation registered 7.3% growth. It is roughly half the growth rate of the 1990s, a time of rising immigration and millennial-generation births.

The 2010s decade was one of fewer births, more deaths, and uneven immigration (downloadable Table C). Although immigration may have become unusually low due to recent federal restrictions that led to a decline in the noncitizen foreign-born population, low natural increase levels—fewer births, more deaths—will likely continue regardless of federal policy, as a result of the aging of the population. Some of this change can be attributed to lower fertility rates and the aging into adulthood of the last of the millennial population. However, census projections show older populations—especially those over age 65—will continue to display far higher rates of growth than youth.

A PREVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT

The constitutionally mandated purpose for taking the decennial census is to apportion members of the U.S. House of Representatives across states based on population. As a consequence, some states gain seats and some states lose them. While the Census Bureau is mandated to deliver these population totals to the president by December 31, various delays associated with this year’s pandemic and court cases will likely postpone delivery until sometime in January.

Still, it is possible to use the new state-level data (determined separately from 2020 census) to make educated estimates of which states will gain or lose congressional seats, as shown in Table 1 and downloadable Table D.

The 2010s saw the lowest population growth in U.S. history, new census estimates show: Extended Excerpt Image 3

This projected reapportionment shows two states—Texas (+3) and Florida (+2)—would gain multiple seats. Five others—all in the West (Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Montana) and South (North Carolina)—gain one.

Ten states are projected to lose one seat each. The most noteworthy of these is California, which has never lost a House seat via reapportionment. Other states projected to lose seats are in the Midwest (Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio), the Northeast (Pennsylvania, New York, and Rhode Island) and slow-growing parts of the South (West Virginia and Alabama).

This reapportionment will also affect the Electoral College in future presidential elections. There are a mix of “red” and “blue” states among those gaining and losing seats. Thus, it is difficult to predict how these changes will benefit future Republican and Democratic presidential candidates, especially since Democrats seem to be making strides in growing, formerly Republican states in the West and the South.

THE DECADE AHEAD

These new census estimates reveal a nation grappling with demographic stagnation to a degree it has not experienced in quite some time. While COVID-19 has surely accentuated this in ways that will continue in the near term, population projections taken prior to the pandemic reveal that our long-term demographic future is characterized by only modest levels of natural increase (births minus deaths), and more pronounced aging. Meanwhile, youth and young adult working-age populations will grow modestly at best, leading to greater “age dependency” as the growing older population becomes dependent on younger workers.

Clearly, the nation’s overall growth—and especially that of its younger population—will depend on a return to healthy immigration levels, as immigrants and their children will become the greatest long-term source of youthful growth. As we rebound from the pandemic, serious attention needs to be given to the crucial role immigration will play in halting even further national growth declines, as well as immigrants’ vital contribution to America’s future economic and demographic viability.

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: September 2, 2026
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Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania

Date Posted:: August 14, 2026
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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Global fertility has fallen below replacement level as of 2026, ending humanity’s ability to sustain long-run population stability without a reversal in trends.
Population momentum—driven by large cohorts of women now in peak childbearing years—will sustain growth for roughly 30 more years before world population peaks at approximately 9 billion around 2056 and begins declining.

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

Justin Fox Bloomberg

Date Posted:: July 21, 2026
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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Post-1960s immigration from Asia and Latin America is the primary driver of rising U.S. demographic diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White population share.
Intermarriage rates among Hispanic and Asian Americans exceed those of Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, expanding a multiracial population that no single government racial category can accurately capture.

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Date Posted:: July 14, 2026
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Baby-boom labor-force entry during 1960–1980 suppressed young-worker wages, which declined sharply after peaking in 1973, reducing economic opportunity for new.
Cumulative labor-market entries over five decades as a % of working-age population drives employment competition that persists decades after initial.
Female labor-force participation expansion and immigration during 1960–1980 created a sustained worker glut that stifled demand for new employment until.

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 7, 2026
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Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network

Date Posted:: May 29, 2026
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Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Model choice accounts for 98% of output variance in 2050 global population projections, driving divergent forecasts ranging from 4–25 billion.
Song Jian’s optimization model converges to 700 million people by 2080 across all parameter variations (670–700 million range), demonstrating structural.
Global fertility declined from 5 children per woman in 1950 to 2.1 currently, with no rebound in countries where rates.

New census estimates show the 2010-2020 period likely saw the slowest population growth in U.S. history, with a growth rate of just 6.6%, the lowest since 1790.

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?

Related Articles:

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will declining birth rates eventually shrink the global economy?

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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Is the traditional racial classification system becoming obsolete?

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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Does a one-time labor surge create permanent wage pressure?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Related Articles:

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much do demographic models actually predict versus explore?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

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Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI