Edward Conard

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  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
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Free Lunch: Piketty meets his match

Martin Sandbu Financial Times
Date Posted:
March 20, 2015
Is Database:
Database

Matthew Rognlie challenges Thomas Piketty’s theory of capital-driven inequality, showing that capital cannot substitute for labor to the extent Piketty suggests.

Matthew Rognlie challenges Thomas Piketty’s theory of capital-driven inequality, showing that capital cannot...
Matthew Rognlie challenges Thomas Piketty's theory of capital-driven inequality by highlighting a key difference in the concept of substitutability, showing that capital cannot substitute for labor to the extent Piketty suggests. Rognlie's analysis reveals that, except for housing, net capital income shares have remained largely constant, with gross shares rising due to faster-depreciating capital like software. Housing, a major part of capital accumulation, has driven the long-term rise in capital income share, but its more even ownership distribution may mitigate inequality concerns. Rognlie argues that rising inequality is better explained by changes within labor income distribution rather than capital accumulation.

Sandbu, Martin, "Free Lunch: Piketty meets his match"Financial Times, March 20, 2015. Available at:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bbf09ba8-cd51-11e4-9144-00144feab7de.html"...Rognlie does two things. In terms of theory, he notes a difference between the concept of substitutability used by Piketty and that commonly measured, depending on whether you measure capital (and output) before or after adjusting for depreciation (the investment needed just to offset the wear of machinery over time). Properly measured, he shows, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that capital cannot substitute for labour to anywhere near the degree needed to fulfil Piketty's prophecies. Empirically, Rognlie looks more closely at capital's share of income, and finds that with the exception of one sector, net shares have remained largely constant aside from short-term fluctuations. (They fell slightly until the 1990s and have caught up since. Gross shares have increased more steadily, but that's because of greater use of capital that depreciates faster - software, for example.) The exception is housing, which accounts for a big part of capital accumulation and for all of the long-term rise in the capital income share. Something has clearly been going on in the housing sector - but as Rognlie points out, since the housing ownership is much more evenly spread than productive capital, it may be less worrying for inequality....."
Free Lunch: Piketty meets his match

Martin Sandbu

How could economists not fawn over Matthew Rognlie? A 26-year-old graduate student has delivered a technical critique of Thomas Piketty's theory of capital-driven inequality that is gaining status as the most devastating yet put forward. What started with a comment on the Marginal Revolution blog has grown into a paper that Rognlie is presenting at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity today - the prime US conference on applied policy economics.

Recall that Piketty, in addition to adding significantly to our empirical knowledge about how incomes and wealth are distributed, theorises that capital accumulation plays a big role in exacerbating inequality and will continue to do so in the future. The idea is that the return on capital will remain sizeable while GDP growth slows (the famous r > g). This means the stock of capital will grow bigger relative to national income and so the share of capital returns in total income will grow at the expense of labour income.

The objection has always been that as capital accumulates, the return on it will fall. Piketty has shown that the rate of return has been remarkably stable historically, and theorised that it can remain so. Technically, how fast returns to capital fall depends on the "elasticity of substitution", ie the ease with which capital and labour can be substituted for one another in the production process. The more easily workers can be replaced by machines, the more capital the economy can absorb without reducing the reward paid to capital owners. If substitutability is moderate, the incremental capital becomes harder to employ productively, and returns fall.

Rognlie does two things. In terms of theory, he notes a difference between the concept of substitutability used by Piketty and that commonly measured, depending on whether you measure capital (and output) before or after adjusting for depreciation (the investment needed just to offset the wear of machinery over time). Properly measured, he shows, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that capital cannot substitute for labour to anywhere near the degree needed to fulfil Piketty's prophecies.

Empirically, Rognlie looks more closely at capital's share of income, and finds that with the exception of one sector, net shares have remained largely constant aside from short-term fluctuations. (They fell slightly until the 1990s and have caught up since. Gross shares have increased more steadily, but that's because of greater use of capital that depreciates faster - software, for example.) The exception is housing, which accounts for a big part of capital accumulation and for all of the long-term rise in the capital income share. Something has clearly been going on in the housing sector - but as Rognlie points out, since the housing ownership is much more evenly spread than productive capital, it may be less worrying for inequality.

Rognlie's work is impressive, and he is receiving well-deserved star treatment today. His discussants are Robert Solow - the nonagenarian Nobel-winning economist known for his theory of economic growth - and Bradford DeLong. DeLong has posted his comments on Rognlie on his blog; they are entertaining and illuminating, though more for raising questions than giving answers.

The upshot is not that inequality doesn't matter. It is that it's hard to explain rising inequality in terms of capital accumulation. Instead, Rognlie concludes, we should focus on changing (and increasingly unequal) distribution within labour income.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Housing
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleMarch 20, 2015Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital ShareThe post-WWII surge in the net capital share, primarily driven by housing, increased from 3% to 8% of private domestic value added, highlighting a significant shift in economic dynamics.Next articleMarch 25, 2015Why the SAT Isn’t a ‘Student Affluence Test’The SAT is often criticized as a measure of student affluence, but data suggests that parental IQ, not income, plays a significant role in test outcomes.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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  • Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes — Damodaran argues that the private credit industry’s increasing financing of the AI buildout is another sign that “a shakeout is overdue, which will…
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking in terms of political and policy views is strongly associated with lower levels of intergenerational upward mobility. @S_Stantcheva…
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Why are constant-quality house prices 15% above their pre-2007 peak? Ed Glaeser notes that US housing grew just 0.6% annually in the 2010s, down from 4% in the…
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • AI’s $600B Question — .@DavidCahn6 at @sequoia argues that because of lack of pricing power and rapidly improving chip technologies, multi-$B investments in current-generation GPUs…
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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  • Business Cycle
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    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
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