Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
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New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters

Matthew Thomas Vulgar Marxism
Date Posted:
November 12, 2021
Is Database:
Database

@MatthewThomas, New York Democrats are losing ground with Hispanic and Asian voters, with 75% Asian districts seeing a 14pp swing to GOP and 75% Hispanic districts a 30pp swing since 2017.

Recent election data indicates a significant shift in voter preferences among Hispanic and Asian communities in New York City, with implications for the Democratic Party's future electoral strategies. In 2017, Bill De Blasio secured a 34-point lead in precincts over 75% Asian, but Eric Adams' margin in these areas decreased to 20 points, marking a 14-point swing toward Republicans. Similarly, precincts over 75% Hispanic saw a dramatic 30-point swing from De Blasio's 70-point lead to Adams' 40-point lead. These trends suggest a growing conservative sentiment among these demographics, challenging the Democrats' traditional reliance on voters of color and indicating potential shifts in the political landscape that could affect future elections.

Matthew Thomas reports some evidence from the recent New York election that suggests the GOP gains in 2020 with Hispanic and Asian voters are ongoing, "... This country is in the midst of a profound realignment along axes of culture and education that are about to make race and class seem like yesterday’s news...In August, I reported that Hispanic and Asian areas of Queens swung heavily toward Donald Trump in last year’s presidential election, powering the best performance by a Republican nominee in the World’s Borough since 2004. Precincts that are more than 75% Asian swung toward Trump by 16 points in 2020. Precincts that are more than 75% Hispanic saw an even more dramatic pro-Trump swing of 25 points. Now, an analysis of Tuesday night’s returns in combination with demographic data from the 2020 census reveals that these patterns are trickling down to local elections too. In 2017, Bill De Blasio won Queens precincts that are over 75% Asian by 34 points against Republican nominee Nicole Malliotakis. This week, Adams won them by just 20 points over Sliwa: a 14-point swing toward Republicans. De Blasio won Queens precincts that are over 75% Hispanic by a whopping 70 points over Malliotakis. Adams won them by 40 points over Sliwa: a 30-point swing toward Republicans...."

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 1


In 2017, Vallone dominated with both white voters and voters of color. He notched over 70% of the two-party vote in majority-white precincts, as well as precincts where less than one-third of residents are white. Ditto for precincts that are majority-Asian and more than one-third Hispanic. But on Tuesday, Paladino secured majorities in the most white and the most Hispanic areas of the district, and split the least white precincts with Avella 50-50. He clung to bare majorities only in Asian neighborhoods. Though some issues of ecological inference are at play with Hispanic voters since they don’t constitute a majority in any one precinct, almost every precinct that is more than one-third Hispanic is also less than one-quarter white, so we can be reasonably sure it wasn’t white voters driving the shift in those areas.

Another remarkable result from Tuesday was that Vallone lost his own bid for a Civil Court judgeship to a Republican candidate with virtually no resources or professional campaign infrastructure. The Queens County judiciary is notoriously corrupt; the nomination process is tightly controlled by the Democratic machine, and judgeships are given away as patronage to party insiders. Although the judicial district that Vallone ran in does not overlap with his base in Northeast Queens - and in fact includes some of the most conservative neighborhoods in the borough - that wouldn’t have been a problem in a less polarized era. His defeat is the first time a Democratic judicial nominee anywhere in Queens has lost to a Republican in recent history.

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 2


New York isn’t the only place where Democrats fell short with voters of color this week. In the Virginia governor’s race, Terry McAulliffe bled far greater support in Biden precincts with large black and Hispanic populations than he did in Biden precincts that are mostly white. Predictably, the NGO mafia is running with the idea that pointing out this fact is somehow racially problematic. AJ Springer, Senior Communications Manager for the Working Families Party, tweeted: “Newsflash to pundits, consultants, and other politicos: A party having to win 70, 80,90+% of POC to win an election doesn't mean the issue is with POC turning out to vote.”

That’s quite the statement considering that for many years, progressive pundits, consultants, and other politicos have been arguing that the Democratic Party must deepen its dependence on voters of color in order to liberate itself from the need to appeal to white people. Very often, they say this is not only a strategic necessity in an age of deepening racial polarization, but a moral imperative that is the party’s only means of honoring its commitments to black and brown people. Yet Springer portrays growing Democratic reliance on voters of color not as a vindication of that analysis, but as a burden placed on them by unreliable whites.

Here in Queens, some on the left have expressed similar sentiments. On Tuesday, Republicans held on to their last remaining City Council seat in the borough when Joanne Ariola defeated progressive Democratic nominee Felicia Singh in a 36-point landslide. Aleda Gagarin, a left-wing organizer and former City Council candidate in Central Queens, commented: “I also don't want to see any ‘hot takes’ on D32 that don't include taking white supremacy and white rage to task. Republicans didn't just ‘keep a seat.’ They used overtly racist fearmongering as a key strategy and tactic. White rage was on full display throughout this election.”

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 3


There’s no doubt this is true: right-wing interests poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into the race to portray Singh as an anti-police radical, and Ariola’s supporters grew increasingly belligerent over the course of the campaign. The weekend before Election Day, Singh was forced to cancel an event with Senator Chuck Schumer after pro-Ariola protesters at the venue were heard making threatening remarks.

What’s doubtful is how much of a role all this played in Singh’s defeat. Majority-white precincts did indeed swing 10 points to the right over 2017, when Democrat Mike Scala lost to Republican incumbent Eric Ulrich. But Scala didn’t exactly have his finger on the pulse of Breezy Point either; he and Singh both got less than a quarter of the white vote in their respective races. In other words, Singh’s platform and identity didn’t provoke especially strong blowback in terms of actual votes, though clearly they heightened the visceral hatred Republicans felt for her. But the results from elsewhere in Queens suggest that her slide among white voters probably wasn’t even about her at all. Deepening partisan polarization is coming for everyone trying to keep the flame of outer borough Democratic viability burning, regardless of ideology or identity.

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 4


A more uncomfortable fact is that Singh failed to rally enough voters of color to make up for softening white support. Though her margin in the district’s majority-Hispanic precincts was slightly better than Scala’s, her raw vote total was lower. And while she won a much higher vote share than Scala in precincts with a large Asian presence, her raw vote there increased by less than 50. This isn’t meant to be negative judgement. Bernie Sanders’ strategy for winning the Democratic primary in 2020 was to turn out poor and working people who don’t typically vote, and with more resources and name recognition than anyone to ever seriously attempt such a feat, he failed. There’s no easy solution to the decades-long demobilization of working-class voters.

But the left can’t afford to chalk up all of our defeats to whitelash alone. This country is in the midst of a profound realignment along axes of culture and education that are about to make race and class seem like yesterday’s news. If we want to prevent this outcome, the first step is admitting that it’s happening.

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 5


These results provide some of the first clear evidence that the trends we saw emerge in 2020 - when most Hispanic and some Asian voters began drifting rightward - will continue to assert themselves in the post-Trump era. They may even be accelerating. Last year, Trump peaked at around one-quarter and one-third of the vote in the most Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods in Queens, respectively. Last night, Sliwa got almost one-third of the vote in Hispanic enclaves and 40% in Asian ones, despite a massive resource disadvantage against Adams and limited exposure in the press.

This should disturb both conventional Democrats merely concerned with the party’s short-term electoral prospects as much as socialists hoping to build mass support for radical politics. At the moment, all that either faction can boast is that the other is flailing just as desperately as they are. But if the conservative turn among non-white, non-college voters continues to gain momentum, the only group that will succeed in building a party of the multiracial working class will be Republicans.

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters: Extended Excerpt Image 6


Growing conservative sentiment among Hispanic and Asian voters was also at work in Conga enthusiast Vickie Paladino’s shocking upset over Tony Avella in Northeast Queens. Avella is a longtime ally of the Vallone family, a local Democratic dynasty that has presided over Northwest and Northeast Queens for decades. For eight years, he represented the latter in the State Senate as a Democrat, though he caucused with the Republicans as a member of the Independent Democratic Conference to facilitate right-wing control of the chamber. In 2018, he was successfully primaried by John Liu in a progressive wave that wiped out six of the eight members of the IDC.

This year, Avella attempted a comeback by running for the overlapping City Council seat, currently occupied by fellow Moderate White Man Paul Vallone. But this time, his constituents decided that if they wanted a Republican to represent them, they might as well go with the real McCoy - or the real Paladino, anyway. In 2017, Vallone sailed to victory against only nominal Republican opposition and a progressive third party candidate. But this week, Democratic support collapsed among every major demographic group in the district.

Matthew Thomas, "New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters,"Vulgar Marxism, November 4, 2021, https://vulgarmarxism.substack.com/p/new-york-democrats-keep-losing-ground

New York Democrats Keep Losing Ground with Hispanic and Asian Voters

Eric Adams cruised to victory in New York City’s mayoral election, besting Republican nominee Curtis Sliwa by nearly 40 points - a commanding performance by any standard. But Adams’ margin wasn’t uniform throughout the city. In Queens, for example, he prevailed by only 22 points - five points fewer than Bill De Blasio’s margin here in 2017. Though Adams still made an impressive showing, New York Democrats shouldn’t pop the vegan wine just yet. Troubling demographic patterns are brewing just below the top-line numbers that could indicate tougher battles are yet to come.

In August, I reported that Hispanic and Asian areas of Queens swung heavily toward Donald Trump in last year’s presidential election, powering the best performance by a Republican nominee in the World’s Borough since 2004. Precincts that are more than 75% Asian swung toward Trump by 16 points in 2020. Precincts that are more than 75% Hispanic saw an even more dramatic pro-Trump swing of 25 points. Now, an analysis of Tuesday night’s returns in combination with demographic data from the 2020 census reveals that these patterns are trickling down to local elections too.

In 2017, Bill De Blasio won Queens precincts that are over 75% Asian by 34 points against Republican nominee Nicole Malliotakis. This week, Adams won them by just 20 points over Sliwa: a 14-point swing toward Republicans. De Blasio won Queens precincts that are over 75% Hispanic by a whopping 70 points over Malliotakis. Adams won them by 40 points over Sliwa: a 30-point swing toward Republicans.

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Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

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  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
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The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

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  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

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  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

Core argument: Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
  2. Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
  3. Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

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  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. American patriotism, measured by those "extremely proud" to be American, tracks closely with which party controls the presidency, with partisan gaps widening sharply over time. Republican pride swings ~14 points between administrations, while Democratic pride has collapsed from 58% to 14% across the same period.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

Core argument: Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
  2. Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
  3. Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government — A Pew study finds that only 15% of Americans trust the Federal government to do what is right “most of the time,” down from ~75% in 1960. A secular drop…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Politics

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all U.S. states in business investment and population growth, creating roughly 20% of net new jobs nationally from 2020 to 2025, and is on track to surpass California as the largest U.S. economy.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas replacing California as America's economic powerhouse?

Core argument: Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.
  2. ExxonMobil’s reincorporation in Texas signals a broader corporate migration that leads to revenue losses for high-tax states like California and.
  3. Texas’s economic dominance positions it to surpass California’s GDP, prompting competitive tax and regulatory reforms across North Carolina, Tennessee, and.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
  • Fifty Shades of Growth — Looking at natural population growth @AzizSunderji finds that all five metros with the highest natural population growth, births net deaths, in the entire…
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
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