Edward Conard

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Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth

AI Summary. The authors estimate that the rise of intangible capital and markups accounts for between one-third and two-thirds of the measured slowdown in U.S. total factor productivity growth, with markups biasing measured productivity downward and omitted intangible investment causing GDP to be understated. Adjusting for both, the estimated decline in productivity growth is 33 basis points smaller.

Nicolas Crouzet National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 13, 2021
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Markups and intangible capital explain somewhere btw 1/3 to 2/3 of the measured productivity slowdown during the 2000s.

Is the measured productivity slowdown overstated by intangibles and markups?

Core argument: The rise of intangible capital and markups accounts for between one-third and two-thirds of the decline in measured U.S. Total Factor Productivity growth during the 2000s, according to the authors' analysis.

The productivity slowdown in the U.S. during the 2000s can be attributed significantly to the rise of intangible capital and markups, accounting for between one-third and two-thirds of the decline in measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. Empirical analysis shows that markups create a downward bias in TFP growth by overestimating the labor share's elasticity of output. Additionally, omitted intangible investments lead to an underestimation of GDP, further skewing TFP measurements. Adjustments for these factors reveal that the decline in TFP growth is 33 basis points smaller, suggesting that structural changes in the economy, such as increased intangible investments and rising markups, have been pivotal in shaping productivity trends. This mismeasurement implies that GDP growth has been more driven by TFP than previously thought, challenging traditional views on investment-specific technical change.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The rise of intangible capital and markups accounts for between one-third and two-thirds of the decline in measured U.S. Total Factor Productivity growth during the 2000s, according to the authors' analysis.
  2. Adjusting for markups and omitted intangible investment, the authors find the decline in TFP growth is 33 basis points smaller, since markups overstate the elasticity of output with respect to the labor share and omitted intangibles understate GDP.
  3. The authors argue that GDP growth has been more driven by TFP than previously thought, challenging traditional views on investment-specific technical change.

Crouzet/Eberly argue measuring intangible capital and rents together explains ~ 1/3 to 2/3 of the productivity slowdown in the USA, "... Empirically reasonable values of markups and unmeasured capital can account for about half of the measured productivity slowdown in the 2000s..."

One implication follows for TFP, "...In this framework,markups alone generate a downward bias in TFP growth. They imply that the measured labor share is an overestimate of the true elasticity of output with respect to labor. When capital is growing faster than labor, this biases downward measures of TFP growth. However, this bias is not quantitatively large, even in extreme cases. Omitted intangibles alone could also bias measured TFP growth: if the true stock of unmeasured capital is growing more slowly than the measured stock, measured TFP growth will be biased downward. In addition, omitting intangible investment makes the level of GDP too low, relative to true GDP; therefore, the measured labor share is higher than the elasticity of output to labor. This upward bias in the measured labor share can be large and increases with the amount of intangible investment omitted from GDP calculations. However, an upward bias in the labor share seems surprising empirically, since the measured labor share has been declining since at least the late 1990s..."

Two insights 1)"... First, while in the model, the level of output is mismeasured — it is too low —, its growth rate is correctly measured, because omitted and measured investment, in nominal terms, grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path. Thus, in our framework, mismeasurement of GDP growth is not a source of bias in productivity growth by construction, whereas it is the focus of much previous work...."

2)"... Second, and most important, the model helps clarify under what conditions mismeasurement in the growth rate of capital may lead to underestimating TFP growth. Specifically, we show that this will occur when the price of unmeasured investment grows sufficiently quickly relative to the price of measured capital. This mechanism, on its own, can lead to a substantial downward bias in measured TFP growth, which we characterize analytically..."

Their takeaway"...If the price of omitted intangible capital is rising sufficiently fast, an upward bias in measured capital growth (and therefore, a downward bias in measured TFP growth) can occur. However, such mismeasurement would also imply that the level of measured GDP is biased downward, by an amount equal to the flow of intangible investment. This, in turn, would tend to generate a rising measured labor share, at odds with the data. Rising markups, in tandem with rising intangibles, can offset this force and allow simultaneously for a downward bias in measured TFP growth and a declining labor share. We articulated this argument more precisely in balanced growth model featuring both intangibles and markups, and showed, using the input-output tables, that this mechanism could plausibly account for one to two-thirds of the decline in measured TFP growth. Our results do not imply that the rate of growth of output is mismeasured. Rather, they attribute some of this decline to rising relative prices of certain forms of intangible capital. A difficult but worthwhile question is why these forms of intangible capital have become relatively more expensive. Additionally, outside of the balanced growth path, omitted intangibles may bias the measured growth rate of GDP, further exacerbating TFP growth biases. Finally, our balanced growth analysis assumes Cobb-Douglas substitutability between labor and capital, but deviations from this assumption may accentuate the wedge between the 630 measured labor share and the output elasticity of labor, and amplifying measurement bias. We leave these questions to future research...."

"...In Section 3, we then use data on omitted intangibles, in the balanced growth framework, to quantify the size of the combined biases in measured TFP growth. We use the annual Input-Output tables for the 1997-2018 period to measure annual expenditures on 61 commodities or services that are treated as intermediate purchases in national accounting. We then examine those for which reclassifying intermediate purchases as final expenditure on capital goods would have the largest impact on GDP. Several service groups stand out. Professional, Scientific and Technical services, Administrative and Support services, and Management services, lead to large upward adjustments in measured GDP...."

"...Using these data and our balanced growth model, we then estimate that the combination ofmarkups and omitted intangibles can explain between one-third and two-thirds of the decline in U.S. productivity from the pre-1997 to the post-1997 period. Table 1 shows that productivity growth measured using the standard Solow residual, declined by 49bps, from 1.11% to 0.62% per year. Our corrected measure of TFP growth, which adjusts for both 122 intangibles and markups, instead declines from 1.11% to 0.95%, or only about one-third as much Importantly, we also show that measurement bias was likely much smaller in the 1947-1996 period, a period which pre-dates the rise in both intangibles and in markups...."

Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Takeaway, "...Our results thus suggest that the decline in TFP growth was, at least in part, the reflection of growing mismeasurement driven by structural changes in the economy — the rise in markups, and the increasing importance of intangibles. Because total GDP growth, in our framework, is not mismeasured, this result has implications for understanding sources of GDP growth. For example, since our adjusted measures suggest that more of total GDP growth since the 2000s was driven by TFP growth, investment-specific technical change might have contributed less to GDP growth than previously thought...."

"... Table 2 reports the time-series averages of the ratios of unadjusted to adjusted GDP, ˆ b, defined as in Equation (18). The averages reported are computed when intermediate use of a single commodity or service group (among the 61 reported in the Use table) is reclassified as intangible investment in isolation. Among the groups with the 10 largest adjustments, 3 service groups are of particular interest. The largest adjustment is associated with the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (PSTS) group. Reclassifying intermediate expenditures on these services as intangible investment implies that actual GDP is approximately 6% larger than measured GDP. This group comprises service activities that can be purchased externally by firms, such as accounting, consulting, design, or computer services. The two other service groups of interest are Administrative and Support Services, and Management of Companies and Enterprises. The former group measures the use of outsourced business support services (such as personnel administration and training). The latter group measures the service output of establishments that administer other establishments in a company. Our core argument is that intermediate expenditures on these types of services could in fact represent purchases of investment goods by firms, which would then be misclassified in national accounts.The type of capital created by these purchases is intangible, in that it does not have a physical presence. Indeed, these purchases could lead to the accumulation of various forms of organization capital (through consulting, advertising, design, management and personnel-related services), none of which are embodied in physical assets. These expenditures lead to capital accumulation to the extent that the corresponding inputs are not used up in production entirely within the year of their purchase. Taken together, omitting these forms of investment could have large effects on GDP. The first column of Table 3 shows that reclassifying the three service groups mentioned above leads to a cumulative adjustment in the level of GDP in the order of 11%. Accordingly, investment rates adjusted for these omissions are higher than, and diverging from, measured investment rates. Figure 3 reports the time series for both the ratio of unadjusted to adjusted GDP, and for the implied ratio of nominal investment to GDP after adjusting for omitted intangibles. For instance, adjusting for Professional Services leads to an upward revision of approximately 5% in the ratio of nominal investment to nominal GDP….”
Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Results, "...Using these GDP adjustments,Table 3 then reports the values of relative price growth of omitted capital, gQ2, that would be required to explain the entirety of the decline in measured TFP growth from bias generated by intangibles and markups. The implied relative price growth ranges from 0.6 to 2.1% p.a., with lower estimates corresponding to more intermediate expenditures being reclassified as investment. Two points are worth noting. First, the required relative price growth is positive; that is, the price of omitted capital must be rising, relative to the price of final goods, in order for the bias to be positive, as discussed in Section 2. In Section 3.3.1, we argue that, for the three service groups we focus on, this is empirically plausible. Second, these adjustment lead to high markups. For instance, when adjusting for the PSTS group, the implied valueadded markup corresponds to a pure profit share of value added in the order of 11.5%. As highlighted in the previous section, in order to simultaneously accommodate a low labor share ˆsL and a substantial underestimation of GDP, markups must be elevated...."

"... Figure 4 reports the implied rate of growth of TFP (as well as a red line indicating the average simple Solow residual ˆgZ the post-1997 sample) when adjusting for the 61 commodity and service groups individually. Adjustments of individual service or commodities groups have a positive, though relatively small overall effect on measured TFP growth. Among the largest adjustments is obtained for the PSTS group; alone, it adds approximately 0.1% to overall TFP growth, or 1/5th of the gap between pre- and post- 1997 TFP growth...."

Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth: Extended Excerpt Image 4


"... Table 4 reports the implied growth rates, Cobb-Douglas intangible shares, and markups, when adjusting for the three key groups of services highlighted earlier in the discussion. The first two lines report the unadjusted Solow residual for the pre- and post-1997 periods; as highlighted in the introduction, it declines by 49bps, from 1.11% to 0.62% per year. The third line reports the average growth rate of TFP obtained when adjusting only for markups, but not for omitted intangibles. The adjustment for markups alone raises measured TFP growth by approximately 9bps, or one-fifth of the decline. The remaining lines report TFP growth in the post-1997 sample when adjusted for both markups and omitted intangibles. Altogether, the decline is 33bps (or 67%) smaller after adjusting for both markups and intangibles produced by all three key sectors highlighted above. Thus markups and intangibles together can account for 2/3 of the observed decline in TFP growth. Adjusting only for professional services, or for professional services plus management, yields somewhat lower effects - from one-third to one-half of the total decline in measured TFP growth...."

Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Nicolas Crouzet and Janice Eberly, "Intangibles, Markups, and the Measurement of Productivity Growth," National Bureau Of Economic Research, July 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29109

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US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year

AI Summary. US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Julia Fanzeres Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 5, 2026
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.

Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?

Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  2. Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
  3. The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth — Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
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Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected

AI Summary. The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.

Greg Jensen Bridgewater Associates
Date Posted:
October 30, 2026
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Bridgewater estimates that AI equities are pricing in ~3.5% annual productivity growth, while real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market are slightly below current levels. They conclude: “Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced.”

Do AI stock valuations and broader markets imply incompatible growth expectations?

Core argument: AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.

Different markets are pricing very different futures; most are far from pricing an unrecognizable world. The AI boom has contributed tens of trillions of dollars of market cap in AI companies. As in any gold rush, trillions of dollars of “picks and shovels” only make sense if a great deal of gold (profits) is found. The pricing of a broader universe of AI companies tells us something about the scale of transformation that is discounted. If we calculate the incremental revenue required to sustain the valuation of AI companies and estimate how much of that can be earned by cannibalizing the revenue of existing companies, we can back out a productivity boost required to generate the rest of the incremental revenues. Today, we estimate that AI equities are discounting something like 3.5% annual productivity growth. That’s more than we estimate is needed for the US to make its debts sustainable. Across a reasonable range of assumptions, we assess AI stocks to be pricing trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past. By contrast, consensus estimates and broader markets imply a world that looks more like the recent past. Making sense of the pricing in AI stocks requires a boom in productivity and growth. Consensus estimates for growth and productivity (from economist and Fed estimates) are slightly lower than current measures, as are rates of real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.
  2. Consensus growth and productivity estimates from economists and the Fed, along with real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market, sit slightly below current measures, describing a world resembling the recent past.
  3. Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced, since the AI boom has added tens of trillions of dollars of market cap that only makes sense if a great deal of profit is found.

Related Articles:

  • No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector — Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
  • Investment
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    • Growth
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No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector

AI Summary. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
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Citing flat revenue per worker, and profit margin growth for the S&P 493, Slok argues that so far, AI’s diffusion through the economy has delivered “zero financial payoff to corporate America outside of tech.”

Is artificial intelligence boosting revenue and margins outside big tech?

Core argument: Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.

With no impact on the bottom line, mainstream corporate America is pulling back and starting to view token spending not as a source of growth but as a cost center that weighs on margins. VC-backed companies are spending more and more on tokens, but mainstream corporate America does not need the latest model and is unwilling to pay for it. As long as agentic AI and token spending are confined to a small part of the economy, the macroeconomic effects of AI will be very limited. The question looking ahead is whether, even as models become commoditized, mainstream corporate America can turn increasingly cheap intelligence into higher revenue growth and higher profit margins. That may be harder than it sounds. The AI story will be decided in the S&P 493, not the Mag 7, and so far, there is no evidence that revenue growth or margins are improving outside the tech sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.
  2. Mainstream corporate America is pulling back from AI and treating token spending as a cost center that weighs on margins, while VC-backed companies spend increasingly more on tokens.
  3. The macroeconomic effects of AI will remain very limited as long as agentic AI and token spending stay confined to a small part of the economy.

Related Articles:

  • Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too — Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity

How Much Revenue Does The AI Buildout Need In 2030?

AI Summary. The authors estimate AI capital spending of $560bn in 2026 and, in a high-investment case, $3.5tn of net AI capital in service by 2030, requiring roughly $1.3tn in annual infrastructure revenue once depreciation, operating costs and a 15% return are covered. That implies 7.4x growth from current annualized revenues, with downstream revenues of $1.9–2.6tn.

William Gildea and Azeem Azhar Exponential View
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
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Beginning with capex projections, Gildea/Azhar derive for their high-growth case a $1.3T annual AI-infrastructure revenue hurdle for 2030. This covers $771B of depreciation and operating costs, plus a 15% return on $3.5T of net capital in service.

How much annual revenue must AI infrastructure generate to justify investment?

Core argument: In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.

We estimate AI CapEx to be $560B in 2026, 64% of the total declared by the hyperscalers. Unfinished facilities can’t generate revenue, so the investment bill and the productive asset base will grow at different speeds. [In the high investment case], by 2030 we see $3.5T of net AI capital in service. The largest component [of the revenue hurdle] is the $555B in compute depreciation. We model lifespans at the current 5-6 years. Shell depreciation and OpEx combined contribute about a further $216B to the required revenue hurdle. [Adding a 15% return on net capital brings required annual infrastructure revenue to $1.3T]. Reaching the $1.3T hurdle would represent 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues. For its customers to earn 30-50% gross margins, downstream revenues need to be $1.9-2.6T. [Editor’s note: Van Nieuwerburgh’s far larger figure of $3.7T covers mature revenues from projects completed through 2032, using commissioning capital and a 50% infrastructure operating cash-flow margin. This estimate instead charges depreciation and operating costs plus 15% on net capital in service in 2030. Different horizons and cost conventions prevent a direct comparison. Van Nieuwerburgh also has a much higher capex estimate.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.
  2. Compute depreciation of $555bn, modeled on 5-6 year lifespans, is the largest component of the 2030 revenue hurdle, with shell depreciation and operating expenses adding about $216bn and a 15% return on net capital completing the $1.3tn total.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • What Investment Data Implies about the AI Transition — The five largest U.S. technology firms are scaling AI capital spending about 50% a year, from $155bn to a forecast $755bn. Embedding this in a two-sector model with rare productivity booms, the authors estimate AI adds roughly 5, 20, or 58pp to cumulative growth over a seven-year transition, depending on scenario.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

AI and Entrepreneurship: What is Really Happening?

AI Summary. Entrepreneurship by businesses with employees is flat or declining, including in AI-intensive information and professional services, where establishment entry has been flat or falling and young-firm employment in AI-exposed industries is falling. Applications for likely solo businesses with no employees rose steeply in those AI-intensive sectors, but self-employment as a main job is flat, suggesting side hustles.

Nathan Goldschlag Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
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Nathan Goldschlag finds that available federal data do not yet establish that AI is boosting entrepreneurship. “Across different cuts of the data, there is no clear evidence of AI affecting entrepreneurship, either for likely employers or nonemployers.”

Is AI driving a boom in new employer businesses?

Core argument: Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.

Employer entrepreneurship is at best rising modestly, and at worst has been falling for several years already. The number of business applications likely to become an employer business was flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026. Fewer of those applications have been the kind that have the highest chance of becoming an employer. Nonemployer entrepreneurship, or “solopreneurship,” is likely rising, but not as the main job of the solopreneurs. These are probably side hustles. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026. But the share of workers claiming to be self-employed nonemployers in their main job — in other words, business owners with no employees — is flat (though noisy). AI-intensive sectors and industries are no exception. Establishment entry in AI-intensive sectors (information and professional services) has been flat or falling in recent years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.
  2. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026, going vertical in the most AI-intensive sectors of information and professional services, while other sectors kept pace until early 2026 and then flattened.
  3. The share of workers reporting self-employment as nonemployers in their main job is flat, though noisy, including among workers in AI-exposed occupations in 2025 and early 2026.

Related Articles:

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Tech's Trillion-Dollar Internal Inconsistency

AI Summary. Wall Street analysts covering technology project the sector's operating cash flow will more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, a gain of over $1.2tn, while analysts covering the rest of the S&P 500 — technology's customers — project those firms will add far less cash flow. These sector-by-sector forecasts are internally inconsistent.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Tech analysts expect sector operating cash flow to more than double to ~$2.4T by 2028. Analysts covering other S&P 500 sectors (tech’s customers) see far less cash growth in their sectors. Slok “raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.”

Are tech cash flow forecasts inconsistent with customers' projected growth?

Core argument: Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.

Wall Street equity analysts work in sector silos, and when you add up their forecasts, the numbers are internally inconsistent. The analysts covering tech expect the sector's operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4 trillion by 2028, an increase of over $1.2 trillion. Meanwhile, the analysts covering the other sectors in the S&P 500, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow. In other words, the tech silo is betting on a future in which demand for AI and tech services explodes, while the silos covering the companies that would pay for those services see a much more modest outlook. Both cannot be right at the same time. The bottom line is that either tech's customers will generate a lot more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.
  2. Analysts covering the other S&P 500 sectors, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow, leaving the combined forecasts internally inconsistent.
  3. Either tech's customers will generate much more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who will pay for AI services.

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