Modigliani Meets Minsky: Inequality, Debt and Financial Fragility In America 1950-2016
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Middle-class households drove US household debt growth from 1950 to 2007, with 49% of housing debt increase due to equity extraction from rising home values.
There is difference between prime debt, the first 80%, and subprime debt, leverage beyond 80%. Most of this represent prime debt.
Created prosperity is transferred to people three ways 1) as return on business investment 2) as increased wages and 3) as real estate appreciation. As the wages and incomes of the real estate occupiers rise, the value of their real estate rises, namely the convenience value of the underlying land, if land is unconstrained. Even the rising wages of white collar workers can get transferred to blue collar real estate owners through the appreciation of their land, if their land becomes more desirable to white collar workers as it has in many cities. Land values also rise when interest rates fall, and they have fallen for decades, which can not be repeated even if low rates can be sustained.
New paper supports your view that equity extraction from housing gains driven by low and middle class borrowing was key driver of crisis.
Paper shows (Using a new Survey of Consumer Finances dataset) that equity extraction was the key driver of aggregate debt increase,without this borrowing housing debt with have increased by only half as much btw 1981-2007(See Figure 20) Home upgrading and home equity extraction accounted for 70% of additional housing debt btw 1981-2007 (Figure 17) Debt increase rose most dramatically for households btw the 50th and 90th percentiles of income distribution. Low and middle class families extracted equity by borrowing against their gains, wealth to income ratios grew faster than debt to income ratios. Home equity borrowing accounts for half the increase in American household debt btw the 1970's and 2007. Equity extraction of the middle class accounts for the lion’s share of equity extraction & the largest part of the increase in household debt creating the financial instability that drove crisis.
Great charts.
" the secular increase in U.S. household debt and its relation to growing income inequality and financial fragility. We exploit a new household level dataset that covers the joint distributions of debt, income, and wealth in the United States over the past seven decades. The data show that increased borrowing by middle-class families with low income growth played a central role in rising indebtedness. Debt-to-income ratios have risen most dramatically for households between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution. While their income growth was low, middle-class families borrowed against the sizable housing wealth gains from rising home prices. Home equity borrowing accounts for about half of the increase in U.S. household debt between the 1970s and 2007.The resulting debt increase made balance sheets more sensitive to income and house price fluctuations and turned the American middle class into the epicenter of growing financial fragility...In Figure 1 shows that the share of the richest 10% of households in total household income increased from below 35% to almost 50% between 1950 and 201...Figure 4 shows the share of total debt owed by the three different income groups. Debt shares have been rather stable over time. Over the entire postwar period, middle-class households have always accounted for the largest share of total debt, on average about 50% to 60% of total outstanding debt. Low-income households in the bottom half make up another 20%. The debt share of the top 10% fluctuated around 20% before the 1980s and then increased to around 30%. It is clear from Figure 4 that the upper half of the income distribution has always accounted for about 80% of total household debt outstanding...Figure 5 confirms this visually. From 1950 to 2007, middle-class households accounted for 55% of the total debt increase, whereas households from the bottom 50% of the income distribution contributed only 15%, even less than the top 10% with almost 30%. This insight is important in itself. We see that 85% of the increase in U.S. household debt occurred within the upper 50% of the income distribution. The explanation for soaring household debt in the United States lies in the borrowing behavior of these incomes groups, and in particular of middle-class households...To do so, Figure 10a decomposes the change in debt-to-income ratios into the extensive and intensive margins stratified by income. The figure shows two boom phases (1950-1965 and 1983-2007), followed by two periods of deleveraging (1965- 1983 and 2007-2016). Figure 10b shows a similar picture for loan-to-value ratios. There are substantial differences between the four periods.....The second important result is that home equity extraction has played the key quantitative role in driving the debt boom. It accounts for about 49% of the total increase in housing debt. In other words, about half of the increase in housing debt is driven by incumbent owners borrowing against their home equity. New owners account for a slightly smaller share, around 43%. Upgraders account for about 23%, while new renters contribute negatively to the total increase. The net contribution of downgraders was negligible over the considered period. Together, upgrading and home equity extraction account for more than 70% of additional housing debt since 1981. This corroborates our previous finding that the intensive margin of housing debt is the key driver of the debt boom.. Without equity extraction, housing debt would have increased by half as much over the 1981 to 2007 period. Debt-to-income ratios would have stayed at around 40% until 2001 and increased only during the boom of the 2000s, when new homeowners increased aggregate housing debt (see also Figure 17). Compared to the observed increase, the counterfactual increase would have been much more modest. By 2007, we estimate that the housing debt-to-income ratio would barely have exceeded 50% of income….”
Alina Bartscher, Moritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick and Ulrike Steins, "Modigliani Meets Minsky: Inequality, Debt and Financial Fragility In America 1950-2016," April 27, 2020, https://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kuhn/paper/Household_Debt.pdf





























Ed Comment: I LOVE to see Main finally admitting my chief criticism of their work -- criticism I published that surely they read: "The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis." As you (Steve) recall, those were imbalances their proposed solution stupidly advocated perpetrating after the crisis as a solution to the crisis. Failing to see that allocations prior to the crisis were onetime and could not continue growing forever was a preposterously stupid oversight on their part. Ironically, I was also the one who recognized it might not be a misallocation, just a one time expansion of an allocation that could not continue to expand at the same rate forever, much less expanded in the face of the crisis as they initially proposed. It showed an utter lack of understanding of what caused the crisis--an expansion of risk-averse (offshore ) savings that destabilized an inherently unstable banking system (that costs more than it was worth to stabilized privately rather than publicly--hence the slowest recovery since ww2).
Amir Sufi and Alan Taylor argue that financial crises are predictable and foreshadowed by credit and elevated asset prices. The negative consequences are a function of both to the crisis itself but also preceding imbalances, “…Financial crises have large deleterious effects on economic activity, and as such have been the focus of a large body of research. This study surveys the existing literature on financial crises, exploring how crises are measured, whether they are predictable, and why they are associated with economic contractions. Historical narrative techniques continue to form the backbone for measuring crises, but there have been exciting developments in using quantitative data as well. Crises are predictable with growth in credit and elevated asset prices playing an especially important role; recent research points convincingly to the importance of behavioral biases in explaining such predictability. The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis. Crises do not occur randomly, and, as a result, an understanding of financial crises requires an investigation into the booms that precede them…”
“…For financial crises to be seen as a distinct, important, and disastrous type of event, we might first ask: how damaging are they? and how frequent?The associated downturns are much more adverse than a typical normal recession. We present a headline summary in Table 1. Using local projections (LPs, see Jorda`, 2005), the deviation of real GDP per capita y is estimated h years after a crisis event. In the first two panels, the event is a crisis year and the baseline is trend; in the last two panels the event is the peak of a financial recession (a crisis within ±2 years) and the baseline is a normal recession. To start, using the simpler crisis year definition, Table 1a shows that at a 6 year horizon, real GDP per capita is lower by about 5%-6% following crises, relative to trend. Table 1b shows the result is not driven by the great global crises, the synchronized distress in many countries seen in the interwar depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Next, aligning events using business cycle peaks as in Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor ` (2013), Table 1c shows that over 6 years, real GDP per capita is lower by about 4% after financial peaks, relative to normal peaks. Table 1d shows this is also not driven global crises, with a deviation of about 3% still seen…”

“…The raw event frequency summary for the onset of financial crises is given in Table 2, and it is also noteworthy that, despite the unusually calm period from 1946 to 1970, when no financial crisis events were seen in advanced economies and very few in emerging economies, the incidence of financial crisis recessions has been large in recent decades, and comparable to outcomes in the turbulent 1870 to 1939 period….”
“…The empirical evidence we survey supports the view that financial crises are indeed predictable, especially by credit and asset price growth. Support has also built up for the view that deviations from rational expectations are an important component in explaining this predictability. In general, the findings in the literature fit a broader trend in macroeconomics towards the study of the booms that precede economic downturns; or, as (Beaudry, Galizia, and Portier, 2020) put it, “putting the cycle back into business cycle analysis.”…”
“…We highlight two interesting findings in Baron, Verner, and Xiong (2021), notably: first, declines in real bank equity returns R B are the best coincident classifier of conventional narrative financial crisis binary events, compared to many macroeconomic and financial variables; second, bank equity returns are a strong predictor of subsequent growth slow downs and credit crunches, based on an LP analysis, even controlling for real nonfinancial equity returns R N, a result we discuss in more detail below. A third result also bears mentioning: banking panics (runs by depositors/creditors) on their own have small macro-financial consequences—it is the bank failures that matter most. Obviously, panics can happen without failures, and failures without panics, in theory and in the data. This finding is important since much debate centered on whether the key locus of the crisis problem is runnable funding outbreaks (roughly, liquidity), or systemic failures (roughly, solvency). The empirical record points to the latter as the more serious issue in terms of macroeconomic consequences, and justifies the central use of solvency and failure criteria in the traditional narrative definition of a financial crisis…”
“..In sum, both measures—bank equity crashes and the traditional narrative indicator— reflect emergent problems on bank balance sheets. They are not perfectly correlated, and the failure-based narrative indicator still provides the most discriminating information: BVX count 197 narrative failure events, and out of these 193 are called as crises (98%); but out of a count of 269 bank equity crashes, only 138 are called as crises (51%). This shows that the inclusion of data on bank equity declines complements the narrative approach with useful auxiliary information….”
“…To confront the issue of whether asset price booms also contribute meaningfully to elevated financial crisis risk, Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2015b) collate further data series on equity and housing prices for the long-panel of advanced economies. They develop a “bubble indicator” based on whether the asset price in a given year is more than one s.d. above its de-trended value (using a lowpass filter) and whether there is also a subsequent large correction. An illustration of this approach is in Figure 6c, where the sample is again restricted to recession peaks, and the logit estimation is augmented to include a bubble indicator for either asset price. When there is no bubble in either asset price, crisis risk is generally low. In contrast, when there is either kind of bubble, crisis risk is significantly elevated, by a factor of roughly 1.5 in the mid-range of credit growth
“…Some illustrative evidence is shown in Figure 7a using local projections. The outcome variable is private credit to GDP, denoted CREDGDPct, from the Jord`a, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) bank loan measure, and the sample is the long-panel of advanced economies. The shock is a change in the degree of financial liberalization, treated as exogenous, according to a set of indices constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) for the period 1973-2005, a range of dates which closely encompasses the great era of financial liberalization in both advanced and emerging economies. The index used here is the standardized sum of three measures of the domestic financial sector, the stock market, and the capital account. The figure clearly shows that in the 5 years after a financial liberalization event, changes in credit to GDP, which were on a positive long-run postwar trend anyway, had a tendency to accelerate even more rapidly….”
“…Illustrative evidence on trends around financial crises are shown in Figure 8 for the JST long panel. Using an event-study approach, the average evolution of each variable is plotted relative to the peak year of the cycle. Averages are displayed separately for normal recessions (solid blue line) and financial crisis recessions (dashed red line). The first row of four charts shows the familiar timing of events and macro aggregates. Crisis probability is of course high in the ±2 year window around a financial crisis recession, by construction, given the JST peak classification; it is negligible in normal recessions, although it is not exactly zero except in year zero, since nearby financial crisis events may be associated with a different nearby cyclical peak in JST. Real GDP per capita growth decelerates after a recession peak, but much more so in a financial crisis recession as expected. Likewise, a recession is associated with the onset of a disinflationary period of several years, but the trend is much more pronounced in a financial crisis recession. Finally, the fourth chart shows that financial crisis recession peaks are preceded by credit booms and followed by credit crunches much more so than normal recessions. The second row of charts in Figure 8 shows some interesting financial market covariates using selected asset prices. The first chart shows the Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) normalized credit spread, which is the percent difference of the credit spread from its country mean (so 0% means the spread is equal to this average), and clearly spreads are tighter than average (50% lower) before a financial crisis recession peak, and much wider immediately after (50%-100% higher), compared to the minimal variation seen in normal recession events. The next chart shows the Baron and Xiong (2017) real total return on bank equities, which is a little high before a normal recession peak and indistinguishable from zero after; but near a financial crisis recession peak, bank equities experience a very large run up before, and a large crash afterwards, with significant negative real returns (note that these are log×100 units). Finally, we can see that distress clearly spills over into broader aggregate asset prices, where the onset of a financial crisis recession event similarly implies much larger and predictable reversals for investors exposed to the stock market or housing market, as shown in the last two charts….”