Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 146
  • Primary focus 69
Showing 69 database articles primarily about Immigration
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove Immigration
  • Remove "primary topics only" restriction
  • Remove 'Database'
Show all 7,218 articles
For whatever topics you select (currently: Immigration):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

Innovators Who Immigrate

Matt Clancy What's New Under The Sun
Date Posted:
February 1, 2023
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

.@mattsclancy highlights evidence that major productivity gains in research result from allowing scientists & researchers to cluster with other highly skilled inventors. Allowing more high-skilled immigration could boost per capita GDP growth rates by 9%.

Moving to the USA raises citations to math publications four-fold, or 2.5-fold if you restrict attention to people who become a math academic at home or abroad. Comparing New Zealander migrants who return or stay abroad - the ones who stay abroad get up to four times as many citations as those who return. PhD students who stay in the USA get 4-6 times as many citations to their work as their peers in the same program who end up moving back to a country with GDP per capita outside the top 25%. That’s a pretty consistently large effect. And we get similar kinds of results when we look at other proxies for scientific achievement, whether it’s counting publications, patents, or becoming an invited speaker to the International Congress of Mathematicians. A model of the innovation/immigration/trade economy between the US and EU...implies if the USA doubled the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 130,000, it would raise the real GDP per capita growth rate in each region by 9% in the long run.

Evidence that major productivity gains in research result from allowing scientists and researchers to cluster with other highly skilled inventors. Allowing more high-skilled immigration could boost per capita GDP growth rates by 9%. “…Moving to the USA raises citations to math publications four-fold, or 2.5-fold if you restrict attention to people who become a math academic at home or abroad. Comparing New Zealander migrants who return or stay abroad – the ones who stay abroad get up to four times as many citations as those who return. PhD students who stay in the USA get 4-6 times as many citations to their work as their peers in the same program who end up moving back to a country with GDP per capita outside the top 25%. That’s a pretty consistently large effect. And we get similar kinds of results when we look at other proxies for scientific achievement, whether it’s counting publications, patents, or becoming an invited speaker to the International Congress of Mathematicians. A model of the innovation/immigration/trade economy between the US and EU…implies if the USA doubled the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 130,000, it would raise the real GDP per capita growth rate in each region by 9% in the long run….”

Matt Clancy, “Innovators Who Immigrate,” What’s New Under The Sun,” February 1, 2023, https://mattsclancy.substack.com/p/innovators-who-immigrate

Innovators Who Immigrate

Talent is spread equally over the planet, but opportunity is not. Today I want to look at some papers that try to quantify the costs to science and innovation from barriers to immigration. Specifically, let’s look at a set of papers on what happens to individuals with the potential to innovate when they immigrate versus when they do not. (See my post Importing Knowledge for some discussion on the impact of immigration on native scientists and inventors)

All of these papers confront the same fundamental challenge: successfully immigrating is (usually) a matter of choice, selection, and luck. For the purposes of investigating the impact of immigration on innovation, that means we can’t simply compare immigrants to non-immigrants. For example, immigrants (usually) choose to migrate, and if they do so because they believe they will be more successful abroad, that signals something about their underlying level of ambition and risk tolerance. That, in turn, might mean they are more likely to be innovative scientists or inventors, even if they had not migrated. Compounding this problem, countries impose all sorts of rules about who is allowed to migrate and many of these rules make it easier to migrate if you can demonstrate some kind of aptitude and talent. That means successful immigrants are often going to be drawn from a pool of people more likely to have the talent to succeed in science and invention, even if they had not immigrated.

These are challenges; but there is also a degree of capricious luck in immigration (and life in general). There are people – perhaps many people – who want to immigrate and have extraordinary talent, but who do not for all sorts of random reasons. Compared to otherwise identical people who do migrate, they might lack information, financial resources, or face higher barriers to legal immigration. Indeed, in many cases, immigration is literally handed out by lottery! The papers we’ll look at employ various strategies to try and find comparable groups of people who immigrate and people who do not, to infer the impact of immigration and place on innovation.

Talented High Schoolers

One way to deal with the selection effect is to try and measure the talent of a sample of both immigrants and non-immigrants and then compare immigrants and non-immigrants who appear to have similar underlying talent. Agrawal and Gaule (2020) and Agrawal et al. (2023) does this with the International Mathematical Olympiads.

The International Mathematical Olympiads is a prominent math competition for high school students from around the world that’s been held annually for decades. Up to six representatives from each country are selected via regional and national competitions, and then travel to a common city and try to solve six different (presumably very hard) math problems. Because it’s an Olympiad, winners take home gold, silver and bronze medals. Agrawal and coauthors know the scores of all the competitors from 1981 to 2000 and then look to see what happens to the competitors later in life. In Agrawal and Gaule (2020) they show that scores on these math competitions strongly predicts later success as a mathematician. That in itself is surprising, given that the talents for doing creative mathematical research may, in principle, differ substantially from performance in a competition.

Their dataset also establishes something else: students from low income countries are less likely to obtain PhDs in math than students with the same score from high-income countries. In Agrawal et al. (2023) they use this dataset to look at the different fates of those who immigrate from their home country and those who do not. On average, a migrant is about twice as likely to be employed in academia as a mathematician as someone from the same county who got the same math score but did not migrate.

Of course, while math scores help address the problem of selection, this doesn’t really get at the problem of choice. Perhaps people who really want to be mathematicians are disproportionately likely to migrate, since the highest ranked mathematics departments tend to be in the USA, and it’s this difference in career intention that explains the difference in career outcomes between migrants and non-migrants.

Agrawal et al. (2023) provides some additional evidence that this is not purely an outcome of career choice. For one, looking only at migrant and non-migrant students who both become math academics (in their own country or abroad), they find the migrants go on to garner about 85% more citations to their publications than their domestic peers (remember, with the same score in math competitions). We might think citations aren’t a great measure of math skill (see my post Do Academic Citations Measures the Value of Ideas?), but they also show migrant academics are about 70% more likely to become speakers at the International Congress of Mathematicians (a non-citation-based measure of community recognition). So among people who ended up becoming academic mathematicians (either at home or abroad), the ones who migrated went on to have more distinguished careers, as compared to their peers who did equally well in high school on math.

But this is still pretty indirect evidence. Fortunately, Agrawal and coauthors also just asked Olympiad medalists directly about their preferences in a survey. From respondents in low- and middle-income countries, 66% said they would have liked to do their undergraduate degree in the USA if they could have studied anywhere. Only 25% actually did. Just 11% said their first choice was to study in their home country. In fact, 51% did.

Why didn’t they study abroad if that’s what they wanted to do? A bunch of the survey evidence suggests the problem was money. For 56% of the low- and middle-income respondents, they said the availability of financial assistance was very or extremely important. Students from low- and middle-income countries were also much more likely to choose a hypothetical funded offer of admission at a lower ranked school than their peers in high-income countries.

Gibson and McKenzie (2014) provides some complementary evidence outside of mathematics. As part of a larger project on migration and brain drain, they identify 851 promising young New Zealanders who graduated high school between 1976 and 2004. These students either represented New Zealand on the International Mathematical Olympiad teams, the International Chemistry Olympiad team, were top in exams, or earned the New Zealand equivalent of the valedictorian rank. Like Agrawal and coauthors, they can then see what happens to New Zealanders who migrate, versus those who remain. They find researchers who moved abroad publish more than those who do not.

As noted, this poses some potential problems; even though we know all these students were talented, those who migrate may have different unobserved levels of skill, ambition, risk tolerance, or something. One way they attempt to deal with this is to focus their attention on the subset of researchers who actually do migrate away from New Zealand, and then looking to see what happens to their research output when they move back. The idea here is those who left were, at least initially, displaying similar levels of skill, ambition, risk tolerance, and so forth (if so, why did they return? We’ll get to that).

For each New Zealand migrant researcher who returns to New Zealand, Gibson and McKenzie try to find another migrant who stayed abroad, but is similar in age, gender, what they studied in high school, highest degree, and so on. They then look to see what happens to the number of citations to their academic work. While both groups had essentially the same citations prior to return migration, after one group returned to New Zealand, the citations to their work declined substantially relative to the citations of migrants who remained abroad.

Again, we see that being abroad was good for research productivity. But again, perhaps we are concerned that there is an important but unstated difference between New Zealanders who stayed abroad and those who returned home. Perhaps the ones who came back simply couldn’t cut it?

But we actually don’t see much evidence of that. The figure above matches each returnee to someone who stayed abroad based on a number of characteristics. But one characteristic they were not matched on is citations to their academic work. And yet, prior to returning, their citations were on a very similar trajectory. And like Agrawal and coauthors, Gibson and McKenzie also surveyed their subjects to see why they moved back. Most of the answers were not related to individual research productivity, but had to do with, for example, concerns about aging parents, child-raising, and the location of extended family.

Scholarship Restrictions

Another line of evidence comes from Kahn and MacGarvie (2016), which focuses on PhD students who come to America from abroad. The paper’s big idea is to compare students who come on the prestigious Fulbright program to similar peers who were not Fulbright fellows. The students and their matches are really similar in this case: they graduated from the same PhD program, either studying under the exact same advisor and graduating within 3 years of each other, or merely studying in the same program but graduating in the same year. The only difference was the Fulbright students have a requirement to leave the USA for two years after finishing their studies, whereas the matched students faced no such restrictions on their ability to stay.

Kahn and MacGarvie first show that these migration restrictions matter; whereas 66% of foreign students doing PhDs in the USA end up remaining, only 12% of the Fulbright fellows do. They then estimate the impact of being abroad on future academic outcomes, but using a statistical model (instrumental variables) that tries to identify the impact of being abroad deriving solely from the restrictions imposed on the Fulbright program. With this approach, they find leaving the USA due to Fulbright requirements is associated with about 65% fewer publications and fewer citations received, and nearly 80% fewer publications in high-impact journals.

Moving Back to China

Shi, Liu, and Wang (2023) takes a similar approach as the above to evaluate the impact of China’s Young Thousand Talents program. This is an ongoing effort to increase China’s domestic scientific capacity by attracting talented scientists to move to China with salary subsidies and research funding. The program isn’t restricted to Chinese citizens, but in practice that’s mostly the population who chooses to take up the offer.

Shi, Liu, and Wang focus on 339 Chinese scientists who obtained PhDs abroad and then moved back to China as part of the program. Similar to Kahn and MacGarvie, they compare this population to a set of Chinese scientists who went to the same overseas university, in the same field, and graduated within three years, but chose to stay abroad. They also try to identify scientists with similar publication and citation trajectories, prior to the date of the return to China.

The figure above plots the publication trajectory of returnees, relative to those who stayed abroad. After a few years of adjustment, those who returned start publishing more than their peers who stayed abroad, with this increase concentrated in last-authored publications (which signals that the scientist is running a lab).

Why are migrants more productive?

In the above, moving abroad is associated with more productivity for mathematicians. Returning home is associated with lower productivity among New Zealand migrant researchers and Fulbright scholars. But returning home is associated with higher productivity among Chinese scientists. What’s going on?

There’s a pretty simple story that runs through all these studies. It’s not migrating that’s good for scientists, it’s about migrating to a place that’s good for science. That might mean a place with the resources to conduct science, or it might mean being in a place with lots of good scientists to collaborate with. Most of the time, it means both, since good scientists tend to go where they have the resources to conduct science. Most people intuitively know this and hence they don’t move (moving is a pain!) unless they think it’ll be good for their career. Hence, the reason we see such a big impact on moving is because people are disproportionately likely to move to places good for science.

For example, in Agrawal et al. (2023), which looked at the effect of moving on the careers of mathematicians, the authors also tried to break down the impact of moving by destination. The USA houses more top math universities (by various ranking) than any other country, and tends to compensate academics well by international standards, so if the moving effect is mostly about moving to places with more support for science, we might expect to see a bigger impact among mathematicians who move to the USA. Indeed, Agrawal and coauthors find that moving specifically to the USA is associated with receiving four times as many citations as not moving, whereas moving to other countries is associated with “only” twice as many. Migrants to the USA also end up six times as likely to become invited speakers at the International Congress of Mathematicians; again compared to twice as likely for migrants to other countries. (Recall, this is when we compare two people from the same country, who received the same score in high school on International Mathematical Competitions!)

Kahn and MacGarvie’s work on Fulbright scholars also tells a similar story. In their case, they focus on the level of GDP per capita in the country that Fulbright fellows return to. They find the penalty associated with return migration becomes increasingly severe as students return to countries with progressively lower GDP per capita. A student returning to a country whose GDP per capita is at the 90th percentile (i.e., only 10% of students in their sample are from richer countries) receive 6% more citations than those who remain in the USA (though the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero), those whose GDP per capita is at the 50th percentile receive 45% fewer citations than remaining scholars, and those returning to countries at the 25th percentile receive 55% fewer citations than remaining scholars.

GDP per capita in China is not in the top 10%, and so we might expect a penalty for scientists moving back to China. But the Chinese Young Thousands Talent program is explicitly about providing resources to scientists to do science. Indeed, in another analysis, Shi, Liu, and Wang try to take into account the extra funding Chinese returnees in their sample get, by gathering data on grants and the size of the teams they coauthor with. Once you take into account teams and grants, the impact of returning is more muted; much of the advantage of returning is about getting access to funding and a peer network that Chinese PhD students abroad struggled to get.

Shi, Liu, and Wang also find the biggest impact of the program among returnees for whom the funds from the Young Thousands Talent program probably really mattered: those in fields that most require access to funding, such as chemistry and the life sciences, and those who were probably struggling more to get funds abroad, because they had not secured faculty positions, and were not among the top 10% most productive. Indeed, among scientists less likely to need funding – those in mathematics or physics, those with faculty positions prior to their return, and the top 10% most productive prior to return – the impact of returning to China was negative for their productivity, though the effects were too small to be statistically distinguishable from zero.

Even Gibson and McKenzie’s study on migrant researchers who return to New Zealand suggests lower productivity upon return is at least partially driven by funding. In their survey of these scientists, Gibson and McKenzie asked them what policies they would personally recommend to government officials and universities trying to entice researchers to return. The survey responses mentioned things like “low salaries and high teaching loads, poorly funded scientific laboratories and the low success rate of grant funding requests.”

When Inventors Migrate

What about inventors, rather than scientists? Prato (2022) looks at patent-holders in the USA and European Union. Among the 1.2mn who file more than one patent with the European Patent Office between 1978-2016, she identifies about 1500 who do so from the USA in some cases and the EU in others, which forms her set of migrating inventors. For each of these migrating inventors, she finds another inventor from the same country with a similar patenting career up to the year the migrant starts patenting in the other region. This is meant to be her set of comparable inventors, if we think patenting history accurately captures things like talent, ambition, and all the other potential differences between immigrants and non-immigrants that we’re worried may be confounding our results. She then looks to see if the patenting trajectory of these groups diverges in the years after half of them immigrate. As we can see below, it does.

In general, inventors who move take out about 40% more patents per year after they move, as compared to inventors from the same country with a similar patent career up until the year the immigrant moved.

Note, these effects stem entirely from migration between comparatively rich countries (the EU and the USA). About 65% of these migrants moved from the EU to the US and 35% went in the other direction. This is not so much a story about people migrating from a place where probably do not have the resources to invent to a place where they do. Instead, Prato argues this is a story about how migration expands your inventor network and allows you to work in the place best suited for your particular technology field.

How much is at stake?

In one way, the results of these papers are not surprising: moving to places with more resources (and peers?) to do science raises your output of science (and invention). But what is perhaps more surprising is how large the implied size of moving is.

As one point of comparison, several of these papers report an estimate of citations received by academic work.

1 Agrawal and coauthors find moving to the USA raises citations to math publications four-fold, or 2.5-fold if you restrict attention to people who become a math academic at home or abroad. Gibson and McKenzie find similar results by comparing New Zealander migrants who return or stay abroad – the ones who stay abroad get up to four times as many citations as those who return. Kahn and MacGarvie find PhD students who stay in the USA get 4-6 times as many citations to their work as their peers in the same program who end up moving back to a country with GDP per capita outside the top 25%.

That’s a pretty consistently large effect. And we get similar kinds of results when we look at other proxies for scientific achievement, whether it’s counting publications, patents, or becoming an invited speaker to the International Congress of Mathematicians. Moreover, Agrawal’s survey results suggests, in math (and it’s hard to believe only in math), there is a large population of talented students who want to study abroad but can’t.

Still, it’s a bit hard to see how this cashes out in terms of it’s ultimate impact: while faster progress in science would probably lead to faster progress in technology, it’s tough to say much about how much faster things could be with this data.

One estimate of the potential impact comes from Prato (2022), which builds a model of the innovation/immigration/trade economy between the US and EU. The model takes into account many subtleties, such as the fact that people with more talent for inventing are more likely to move to places where the rewards for invention are higher, and in turn benefit from working with other high skilled inventors. Her model implies if the USA doubled the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 130,000, it would raise the real GDP per capita growth rate in each region by 9% in the long run.

But there’s reason to think that’s an under-estimate of the ultimate impact. Prato’s model is calibrated on migration between the US and EU, two regions with the resources to fund invention and science. As we’ve seen, the impacts of immigration are likely to be much stronger for other regions.

1 These papers have multiple analyses each, and so some of the estimates listed here differ a bit from the estimates noted earlier because sometimes I pulled from different analyses.

  • Immigration
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce
Previous articleFebruary 1, 2023America's 2022 Slowdown.@JosephPolitano notes real fixed investments have dropped persistently throughout 2022 which raises the risk of a recession in 2023-2024. Recent data “raises the chances of a soft landing,” though “recession risks remain high.”Next articleFebruary 1, 2023Mexico’s Industrial Hubs Grow as Part of Trade Shift Toward NearshoringForeign direct investment in Mexico reached $32B during the first 9 months of 2022 relative to $31B in 2021, suggesting that nearshoring might be underway. @WSJ
Showing 68 database articles primarily about Immigration

Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part One

AI Summary. Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025 was almost entirely (98%) driven by immigration, as natural population increase (births minus deaths) was negligible; since deaths have exceeded births since 2015, all future population growth depends entirely on continued immigration.

Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.

Does Spain's future population depend entirely on immigration?

Core argument: Immigration drove 98% of Spain’s population growth from 2000–2025—delivering the EU’s largest absolute population gain over that period—while natural increase contributed fewer than 200,000 net births across 25 years, less than 0.5% of Spain’s 2000 population.

Without immigration, Spain’s population would have stagnated in the first quarter of the 21st century. According to official Spanish data, births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 for the 2000-2025 period (2025 numbers still provisional)—or less than one half of 1% of Spain’s 2000 population. Thanks to its robust immigration inflows, however, Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025. Virtually all (98%) of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration during those years. And since deaths have exceeded births in Spain since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Immigration drove 98% of Spain’s population growth from 2000–2025—delivering the EU’s largest absolute population gain over that period—while natural increase contributed fewer than 200,000 net births across 25 years, less than 0.5% of Spain’s 2000 population.
  2. Spain has recorded more deaths than births every year since 2015, making continued immigration the sole driver of any future population growth.

Related Articles:

  • European Stagnation Is Real — Six large American technology companies are worth more than all European stock markets combined, and the wealth they generate flows primarily to American households through equity ownership and high wages rather than to European workers or investors.
  • Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain — Spain's recent economic growth and job creation have been driven largely by immigration, with roughly 70% of new jobs since 2019 going to immigrants. This reliance reflects a fertility rate of just 1.1 births per woman — the lowest in the EU after Malta — and a domestic workforce increasingly
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Nicholas Eberstadt warns that depopulation will stress families as smaller families “become ever less able to bear weight—even as the demands that might…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain

AI Summary. Spain's recent economic growth and job creation have been driven largely by immigration, with roughly 70% of new jobs since 2019 going to immigrants. This reliance reflects a fertility rate of just 1.1 births per woman — the lowest in the EU after Malta — and a domestic workforce increasingly

Barney Jopson, Alan Smith and Irene de la Torre Arenas Financial Times
Date Posted:
May 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Spain’s foreign-born population grew from ~5% to ~20% in less than 25 years. Since 2020, ~25% of the 1.1mm new jobs created in the EU were Spanish, and ~70% were filled by immigrants. At 1.1 births/woman, Spain has the second-lowest birth rate in the EU.

How Has Immigration Driven Economic Growth in Spain?

Core argument: Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain.

Over the past two years, Spain has been the world’s fastest-growing large advanced economy and an engine of EU job creation. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according to FT analysis. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019. Spain’s unemployment rate remained the second highest in the EU at 10.3% in March. Juan Félix Huarte, chair of Uriel Investments, whose businesses range from waste management to renewables, says immigrants have become vital for the country’s economy for two underlying reasons. One is Spain’s fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman, the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the rate of 2.1 needed to maintain demographic stability. “The Spanish, unfortunately, don’t have children. We have pets, but we don’t have children,” Huarte says. The other reason, he says, is that many young Spaniards are disinclined to take arduous jobs: “We’re getting society far too used to government assistance, to grants, to support from the state.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain.
  2. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according.
  3. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019.

Related Articles:

  • Euro Area Outlook 2026: Cyclical Boost, Structural Drag, Unchanged Rates — GS forecasts overall Euro area real growth of 1.4% in 2026 Q4/Q4 as fiscal expansion in Germany is offset by the ongoing China Shock, which GS forecasts will…
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — An EC study of European competitiveness finds that EU gross value-added per hour worked increased by 0.7%/year from 2000-19, vs. 1.2%/year in the US. “Europe…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Unemployment/Participation

How Does Immigration Shape Average Labor Productivity? Evidence from the CPS

Serdar Ozkan and Nicholas Sullivan Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
March 31, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Labor productivity increased 8.2% over the 2023–2025 period, while a CPS-based measure of worker quality has stayed within 1% of its Q1 2023 level, despite significant changes in the immigrant-intensity of the labor force over the period.

On net, the U.S. workforce became meaningfully more immigrant-heavy from 2023 to 2024 and then partially reversed, all within a three-year window. Despite these compositional changes, our CPS-based worker quality index barely moved. It hovered within less than 1% of its first quarter 2023 level throughout the entire period, while BLS nonfarm business productivity climbed 8.2% over the same span. Why would swings in workforce composition leave average productivity nearly unchanged? Two reasons. First, the shifts in employment shares by place of birth, while noticeable, are small in absolute terms. Even with a 1pp rise in the U.S. employment share of lower-productivity, Latin American-born workers moved the needle on aggregate worker quality only modestly—far less than the roughly 8% productivity gain recorded by the BLS over the period. Second, not all immigrants are less productive than U.S.-born workers. Central American immigrants—who accounted for the largest single increment of the foreign-born workforce share—earn wages that fall about 25% below the U.S.-born average. In isolation, their growing employment shares put modest downward pressure on average productivity. But workers arriving from Europe, Asia, and other high-income regions display the opposite pattern: Their predicted wages exceed the U.S.-born average by about 20%, reflecting higher educational attainment and more highly compensated occupations.

Related Articles:

  • An AI Productivity Boom? Don’t Count Your (Productivity Data) Chickens — Martha Gimbel notes that it will be hard to untangle potential AI-driven productivity gains from compositional gains as lower-skilled immigrants are removed…
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — Brookings estimates that in 2025, net immigration to the US was btw -10,000 and -295,000, and will be btw 185,000 and -925,000 in 2026. They estimate that…
  • Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Fails to Deliver Jobs for US-Born Workers — While immigration may have been negative in 2025, the native-born unemployment rate is now 4.7%, up from 4.3% in January 2025. The labor force participation…
  • Immigration
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce

With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025

Jed Kolko Jed Kolko Substack
Date Posted:
March 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As immigration slowed in 2025, large urban counties’ growth continued to slow relative to that of suburban, rural and smaller urban counties. Domestic migration continued to consist of moves from expensive counties to more affordable suburban areas.

Urban counties grew more slowly than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas in 2025. All types of counties grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell. However, the slowdown was especially sharp for urban counties. The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other types of places were in 2020-2022, when people moved out of cities during the pandemic, and in 2003-2006, when the housing bubble boosted housing construction in outlying suburban areas and drew new residents from cities. (This is based on vintage 2025 Census population estimates, released this morning.) Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for more affordable suburban areas and smaller communities.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — CBO forecasts US population growth over the next decade will be 0.3% annually. Starting in 2030, net immigration will be the sole driver of population growth…
  • New Population Estimates Show Historic Decline in Net International Migration — New Census estimates suggest the overall US population grew by 1.8mm or .5% btw July 2024 and July 2025. Net migration was 2.7mm in 2024 and 1.3mm in 2025…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

The H-1B Wage Gap Really Is That Large

George Borjas City Journal
Date Posted:
March 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Responding to He and Ozimek’s claim that his paper overstates the wage gap, Borjas argues “H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa.”

The table summarizes the results of both my analysis and that of He-Ozimek. The first row reports a 14.1% wage gap estimated using H-1B wage data from the FY2021-FY2024 lotteries and the 2023 American Community Surveys (ACS), as I did in my original paper, [controlling for] age, gender, education, geography, and occupation. These numbers are inflation-adjusted, as the NBER paper notes. Row 2 presents the results implied by the He-Ozimek research design, which suggest a smaller wage gap, depending on the exact specification. There is, however, a fundamental error in that design. He-Ozimek calculate the H-1B wage gap by comparing the wage of the FY2024 lottery winners with the wage of natives in the 2023 ACS. H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa. The FY2024 H-1B lottery was conducted in March 2023. The actual employment of H-1B recipients begins after their H-1B status is approved and after the federal fiscal year begins on October 1, 2023; the earliest that FY2024 recipients could actually start earning was in the last quarter of 2023.

Related Articles:

  • The H-1B Wage Gap, Visa Fees, and Employer Demand — Adjusting for worker quality, H1-B holders earn ~16% less than peers (software developers ~26% less). With H1-Bs capped at 85k, excess demand means a $150k fee…
  • The Flawed Paper Behind Trump’s $100,000 H-1B Fee — He/Ozimek dispute Borjas’ finding that H1-B workers are underpaid. A “temporal mismatch” between the native sample and the H-1B sample means “effectively…
  • Immigration
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

How 250 Years Of Immigration Shaped America

Economist Staff Economist
Date Posted:
March 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

At 15.8%, the foreign-born population of the US is above its ~15% previous peak in 1890. That prior peak gave way under immigration restrictions such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the Immigration Act of 1924.

After periods of high immigration, restrictions have tended to follow. In 1890 the foreign-born share of America’s population reached nearly 15% (a threshold that would not be surpassed until the mid 2020s). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 banned Chinese labourers from immigrating to America for ten years, the first federal law to restrict immigration explicitly based on race or nationality. In 1924 Congress capped annual arrivals from Europe to just 2% of each nationality’s population residing in America at the time of the 1890 census, and banned immigration from Asia outright. These quotas suppressed immigration for 40 years and prevented America from accepting thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe. By 1970 America’s foreign-born population had fallen to around 5%.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — CBO forecasts US population growth over the next decade will be 0.3% annually. Starting in 2030, net immigration will be the sole driver of population growth…
  • U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Reached a Record 14 Million in 2023 — Pew estimates the unauthorized immigrant population was 14mm in 2023, or 4.1% of the population. They also estimate that in January 2025, 53mm immigrants…
  • Switzerland To Vote On Plan To Cap Population At 10mn — Switzerland will hold a vote on a proposal that would cap the country’s population at 10mm people. 27% of the country’s 9.1mm people are foreign…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms